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1 Introduction 
1..1. Reminiscences from a Continuing Past 
1.1.1 Protecting Communities I 
ON 7 APRIL 1933, the German government enacted a law prescribing 
that all civil servants of 'non-Aryan' descent were to be transferred into 
retirement. 1 The concept of non-Aryan descent was defined in an 
Ordinance of 11 April 1933 to apply to all persons who had a parent or 
grandparent of Jewish confession.2 Two years later, this definition was 
Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums [Law on the Restoration of the 
Career Civil Servant Profession], 7 April 1933, RGBI. I, 1933 No. 34, p. 175, Section 3: 
'Beamte, die nicht arischer Abstammung sind, sind in den Ruhestand [ ... ] zu versetzen ... ' 
['Civil servants not being of Aryan descent are to be transferred into retirement .. .'. 
Translation by this author]. 
Erste Verordnung zur Durchfiihrung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des 
Berufsbeamtentums [First Ordinance on the Implementation of the Law on the 
Restauration of the Career Civil Servant Profession], 11 April 1933, RGBI. I, 1933 No. 
37, p. 195. Art. 2 (1): 'Als nicht arisch gilt, wer von nicht arischen, insbesondere 
jiidischen Eltern oder Grosseltern abstammt. Es geniigt, wenn ein Elternteil oder ein 
Grosselternteil nicht arisch ist. Dies ist insbesondere dann anzunehmen, wenn ein 
Elternteil oder ein Grosselternteil der jiidischen Religion angehort hat.' ['A non-Aryan is 
a person, who descends from non-Aryan, inter alia Jewish, parents or grandparents. It 
suffices if one parent or one grandparent is non-Aryan. This has to be presumed inter alia 
in the case of one parent or grandparent being of Jewish faith.' Translation by this 
author]. 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _002
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CHAPTER 1 
elaborated in another law, which prohibited marriage and extramarital 
intercourse between Jews and persons of German descent.3 As indicated 
by the very name of the 1935 law, 'Act on the Protection of German 
blood and German honour', the rationale of all these measures was 
claimed to be the protection of one community from the detrimental 
influence of another.4 
These acts represented the first legal measures in a comprehensive 
process of definition, marginalisation, expropriation, forced emigration 
and deportation of the German Jewry, culminating in the extermination 
phase from 1941-5.5 The process unfolded in spite of diplomatic 
protestations by other states and claims of a Daseinsrecht by the Jewish 
population in Germany1', diminishing the latter from 499 800 in 1933 to 
an estimated 20-25 000 at the end of the Second World War.7 
3 Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre [Law on the Protection 
of German Blood and German Honour], 15 September 1935, RGBl. I, 1933 No. 100, p. 
1146. Section 1 and 2. 
4 This is not contradicted by the fact that both communities did not exist preceding the 
law and needed to be constructed by it. 
5 R. Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der eurapiiischen Juden (1982, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main), p. 
57. 
6 'Every organised group replied to National Socialism with resounding affirmations of the 
right of Jews to be German, to live in and love Germany. Daseinsrecht, the right to 
maintain a Jewish presence in Germany, was construed as a legal right, a moral necessity 
and a religious imperative by all Jewish organisations from Orthodox to Reform, right to 
left, Zionist and non-Zionist.' L. S. Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-45 
(1987, Harmondsworth, London), p. 220. The insistence on a 'right to remain' for the 
victims of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s resounds fatally of this 'right to exist and to 
maintain presence'. There is a difference, though, whether this right is claimed by the 
victims of persecution, as was the case in the 1930s, or by outsiders, who may be in 
pursuit of their own interests, as was the case in the 1990s. 
7 W. D. Rubinstein, The Myth of Rescue. Why the Democracies could not have saved more fews 
from the Nazis (1997, Routledge, London), pp. 18 and 19, based on calculations in Jewish 
Immigrants of the Nazi Period in the U.S.A. Vol. 6: Essays on History, Persecution and 
Emigration of German Jews, , H. A. Strauss ed. (New York, 1987). See also Hilberg, 
1982, Vol. 3, p. 1116, for a confirmation of post-war numbers. It should be recalled that 
the named statistics only relate to German Jews. The majority of Jewish victims of the 
German extermination policies were provenient from occupied territories in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The total number of Jewish extermination victims is currently estimated 
at 5.7-6 million. Rubinstein, 1997, p. 221, note 8. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1.2 Protecting Communities II 
On 31 August 1938, Switzerland terminated the Swiss-German agreement 
abolishing visa requirements for nationals of both countries.8 This step 
was preceded by a number of interventions on the part of the Swiss 
Government, expressing discontent with the increasing number of illegal 
border crossings of Jewish refugees and the inertia of German authorities 
in this regard.9 On one occasion a Swiss representative stated that 
'Switzerland, which has as little use for these Jews as has Germany, will 
herself take measures to protect Switzerland from being swamped by Jews 
with the connivance of the Viennese police'. 10 In the deliberations 
between the governments following the termination of visa-free travel, the 
Swiss side was prepared to accept a compromise. Provided that the 
German authorities marked the passports of German Jews and prevented 
the exit of those lacking a Swiss visa, the Swiss government would limit 
visa requirements to the German Jewish population. On 29 September, 
both sides agreed as follows: 
The German Government will see t~ it that all passports for travel 
or sojourn abroad held by Jews who ai'e Reich subjects {section 5 of 
the First Decree issued under the Reich Citizenship Law of 
November 14, 1935 - RGBl I, p. 1 333) are provided within the 
shortest possible time with a mark designating the holder as a Jew. 
The Swiss Government will permit Jews who are subjects of the 
Reich and whose passports are marked as described in No. 1, or 
must be so marked according to the German regulations, to enter 
Switzerland if the appropriate Swiss Mission has entered on the 
8 Agreement of 9 January 1926 regarding the reciprocal abolition of visa requirements. 
Unpublished, referred to in the Agreement of 29 September 1938, see note 11 below. 
9 A full account of these activities based on documents emanating from the Swiss 
authorities is given in Beilage zum Bericht des Bundesrats an die Bundesversammlung uber 
die FliJchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933 bis zur Gegenwart, Bundesblatt der 
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Jg. 109, II Band, Addendum to Document 7347. 
Disregarding details, these sources confirm the information contained in the German 
documents referred to below. 
10 Report of 24 June 1938 by the German Legation in Berne, Doc. No. 7024/E522333, 
referred to in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D {1937-1945) Vol. V, 
(1953, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London), p. 896, note 2. The position of the 
Swiss government was voiced by its representative Heinrich Rothmund, Head of the 
Swiss Federal Police. 
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passport an "assurance permitting sojourn in Switzerland or transit 
through Switzerland". 
The German agencies in question which are charged with 
passport inspection and border patrol at the German-Swiss border 
will be instructed to prevent the exit to Switzerland of Jews who 
are subjects of the Reich and whose passports do not show the 
"assurance permitting sojourn in Switzerland or transit through 
Switzerland" .11 
On 11 November 1938, one day after the Reichskrista!lnacht pogrom12, 
Switzerland and Germany exchanged notes ratifying the quoted 
agreement. Anticipating its entry into force, a German ordinance of 5 
October 1938 stipulated that German Jews had to turn in their passports 
to the authorities for revalidation. The passports thus received were to be 
provided with a symbol identifying the bearer as a Jew.13 The symbol, 
chosen by the Minister of the Interior, was a stamp featuring the letter 
'J'.14 
1.1.3 Protecting Communities Ill 
On 21 June 1993, the Swedish government granted a large group of 
Bosnian asylum-seekers permanent residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds, as there were 'no indications that they would be able to returnto 
their country within the near future' .15 Many of these asylum-seekers had 
11 Agreement of 29 September 1938 (translation), enclosure to Doc. 7025/£522443-45, R 
20829, Letter of the Reichsfiihrer SS and Chief of German Police to the Foreign 
Ministry, 1953, Volume V, p. 987. This agreement, classified as confidential, was neither 
published in the German Reichsgesetzblatt nor in the Swiss Amtliche Sarnmlung des 
Bundesrechts. 
12 Reichskristallnacht (night of shattered glass) is a euphemistic term used for the violent 
events of 9-10 November 1938, initiated at the order of the German Minister for popular 
enlightenment and propaganda, Joseph Goebbels. 91 Jews were killed during nation-wide 
pogroms, and another 244 died in the Buchenwald concentration camp in the following 
months, M. Gilbert, The Dent Atlas of the Holocaust (1993, Dent, London), pp. 27 and 28. 
13 Verordnung iiber Reisepasse von Juden vom 5. Oktober 1938 [Ordinance on travel 
passports of Jews of 5 October 1938], RGBl. I, 1342. Section 1 (3). 
14 Circular of the Foreign Ministry, 11October1938, Reproduced in 1953, Volume V, Doc. 
No. 644, pp. 898-900, p. 899. 
1; Regeringens Proposition 1993/94:51, Overforing och mottagande av jlyktingar fran fd. 
Jugoslavien m.m. (1994), p. 2. 
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been kept waiting for a considerable time for a final decision in their case 
and were greatly relieved by the news. In Europe, only the Netherlands 
granted permanent residence permits to fleeing Bosnians at that time.16 
Simultaneously, the government decided to impose visa requirements 
for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the lack of such a requirement 
would 'entail substantial difficulties to regulate immigration'. 17 The latter 
decision had an unambiguous effect. The number of Bosnian asylum-
seekers arriving in Sweden fell dramatically. The average monthly figure 
was barely 1 500 arrivals, compared to 7 000 a year earlier. 18 While 25 110 
asylum requests had been filed with the Swedish Immigrant Board by 
Bosnians in 1993, the corresponding figure for 1994 was down to 2 649. 
Apart from the imposition of visa requirements, no other factors had 
contributed to this decrease in numbers. Domestic legislation remained 
unaltered, and the conflict in the region of origin would continue to 
produce substantial numbers of refugees for years to come. 
The situation bore some resemblance to a trade-off. To protect the 
group of Bosnians already on Swedish territory, future arrivals were 
drastically diminished. In 1992-3, the Swedish government argued, a 
considerable number of persons already had found haven in Croatia and 
other countries before moving on to Sweden. 19 To alleviate detrimental 
effects in hard cases, the Swedish government established a visa office in 
Zagreb, where entry permits were granted to Bosnians belonging to 
vulnerable groups. 
The Swedish visa decision was not unique.20 By 1993, visa requirements 
for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been introduced, domino-fashion, 
16 G. Brochmann, Bosniske flyktninger i Norden. Tre veie til beskyttelse (1995, Nordiske 
Komparative studier om mottak av flyktninger, Oslo), p. 30. 
17 Socialforsakringutskottets betankande 1993/94:SfU6, Overf<iring och mottagande av 
flyktingar fran Jd. Jugoslavien m.m. [Transfer and reception of refugees from Former 
Yugoslavia et al.] (1994), p. 9. 
18 The Swedish Ministry of Labour, Immigrant and As-ylum Policy (1995, The Printing 
Office of the Cabinets and Ministers, Stockholm), p. 23. 
19 The Swedish Ministry of Culture, Immigrant and As-ylum Policy (1994, The Printing 
Office of the Cabinets and Ministers, Stockholm), p. 14. 
20 On 26 June 1993, Denmark introduced visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia. Precisely as the Swedish government 
had done, the Danish administration argued that most of the previous arrivals had moved 
on to Denmark from safe havens in other countries. The drop in numbers was as 
dramatic as in Sweden. Brochmann, 1995, p. 16. 
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throughout Europe. As the main rece1vmg country in the region of 
conflict, Croatia had decided to close its borders to Bosnian refugees as 
early as July 1992.21 This had decisive effects on the availability of 
protection at large. Just as in 1938, the trap had closed. 
1.1.4 The Ambiguity of Hindsight 
Notwithstanding their incommensurability, the historical sequences 
expounded above reflect different steps in the escalation of protective 
conflicts. These steps merit further analysis. 
The 1933 case represents an inter-state conflict, where a group is 
defined into existence and gradually excluded from a nation-state 
community. This exclusion is but a consequence of a claimed necessity to 
protect another group, in the historical case, Germans of 'Aryan' descent. 
To be sure, the protective need, as well as the group to be protected from, 
were the products of propaganda. Both communities-Aryans and non-
Aryans-constitute artificial constructs, lacking any base in law or state 
practice before 1933. The German civil servants tasked with drafting the 
named laws encountered considerable technical difficulty when recasting 
the image of the Jewish 'enemy', as conjured up in the 1920s, in terms of 
an operational legal definition. It is hardly surprising tpat the borderlines 
between bath groups and within the group of non-Aryans were drawn 
without logical consistency.22 The distinction thus introduced lacks any 
rational -base and is consequently endowed with the character of 
discrimination. 
At a certain point, exclusion starts to internationalize. Having been 
depicted as a threat to the community of Aryan Germans, Jewish 
Germans became refugees. As refugees, they became a threat to other 
communities as well. By 1938, the outflow from Germany had grown to 
21 M. Barutciski, 'The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of 
UNHCR: Displacement and Internal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-94)', 8 IJRL 
49(1995), p. 74 with further references. On 17 July 1992, Croatia already hosted a total of 
334 000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which made it one of the most affected 
recipient countries. Ibid. 
22 See Hilberg, 1982, pp. 70-84 on the contradictions inherent in the law and exacerbated in 
its implementation. In certain cases, Hitler decided personally on exceptions from the 
legal categorisations and upgraded non-Aryans to Aryans. This procedure was known as 
Befreiung-liberation. Hilberg, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 83. 
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such proportions that refugees were increasingly perceived as a threat by 
potential host communities. This is clear from the Swiss example, where 
the interests of German refugees were juxtaposed to those of the Swiss 
population. 
The 1938 case was decisively different. Switzerland engaged neither in 
the drafting of discriminatory definitions nor in persecution. The steps 
taken by it in 1938 built on the basic distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens, firmly based in international law. The imposition of 
differentiated visa requirements was a reaction to an increasingly 
anomalous migratory situation caused by the persecution in Germany. 
Controlling migration by such means was not unusual at the time and is 
even more widespread today. Exclusion of citizens within nation-state 
communities is one matter, exclusion of non-citizens quite another. 
Beyond that, a consensual appraisal seems remote. Two lines of 
argument offer themselves. One is that Switzerland could not possibly 
have received more German refugees and was under no obligation to do 
so. Switzerland had a right to control the entry and stay of aliens on its 
territory. Accordingly, it was perfectly rational to single out those who 
had a high propensity for becoming refugees and to control their entry by 
means of a visa requirement. In the given historical situation, this group of 
persons happened to be congruent with the German definition of Jews. 
Between 1933 and 1938, Switzerland had offered a haven to some 7 000 
German Jews. Given the size of the country and its population, this share 
is not disproportional compared to the overall European refugee reception 
at the time.23 The responsibility for discrimination and persecution lies 
with Germany alone, whose nationals the persons were. 
The second line of argument concludes that Switzerland could have 
received more refugees. Other countries in the immediate vicinity of 
Germany had done so.24 De facto, Switzerland replicated the discri-
minatory definition of Jews by singling them out along the lines of the 
German legislation for the purposes of migration control. Beyond the 
23 During the same period, the U.K. received 52 000 German Jews, France 30 000, the 
Netherlands 30 000, Poland 25 000, Belgium 12 000, Portugal 10 000, Yugoslavia 7 000, 
Czechoslovakia 5 000, Italy 5 000, Sweden 3 200, Spain 3 000, Hungary 3 000, Denmark 
2 000 and Norway 2 000. Gilbert, 1993, as reproduced in Rubinstein, 1997, p. 17. 
24 This argument could be based on the same statistics as the first one, pointing to the much 
higher intake by the Netherlands and Belgium during the same period. For both 
arguments, it is of no import that the haven in the Netherlands and in Belgium would be 
disrupted later by the German occupation during the war. 
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legitimate distinction between c1t1zens and non-c1t1zens, Switzerland 
opted for an illegitimate distinction between Germans and German Jews. 
Moreover, it ensured that German authorities would hinder emigration of 
the targeted group to a potential haven, namely Switzerland.25 In 1938, 
sufficient information was available for the Swiss government to realize 
that German Jews would, at the least, continue to face harsh treatment in 
Germany. After all, the Reichskristallnacht coincided with the formal 
conclusion of the agreement. While Switzerland has no part in the 
responsibility for persecution and genocide, it bears a responsibility for 
barring admission to its victims. 26 
To avoid misunderstandings, it must be underscored that Switzerland is 
far from being the only country who used legal devices to fend off would-
be refugees from Germany.27 Neither is it the only country whose 
conduct vis-a-vis German refugees has been questioned (and subsequently 
defended). Historical research is deeply divided about the treatment of this 
group by potential countries of refuge.28 Judging the conduct of these 
states entails the ever-present risk of ahistorical reasoning. But the point to 
25 See the agreement of 29 September 1938, note 11 above, para. 3. It should be noted that 
the official German policy at the time was to promote the emigration of German Jews. 
(See e.g. Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department of 12 November 
1938, Doc. No. 1125/321681-82, 1953, Volume V, p. 904. The agreement as well as the 
stamping of passports with the symbol 'J' actually barred emigration from Germany. 
26 For an outspokenly critical assessment of the Swiss refugee policy during the Nazi era in 
Germany, see Unabhangige Expertenkommission Schweiz-Zweiter Weltkrieg, Die 
Schweiz und die Fliichtlinge zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, December 1999, available 
at < http://www.uek.ch/dindex.htm> (accessed on 11December1999). The report was 
commissioned by the Swiss federal parliament and drafted by an independent group of 
experts. 
v The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) sent out a circular in 
1938 to the effect that holders of German passport stamped with a 'J' were not to be 
admitted to Sweden, save for cases in possession of a residence permit or a 'border 
recommendation' (gransrekommendation). Border recommendations were only available 
in cases where return to Germany was deemed unproblematic. See Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar (SOU) 1967:18, p. 160. For a detailed account, see H. Lindberg, Svensk 
flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936-1941 (1973, Allmanna Fiirlaget, 
Stockholm), pp. 123-80. 
28 For a defense of potential destination countries, see Rubinstein, 1997, pp. 15-62, arguing 
that a reluctance to flee and emigration restrictions by Nazi Germany rather than 
immigration restrictions by potential destination states inhibited the escape of the 
German Jews. For an opposed view, claiming that less restrictionist immigration policies 
could have saved more, see M. M. Marrus, The Holocaust in History (1987, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London), pp. 164-5. 
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be made here is a different one. In the 1938 case, the original conflict-the 
exclusion and persecution of German Jews-had attained a new 
dimension. Apart from opposing German Aryans to German Jews, it now 
involved a juxtaposition of German refugees with the Swiss population, as 
well as a juxtaposition of the Swiss and German governments. 
The 1993 case reiterates some of the patterns prominent in the 1938 
sequence of events. In both cases, the root cause of flight was a massive 
violation of human rights and genocide in the making. In 1993 as well as 
in 1938, the imposition of barriers to continued flight centred on 
protection of the recipient society from migration beyond its 'absorptive 
capacity'. The legitimacy of blocking access has been questioned in both 
cases. But the 1993 case also indicates that the protective dilemma is not 
merely a clash of two communities but rather an amalgam of multiple 
clashes. The chain of juxtapositions already enumerated above is extended 
by two further conflicts. We recall that the Bosnian protection seekers 
already present in Sweden were granted permanent status at the very 
moment that flight for their compatriots was barred. By this double 
move, one segment of the group of victims was juxtaposed to another. 
Furthermore, the interests of potential countries of refuge may collide. 
When the first recipient countries had decided to impose visa regulations, 
others quickly felt compelled to follow suit. Had they not done so, they 
would have faced a proportionally larger share of refugees to protect. 
Thus exclusion within nation-state communities triggers opposition 
between refugee communities and other nation-state communities, 
between host countries and countries of origin, between victims leaving 
early and victims leaving late or not at all, as well as among host countries. 
Their historical idiosyncrasies apart, all cases portrayed above possess 
two common elements. First, the protection of communities is used as a 
central legitimising argument. While the protection argument was 
manifestly abused in the 1933 case, the answer is not so evident in the 
1938 and 1993 cases. Second, the instrument of law-domestic legislation 
as well as international agreements-was used to attain the protective goal 
in all three cases. While law can be used in a critical manner as a 
benchmark against which state action is assessed, it simultaneously 
represents the vehicle of such action. 
Leaving the 1933 case for a moment, several dissimilarities between the 
1938 and 1993 cases are worthy of further consideration. In 1993, the 
international community possessed well-elaborated knowledge of 
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historical experience; the risks of denying haven were known from the 
extermination of the European Jews and a number of consecutive refugee 
crises around the world. The international community was well aware of 
what was going on in Former Yugoslavia. and the risks for those 
compelled to remain in the territories of conflict could be calculated to a 
sufficient extent. Precisely as the 1938 case attained a different aura in the 
light of the extermination period beginning three years later, the 1993 case 
appears all the more problematic in the light of the massacres following 
the fall of the Safe Zone of Srebrenica.29 Second, the international 
community had a superior position vis-a-vis the perpetrators of 
persecution, and-as became clear in 1995-its political and military 
capacity could impose an end to fighting and the continued generation of 
large-scale displacement. Briefly, the options were rapid deployment of 
intervention forces, refugee reception or both. There were no such 
prospects in 1938-the state engaging in persecution possessed such a 
strong position that leading European governments opted for a policy of 
appeasement instead of confrontation. Contrary to the situation in 1993, 
there were no prospects for successful intervention into the root causes. 
Third, and probably most important for our context, international law 
had changed since 1945. A corpus of human rights has been moulded into 
the form of binding treaty law since World War II, and specialized 
instruments and institutions have been created to address situations of 
flight across international borders. 
It is not for this work to make moral judgements. Rather, the point of 
this section has been to introduce the creation, protection and deflection30 
29 In July 1995, as the Vojska 'Republike Srpske' (VRS-Army of the 'Serbian Republic') 
overran the Srebrenica enclave, soldiers of the Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (ABH-Army 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina), other draft-age males and some women and children attempted 
to flee through the forest towards ABH-controlled territory. 'Those who reached it 
reported systematic ambushes by the VRS on the groups of soldiers and civilians, and the 
capture of large numbers of people, including civilians. There was strong circumstantial 
evidence that many of the 3 000 people who were reported to have fallen into the hands 
of the VRS and another 5 000 people who were also unaccounted for had been 
deliberately and arbitrarily killed by VRS forces or paramilitaries from Serbia. [ ... ] A 
small number of the missing from Srebrenica were later discovered to be in detention but 
the vast majority remained unaccounted for at the end of the year.' Amnesty Inter-
national. Amnesty International Report 1996. (1996, Amnesty International Publications, 
London), pp. 96-7. 
3° For the purposes of this work, deflection means any measure inhibiting lasting forms of 
access to a territory. 
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of refugees, through three historical precedents, in order to prepare the 
ground for a legal analysis. This introduction allows for a number of 
conclusions to be drawn. First, the protection of communities is a 
common denominator for all three processes. This actualizes those rules 
dealing with the protection of individuals and communities not 
amounting to nation states-human rights-as well as the rules dealing 
with the protection of nation state communities-often denominated 
'state sovereignty'. Second, the issue of refugee protection must be 
analysed not merely in terms of domestic protection categories but also 
with regard to means of migration control, of which visa requirements are 
but one example. Thirdly, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that 
such forms of regulation may have fatal consequences for those whose 
access is blocked. These consequences can turn out to be irreparable at a 
later stage; when extermination started in 1941, the war as well as the 
German authorities had blocked emigration, and a liberalisation of 
admission would have had very limited effect.31 Thus, there are important 
values at stake, which motivate a careful analysis of the legal framework 
governing such regulations. Fourthly, the relationship between 
persecution, conflict, refuge, and intervention is clearly a complex one, 
providing no self-evident answer to the question of exactly how much 
protection a state owes to persecuted non-nationals. The relationship 
between refugee protection and migration control remains as 
problematical today as it was in 1938 or 1993. The question to be pursued 
in the following is how it is framed in international law. 
1..2 Identifying the Problem 
What is the optimum level of inclusion? Provided that this level can be 
identified, how is it most faithfully implemented in law? 
There is a linkage between these fairly abstract questions and the 
concrete reality of seeking refuge abroad. To start with, refugees are 
persons who have been excluded de facto from the legal protection of 
their home communities. Finding a haven elsewhere means but their re-
31 One could claim that the extermination policies conducted by Germany from 1941-5 
could not have been reasonably predicted by potential states of refuge in 1938. However, 
the historical experience of extermination cannot be ignored by contemporary decision-
makers: discriminatory policies bear a potential foj genocide. 
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inclusion under another form of legal protection, outside the country of 
origin. In turn, the state of which such extraterritorial protection is 
requested has to consider where to draw the line: to whom shall it grant, 
to whom deny this protection? To be sure, there are two questions of 
exclusion and inclusion, one situated in the country of origin, another in 
the host country. It is the latter that will be dealt with in this book. 
Against this background, the question 'what is the optimum level of 
inclusion' can be adapted to the issue of extraterritorial protection and 
specified. This work is seized with three basic questions: 
I. How is access to extraterritorial protection regulated m the 
European Union? 
II. Is the EU acquis in conformity with international law? 
III. Can both questions be answered in a determinate manner? 
Grappling with these questions presupposes clarity on their precise 
content as well as on the path to be pursued in answering them. In the 
following sub-sections, the delimitation of the topic shall be expounded 
and justified; methodological considerations and elaboration of the 
structure of our further inquiry will follow. 
1..3 Delimiting the Problem 
This sub-section deals with the first of the three basic questions, namely 
how access to extraterritorial protection is regulated in the European 
Union. Why speak of access to protection? Why choose the saturated 
concept of extraterritorial protection when others simply speak of asylum? 
Which norms are covered by the term regulated as used in the basic 
question? And, finally, how is the geographical delimitation to the 
European Union motivated? 
1.3.1 'Access' 
Conceiving the problem as one of access to protection instead of, say, a 
right to protection extends the scope of this work over a broad variety of 
norms. What is the common denominator of these norms? 
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Generally speaking, differences in protection are created by means of 
thresholds. Within the context of state protection, a decisive threshold 
exists between non-citizens and citizens. This becomes clear in 
constitutional law as well as in international human rights law, both of 
which accord a more favourable position to state citizens.32 Another 
threshold of focal interest severs those within state jurisdiction from those 
outside it. The latter threshold is usually linked to a person's presence on 
state territory. Again, international human rights law may serve as an 
illustration, as its major treaty instruments extend a basic form of 
protection to ·all persons within the jurisdiction of State Parties. 
As a corollary of their territorial supremacy, states are entitled to 
control the composition of their populations33, which means nothing less 
than delimiting the group to which protection is extended. This 
prerogative entails a right to control borders, understood in a literal and a 
metaphorical sense-covering physical borders as well as administrative 
thresholds-severing citizens from non-citizens, participants from non-
participants, beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries and tolerated from non-
tolerated. The means by which such controls are exercised range from 
naturalisation to forcible removal. 
A classical starting point for inquiries into asylum law has been the 
question 'who is a refugee?' Asking this question means inquiring into a 
difference. This difference simply severs beneficiaries of asylum or other 
32 See e.g. Art. 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], limiting participatory rights to citizens, while all 
other rights are enjoyed by 'everyone' under the jurisdiction of a State Party. The same 
form of distinction can be found inter alia in Art. 20 of the Swedish Constitution, 
limiting the rights of foreigners within the realm in relation to those enjoyed by Swedish 
nationals. However, it must be recalled that states are obliged to treat aliens in accordance 
with 'ordinary standards of civilization', and that these standards may in single cases 
exceed those applied to the treatment of citizens. Since World War II, the development of 
human rights law has continuously limited the number of such cases. See A. Verdross and 
B. Simma, Universelles VOlkerrecht. Theorie und Praxis, 3 ed. (1984, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin), pp. 801-5. For a comprehensive overview, see R. B. Lillich, The Human Rights of 
Aliens in Contemporary International Law (1984, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester). 
33 In its jurisdiction on Art. 3 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR], the 
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly spelt out that states are entitled to 
control the entry of aliens on their territory. See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, 




forms of extraterritorial protection from non-beneficiaries. Answering 
this question with legal authority means establishing a difference. This 
difference is but a specific threshold, which a person seeking protection 
must pass. Simply put, a refugee definition is a norm of qualification 
established by law and used by states when allocating extraterritorial 
protection. 
Definitional issues, however, are merely one factor determining an 
individual's possibilities of receiving extraterritorial protection. To 
alleviate pressure on their protection systems, industrialized host states 
use a wide array of other thresholds diminishing numerical and qualitative 
access to legal protection. The most prominent among them are measures 
of migration control which inhibit potential protection seekers from 
leaving their home country or from filing a protection claim in a given 
host state. As an example, the country of destination may deny an entry 
permit to the potential asylum seeker and thereby inhibit access to its 
territorial protection. Thus relevant parts of the law regulating the 
granting of entry permits fall within the scope of our inquiry. 
Such thresholds need not explicitly deal with extraterritorial 
protection. Yet precisely like the definition of beneficiaries, they impact 
prospects of being granted such protection. The interaction of these 
norms actually calls to mind a filtration process. The group of potential 
claimants is reduced successively: blocking exit from the home country 
for some, inhibiting territorial access to the potential host state for others, 
while letting a limited number of individuals pass through to claim the 
right. Clearly, the granting of extraterritorial protection to a happy few 
means little more than successfully passing the final filter. 
In the following, the term 'filter' will be used for all legal devices 
explicitly or implicitly connected with the regulation of the personal and 
material scope of extraterritorial protection. 
Including such filters within the scope of this work will permit the 
analysis of all legal norms with an impact on an individual's prospects of 
receiving extraterritorial protection as an interacting totality. By contrast, 
framing the problem as solely turning on 'the right to protection' tends to 
lose sight of the preconditions for claiming that right; it is the aggregate 




1.3.2 'Extraterritorial Protection' 
The term 'asylum' would appear to be a natural choice for reflecting the 
type of protection at stake in this work. However, this term has 
undergone a shift in connotation in later years that may give rise to 
misconceptions. At the 1950 Bath session of the Institut de Droit 
International, asylum was defined as the protection accorded by a state to 
an individual who comes to seek it: 
Dans les presentes Resolutions le tenne "asile" designe la protection 
qu' un Etat accorde sur son territoire ou dans un autre endroit 
relevant de certains de ses organes a un individu qui est venu la 
chercher. 34 
The charm of this definition lies in its openness. It covers the various 
types of protection granted under international law as well as under 
national law or the discretion of states, regardless of whether they are 
termed 'asylum' or merely 'protection from deportation'. Its scope 
comprises beneficiaries of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (henceforth 1951 Refugee Convention)35 as well as protective 
provisions in a variety of human rights instruments, without being 
confined to their restrictions. The term 'protection' connects elegantly to 
human rights law, which mirrors a linkage of increasing importance in the 
refugee discourse. 36 
However, this definition conflicts with the dominant understanding of 
the term 'asylum' in the contemporary European context. The term 
'asylum' is increasingly limited to denote protection granted under the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Article 1 of the 1991 Dublin Convention 
documents this move towards specification: 
34 Institut de Droit International, L' Asile en Droit International Public, adopted 11 
September 1950, quoted in A. Grahl Madsen, The Status of'P.efagees in International Law, 
Part II (1972, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden), p. 3. 
35 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. In the 
following, reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention covers the Convention as modified 
by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267. 
36 See, e.g., G. Melander, 'The Relationship between Human Rights, Humanitarian Law 
and Refugee Law', in Goran Rystad (ed.), Encountering Strangers (1997, Lund University 
Press, Lund), p. 32. 
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For the purpose of this Convention:[ ... ] 
b) Application for asylum means: a request whereby an alien 
seeks from a Member State protection under the Geneva 
Convention by claiming refugee status within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New 
York Protocol; ... 37 
A congruent understanding can be traced in domestic law in Europe. To 
name but one example, Swedish law reserves the term 'asylum' to 
residence permits granted on the basis of the Swedish adaptation of the 
refugee definition contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Residence 
permits granted on other grounds are not termed 'asylum' even if they are 
protection-related. 38 
With regard to this terminological nicety, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention must be.regarded as neutral. The term 'asylum' is not used in 
its operative articles, and its sole occurrence in the preamble does not 
allow for any conclusion on whether it supports an expanded or a 
specified definition. 
Although the definition of asylum elaborated by the Institut de Droit 
International is attractive in its openness, it would be unwise to choose 
terminology running counter to the current practices of those states 
whose law and practice is under scrutiny here. As mirrored in Article 1 of 
the Dublin Convention, the term 'asylum' will be understood throughout 
this work as denoting protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
But the 1951 Refugee Convention is limited in its scope, and state 
obligations to protect aliens seeking refuge may also flow from other legal 
instruments such as the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR. Moreover, a 
number of host states afford protection under domestic legislation, with 
or without a clear linkage to international instruments. These forms of 
refuge have been termed 'subsidiary protection' in EU Council 
37 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
Lodged in One of the Member States of the Community, Dublin, 15 June 1990, OJ 
(1997) C 254/1 [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
38 Utlanningslagen [Aliens Act], SFS 1989:529, as amended by SFS 1996:1379, Chapter 3 
Sections 1 and 2. 
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documents.39 Following the understanding prevailing in that document, 
this term would cover refuge granted to 'individuals who do not qualify 
for refugee status under the Geneva Convention, but who for one reason 
or another are, or may be, in need of protection'. 
A further wildcard in this context is the concept of temporary 
protection, which surfaced in the early 1990s as a response to the 
protection needs triggered by the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. So far, 
the group of its beneficiaries has been exemplified rather than defined on 
the level of international law. 40 As this concept is said to affect both 
persons who fall under the 1951 Refugee Convention and persons who do 
not41 , it shall be understood as partly consumed by the joint categories of 
asylum and subsidiary protection for the time being. However, where 
temporary protection is aimed at beneficiaries who would not be eligible 
for asylum or subsidiary protection, it is outside the framework of this 
mqmry. 
To conclude, the scope of this work covers two forms of protection: 
O asylum, as understood in Article 1 of the Dublin Convention, and 
O subsidiary protection, understood as other forms of protection 
than asylum, based on binding instruments of international law 
other than the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
To the extent the beneficiaries of temporary protection would be eligible 
for asylum or subsidiary protection, temporary protection is covered as 
well. 
39 Council of the European Union, Note from the Danish Delegation to the Asylum and 
Migration Working Parties, Subsidiary Protection, ASIM 52, Doc. No. 6764/97, 17 
Man::h 1997. It must be doubted whether it is accurate to term such protection as 
subsidiary in relation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, as there is no clear hierarchical 
relationship between human rights law and refugee law. However, we see no need to 
propose a new terminology here. 
40 Domestic legislation in Europe provides no basis for singling out a common core of 
beneficiaries for the purposes of international law. 
41 In the 1994 General Conclusions on International Protection, Member States of 
UNHCR's Executive Committee noted 'that the beneficiaries of temporary protection 
may include both persons who qualify as refugees under the terms of the 1951 
Convention. and the 1967 Protocol and oth~rs \who may not so qualify, and that in 
providing temporary protection States and ljNHCR should not diminish the protection 
afforded to refugees under those instruments'. UNHCR EX COM, General Conclusion 
on International Protection. No. 74 (XL V)', 1994, para. t). 
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Clarity in presentation requires an overarching term embracing both 
asylum and subsidiary protection. For now, there is no obvious candidate 
to be extracted from the language used by actors of international law. To 
denote both forms of protection, we take the liberty of using the term 
'extraterritorial protection' in the following. While the word 'protection' 
alludes to the continuation of human rights protection during and after 
flight, the word 'extraterritorial' expresses the exceptional character of 
such protection in that it takes place outside the country of origin. To be 
sure, calling such protection 'extraterritorial' means adopting the 
perspective of the individual affected. 42 
Due to its overarching character, extraterritorial protection does not 
necessarily entail a legal status equivalent to the one laid down in the 1951 
Refugee Convention. On the contrary: even the most rudimentary form 
of protection, such as a temporary stay of deportation on protection-
related grounds, is covered by the term.43 
1.3.3 'Regulated' 
The phrase 'regulated in the European Union' contains normative, geo-
graphical and institutional dimensions. Starting with the first, 'regulating' 
simply translates to the activity of steering by means of legal norms. Only 
such norms will be taken into account which 
1. possess binding force, 
2. emanate from international law or the law of the European 
Union, and 
42 The term 'extraterritorial protection' runs the risk of being confused with the term 
'extraterritorial asylum', where the latter denotes protection granted by a state outside its 
territory, e.g. on its diplomatic premises. See M. Garcia-Mora, International Law and 
Arylum as a Human Right (1956, Public Affairs Press, Washington), p. 1. The difference 
of perspective stands clear: while 'extraterritorial asylum' reflects the perspective of the 
state granting such asylum, 'extraterritorial protection' mirrors the situation of the 
individual protection seeker whose own country denies her protection. Moreover, the 
risk of confusion is diminished by the fact that Garda-Moras term is not widely used in 
the contemporary discourse on protection. 
43 By this, it should be clear that extraterritorial protection is a descriptive rather than a 
nonnative concept. It does not necessarily imply the granting of the full range of human 
rights owed to an alien. Its core element is non-refoulement. 
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3. have a bearing on access to extraterritorial protection within the 
European Union.44 
Where necessary, domestic law shall be used to clarify the scope and 
content of international law as well as the law of the European Union. A 
comparative presentation of relevant domestic law in all Member States 
would exceed the format of this work. 45 
The two former criteria, concerned with binding force as well as 
pedigree, beg a vast array of further questions that flow not solely from 
the need to justify the delimitation chosen here but mainly from the need 
to define the terms of reference used in the ensuing research. The 
preceding sub-sections on 'access' and 'extraterritorial protection' 
attempted to reconcile both needs. Given the magnitude of questions such 
as 'what is law' or 'what is binding law', it goes without saying that such 
an approach would entail problems. Therefore, this sub-section shall be 
confined to motivating the delimitation to law. 
This is a work on law, using the language of law. In the political 
discourse underlying issues related to asylum, protection and 
immigration, legal arguments enjoy the privilege of a decreased 
argumentative burden.46 That alone justifies efforts to identify the content 
of law in this area. Concurrently, this privilege motivates bona fide 
participants in this discourse to aspire to a strict division between legal 
and non-legal arguments. To wit, the privileged position of law would 
44 The terms 'access' and 'extraterritorial protection' contained in the third criterion have 
already been expounded in the preceding sub-sections. 
45 The present work can draw on already existing sources in that regard. On the 
institutional side, both the Council of the EU and the IGCARMP compile updated 
overviews of domestic legislation in regular intervals, mostly based on questionnaires sent 
out and returned by governments co-operating in each forum. The European Parliament 
has recently presented information on domestic asylum procedures in its working paper 
on asylum in Member States: European Parliament, Asylum in the EU Member States 
(2000, The European Parliament, Brussels). Among NGO's, the Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC) collates updated overviews on legal and social conditions of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Europe. On the academic side, a thorough and impressive comparison of the 
refugee definition in domestic law and practice has been carried out in a project directed 
by Jean-Yves Carlier: Wbo is a RejUgee? A Comparative Case Law Study, J. Y. Carlier, D. 
Vanheule, K. Hullmann and C. P. Galiano eds (1997, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague). Further publications comparing single aspects of domestic legislations exist and 
will be referred to contextually below. 
46 Simplified, a legal argument enjoys a trump status in relation to a competing political 
argument. See chapter 1.5 below. 
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quickly erode if any political argument could usurp legal status. 
Delimiting law from non-law is a precondition for the identification and 
preservation of law. From the outset, this works in both ways-it can be 
beneficial for a protection seeker and for restrictive destination states 
alike. 
By the same token, it is suggested to focus this work on binding norms 
within law. This requires a further distinction between binding legal 
norms and other norms not possessing binding force although they are 
situated within legal discourse.47 As an example of the latter, one may 
refer to a recommendation spelt out by a group of states assembled in 
some international forum. Such an instrument is regularly drafted in legal 
language, more often than not emulating the format of binding law. 
States, courts and doctrinal writers use it as support when arguing 
positions. This may explain why the contested concept of 'soft law' has 
been conceived to denote the norms contained in such instruments.48 The 
decisive difference, however, is that they do not create obligations by 
themselves. This puts them in a different bracket than instruments that 
do, and it allows us to treat them in a different manner. 
As will emerge below, this work is seized in particular -with the 
dilemmas connected to the determinacy of law.49 We shall see that 
determinacy hinges on a gradual reduction of the number of norms 
competing for domination. A conservative position on the sources of law, 
excluding non-binding norms, offers the best prospects for confronting 
the problem of indeterminacy. It limits choices ab initio and must be 
regarded as the strongest counter-position law has to off er when testing 
post-modern scepticism about its determinacy. 
47 A discussion of whether non-binding norms situated within legal discourse should 
properly be called legal norms is omitted here. 
<B On the phenomenon of soft law in international law, see J. Sztucki, 'Reflections on 
international "soft law"', in N. Jarebnrg (ed.), De lege (1999, Iustus, Uppsala). On the 
phenomenon of soft law within EC law, see K. C. Wellens, 'Soft Law in European 
Community Law', 1989 CMLR 267 (1989). For further discussion, see chapters 1.4.1.2, 
1.4.2.4 and 1.4.2.6 below. 
49 See chapter 1.5.1 on the triple dilemma below. 
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1.3.4 'In the European Union' 
Apart from the normative delimitation, the first basic question contains a 
geographical and an institutional delimitation as well. To reiterate, the 
third criterion delimited the scope to such norms as have a bearing on 
extraterritorial protection in the European Union, while the second 
criterion included the law of the European Union among the legal systems 
to be scrutinized. 
While Western European states are still accessed by important numbers 
of protection seekers, of which a substantial share is allowed to stay, the 
same may be said for countries in other regions of the world. Indeed, if 
this work had been seized with the latter phenomenon alone, it might 
have proven sufficient to analyse the way in which single Member States 
handle protection demands by aliens. The focus of inquiry would have 
been on the tension between international and domestic law. The legal 
relationship to be dealt with would stand between the state and the 
individual protection seeker. Other states would only emerge as 
peripheral actors in this relation. 
This is not so within the European Union. Since the inception of the 
Single European Act, the Member States have jointly embarked on serious 
attempts to realize an area of free movement of persons by way of 
international and supranational co-operation. This brings another 
relationship into the protection issue, namely th<it among Member States. 
Why is this so? Clearly, opening internal borders would also mean 
improving the potential of protection seekers to move between Member 
States, and it was feared that this mobility would allow them to seek the 
best offer of protection, given the substantial differences in domestic legal 
systems. It would further mean that external border control would 
become a matter of common concern, following the logic of the weakest 
link. If one country failed to control its borders, the problems potentially 
arising therefrom would not only affect itself but also the other Member 
States. Against the background of the continuing arrival of protection 
seekers in the territories of Member States, these reflections led to the 
integration of immigration and extraterritorial protection in a number of 
co-operative frameworks set up among Member States. Whatever its 
value, the acquis of such co-operative agreements has grown to a 
substantial number of norms and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the 
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European Union offers a hitherto singular reformulation of the conflict 
between migration control and refugee protection. 
To sum up, the specific interest this work takes in the European Union 
flows from the combination of two factors. First, there is a continued 
demand for extraterritorial protection in its territories. Secondly, the 
regulation of movements of persons to and between Member States is 
presently undergoing a major restructuring. The basic conflict between 
migration control and extraterritorial protection, well known from the 
area of unilateralism, is transformed into the setting of close multilateral 
co-operation. Two legal relationships interact: that between the individual 
protection seeker and a specific Member State and that between the 
specific Member State and other Member States within the European 
Union.50 
To do full justice to this double bind of Member States, consisting of 
protection demands and the imperatives of the common market, both 
international law and the law of the European Union must be involved in 
the ensuing deliberations. One can conceive of a multitude of outcomes 
flowing from a synoptic analysis of the two legal systems: they can coexist 
with each other, overlap with each other, complement each other, modify 
each other, or simply conflict with each other. 51 
Finally, we would like to introduce a temporal delimitation as well as a 
prudent geographical extension. We have deemed it reasonable to 
scrutinise the development of European integration in the field of asylum 
and migration from the year 1985 onward. This year marked the 
beginning of closer co-operation related to freedom of movement within 
the Union whose hallmarks were a White Paper by the Commission and 
the Schengen Agreement. Reaching back to earlier developments would 
not necessarily facili1tate our analysis or alter its outcome. 
Our presentation will focus primarily on the present Member States. 
However, we shall attempt to extend our perspective to include those 
candidate countries whose accession negotiations started first: Cyprus, the 
so Beyond the scope of this work, other relationships would merit scrutiny: those between 
the group of Member States, the group of transit states and the group of countries of 
origin. 
st As will be seen, each of the named legal systems is open for receiving normative 
influences from the other. Compare Art. 6 TEU, opening up the law of the European 
Union for the normative content of the ECHR. In turn, norms contained in the law of 
the European Union could crystallize into regional international law. 
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The reason for 
doing so is pragmatic. First, one may state that, in reality, the EU acquis is 
already extended to the candidate countries by means of the pre-accession 
process. Second, there is a value in tracking how the patterns of 
obligations under international law will shift with the extension of 
membership. Third, involving the candidate countries shall allow us to 
analyse the effect of certain ·legislative tools used by the Union and its 
Member States on neighbouring countries. 
:1..4 Identifying Law 
This brings us to the second of the three basic questions, inquiring into 
the conformity of the EU acquis with international law. Answering this 
question presupposes two things-clarity on what the concepts 'EU 
acquis' and 'international law' imply, and what it means when the two are 
in conflict. 
Before understanding what the EU acquis and international law 
prescribe, we need to clarify what the terms 'EU acquis' and 'international 
law' stand for. There is good reason to be rigidly clear when dealing with 
both terms. After all, the preceding sectioa enunciated the need for a 
conceptualisation of law well prepared to meet the ev'.olving scepticism 
about its determinacy. This conforms with the methodological principle 
of testing the strongest manifestations of a position; faced with doubts 
about determinacy, a strict concept of legal 'bindingness' must be regarded 
as such a strong manifestation of a concept of law. It offers the greatest 
likelihood of reducing complexity and thus eliminating indeterminacy. 
Against this background, the present section is endowed with multiple 
tasks. First, the clarification of concepts begun in the first section needs to 
be continued with regard to the terms 'international law' and 'law of the 
European Union' respectively. Second, an identification of legal sources 
along the strict concept of bindingness expounded above shall be pursued. 
In consecutive order, we will deal with issues surrounding the 
identification of the sources of international law and the law of the 
European Union. 
But there is a third task to be catered for as well. What is a conflict and 
how is it resolved? Both issues are at the core of our question whether the 




Following Lindahl, the term 'conflict' shall refer to a situation where it is 
impossible to realise two legal norms jointly.52 For our purposes, it is fully 
sufficient to distinguish two conflict situations-disaffirmation and 
compliance conflict. With the term disaffirmation, we shall refer to a 
situation where two norms of a different deontic mode stand opposed.53 
As an example, we could imagine that a norm of international law 
prohibits states to remove protection seekers, while another norm allows 
states to effectuate removal. With the term 'compliance conflict', we shall 
refer to a situation where two norms sharing the same deontic mode stand 
opposed.54 To exemplify, we could imagine that one norm prescribes that a 
state refrain from removing a protection seeker, while another norm 
prescribes that the very state effectuate removal. As we shall see in later 
chapters, both disaffirmations and compliance conflicts are of relevance 
for this work. 
Nevertheless, what seems to be a conflict at first sight does not need to 
be upon closer examination. Generally speaking, legal systems use three 
types of techniques to dissolve prima facie conflicts between norms: 
O normative hierarchies 
0 interpretation and proportionality arguments 
O justiciability advantages 
Normative hierarchies and justiciability advantages can be dealt with to a 
large extent in the present section. Interpretation and proportionality 
arguments are rather complex subjects to which we will return at a later 
stage. 
With regard to normative hierarchies, let us suppose that we detect a 
norm of the acquis standing against a norm of international law. Let us 
also suppose that any norm of international law is simply superior to any 
norm of the law of the European Union (as we shall see, this is not the 
case). This hierarchy between the two systems of norms would dissolve 
the prima facie conflict and bring about conformity. Therefore, it is nf't 
52 L. Lindahl, 'Conflicts in Systems of Legal Norms: A Logical Point of View', in P. W. 
Brouwer, T. Ho!, A. Soeteman, W. G. van der Velden and A. H. de Wild (eds), Coherence 
and Conflict in Law (1992, Kluwer Law and Taxations Publishers, Deventer), p. 39. 
53 Lindahl, 1992, p. 42. 
54 Lindahl, 1992, p. 45. Compliance conflicts involve solely mandatory norms. 
24 
INTRODUCTION 
enough to delimit the sources of law. We also have to explore the 
existence of normative hierarchies between norm systems and, for that 
matter, within them.ss 
It is conceivable that neither normative hierarchies nor interpretation 
and proportionality arguments dissolve a given normative conflict. The 
last resort of conflict resolution is to endow an institution with the task of 
'finding the law'. This could be a court or a treaty monitoring body. This 
form of conflict resolution goes under the name of justiciability. Basically, 
it is a very simple concept. In the absence of justiciability, the interests of 
the stronger party to a conflict will prevail in practice, while the leg.al 
issue underlying the conflict remains indeterminate. By contrast, 
justiciability not only gives the weaker part a fair chance to obtain justice, 
but also creates determinacy within the legal system itself. As we shall see, 
some norms are justiciable while others are not. However, justiciability is 
not a mere on-off concept-there are also different degrees of justiciability. 
What body is endowed with the task of severing normative conflicts and 
exactly what are its competences? Who is entitled to turn to that body and 
under what preconditions? What effect does its decision have? Is it legally 
binding or not? Are sanctions linked to non-compliance with the 
decision? Even here, differences exist not only among different norm 
systems but also within them. 
A special aspect of justiciability is the question whether a certain norm 
of international provenience may penetrate domestic legal orders, 
allowing a party to invoke it before domestic courts and dominating 
conflicting domestic norms. The capacity to do so is a notorious feature of 
certain norms of EC law, although not exclusive to it. The penetration of 
domestic legal systems cannot be determined abstractly without looking 
into the constitutional orders of the states included in the scrutiny. 
Therefore, our following presentation must by necessity remain 
incomplete, as we shall only focus on the supranational and international 
levels, while omitting the domestically created determinants for 
penetration. 
In the final analysis, it is possible that certain conflicts between the EU 
acquis and international law may only find their resolution in the 
55 It is equally possible that one norm of international law could be invoked in favour of 
the protection seeker, while another norm of international law could be invoked in 
favour of the state. Such a conflict could be solved, amongst others, if the conflicting 
norms belong to different hierarchical levels within international law. 
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courtroom. Therefore, our subsequent scrutiny shall also include general 
observations on the degree to which norms contained in the EU acquis 
and in international law enjoy justiciability. It is self-evident that no 
complete account is intended. Rather, the following sub-sections should 
provide us with a basic understanding of similarities and dissimilarities of 
both legal systems, as far as they are relevant for the subject of this study. 
1.4.1 International Law 
1.4.1.1 The Concept of 'International Law' 
Prior to World War I, international law was predominantly seized with 
regulating the conduct of states vis-a-vis other states. Certainly, such inter-
state relations still feed popular perceptions of the core content of 
international law. However, given the significant role human rights law, 
humanitarian law and refugee law have attained ever since, the concept of 
international law needs to be extended to comprise certain norms 
governing the relationship between state and individual as well. To be 
sure, the latter category of norms can be found both in domestic law and 
in the law of the European Union. The distinguishing factor is that 
different procedures are followed for positing them. The appropriate 
procedures offered by international law are different from those used by 
the domestic legislator, by contracting individuals or, most relevant for 
the subject of this work, by international organisations. 
Conceiving international law as a specific procedure for creating 
obligations saves us from negative definitions of considerable abstraction, 
which tend to be overtly inclusive.56 The problem of characterising 
international law transmutes into the problem of defining its sources. This 
56 Compare the definition offered by Seidl-Hohenveldern: 'Das Volkerrecht ist die Summe 
der Normen, die die Verhaltensweisen festlegen, die zu einem geordneten Zusammenleben 
der Menschen dieser Erde notwendig und nicht im innerstaatlichen Recht der einzelnen 
souveriinen Staaten geregelt sind.' ['Public International Law is the sum of norms 
determining such conduct necessary for the orderly coexistence of men and women of 
this world and which are not laid down in the domestic law of the single sovereign 
states.' Translation by this author], I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, VOlkerrecht, 7 ed. {1992, Carl 
Heymanns Verlag KG, Koln/Berlin/Bonn/Mi.inchen), p. 1. This wording would also in-




is adequate for our purposes, as one of the guiding interests of this 
particular exercise is to carve out the difference between international law 
and the law of the European Union. 
Before entering into details, a few words should be devoted to the task 
of this exploration. The doctrine of sources is, of course, part of the 
ongoing dispute about law. Sources cannot per se provide a neutral basis: 
Fastenrath has been able to show that the very source metaphor is 
grounded in a logical-positivistic understanding of law.57 But the debate on 
sources contains more contentious ground: is bindingness based in the will 
of an actor or in the perception by other actors? Is the number of sources 
finite or not? Should sources be regarded as part of the legal system or as 
metalegal norms? However, beyond foundational disputes, a look at both 
state practice and learned discourse reveals a high degree of convergence 
about the standard modes by which law is produced. This convergence 
offers itself as a pragmatic point of entry into our subject matter and will 
therefore be taken as axiomatic for the time being. Within this axiom, the 
term 'source' merely designates a procedure of positing norms, which has 
been recognized by the actors of a legal system. As the reader will note, 
this represents another specification-away from the doctrine on sources 
to the creation of norms. 58 
This formal approach to the issue of sources has often been backed up 
by reference to Hart's rule of recognition, referring 'to general character-
istics to be found in primary rules before their very existence may be 
established in an authoritative way'.59 The rules of change, the rules of 
57 U. Fastenrath, Lucken im VOlkerrecht (1991, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), pp. 84-5. 
58 But see G. M. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (1993, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London), p. 24, who distinguishes between 
sources of law, establishing 'common rules of conduct' and sources of obligations, 
establishing 'subjective legal obligations recognized by i'pternational law'. This allows 
him to sever the sources named in Art. 38 CICJ from 'obligation-creating procedures 
established by a treaty'. However, a treaty may very well ~ontain both 'common rules of 
conduct' and 'subjective legal obligations' in Danilenko's sense. This makes Danilenko's 
distinction less fundamental than he wishes it to be. Moreover, as we do not need to 
establish the content of the source concept as such (if at all possible), but seek to single 
out the provenience of legal obligation under international law, there is no reason to 
adopt this distinction here. 
59 K. C. Wellens, 'Diversity in secondary rules and the unity of international law: some 
reflections on current trends', in L. M. Barnhoorn and K. C. Wellens (eds), Diversity in 
secondary rules and the unity of international law (1995, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague), p. 7. 
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adjudication, and the rule of recognition represent a triad of 'secondary 
rules'. Secondary rules 'specify the ways in which the primary rules may 
be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied and the fact of 
their violation conclusively determined'. 60 Hart himself has suggested that 
international law lacks a rule of recognition.61 However, a number of 
international lawyers disagree on this assessment, pointing to the doctrine 
of formal sources as secondary rules.62 It should be emphasized, though, 
that usage of the term 'rule of recognition' does not always imply 
wholesale acceptance of Hart's terminology or theory. Further, it is by no 
means clear that Hart's division of law into primary and secondary rules 
corresponds to the division of international law into primary norms and 
secondary norms. Hart's terminology is far more specific than the one 
used in international law or in the law of the European Union, where 
secondary law simply characterizes norms derived from primary law. 
Finally, there has been considerable debate on whether sources of 
international law actually represent part of the legal system or not.63 
Adopting Hart's terminology would mean taking sides in that conflict. 
Therefore, as already pointed out, this work will limit itself to speak of 
sources as a procedure for positing norms which has been recognized by 
the actors of a legal system. 
1.4.1.2 Sources of International Law 
Generally, the making of international law is not bound to follow a 
specific form. Norms can be produced by a variety of procedures. Apart 
from divergences on technicalities, a core of such procedures seems to 
enjoy near-universal acceptance by states. Treaty law, custom, general 
principles of law and unilateral declarations are all primary sources of 
international law, directly creating rights and obligations for the actors 
involved. 
60 H. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961, Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 92. 
61 Hart, 1961, p. 209, pp. 228-31. 
62 F. Kratochwil, 'Is International Law "Proper" Law?', LXIX Archiv fur Rechts· und Sozial· 
philosophie 12 (1983), p. 26 et seq.; J. I. Charney, 'Universal International Law', 87 AJIL 
529 (1993), p. 533. See also Danilenko, 1993, p. 28, note 46 with further references to N.J. 
Onuf, G.J.H. van Hoof and Th. Franck. 
63 Fastenrath, 1991, p. 85 with further references. 
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For treaty law, customary law, and general principles of law Article 38 (1) 
(a)-(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice offers a handy 
and oft-quoted specification. Although its addressee is formally limited to 
the ICJ, the catalogue of sources contained in this norm has been widely 
used by the actors of international law.64 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;65 
These three procedures are usually categorized as multilateral methods of 
creating norms. Beyond them, norms may also emanate from unilateral 
declarations. This method has been expounded as follows by the ICJ in 
the 1974 Nuclear Tests Cases: 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral 
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations [ ... ]When it is the intention of the State 
making the declaration that it should become bound according to 
its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of 
a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to 
follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An 
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly and with an intent to be 
bound, even though not made within the context of international 
negotiations, is binding. 66 
Moreover, it is important to note that unilateral declarations in the 
narrow sense must be distinguished from other declarations that merely 
trigger or annul obligations regulated in primary law. Such unilateral 
64 For an extensive discussion, see Danilenko, 1993, pp. 32-6, with further references to the 
invocation of the quoted provision as a catalogue of the formal sources of international 
law by states in notes 71 and 72. 
65 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI [hereinafter 
SICJ], Art. 38 (1) (a)-(c). 
66 Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 267 and 472. 
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declarations, in fact, create norms without relying on a procedural 
framework offered within other parts of primary law.67 Whether this 
norm-creating method is truly unilateral in the sense that its bindingness 
does not depend on the actions or omissions of other states is of little 
importance for our context.68 Suffice it to note that this method of 
creating obligations has been recognized in state practice.69 
The output of these four procedures can be conveniently termed 
primary law, which allows for an analogy with the law of the European 
Union. By contrast, decisions of international organisations or judgements 
issued by international courts or tribunals need a base in primary law to 
be binding upon the actors of international law. This makes such 
decisions or judgements secondary law. By way of example, a judgement 
by an authorized international court in a case it has been seized with70 or a 
resolution by the UN Security Council71 may entail a binding effect. 
Their bindingness is derived from a source under Article 38 (a)-(c), 
namely the treaty law of the UN Charter and the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) respectively. The 
proper foundation of this bindingness is to be found in the named treaties, 
endowing the organ with competence for mandatory decisions. 
By contrast to a number of domestic legal systems, international law 
does not contain a numerus clausus, that is, an exhaustive enumeration of 
norm-creating methods. Consequently, apart from treaties, customary 
law, general principles of law and unilateral declarations, there may be 
other ways and means to bind states under international law. Hence, 
sources beyond those named have been proposed to possess the capacity 
67 This dependence on a primary law framework makes treaty ratification fall outside the 
narrow concept of unilateral declaration. To be valid, a ratification depends on a 
normative framework codified in Articles 2 (1) (b) and 14 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 24 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VTC]. 
68 See Fastenrath, 1991, pp. 105 and 106 for a discussion of alternative foundations of 
bindingness (auto-limitation of States as opposed to the protection of good faith). 
69 See Verdross and Simma, 1984, p. 431, para 671, quoting examples from the area of 
- disarmament and the use of nuclear weapons. 
70 Art. 59 SICJ, Art. 46 (1) ECHR. 
71 Art. 46 (1) ECHR. 
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to bind states.72 Concluding on a rather complex and extended discussion, 
none of these propositions has won the necessary support by the actors of 
international law.73 Prima facie, there is no reason for the present work to 
break new ground in this respect. 
The preceding discussion of sources leaves us with a residue of legal 
phenomena relevant for the determination of international law, which 
clearly do not fulfil the prerequisites for sources as procedures to create 
norms. These phenomena comprise inter alia: judicial decisions and 
doctrinal writings as 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law'7~, various forms of 'evidence' for a certain custom, 'subsequent 
practice' as referred to in Article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Treaty 
Convention75, or supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of 
Article 32 VTC. In the context of refugee protection, norms emanating 
from the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 
intended to guide states in their interpretation of international refugee 
law, belong to that category.76 For reasons of convenience, such norms 
have often been termed 'soft law'. The difference between such 
phenomena and the four sources dealt with above is evident: while the 
latter are binding in themselves, the former may only contribute to 
determine the content of binding norms. Certainly, subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law, supplementary means of interpretation, 
and 'soft law' may single out normative contents in a manner reminiscent 
of sources proper, but they do not confer binding force upon these 
contents. In line with its principled distinction between binding and non-
binding norms, this work acknowledges their relevance, but insists that 
they not be termed sources of law. 
72 Large part of those discussions focused on certain Resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly as a possible source of international law. From the academic angle, consensus 
was proposed as another formal source of law. For a comprehensive discussion, see 
Fastenrath, 1991, pp. 110-8. 
73 Verdross and Simma, 1984, p. 409. 
74 Art. 38 (d) SICJ. 
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 24 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
76 J. Sztucki, 'The Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees adopted by the 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme', 1 IJRL 285 (1989); U. Brandl, 'Soft 
Law as a Source of International and European Refugee Law', in J. Y. Carlier and D. 




1.4.1.3 Normative Hierarchies within International Law 
The horizontal structure of the international legal order, the absence of a 
numerus clausus in law-making, and the equality of states all suggest the 
absence of clear, unequivocal normative hierarchies among the sources of 
international law. A look into the preparatory works of the ICJ Statute 
has clarified that the consecutive enumeration of sources contained in its 
Article 38 (1) (a)-(c) does not reflect a hierarchy of sources.77 The absence 
of a predetermined hierarchy of sources in international law is no longer 
questioned these days. 78 
Nevertheless, in a precipitate analogy to the law of the European 
Union, would it not be self-evident to accord primary law the right of 
way before secondary law? It is true that primary law prevails over 
secondary law emanating from the same source; that is, a binding 
resolution of the Security Council is subordinate to a stipulation of the 
Charter of the United Nations (henceforth UNC).79 Different is the case 
where secondary law is competing with a norm beyond its foundational 
instrument. There is no rule of thumb. Instead, a solution must take into 
account third party interests and make recourse to the parties' intentions 
when stipulating the conflicting norms. 80 
Quite another matter is the establishment of hierarchies of norms. 
Wherever necessary, conflicts within primary law have to be solved by 
applying the rules of lex posterior derogat legi priori, lex superior derogat 
legi inferiori and lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
The predominance of lex superior is illustrated by the status accorded 
to jus cogens as defined in Article 53 of the VTC. It flows inter alia from 
Articles 53 and 64 VTC that jus cogens derogates norms of international 
71 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (1997, Routledge, 
London), p. 56, stating that the drafting history of the SICJ does not suggest that there is 
an order of application inherent in Art. 38 SICJ. 
78 Negating the hierarchical structure of international law: K. Zemanek, 'The Legal 
Foundations of the International System, General Course on Public International Law', 
Recueil des Cours 1997, Tome 266 (1998), p. 132, and W. CzapHnski and G. M. Danilenko, 
'Conflicts of Norms in International Law', 21 NJIL {199.0), pp. 6-8, both with further 
references. Further on hierarchies within as well as between the various sour-ces, Verdross 
and Simma, 1984, pp. 412-6. 





law not possessing that status.81 However, the identification of jus cogens 
has proven problematic, limiting the practical value of the concept.82 To 
be sure, jus cogens is neither a source of law nor does it give prevalence to 
specific sources. Rather, it is a quality attached to a specific norm, what-
ever its source may be.83 
The practical application of the remaining two collision rules is marred 
by similar doubts. Both the lex posterior rule and the lex specialis rule 
presuppose that the two competing norms essentially deal with the same 
subject matter. But exactly what degree of congruence is required? And 
how do we distinguish the general from the specific? For all three 
collision rules, the crucial question remains how to determine the 
relationship between competing norms. This problem is not exclusive to 
international law but affects the law of the European Union and domestic 
law in an equivalent manner. 
1.4.1.4 International Law and Justiciability Advantages 
Clearing our minds on the issue of justiciability of international law 
presupposes answers to three questions. First, does international law offer 
its own implementation mechanisms? Are there any institutions, treaty 
monitoring bodies or courts that directly secure the justiciability of 
international law? Second, what is the standing of international law norms 
in domestic law? Third, to what extent can such norms be invoked by 
individuals before domestic courts? 
Quite obviously, international law cannot compete with the 
implementation mechanisms usually offered within domestic legal 
systems. There is no all-embracing grid of justiciability on the 
international level. However, important exceptions to this rule can be 
made out. Certain human rights instruments offer individuals the option 
of filing complaints with specific monitoring bodies. These bodies are 
endowed with competence to look into the matter and to take a stand on 
81 See Arts 53 and 64 VTC. 
82 To name but one example, Higgins has shown that the resort to arguments of jus cogens 
can be superfluous in a number of cases, as the underlying normative conflicts can be 
solved with lesser means, i.e. a careful customary law argumentation. R. Higgins, 
Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It (1993, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford), pp. 21-2. 
83 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 II, p. 248. 
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the proper application of the invoked human rights norm to the facts of 
the case. In our context, three bodies are of specific relevance: the Human 
Rights Committee in Geneva, monitoring the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the CAT Committee in Geneva, 
monitoring the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and the European 
Court of Human Rights (EctHR) in Strasbourg, monitoring the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). 
Generally, the control density as well as the control intensity of 
protective rights in international law is low. First of all, not all 
instruments relevant in our context are coupled to a monitoring 
mechanism. The 1951 Refugee Convention, without doubt the prime 
protective instrument in the area we are seized with, does not offer any 
mechanism for individual complaints on an international level. Second, 
where monitoring mechanisms are coupled to protective instruments, the 
Contracting Parties are often left with the choice to 'opt in' to 
monitoring. States bound by the IC CPR and by CAT do not 
automatically authorise their monitoring bodies to receive individual 
complaints. This has to be done in an additional step which far from all 
Contracting Parties take. Thirdly, neither the Human Rights Committee 
(monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR) nor the CAT Committee 
(monitoring the implementation of CAT) are authorised to issue decisions 
that are legally binding for the respondent states. 
Compared to the Human Rights Committee and the CAT Committee, 
the ECtHR is much closer to a full-fledged court in domestic legal 
systems. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR extends to all matters concerning 
the interpretation and application of the ECHR and its protocols.84 States 
bound by the ECHR automatically accept the monitoring function of the 
ECtHR. 85 Moreover, the ECtHR is authorised to issue binding judge-
ments rather than recommendatory decisions.86 As we will see later in this 
work, it has played a decisive role in the development of extraterritorial 
protection; in recent years, the CAT Committee has seconded this trend. 
84 Art. 32 ECHR. 
85 Art. 34 ECHR. Before the reform of the control machinery effectuated by the 11th 
Protocol to the ECHR, the admissibility of individual complaints hinged on a declaration 
by the respondent Contracting Party, recognizing the competence of the monitoring 
bodies to receive such petitions. 
86 Art. 46 ECHR. 
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Let us then turn to the two remammg questions and elucidate the 
relationship of international law and domestic law. In this context, it is 
important to recall that international law imposes obligations but 
generally leaves the choice of how to implement them domestically to 
states. 
As a consequence, international law is dependent on its reception in the 
municipal legal order. Technically, a variety of receptive methods exist, 
spanning from monist to dualist solutions, and international law has no 
bearing on states' choices in this regard. Thus, it is only by virtue of a 
general or specific stipulation in municipal law that norms of 
international law gain entry into the internal legal domain of a state. 
Another facet of this freedom of implementation enjoyed by states is that 
international law does not require its own primacy in domestic legal 
systems. 87 As we shall see below, both features distinguish international 
law from EC law. 
With regard to the second question, the following may be adduced. In 
line with the traditional conception of international law as inter-state law, 
the addressees of its norms are mainly states. The vast majority of norms 
of international law are not intended to accord rights or to create 
obligations for individuals. However, the number of important exceptions 
to this rule has multiplied in recent decades, in the shape of, inter alia, 
norms governing the conduct of international organisations, norms 
establishing the responsibility of individuals under international law, and 
norms according human rights to individuals. Where it can be shown that 
the intention of the parties was to create rights and obligations for 
individuals, such norms can be invoked directly before domestic courts 
and authorities. Some legal systems have systematized this qualification of 
norms. To name an example, United States law distinguishes between self-
executing and non-self executing treaties. While the former can be directly 
invoked before a U.S. Court even in the absence of further implementing 
legislation, the latter cannot. In the course of the further inquiry, it shall 
~- \I. 
emerge that EC law also recognizes this distinction but has systematized 
and exploited it to a much larger extent than international law. 
87 However, conflicting domestic legislation cannot be used as an excuse for non-
compliance with international law. But the point made here is that international law does 
not prescribe that domestic law generally accords its norms a given place in the domestic 
hierarchy of norms. 
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1.4.2 The Law of the European Union 
1.4.2.1 Terminology 
When we referred to the EU acquis on asylum and immigration earlier, 
we actually referred to norms stemming from the 'law of the European 
Union'. This term has been proposed88 to embrace, first, the law of the 
European Communities and, second, the law of the European Union. 
While it is well established to refer to the first as 'EC law', the second has 
been labelled 'Union law'. 89 
Although this triangular terminology does not eliminate a residual risk 
of confusion, it appears to be the tidiest alternative on offer. The term 
'law of European integration' is unattractive, as the Union hardly 
possesses a monopoly on regional integration.90 Likewise, the term 
'European Law' is unduly inclusive with regard to the mismatch between 
the geographical extension of the continent and the membership of 
European states in the EU. Therefore, this work opts for the proposed 
triangular model, where the overarching concept 'law of the European 
Union' consists of both EC law and Union law, mirroring the division 
into the supranational First Pillar on one hand, and the intergovernmental 
Second Pillar and Third Pillar on the other. 
EC law has attained growing importance for the present subject, as the 
Treaty of Amsterdam moved the issues of visa, asylum, immigration and 
other policies related to free movement of persons from Union law, 
namely the intergovernmental Third Pillar, to EC law under the supra-
national First Pillar. This seems to suggest that Union law is no longer 
relevant for the material questions this work is seized with. However, 
excluding Union law and its sources from further scrutiny would 
disregard that the acquis communitaire related to these policies and 
adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam still 
88 M. Schweitzer, Staatsrecht III-Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht, Europarecht, 5th ed. (1995, Muller, 
Heidelberg), p. 9. 
89 M. Pechstein and C. Koenig, Die Europaische Union. Die Vertrage van Maastricht und 
Amsterdam, 2 ed. (1998, Mohr Siebeck, Tiibingen), pp. 4-9. 
90 By way of example, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Economic Area (EEA), the Nordic Council 
and the Benelux Economic Union all pursue important integrational goals in the 
European context, involving groups of states not congruent with the circle of Members 
of the European Union. 
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retains its quality as Union law. To understand the acquis conceived pre-
Amsterdam in the framework of the Third Pillar, it is still mandatory to 
clear our minds on its sources. As we shall see, Union law conceived post-
Amsterdam possesses limited relevance for the subject of this work. 
1.4.2.2 Primary and Secondary Law of the European Union 
Within the law of the European Union, the distinction between primary 
and secondary law is well established and plays an importarit role in its 
doctrine of sources. The term 'primary law' denotes those norms flowing 
from the foundational instruments of EC law and Union law re-
spectively.91 To wit, these instruments concurrently represent a source of 
obligation under international law (namely treaty law in the sense of 
Article 2 (1) (a) VTC) and under the law of the European Union (namely 
as primary EC law). 
The term 'secondary law' denotes those norms stipulated by the organs 
in accordance with the procedures set out in the foundational 
instruments. Thus, secondary EC law is derived from primary EC law, 
and secondary Union law finds its origin in primary Union law. The 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining 
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States provides an excellent 
example of secondary EC law.92 A regulation is defined as a binding 
instrument of law in Article 249 TEC.93 The competence to enact a 
regulation in the pertinent issue was laid down in Article 100 (c) 
TEC/Maastricht. Accordingly, the binding nature of this regulation is 
derived from the TEC. As we shall see, this alone is a sufficient 
justification under the framework of EC law. 
For a justification under international law, the following argument can 
be adduced. By ratifying the TEC and approving its Article 249, State 
Parties have agreed to be bound among themselves by the outcomes of a 
91 For a detailed account, see chapters 1.4.2.2 and 1.4.2.6 on primary and secondary law 
within EC law and Union law respectively. 
92 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States, OJ (1995) L 234/13. 
93 At the time of its enactment, this regulation was based on Art. 189 TEC/Maastricht, 
which has now been replaced by the identically worded Art. 249 TEC. 
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specific legislative mechanism, producing mandatory norms in a manner 
deviating from the procedures commonly used in international law. As 
there is no numerus cla~sus in international law, State Parties are free to 
create bindingness in the manner described by Article 249 TEC. It will 
emerge in the next sub-section that a justification under international law 
is not necessary to make EC law valid. This is different for secondary 
Union law: for the time being, a sound chain of justification under 
international law is a prerequisite for its validity. In the following 
sections, the underlying reasons for these differences will be further 
explored. 
1.4.2.3 EC Law and Union Law: Conceptual Questions 
At first sight, it may appear tempting to treat the law of the European 
Union as a regional variety of international law. Giving in to that 
temptation would liberate us from a further exploration of its sources and 
establish an overarching analytical framework for legal norms. As we will 
see, however, the peculiarities of EC law shall prohibit such a reduction. 
Secondly, one might hope to treat the law of the European Union as a 
singular whole, operating with the same doctrine of sources, the same 
methods of solving normative conflicts, and the same methods of 
implementation. This hope shall also come to naught. Such a treatment 
would create rather than solve analytical problems, as the differences 
between EC law and Union law are fundamental in nature. 
To start with, EC law can no longer be framed as a regional variety of 
international law. The decisive difference lies in an unparalleled transfer of 
state sovereignty from the Member States to the organisational structure 
of the EC. Successively, this transfer has provided the grounds for 
stipulating norms, defining the group of addressees, implementing them in 
domestic arenas, adjudicating alleged breaches and sanctioning them-all 
in a manner exceeding the explanatory framework of ordinary 
international law.94 By consequence, EC law has been conceived as neither 
international law nor domestic law, but a legal order sui generis in the oft-
94 In contemporary debate, attempts to explain EC law as international law seem rare. The 
most recent 'traditionalist' source referred to by Pechstein and Koenig dates from 1977. 
See Pechstein and Koenig, 1998, p. 108, note 3. 
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quoted case law of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ).95 This 
has allowed the Court to claim the independence of EC law in relation to 
other legal systems.% 
The pivotal element of this legal order is twofold. First, it enjoys 
supremacy over domestic law, irrespective of whether the latter is 
statutory97 or constitutional98 in nature. Second, under certain conditions, 
EC law can be invoked before domestic courts without any intermediary 
act of incorporation. These conditions are set out in the doctrines of direct 
applicability ;,,-;.d direct effect, which will be dealt with further below. 
Given the sui generis character of EC law, where does that leave Union 
law? Two positions offer themselves.99 The first one insists that Union 
law, due to its intergovernmental rather than supranational character, 
must be regarded as international law. The following arguments support 
this contention. Strikingly, the forms of Community legislation under 
Article 249 TEC are not made available in Article 34 TEU. Moreover, the 
competence of the ECJ for the majority of legal instruments under the 
TEU is largely excluded. Finally, the dominance of unanimity decision-
making constitutes a decisive difference in comparison to EC law. 
Proponents of the second position, however, point to the close 
interlinkage of Union law with the Community framework when 
95 '[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights,[ ... ]', Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos 
vs. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963], ECR 1, p. 12. 'By contrast with 
ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, 
on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.' Case 6/64, Costa vs. ENEL, 
[1964], ECR 585, p. 593. 
% The ECJ has qualified the TEC as an 'independent source of law' vis-a-vis domestic law 
inter alia in Case 6/64, Costa vs. ENEL, [1964], ECR 585, p. 593 and in Case 11/70, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle for Getreide und 
Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125, [1972] CMLR 255. 
97 Supra. 
98 '[T]he vaiidity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be 
affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by 
the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.' Case 
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fo. · Getreide und 
Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125, [1972] CMLR 255. 
99 For a comprehensive exploration of both positions in the context of the Third Pillar, see 
M. Schieffer, Die Zusammenarbeit der EU-Mitgliedstaaten in den Bereichen Asyl und 
Einwanderung (1998, Nomos, Baden-Baden), pp. 157-66. The following presentation is 
based on Schieffer in that regard. 
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motivating its sui generis character, different from both EC law and 
international law. This position is defended inter alia by the European 
Commission and some doctrinal sources. It rests mainly on the identity of 
the organs serving both the Communities and the Union, the right to 
initiative accorded to the European Commission and the involvement of 
the European Parliament, and the option to cover operative costs under 
the Third Pillar through the budget of the Communities. 
The second position has been pointedly described as drawing on 
anticipated developments rather than on present realities. 100 Therefore, for 
the time being, the TEU must be regarded as a 'divided treaty'101, 
encompassing EC law in the First Pillar and international treaty law in 
the Second and Third Pillar. The decisive feature of EC law is to be found 
in the promotional role of the ECJ and the doctrines developed by it. 
Presently, their portee is by and large limited to the First Pillar. The 
modifications of the TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam did not alter this 
state of affairs.102 For these reasons, Union law will be regarded as 
international law in the following. This does not preclude some deviations 
from the characteristics of international law. Nonetheless, such deviations 
are based on the TEU and can be justified as created by international 
treaty law. 
Yet the problem of this sub-section was not to identify the true 
character of EC law and Union law as an end in itself, but only inasmuch 
as this permitted the determination of their sources. By way of 
conclusion, EC law is different from regional international law to a degree 
prohibiting simple and exclusive recourse to the doctrines of international 
law when identifying the content of the former. Taking an intermediary 
position, Union law does not defy the analytical framework offered by 
international law in the same principled manner. In all, the law of the 
European Union can be reduced neither to international law nor to EC 
law. This suggests that EC law and Union law should be analysed 
separately. 
100 Schieffer, 1998, pp. 163-4. 
101 Schieffer, 1998, p. 165. 
102 Amsterdam brought a few changes, which mitigate the differences between EC law and 
Union law to a very limited extent. By virtue of a declaration based on Art. 35 TEU, 
Member States may accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the area of police and judicial 
co-operation in criminal matters. Moreover, the Union has been endowed with a limited 
competency to conclude international treaties (Art. 24 TEU). 
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1.4.2.4 EC Law: Sources and Normative Hierarchies 
It has already emerged that EC law possesses features that stand out in a 
comparison with international law. While the position of international 
law in domestic law is dependent on the domestic norm hierarchy, EC 
law enjoys supremacy. Its sui generis character also manifests itself in a 
specific structure of sources; the binding quality of its norms need not be 
justified externally, that is, vis-a-vis international or domestic law. Put 
briefly, EC law is a self-contained legal order. Its doctrine of sources 
deviates considerably from international law. 
The primary law of the EC encompasses the foundational treaties of the 
three Communities including addenda, annexes and protocols, later 
modifications by treaties of international law103 as well as customary EC 
law and the General Principles of law.104 To the extent the TEU has a 
bearing on EC law, it belongs to primary EC law as well. 105 Primary EC 
law is posited at the top of the EC norm hierarchy, and secondary law 
must necessarily comply with it. 106 The superior position of written 
primary law is endorsed in Article 46 TEU, setting out the procedure by 
which foundational treaties are to be amended. It flows from this article 
that primary law can only be overridden by new primary law. 
Secondary law is also confined to the limits set out by the General 
Principles of Law. Hierarchically, these principles are on the same footing 
as primary law.107 Just as their namesake in international law, such 
principles were originally devised to fill normative lacunae; this gives 
them an open-ended texture. However, the precise content of the General 
Principles need not necessarily be identical with their namesake in 
international law. This follows already from the fact that th.e Member 
States are but a fraction of the group of 'civilized nations' relevant for 
identifying General Principles under Article 38 (c) VTC. 
Within EC law, the concept of General Principles of Law has been 
developed by the ECJ, drawing primarily on the general principles 
103 M. Schweitzer and W. Hummer, Europarecht, 4th ed. (1993, Alfred Metzner-Luchterhand 
Verlag, Neuwied), pp. 14-5. 
10• T. Oppermann, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (1999, Verlag C.H. Beck, Miinchen), p. 182. 
105 Pechstein and Koenig, 1998, pp. 54-62. 
106 See Art. 5 TEC: 'The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein'. As stipulated in Art. 
230 TEC, the ECJ exercises a control function in this regard. 
107 Oppermann, 1999, p. 191. 
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common to the legal systems of the Member States.108 Such principles are 
identified by evaluating a comparison of domestic law. As this evaluation 
is not necessarily bound to a minimum common denominator109, it leaves 
ample room for discretion. The ECJ has already set out a number of 
General Principles, but nothing suggests that this process has come to an 
end. In the future, further principles may surface, identified along the 
lines suggested by the ECJ. 
Within the framework of General Principles, the ECJ has addressed the 
delicate issue of the protection of basic rights. In particular, the ECJ has 
emphasized in the Hauer case 
that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of the law, the observance of which it ensures; that in 
safeguarding those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration 
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, so 
that measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights 
recognized by the constitutions of those states are unacceptable in 
the Community; and that, similarly, international treaties for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community 
law.110 
As EC law enjoys supremacy over domestic constitutional law, the latter 
cannot protect against the former. It follows that a sufficient standard of 
basic right protection must be integrated into EC law to prevent a 
downgrading of legal protection.111 As Weiler has shown in his exegesis of 
the ECJ judgement in the Hauer case112, the court derived such protective 
rights in three distinct steps. First, it looked at the level of international 
law, which led it to the First Protocol of the ECHR. In the opinion of the 
Court, this did not yield a sufficiently specific result. Second, it tested the 
challenged domestic norm against the constitutional rules and practices of 
108 Case 36/75, Rutili, [1975] ECR 1219, p.1232. 
109 Pechstein and Koenig, 1998, p. 111. 
11° Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Judgment of the Court of 13 
December 1979, [1979] ECR 3727, para. 15. 
111 Nold Case, 14.5.1974, aff. 4/73, Rec. 508. 
112 J. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. "Do the new clothes have an emperor?' and other 
essays on European integration (1999, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 112-6. 
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the Member States. Here, it could have adopted a simple maximalist 
approach, sifting through the Member States' constitutions and picking 
the farthest-going domestic right as a model for the whole Union. 
However, as Weiler underscores, the Court did not do that. Rather, it 
used the constitutional backdrop for culling the 'ideas' inherent in the 
right to property113, which was at stake in Hauer. In a third step, it 
conducts its own proportionality test, in which the challenged norm is 
weighed against the Community interest. Thus, the yardstick in 
proportionality reasoning is not the general interest of the single Member 
State, but of the Community as a whole, which may entail quite different 
results. 114 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, a certain group of individual rights has 
been formally endorsed in Article 6 (2) TEU: 
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and 
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law. 
Compared to the status quo ante, this accords the protection of 
individuals a place in primary law and extends it into Union law. 
However, Article 6 (2) TEU is not coextensive with the concept of 
General Principles at large. Where such principles are derived from other 
sources than the ECHR or the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, they would not fall under the scope of Article 6 (2) TEU. This 
means that the concept of General Principles is far from being rendered 
obsolete by the quoted provision. 
113 Weiler, 1999, p. 114. 
114 Quite obviously, this relativistic method runs counter to any concept of 'absolute' rights. 
While the described method works for the right to property (which may be legitimately 
limited), it is far more problematic for, say, the prohibition of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (Art. 3 ECHR). This prohibition leaves no space for legitimate 
infringements, identified by weighing the interests at stake. However, one could argue 
that the Court would stop after the first step, and declare Art. 3 ECHR to be sufficiently 
specific to deliver guidance. 
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The primary law of the EC also features its own customary law. However, 
only few examples have been named for its manifestations, and these are 
of no import to the subject of this study.115 
Agreements between the EC and third countries and so-called mixed 
agreements116 have been declared to form an inherent part of the EC legal 
order.117 Inasmuch as they bind the EC institutions, they are superior to 
secondary law.118 For agreements between the EC and third countries, this 
has been expressly recognized in Article 300 (7) TEC. 
Positioned below primary law we find secondary EC law. There are 
three types of binding instruments-regulations, directives, and decisions 
-available exclusively to Community legislators. This is clear from 
Article 249 TEC-a provision that could be said to represent the toolbox 
of secondary EC law: 
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly 
with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make 
regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations or deliver opinions. 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom 
it is addressed. 
[ ... ] 
115 M. Schweitzer and W. Hummer, 1993, p. 18, naming two examples from practices within 
the Council. 
116 Mixed agreements are 'agreements which include among their Contracting Parties not 
only one or more of the European Communities but also one or more of their Member 
States [footnote omitted]'. A. Rosas, 'Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements', in M. 
Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union (1998, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), p. 125. For a typology of mixed agreements, see Rosas, 
1998, pp. 128-33. 
117 Case 131/73, Haegemann, ECR 459. 
118 G. Isaac, Droit communitaire general, 3 ed. (1992, Masson, Paris), p. 135. 
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While decisions under EC law possess some similarities with decisions of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UNC119, there is hardly an 
equivalent to regulations and directives under international law. 
Conferring abstract and general normative powers upon the institutions 
of the Communities and diminishing the sovereign powers in the field 
where these institutions have made use of them120, they must be dealt with 
as sources of a specific nature lacking parallels in international law. 
But secondary law also features non-binding instruments. Article 249 
TEC entitles the Community legislator to make recommendations and to 
offer opinions but adds that they shall not have binding force. Therefore, 
they fall outside our narrow concept of what constitutes a source of law, 
based on the bindingness of norms. The same is true for so-called atypical 
instruments; that is, types of instruments issued by Community 
institutions, although they are not codified in the TEC.121 However, it is 
of utmost importance to recall that the precise nature of secondary law 
instruments is not determined by their name, but by their substance. The 
ECJ has declared atypical instruments to be mandatory, when it has found 
that their content revealed an intention to be bound. Thus, formally non-
binding declarations have transmuted into binding instruments following 
a thorough analysis of their content by the ECJ .122 
The case law of the ECJ is all too often named as a source of EC law. It 
is true that the ECJ has been endowed with the power to interpret the 
TEC and certain acts related to it. 123 All the more, one must object that 
obligations derive not from interpretation, but from sources prior to 
them. Clearly, the ECJ does not create obligations but, where need be, 
specifies them. Moreover, it is not feasible to accord the case law of the 
ECJ a fixed place in the hierarchy of norms. The place of such norms 
depends, of course, on whether the Court is charged with interpreting 
primary law or secondary law, or whether it sets out to identify General 
119 Both are solely binding upon their addressees and do not stipulate general norms. 
120 In areas where the Communities have used their discretionary power to legislate, the 
Member States are no longer competent to do so. This was enunciated in the ERTA Case. 
Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities. European Agreement on Road Transport, Judgement of the Court of 31 
March 1971, [1971] ECR 263, p. 263, para. 31. 
121 These acts are often termed as resolutions, conclusions, declarations or communications. 
122 ERTA Case, paras 34-55. For further references, see Isaac, 1992, p. 130. 
123 Art. 234 TEC. 
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Principles of Law. Therefore, we see no need to include case law as a 
specific entry in the present account of sources. 
In the course of this sub-section, it has emerged that EC law is more 
hierarchically structured than international law. International law is a flat 
legal order: the amount of lex superior is limited, and a majority of 
normative conflicts must be solved by other means. EC law, in turn, is 
characterised by a hierarchical opposition of primary law, general 
principles of law and external agreements to secondary law. Due to the 
role of the ECJ and the sheer quantity of secondary legislation, the 
dynamics of this legal order rely to a much greater degree on the 
argument of lex superior. 
1.4.2.5 EC Law and Justiciability Advantages 
When analysing justiciability advantages within the framework of EC 
law, we shall draw on the same questions asked earlier with regard to 
international law. First, does EC law offer its own implementation 
mechanism? Second, what is the standing of EC law norms in domestic 
law? Third, to what extent can such norms be invoked by individuals 
before domestic courts? 
Indeed EC law possesses a potent implementation mechanism in the 
ECJ, whose task is to 'ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
[the TEC] the law is observed'. 124 As an international implementation 
mechanism, the ECJ is unparalleled in its powers. 125 Its jurisdiction 
stretches over a vast number of primary and secondary acts126; its capacity 
to issue binding judgements127, to mete out penalties128, to suspend the 
application of challenged acts129 and to decide interim measures130 is 
considerable. The TEC also prescribes that domestic courts may request 
preliminary rulings from the ECJ on questions within the jurisdiction of 
124 Art. 220 TEC. 
125 The jurisdiction of the ECJ is extolled in Arts 220-45 TEC. 
126 See e.g. Art. 234 TEC. 
127 Art. 228 (1) TEC. 
128 Art. 228 (2) TEC. 
129 Art. 242 TEC. 
130 Art. 243 TEC. 
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the latter131, thus linking EC law to domestic adjudication within Member 
States. Without going into further detail, one can safely state that the 
monitoring mechanisms offered by international law are far from 
approximating the privileged position the ECJ retains with regard to EC 
law. 
What, then, characterises the relationship of EC law to the domestic 
law of the Member States? It has already emerged that the two major 
characteristics of EC law are its supremacy and its specific capacity of 
penetrating into the domestic legal orders of the Member States.132 
Compared to the relationship between international law and domestic 
law, this represents a double advantage. First, there is a clear normative 
hierarchy in favour of EC law, which international law lacks. Second, the 
direct applicability and direct effect of certain EC law norms add 
important justiciability advantages to the doctrine of supremacy. These 
advantages are much more far-reaching than those available under 
international law. 
The development of the supremacy doctrine originated with the Costa 
v ENEL case133 and was further refined in the Van Gend en Loos case, 
where the ECJ pointed to the risk of legal disharmony between Member 
States and, ultimately, discrimination, if EC law were not given pre-
valence when invoked before domestic courts.134 Deriving the supremacy 
of EC law from the TEC has been rightly described as depending on 'a 
"constitutional" rather than international law interpretation'.135 In spite of 
the outspoken initial resistance by certain governments136, the supremacy 
of EC law now seems to enjoy sufficient support by the Member States. 
Being the masters of the treaties, they refrained from altering the structure 
of supranational constitutionalism thus created by the Court. The 
successive amendments of the foundational treaties had provided ample 
131 Art. 234 TEC. 
132 This description originates with Guy Isaac, who attests EC law 'une force specifique de 
penetration dans l'ordre juridique interne des Etats members', Isaac, 1992, p. 151. 
133 Case 6/64, Costa (Flaminio)vENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
134 Case 26/ 62, Van GentJ en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1. 
135 J. Weiler, 'The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism', 1 YBEL 
267 (1981), p. 275. 
136 Compare the positions taken by Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands in van Gend en 
Loos, and the overview in P. Craig and G. de Burca, EC Law. Texts, Cases and Materials 
(1995, Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 252-82. 
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opportunity to do so.137 This goes to show that the Member States have, 
by and large, accepted the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. EC 
law thus enjoys a fixed position in the domestic legal orders of the 
Member States. Differently from international law, its impact does not 
hinge on implementing domestic law. This answers the second question. 
Regarding the third question, and specifying our earlier findings 
somewhat, it must be recalled that far from all norms of EC law can be 
successfully invoked by individuals before a domestic court. In primary 
law, a treaty provision may have direct effect provided that it is clear, 
unconditional, containing no reservation on part of the Member State, 
and not dependent on any national implementing measure. 138 With regard 
to secondary law, Article 246 TEC explicitly states that regulations 'shall 
be [ ... ] directly applicable in Member States'. The ECJ has affirmed that 
regulations possess direct effect and can be applied in the domestic law of 
a Member State withnut any form of incorporation. Going beyond that, 
Member States are even proscribed from taking incorporative measures 
that alter, obstruct or obscure the nature of the regulation, as this may 
cause distortions in their uniform application. 139 
Somewhat more surprisingly, the ECJ has also considered the 
possibility that directives may have direct effect. Eager to deny states the 
opportunity to profit from their failure to implement directives, the ECJ 
has held in several cases that directives imposing clear, unconditional, 
sufficiently precise and complete obligations entail direct effect, if the 
Member State has failed to implement them within the prescribed 
period.140 
137 Apparently, under the negot1at1ons preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, certain Member States proposed a procedure, under which rulings of the 
ECJ could be set aside by a qualified majority of Member States. This proposal was not 
pursued further. 
138 However, doctrinal writers have noted that the Court itself stretches this rule by severing 
provisions and endowing some of its parts with direct effect. Craig and de Burca, 1995, p. 
158. 
139 Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, 7.2.1973, [1973] ECR 101; Vario/a, 10.10.1973, aff. 
34/73, ECR 981. 
140 Van Duyn, Ratti and Becker represent landmark cases for the unfolding of this 
interpretation. Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337; Case 148/78, 
Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629; Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt 
Munster·Innenstadt, [1982] ECR 53. 
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Since the Grad case, it has been clear that the direct effect of decisions also 
extends to the creation of rights for third parties.141 
Provisions in international agreements concluded by the EC with third 
states have direct effect when, regard being had to its wording and the 
purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear 
and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or 
effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure.142 
Nonetheless, these limitations to the doctrine of direct effect do not 
alter our earlier conclusion. EC law offers both an unparalleled 
implementing mechanism and a dominant position vis-a-vis domestic law, 
thus providing good opportunities for individuals to achieve effective 
implementation of their rights. However, as we will see in later chapters, 
this favourable assessment is subject to important qualifications in the area 
of asylum and migration. 
1.4.2.6 Union law: Sources, Normative Hierarchies 
and Justiciability Advantages 
The EC forms an international organisation, endowed with legal 
personality and the capacity to assume responsibility as a legal subject. 
The opposite is true for the EU. There is no doubt that the Union cannot 
enjoy rights and attract obligations, has no legal responsibility and, as a 
matter of consequence, is not an international organisation in the legal 
sense. 143 Instead, it is the states parties to the TEU who are taking the role 
as legislators and to whom acts and omissions within the Union frame-
141 Case 9-70, Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein. Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Finanzgericht Munchen-Germany, Judgment of the Court of 6 October 1970, [1970] ECR 
825. 
142 Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwiibisch Gmund, [1987] ECR 3719. 
143 For a comprehensive argumentation supporting this position, see Pechstein and Koenig, 
1998, pp. 29-43 with further references. But see J. Klabbers, 'Presumptive Personality: 
The European Union in International Law', in M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law 
Aspects of the European Union (2000, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), who first 
opposes the will theory (negating the Union international personality) with the objective 
theory (affirming the Union's international personality), then declares both theories to 




work are attributable.144 
The dependent character of Union law is reflected in its doctrine of 
sources. Most strikingly, the supranational elements of EC law-
supremacy and direct effect-are absent in it. Thus, Union law needs to be 
implemented precisely in the same manner as international law. The 
intergovernmental framework of Union law is best grasped as inter-
national law, from which each norm of Union law derives its validity. As 
we shall see, the doctrine of sources governing international law applies to 
Union law as well. However, in comparison to international law at large, 
Union law possesses rather developed hierarchical features. 
First and foremost, Union law either emanates directly from the TEU 
(primary law) or is derived from it (secondary law). To date, other sources 
of law have not been made use of by the Union legislator. The primary 
law of the Union now consists of Articles 1 to 7 and 11 to 53 TEU.145 
Clearly enough, as the TEU is a treaty under international law, it is 
binding in its totality. In line with the normative hierarchy of 
international law146, primary Union law is superior to secondary Union 
law .147 Those fundamental rights constituting general principles of 
Community law as well as the rights enshrined in the ECHR have been 
codified as part of primary Union law in Article 6 (2) TEU and share this 
preferred position. 
However, Article 6 (2) TEU must not be misunderstood to introduce 
general principles of law as known from EC law into the legal framework 
of the Union. Rather, the provision refers to a method by which the 
fundamental rights in question are to be identified-it happens to be the 
method used by the ECJ when extracting general principles of law from 
the constitutional traditions of Member States. Furthermore, within 
Union law, the rights thus identified are not protected as general 
principles of law but as primary law. 
144 Or, to use a term from German doctrine, states are the 'final subjects of attributability' 
(Zurechnungsendsubjekte) within Union law. Pechstein and Koenig, 1998, p. 30 and pp. 
78-80. 
145 Arts A-F and Arts J-S TEU/Maastricht. 
146 Verdross and Simma, 1984, p. 415. 
147 After Amsterdant, this is explicitly confirmed in Art. 35 TEU, allowing the ECJ to assess 
the validity of secondary acts in the JHA field. There is no corresponding authority for 
the ECJ in the CFSP field. 
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Secondary Union law is law created through the institutions of the 
Union. Within the corpus of secondary Union law, binding and non-
binding instruments coexist. For the identification of those parts 
representing sources of law in the strict sense, we have to single out the 
binding instruments. The pivotal element in this process is whether and to 
what extent the TEU confers binding force on secondary acts. 
Given that the presently existing asylum acquis was adopted before the 
Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, large parts of it consist of 
secondary Union law. As already pointed out, our interest for Union law 
is historical-after Amsterdam the asylum acquis will be developed further 
as EC law, and not as Union law. Within the framework of competencies 
in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, the pre-Amsterdam acquis in the 
asylum area made use of the instruments offered by Article K.3 
TEU/Maastricht or consisted of so-called atypical instruments. 
Article K.3 TEU/Maastricht had three instruments on offer: joint 
positions, joint actions and recommendations to adopt international 
agreements established in the Council. 148 While the latter recommendation 
is a non-binding instrument149 , the agreements, if adopted by Member 
States, certainly produce legal obligations.15° Clearly, joint positions are to 
be regarded as a source of legal obligations as well, as they oblige Member 
States to defend a joint position within international organisations and at 
international conferences.151 Beyond that, opinions differ with regard to 
the binding character of joint positions and joint actions.152 One position 
focuses on the fact that joint positions and joint actions are explicitly 
conceived as binding instruments under the Second Pillar, obliging 
Member States to act in accordance with them both on a domestic and on 
an international level. 153 It is maintained that joint positions and joint 
actions adopted under the Third Pillar must be regarded as having the 
same mandatory force. Opponents of this reading, however, simply turn 
its core argument around. They emphasize that the terms 'joint action' 
148 The instrument of framework decisions was added by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
makes it irrelevant for the topic of this work. See Art. 34 TEU. 
149 Schieffer, 1998, p. 171. 
150 Such agreements cannot modify primary Union law, though, inasmuch as they do not 
follow the amendment procedure in Art. 48 TEU. 
151 Art. K.5 TEU/Maastricht. 
152 For a detailed discussion, see Schieffer, 1998, pp. 172-5. 
153 Arts J.2 (2) and J.3 (4) TEU/Maastricht. 
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and 'joint position' do not denote binding instruments in the language of 
international law. Therefore, it was necessary to endow these instruments 
with mandatory power under the Second Pillar. The absence of such 
stipulations under the Third Pillar only allows for the conclusion that 
Member States did not wish these instruments to be binding in the way 
they are under the Second Pillar. 
In a way, this conflict mirrors opposing conceptions of Union law: 
some see it as being more proximate to EC law; others perceive and 
construe it as international law. While the former position militates for an 
extended binding force, the latter entails a limitation of bindingness to the 
stipulations of Article K.5 TEU/Maastricht. Taking the former position, 
however, must also of necessity entail that joint positions and joint 
actions be binding solely as Union law-an order sui generis which is not 
as far developed as EC law. Even if one frames Union law as a sui generis 
order, it is by no means clear that the legal doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect developed for EC law by the ECJ can be transposed to it. 154 
In the light of these considerations and in line with our perception of 
Union law as international law, we conclude that Joint Positions are not 
binding beyond the obligation to defend their content at international 
conferences, and that Joint Actions are not binding at large. 
But Article K.3 TEU/Maastricht was no exhaustive toolbox. In 
practice, the Council also adopted decisions, conclusions and 
recommendations which can be regarded as representing an 'appropriate 
form' in the meaning of Article K.3 (2) (a) TEU/Maastricht to promote 
the ends of the Union.155 Lacking any contrary indication in primary law, 
these instruments must be regarded as non-binding, which deprives them 
from the quality of a source of law. 156 
154 A comparison to the present state of affairs under the Amsterdam Treaty indicates the 
cautiousness of Member States in this regard. Interestingly, the stipulations on 
framework decisions and other decisions in Art. 34 (b) and (c) TEU explicitly exclude 
direct effect. The remaining two forms of measures set out in this article, namely joint 
positions and recommendations to adopt Conventions established in the Council are not 
prone to produce direct effect. However, this analogy should not be carried to far, as the 
material content of Title VI has been diminished by the transferral of issues related to 
free movement to the First Pillar. 
155 Schieffer, 1998, p. 171. 
156 But see E. Guild and J. Niessen, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the 
European Union (1996, Kluwer Law International, The Hague), p. 36, holding that their 
status is 'unclear' and that they entail obligations 'in some cases'. No arguments are given 
in support of this assessment. 
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Are there sources other than primary and secondary law? As Union law is 
regional international law, the relevance of custom, general principles of 
law and unilateral acts must not be precluded. In practice, there are no 
indications that the Union legislator has made use of the latter sources. 
With regard to justiciability advantages, Union law is a far cry from EC 
law. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ECJ had 
no jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the Third Pillar.157 Although this 
has changed, these changes are irrelevant for our topic, as asylum and 
migration issues have been concurrently moved from the Third to the 
First Pillar and subordinated to a tailor-made regime of justiciability.158 
1.4.2. 7 A Normative Hierarchy between EC Law, Union Law 
and International Law? 
From the outset, there is no hierarchical relationship between EC law and 
international law. As Union law is a regionally and institutionally con-
fined part of international law, EC law is not subordinated to Union law. 
Nor is Union law inferior to EC law. The relationship between both legal 
orders is horizontal, not vertical. 159 
However, this does not necessarily imply the emergence of numerous 
normative conflicts. Firstly, the evolution of such conflicts is limited by a 
strict delimitation of competencies between the First pillar on one hand, 
and the Second and Third Pillars on the other. Secondly, the imperative of 
coherence enshrined in Article 3 TEU compels both the EC and the EU 
to adjust their legislative acts so as not to interfere with each other. 
Thirdly, Member States have regulated some of the areas where Union 
law and EC law meet. Although these provisions stipulate hierarchies, 
they do so only within a narrow framework and thus do not allow for a 
hierarchical structuring of both legal orders at large. We shall provide two 
examples in the following. 
157 See Art. L TEU/Maastricht. The exception contained in Art. K.3 (2) (c) was never made 
use of in the area of asylum and immigration. 
158 See chapter 4.2.5 below. 
159 Pechstein and Koenig, 1998, p. 113. 
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On a general level, Article 47 TEU secures the integrity of EC law vis-a-
vis Union law by stating: 
Subject to the provisions amending the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community with a view to establishing the 
European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community, and to these final provisions, nothing 
in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or 
supplementing them. 
This denies Union law the possibility of altering, amending or abolishing 
not only present, but also future primary EC law. For specific policy 
areas, procedures have been made available to ensure coherence and to 
avoid normative conflicts. By way of example, Article 301 TEC 
subordinates EC measures to decisions on economic sanctions against 
third states taken within the Second Pillar. 
The exploration of the law of the European Union has also addressed 
one of the most decisive hierarchical problems for our topic. This 
concerns the relationship between international law beyond Union law, 
on one hand, and the law of the European Union on the other. The 
sensitivity of this issue is illustrated by the debate on the role of the 
ECHR in the law of the European Union. Art. 6 (2) TEU brings the 
norms enshrined in the ECHR within the reach of the Luxembourg 
Court, while the Strasbourg Court considers itself to have jurisdiction in 
cases where Member States implement the law of the European Union. 
There is an impending risk of divergent interpretations of the ECHR by 
the two courts. 160 
This much is clear-the named legal systems are not hierarchically 
related to each other. The relationship between international law and 
community law cannot be established in a generally valid, linear fashion. 
16° Compare Dec. 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] ECR 1-1759 and Case 
No. 24833/94, Matthews vs. U.K, Judgment of 18 February 1999, ECtHR. 
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Extending the scope of his analysis to include domestic law as well, 
Bethlehem resorts to the metaphor of a net when describing how the 
three legal systems are associated with each other: 
A characterisation which hinges on a linear conception of the 
interaction between various systems of law seems also to mis-
perceive the complex, multi-directional interaction that must 
perforce apply in circumstances in which rules and principles from 
more than one system address, even if only indirectly and in a 
complementary manner, the same subjects and subject-matter. Just 
as a web, or net, is made up of numerous strands criss-crossing at 
various points while, at the same time, going in different directions, 
so is the relationship between international law, community law 
and national law; interacting constantly even though the focus may 
be slightly different.161 
Bethlehem goes further and rejects a description of these systems as 
distinct or separate from one another as 'entirely artificial' .162 Be this as it 
may, it is certainly appropriate to stress the non-linearity in their inter-
action. This leaves us with an approach based on case-by-case analysis. 
Accordingly, in the absence of a predetermined hierarchy, any clash 
between instruments of international refugee law and international 
human rights law with the law of the European Union must be solved on 
just such a case-by-case basis. 
1.4.3 Intermediary Conclusion 
This section was intended to clarify the second basic question, concerning 
conflicts between the EU acquis and international law. After this 
elucidation, matters are no longer as simple as they appeared at the outset. 
The handy binary opposition of the EU acquis with international law has 
given way to a triangular relationship between EC law, Union law and 
international law. There is no facile hierarchy between the three norm 
161 D. Bethlehem, 'International Law, European Community Law, National Law: Three 
Systems in Search of a Framework. Systemic Relativity in the Interaction of Law in the 
European Union', in M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European 
Union (1998, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), p. 195. 
162 Bethlehem, 1998, p. 194. 
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systems, none of which overrides the others. This alone leaves us with 
nine different configurations of normative conflict between the three legal 
systems.163 If we extend our perspective to the distinction between 
primary and secondary law, the number of conflict configurations that do 
not find a hierarchical solution increases to 20.164 True enough, collision 
rules promise a certain order. However, as we have seen, their effective 
application relies on the construction of a nexus between competing 
norms-a construction that all too easily can be challenged by sceptics. 
Taken together, this goes to show that normative hierarchies play a fairly 
limited role in resolving potential legal conflicts; typically, solutions need 
to be sought horizontally rather than vertically. As a consequence, the 
subsequent inquiry will focus on the other two resolutive mechanisms-
interpretation and proportionality arguments-as well as justiciability 
advantages. 
While we will have to return to interpretation and proportionality 
arguments in later chapters, a few conclusions can already be drawn on 
justiciability advantages. EC law stands out among the three normative 
systems. Compared to the others, it ensures far-reaching justiciability 
through its capacity to penetrate deeply into domestic legal orders. 
Through the ECJ, it is endowed with a powerful guardian, which is 
seamlessly linked to the domestic law of Member States. Generally, Union 
law does not share this potent justiciability advantage with EC law. 
However, the potential of international law should not be 
underestimated. In the area of human rights, international law offers 
competitive justiciability mechanisms as well. For those rights enshrined 
163 Norms pertaining to each system can conflict with other norms within the same system, 
or with norms from other systems. By way of example, a norm pertaining to the corpus 
of EC law can conflict with another EC law norm, with a norm of Union law, or with a 
norm of international law. 
164 Each of the three norm system falls apart into primary and secondary law, allowing for 
36 configurations. After weeding out duplicates, we retain 24 configurations. Within the 
law of the European Union, a configuration opposing a primary law norm with a 
secondary law norm within the same norm system does not represent a conflict, as the 
normative hierarchy between primary and secondary law immediately secures dominance 
to the primary law norm. Within international law, the same is true for secondary law 
competing with primary law emanating from its foundational instrument. Beyond that 
constellation, there is no rule of thumb. Therefore, we can deduce four further 
configurations within the law of European Union from the 24. This leaves us with 20 




in the ECHR, the ECtHR offers the option of individual redress. Such 
action may result in a decision binding the respondent State Party. Both 
the CAT and the ICCPR are monitored by bodies that may be seized by 
individuals. In contradistinction to the ECtHR, neither the CAT 
Committee nor the Human Rights Committee issues binding decisions. 
Other instruments, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, lack options for 
individual redress. 
Finally, with regard to the ECHR, we have also noted that certain 
norms of international law concurrently have a place in the law of 
European Union and thus participate in the justiciability advantages 
available within the latter. Within EC law, the legality of secondary EC 
law must be measured against the human rights enshrined in the ECHR. 
Apart from justiciability in Strasbourg, this opens up an additional avenue 
to the Luxembourg court as well. However, as the ECtHR and the ECJ 
are principally on the same footing, this also entails the risk of 
contradictions between the case law of both courts, resulting in 
indeterminacy on a higher level. This may suffice here to illustrate that 
justiciability alone does not create determinacy-there has to be a 
comparative advantage of justiciability, allowing one norm or one 
interpretation to prevail over another in terms of implementation. If not, 
the problem of indeterminacy is merely shifted from a doctrinal to an 
institutional level. 
1..5 Determining Law-Methodological Considerations 
This section deals with the third and last basic question. While to 
determine the optimum level of inclusion and its faithful implementation 
in law is to place a non-legal query first and to premise the question of 
implementation on the answer, this order is reversed in the sequence of 
questions underlying this work: 
I. How is access to extraterritorial protection regulated m the 
European Union? 
II. Is the EU acquis in conformity with international law? 
III. Can both questions be answered in a determinate manner? 
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Why this reversal? A philosopher might start out with a moral analysis of 
the optimum of inclusion. Not so the lawyer: among the raw material 
used, the law maintains a preferred position. This brings about a different 
way of asking questions on inclusion and exclusion. For the lawyer, the 
balance between inclusion and exclusion is first and foremost struck in the 
law, not in moral philosophy. Thus, tentatively, it makes sense to inquire 
into existing norms first, for the time being without focusing overly on 
their moral or political aspects. 
At the same time, it should be readily acknowledged that moral and 
political aspects are present in the legal material, albeit in an indirect 
manner. After all, a law steering protection stems from a political conflict 
on inclusion and exclusion. The outcome of this conflict is present in the 
law and its interpretation, whether veiled in the 'letter' of its provisions or 
their 'spirit'. Moulding a political decision into law means changing the 
way it is used in discourse. The need to argue for the quality of its moral 
or political content is significantly reduced. 165 Instead, it can be 'invoked', 
which involves an element of authority, or, put differently, a presumption 
of correctness. The lawyer accedes to the political decision only through 
the norms into which it is moulded. On the whole, law is a reduction of 
complexity, based on the premise that it can produce one single, correct 
outcome. This entails a number of problems. 
1.5.1 A Triple Dilemma 
But can a lawyer remain faithful to the law? The limits of description 
appear wherever interpretation becomes necessary. Faithful description 
presupposes the opening up of conflicting interpretations in law. This 
consideration flows from the subjective dependency of interpretation: 
doing away with conflicts for the sake of a uniform, contradiction-free 
presentation of the matter is not to mirror existing law, but to take sides 
in a moral-political controversy, turning description into prescription. On 
the other hand, it appears that an excessive openness vis-a-vis inter-
pretative conflict is self-cancelling. A description of lex lata elaborating 
each and every conflict would get stuck at a very early stage. There is 
165 This flows from the repartition of labour between rational morality and law in society. 
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some irony in the conclusion: faithful description preserves the 
complexity166 inherent in the dilemma of interpretation and runs counter 
to law's promise of determinacy. Taken to its extreme, description 
annihilates itself. 
Obviously, this risk can only be countered by making choices-that is, 
by introducing normativity. When interpreting a legal norm, the lawyer 
adds prescription, carrying the reduction of complexity already attained 
by written law further. Arguing for a certain legal interpretation in a 
reasonable manner means linking a specific norm to a larger whole. This 
whole could be the usage of language beyond that norm, the telos of the 
law, or the ideology prevailing in the stipulation of a certain law. This is 
where the political conflict underlying the norm resurfaces. However, 
argumentation is not limited to the level of politics relevant for stipulating 
the very norm to be interpreted. As exemplified by referring to an 
ideology underpinning a certain norm, abstraction can be carried much 
further. 
An important benchmark in the competition for the best argument is 
the degree of complexity it can reduce in a coherent manner. 167 Given that 
coherent argumentation sooner or later turns circular, it has been argued 
that larger circles, or tighter networks 168, are to be preferred. This explains 
the drive for incorporating as many argumentative elements as possible. 
Thus, there is a dynamic inherent in legal argumentation promoting its 
166 'Als komplex wollen wir eine zusammenhangende Menge von Elementen bezeichnen, 
wenn auf Grund immanenter Beschrankungen der Verkniipfungskapazitat der Elemente 
nicht mehr jedes Element jederzeit mit jedem anderen verkniipft werden kann.' N. 
Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie (1984, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main), p. 46. 
167 See R. Alexy, 'Coherence and Argumentation or the Genuine Twin Criterialess Super 
Criterion', in A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. Rabinowicz and J. Wolenski (eds), 
On Coherence Theory of Law (1998, Juristforlaget i Lund, Lund), p. 42, enumerating three 
elements of coherence (consistency, complexity and connection). Regarding complexity, 
Alexy states that this criterion 'demands that a coherent set of propositions should 
comprise as many and as different propositions as possible'. This suggests that the quality 
of legal argumentation hinges on its capacity to reach out as far as possible into the realm 
of complexity in an organising manner. It should be observed that Alexy's usage of the 
term complexity is not congruent with Luhmann's. 
168 W. Rabinowicz, 'Peczenik's Passionate Reason', in A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. 
Rabinowicz and J. Wolenski (eds), On Coherence Theory of Law (1998, Juristforlaget i 
Lund, Lund), p. 18, and A. Peczenik, 'Second Thoughts on Coherence and Juristic 
Knowledge', in A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. Rabinowicz and J. Wolenski (eds), 
On Coherence Theory of Law (1998, Juristforlaget i Lund, Lund), p. 55. 
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ever-wider reach. This dynamic may indeed assist in solving interpretative 
problems; where weighing one argument against a competing argument 
reveals superiority in terms of reducing complexity, interpretation leads 
to determinacy. However, where the competing arguments attain roughly 
the same weight, interpretation may have attained a reduction of 
complexity in that less weighty arguments are discarded, but the 
remaining conflict appears more profound than ever. Thus, the reduction 
of choices is bought at the expense of deepening the conflict, making 
determinacy more remote than before interpretation. 
The quest for an ever more comprehensive argumentation brings in 
legal science. Both time and qualification set limits to how far a practising 
lawyer-be it a judge, an attorney or a legal adviser-can go in extending a 
legal argument. A doctrinal writer may simply furnish further elements 
strengthening the mesh of argumentation used by a lawyer. But a 
doctrinal writer may also integrate a specific legal problem into a theory 
of law. This is attractive, as it promises the double benefit of concurrently 
solving a legal problem and explaining law. However, grand theories do 
find grand competitors sooner or later. Even in legal theory, the extension 
of legal arguments leads to the deepening of conflict rather than to their 
solution. 
Interpretative conflicts are to the detriment of law's authority: where 
argumentation sees the number of elements distant from the letter of the 
law increase, its specific authority as a legal argument decreases. 169 Fully in 
line with the aspiration to depoliticized determinacy, law is perceived as 
technically good if it provides approximations to ready-made answers. 
The greater supportive argumentation necessary for extracting a solution 
from the letter of the law, the less law's authority can be transferred to the 
solution thus reached. Where interpretative argumentation has attained a 
complexity equivalent to the one reduced in the original political 
discourse preceding the positing of law, the specific meaning of law is lost. 
In that sense, the letter of the law is a centre of authority. An extensive 
argumentation automatically distances itself from this centre of authority. 
169 This phenomenon is somewhat different from the interplay of ascending and descending 
arguments in international law described by M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. 
The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989, Lakimiessliiton Kustannus, 
Helsinki), pp. 40-51. Koskenniemi sketches international law as osciallating between two 
argumentative poles of apology (power) and utopia Qaw), ultimately incapable of 
producing determinate outcomes. What we are seized with here is rather the relationship 
of determinacy and law's authority. 
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Thus, the reduction of complexity attained by comprehensive argumen-
tation is also bought at the price of depreciating the mythical force of law. 
The unwillingness of some courts to expose the theoretical underpinnings 
of their legal argumentation may be related to this anticipated loss of 
authority. 170 Another pertinent example is Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR) 171 , enunciating the 
philosophical foundations of the human rights catalogue enshrined in the 
instrument.172 A number of actors involved in its drafting as well as later 
commentators held that this enunciation would weaken rather than 
strengthen the Declaration. 173 
Considering these various entrapments, we may conclude that law's 
determinacy is threatened in a threefold manner. To wit, 
O description preserves law's complexity, 
O prescription deepens legal conflicts, and 
O complex argumentation depreciates the authority of a legal 
argument. 
This threat shall be referred to as the triple dilemma in the following. 
1.5.2 Structuring Conflicts 
How does the triple dilemma of legal argumentation impact this work? 
What consequences does it entail for choosing and structuring material? 
Returning to the basic questions on refugee protection in the European 
Union, we find that they consist of two interrelated elements-law's 
content and law's determinacy. These elements concurrently beg for 
description and prescription, thus exposing our inquiry to the risk of the 
170 Elsewhere in this work, we shall revert to the non-exploited theoretical potential in the 
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights. See chapters 10.1.1 and 11 below. 
171 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) of 10 December 1948 
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
172 Art. 1 UDHR reads: 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood'. 
173 For a comprehensive account on the drafting of this provision, see T. Lindholm, 'Article 
1', in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A 
Common Standard of Achievement (1999, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), p. 41. 
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preservation of complexity by description, the deepening of conflict by 
prescription and the loss of authority by extensive theoretical 
argumentation-in short, the triple dilemma. To be sure, as this work is a 
form of legal reasoning, it is itself exposed to the same dilemmas as the 
material it deals with. How do we administer this risk? 
Initially, we have to discover the extent to which the triple dilemma 
poses a problem for our specific topic. While good reasons suggest that the 
triple dilemma implies a risk for law in general, it remains to be 
established exactly how relevant it is for the law of refugee protection in 
the European Union. It should be reiterated that law and legal research 
share the goal of reducing complexity in terms of solving conflicts. 
Applied to our context, a self-evident measure would be to structure 
conflict situations according to their degree of gravity. 
This structure comprises three levels on a sliding scale of gravity. First-
level conflicts can be solved by concrete legal-technical means. Their 
depth of opposition is low, which makes it fairly easy to overcome such 
conflicts. Typically, single norms clash with each other in this category, 
and actors typically resort to means of resolution offered by the legal 
system itself. In this category, the focus is on the law's content in a very 
practical sense. The impact of the triple dilemma on first-level conflicts is 
very limited. After all, we are dealing with comparatively simple cases. 
Second-level conflicts feature an increased depth of opposition, and 
their resolution is more demanding. So is the abstraction necessary for 
succeeding, which forces actors to leave the legal-technical sphere in 
favour of legal theory. In this category, principles rather than single 
norms clash with each other. The argumentation is increasingly 
qualitative as elements of equity augment. The impact of the triple 
dilemma is on the rise in this category. This is the sphere of hard cases. 
Third-level conflicts attain a maximal depth of opposition, provoking 
the question whether such conflicts can be resolved at all. Even 
abstraction reaches its maximum. In this category, theories, ideologies and 
foundational assumptions clash with each other, forcing actors to resort to 
a clearly metalegal level in their quest for a further reduction of 
complexity. The limited number of conflicts surviving the process of 
reduction at lower levels is fully exposed to the triple dilemma. We are 
now dealing with the upper class of hard cases. The remaining question is 
whether further reduction does away with the conflicts themselves or 
with the credibility of law as a device to resolve conflicts. 
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In addition, on the theoretical side, we find that content can be challenged 
by indeterminacy on the three levels indicated: the legal-technical level, 
the qualitative level and what we choose to call a metalegal level. Still, 
content and determinacy mutually presuppose each other: determinacy 
cannot be assessed without extensive study of law's content. But where 
such a study reveals the parity of deeply opposed options, content cannot 
be determined. Methodologically, it follows that the issues of content and 
determinacy should not be separated in the presentation of relevant 
material. So far, this is by no means deviating from a conventional 
apprnach to legal research, which usually weaves together description and 
(prescriptive) argumentation. 
Where are the advantages then? The three-pronged structure does 
justice to the conflict-resolutive capacities within each category, thereby 
omitting unnecessary inflated argumentation. This narrows down the 
number of conflicts to be dealt with on the higher levels. Simultaneously, 
the structure underscores that each category of interpretative conflict 
demands adequate remedies-legal-technical arguments on the first level, 
qualitative arguments on the second and, if at all available, metalegal 
arguments on the third level. Finally, the structure allows for an 
extrapolation of persisting conflicts on the concrete and specific level of 
law back to the foundational assumptions feeding them and further to 
ultimate questions on law's determinacy. 
1.5.3 The Legal-technical Level 
A large number of legal conflicts, it is obvious, can already be solved at a 
legal-technical stage by applying collision norms174 or formal means of 
interpretation. 175 It is fully conceivable that the various legislators have 
been able to strike an optimum balance in the positing of norms, and that 
a specific area of law is free from deep oppositions in interpretation. To 
find out about this, we have to embark on a rather conventional study of 
lex lata in order to track down the existence of deep oppositions in 
interpretation. This first step should already provide for a substantial 
limitation of conflicts that the present inquiry has to handle. 
174 See chapter 1.4.1.3 above. 
175 Within international law, a formal methodology of interpretation is laid down in Arts 31 
and 32 VTC. See chapter 9.3 below. 
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Obviously, this task entails that provisions stemming from international 
law, the law of European Union and-to the extent necessary for carving 
out interpretive divisions-domestic law of the Member States be 
presented and brought into relation with each other. Part II of this work 
shall cover the law of the European Union relevant for our topic, while 
Part IV will focus on the framework provided by international law. In 
that sense, Parts II and IV represent the empirical substance of this 
exercise, severing first-level conflicts, second-level conflicts and third-level 
conflicts. The solution of legal-technical conflicts will take place in 
Chapter 9 after a full presentation of relevant legal norms. 
1.5.4 The Qualitative Level 
Next, the remaining conflicts are exposed to a qualitative assessment in a 
quest for their resolution. This assessment aims at a further reduction of 
complexity by opposing qualitative arguments linked to the conflicting 
interpretations. To a certain extent, law can handle second-level conflicts. 
There is a formal approach: canons of interpretation prescribe a procedure 
to be followed for solving them. And there is a material approach giving 
prevalence to what is regarded the better argument. In singling out the 
better argument, lawyers often make use of proportionality arguments 
and coherence arguments. The former aspires to cede to a solution more 
proportional to the ends pursued by a legal norm, while the latter allows a 
solution to prevail that is more coherent with the legal system as such. 176 
As we shall see, both figures of reasoning occur with some frequency in 
case law and in doctrine. To be sure, establishing preference on grounds of 
proportionality or coherence is no mathematical exercise. It involves 
taking a position. However, the range of arguable positions is circum-
scribed by law, and the measure of subjectivity is limited e.g. by proce-
dural rules of interpretation. 
176 'Koharenz ist ein Mail fur die Gtiltigkeit einer Aussage, das schwacher ist als die durch 
logische Ableitung gesicherte analytische Wahrheit, aber starker als das Kriterium der 
Widerspruchsfreiheit.' Habermas, 1992, p. 258. ['Coherence is a gauge for the validity of 
a proposition, wh;ch is weaker than the analytical truth secured by logical deduction, but 
stronger than the criterion of non-contradictiousness.' Translation by this author.] As 
regards criteria of coherence, see R. Alexy and A. Peczenik, 'The Concept of Coherence 
and its Significance for Discursive Rationality', 3 Ratio Juris 130 (1990}. 
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Our task shall be to identify second-level conflicts and to expose both the 
methods formally prescribed by international law and those actually used 
by international lawyers when solving them. This task will be mainly 
performed in Chapter 10 of this work. 
1.5.5 The Metalegal Level 
Third level-conflicts reach beyond the formalism represented by collision 
norms or canons of interpretation. Although one might wish to evict 
them from the realm of law and relegate them to the political sphere, they 
remain inextricably linked to law's meaning. At the outset, it is necessary 
to identify the foundational assumptions underlying persistent conflicts. 
This shall be done in Chapter 2 of this work. Next, we have to tackle the 
question whether anything can be done about foundational conflicts. Two 
positions offer themselves: either these conflicts can be resolved in a 
determinate manner by a sufficiently complex theory or they cannot. Let 
us deal with both in consecutive order. 
A commonly used method to resolve foundational conflicts is by 
setting a given foundation prior to its competitors. This is most vividly 
exemplified in the conflict between liberals and communitarians, where 
the former posit the individual as prior to society, while the latter prefer a 
reversed order. In the area of human rights law, a paradigmatic example is 
the dispute on the various generations of human rights-while some 
lawyers uphold the foundational differences between these generations, 
others stress that such distinctions compromise the idea of human rights 
as a whole. 177 On a less abstract level, we frequently encounter disputes on 
which rights are more 'basic' than others, where justiciability, non-
derogability or irreparability are used to establish priorities. 
At first sight, the convincing power of the priority argument relies on 
the degree to which it can consume and absorb an opposed foundation. By 
way of example, a certain class of utilitarians claim that pursuing 
m It is little helpful that state actors have declared the indivisibility of all human rights, 
while maintaining monitoring systems reflecting considerable differences in treatment of 
these generations of rights. Consider, e.g., the indivisibility rhetoric of the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration with the institutional bias in treaty monitoring, giving preference to first-
generation rights. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted 25 June 
1993 by the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 
1993 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration], para. 5. 
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particularistic goals will eventually lead to the common good. That is, 
where individual needs are served, societal needs will automatically profit; 
this argument consumes the cause of their communitarian opponents. 
Ethically inspired foundationalists do the same when they contend that 
democracies fight fewer wars or provide better economic performance. 
This means nothing less than that an order primarily built on the ethical 
value of egalitarianism also yields better instrumental results than its 
primarily instrumental competitors. Of course, setting foundations as 
prior provides important advantages, strips competing goods of their 
foundational character and relegates them to second rank. Thus, there is a 
case for challenging the outcome of any priority argument, and its 
capacity to construct ultimate justifications may turn out to be a chimera. 
Let us exemplify. An interesting attempt to bypass the bipolar 
stalemate has been brought to the fore by Habermas, in his claim that the 
public and private spheres are 'co-original' .178 This implies that individual 
human rights and the societal organisation of the state are not opposed to 
each other anymore. To put it somewhat disrespectfully, both 
foundations 'come first'. The extent to which this reconstruction of law 
and politics provides a response to the problem has to be established with 
regard to third level conflicts. Critics claim that Habermas still posits 
foundations when relying on a universalist rationality based on language 
and communication. 179 Were this true, his approach would be relegated to 
the sphere of priority arguments and contestable as such. 
But is there a world beyond the low-intensity warfare of foun-
dationalists? Both pragmatism and deconstructivism discard the necessity 
of an Archimedean point to which all normative arguments can be 
hooked, thus taking the second position. If this proved to be correct, the 
consequences for further reasoning on our topic would be radical. While 
it almost effortlessly solves the problem of ever deepening and 
irreconcilable dichotomies, this solution is bought at the price of 
axiomatic indeterminacy. In other words, both approaches accord 
foundational character to indeterminacy. It is clear that this hurts the 
assumption of law's primary function, namely to reduce complexity to 
determinate outcomes. Provided the proponents of indeterminacy are 
right, we need to consider possible consequences for the area of law in 
178 Habermas, 1992, p. 138. See generally Habermas, 1992, pp. 135-51. 
179 C. Mouffe, 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism, and the Politics of Democracy', in C. Mouffe 
(ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism (1996, Routledge, London), p. 1. 
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question here. To be sure, the second position also falls victim to the last 
element of the triple dilemma: although it may provide a better expla-
nation of the law, the indeterminacy not only augments the distance to 
the letter of the law, but puts law as a distinct social practice into 
question. This is one of the main concerns raised by critics of the 
indeterminacy position. Where law is deconstructed as politics and where 
solutions are transformed into new conflicts, both law and politics lose in 
value. Thus, a final consideration would be whether the proponents of 
indeterminacy have offerings on the pragmatic level, which trespass what 
can be attained by an orthodox reading of the law based on the idea of its 
determinacy. 
In all, the quest for resolving third level conflicts flowing from the law 
of extraterritorial protection in the European Union leaves us with two 
questions. First, do determinate grand theories stand up to the pressure of 
the scepticism of indeterminists? Secondly, what are the consequences if 
the answer is 'no' and the indeterminacy position has a case? To ponder 
these questions shall be the task of the final chapter. 
In conclusion, we are not spared the task of describing, interpreting and 
theorising on the law of refugee protection in Europe, when grappling 
with its content and determinacy. To what extent the existence of the 
triple dilemma hampers this process can only be established underway. 
Even here, it is reasonable to 'take law by its word' and to follow it in its 
quest for reducing complexity and producing determinacy, before 
assessing whether it succeeds in living up to its promises. Not doing so 
would mean losing the empirical ground for theoretical reflection. 
1.6 The Structure of Inquiry 
After identifying and delimiting problem, sources and method, what is the 
course of inquiry to be taken? Let us recall our task, before setting out a 
course. It was to answer the following basic questions: 
I. How is access to extraterritorial protection regulated m the 
European Union? 
II. Is the EU acquis in conformity with international law? 
III. Can both questions be answered in a determinate manner? 
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In pursuing this task, we will opt for a simple structure consisting of three 
core groups of chapters. Each of these groups is related to one basic 
question. While Part II (Chapters 4 to 7) is seized with the first basic 
question on the content of the acquis, Part IV (Chapters 9 to 12) attempts 
to answer the second basic question on the conformity of the acquis with 
international law. The third basic question-centred on the issue of 
determinacy-is introduced in Part I (Chapter 2), further developed in 
Part III (Chapter 8) and concluded in Part V (Chapter 13), thus forming a 
double bracket encompassing the central parts of this inquiry. For ease of 
understanding, Figure :I. offers a graphic representation of this structure. 
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Let us now explain this structure in detail. Part I has the task of 
introducing the problem of this inquiry and of providing the necessary 
tools for tackling it. The first chapter, of which this section forms part, 
formulates and delimits the specific questions fuelling our research under-
taking (Chapter 1-Introduction). The second chapter introduces the 
conceptual oppositions feeding the conflict between inclusion and 
exclusion in the practice of states as well as in international law (Chapter 
2-Universalism versus Particularism). The third chapter singles out 
determinants that have an impact on the capacity of a protection system 
in general and therewith on the legal norms governing it (Chapter ]-
Determinants of Protection Systems). 
As noted earlier, Part II shall explore how access to extraterritorial 
protection is regulated in the European Union. In the course of its four 
chapters, the focus narrows from overall developments, such as flight 
movements and institutional responses, to single norms of the acquis. 
Chapter four presents the migrational environment and institutional 
superstructure impacting extraterritorial protection within the European 
Union (Chapter 4-European Integration in the Area of Asylum and 
Migration). Chapters five, six and seven are dedicated to single norms 
within the EU acquis effecting, respectively, access to territory, to 
procedures, and to protection (Chapter 5-Access to Territory under the EU 
acquis, Chapter 6-Access to Full-Fledged Procedures under the EU acquis, 
Chapter 7-Access to Protection under the EU acquis). 
Part III consists of but a single chapter dedicated to the concept of 
burden sharing in international law as well as in the law of the European 
Union (Chapter 8-Sharing the Burden?). Performing a pivotal role in the 
layout of this work, this chapter has been assigned three tasks: a) to 
present the last chip missing in the puzzle of the EU acquis-namely those 
norms impacting the sharing of protection responsibilities, b) to explain 
the multilateral dynamics determining the actual content of the acquis in 
game-theoretical terms, and c) to unfold an indeterminate conflict on 
interpretation linked to the issue of burden sharing. The last assignment 
prepares the ground for Part IV, which is exclusively seized with norm 
conflicts, as well as for Part V, which shall deal with the issue of 
determinacy. 
Part IV explores the second basic question: 'Is the EU acquis in 
conformity with international law?' In the ninth chapter, the benchmarks 
for assessing conformity are collected. Relevant norms of international 
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law having a bearing on extraterritorial protection are identified, and a 
method of interpretation is expounded and employed to single out hard 
cases entailing interpretive conflicts (Chapter 9-International Law and 
Extraterritorial Protection). Subsequently, these hard cases are subjected to 
a thorough interpretation along the lines of the methodology chosen 
earlier {Chapter JO-Interpreting Hard Cases}. 
The following chapter is dedicated to finding and justifying the limits 
of extraterritorial protection under the ECHR, a task necessitated by the 
preceding analysis of hard cases, and complex enough to merit a chapter 
of its own {Chapter 11-Delimiting and Justifying Protection under the 
ECHR). In a last step, and drawing on the results of earlier chapters, three 
normative conflicts between the EU acquis and international law are 
uncovered, involving access to territory, procedures and protection 
{Chapter 12-Three Conflict Zones). 
Some of these conflicts can be resolved, but others appear to be 
invulnerable to the power of interpretation or proportionality arguments. 
The latter class of conflicts compels us to revisit the question of 
determinacy, which brings us to Part V. Closing the bracket, the 
thirteenth chapter concludes on the determinacy problems emerging in 
the course of the study and discusses the options to justify foundational 
assumptions in law (Chapter 13-Demos, Determinacy and Justification). 
Finally, the last chapter comes full circle by formulating conclusions in 
direct response to the three basic questions asked in the first chapter 
{Chapter 14-Negotiating Asylum: A Summary of Observations}. 
71 

2 universalism versus 
Particularism 
2.:1. Choosing between Torture and Terrorism: Mr. Chahal vs. 
the U.K. Population 
IN 1996, the European Court of Human Rights had to decide whether 
the United Kingdom would violate the ECHR by executing an order for 
deportation of Mr. Chahal to India. Mr. Chahal was a Sikh separatist, and 
the U.K. Home Secretary motivated the deportation decision by adducing 
that his 'continued presence in the United Kingdom was unconducive to 
the public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a 
political nature, namely the international fight against terrorism' .180 Mr. 
Chahal's application for asylum was turned down in several instances and 
the deportation order was upheld after an advisory panel had considered 
the aspects of national security involved in the case. Mr. Chahal's 
solicitors then turned to the European Commission for Human Rights, 
which referred the case to the Court. The Court found by twelve votes to 
seven that the implementation of the deportation decision would infringe 
upon the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment spelt 
out in Article 3 ECHR. The Court majority considered this prohibition 
180 ECtHR, Chahal vs. the U.K, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V [henceforth Chahal], 
para. 25. The Chahal case is further analysed in chapter 12.2.2.3 below. 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _003
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to be of an absolute character, making aspects of national security legally 
irrelevant to the case. 181 The Court minority, however, held that the 
United Kingdom could legitimately weigh the interest of national security 
against the individual's interest not to be ill-treated. 182 
The Chahal case represents a formidable extrapolation of the protection 
dilemma. Should Mr. Chahal be protected from ill-treatment in India at 
the price of exposing the population of the U.K. to his terrorist 
potential?183 Granting for the moment that Mr. Chahal's continued 
presence indeed posed a danger to the population of the United Kingdom, 
and that he was indeed threatened by mistreatment in India, there is 
obviously more than one arguable answer to the question of principle-
namely, whose interests shall be sacrificed. Put differently, the Court had 
to make a choice between two risks: torture and terrorism. 
Far from all cases turning on extraterritorial protection contain such a 
dramatic opposition of interests as Chahal. Even in less poignant claims, 
however, an identically structured opposition between individual and host 
community can be made out. What are the ideological underpinnings of 
that structure? 
Migration and asylum law are situated in the conflict zone between 
universalism and particularism, leaving lawyers with a choice between 
two foundational paradigms-one striving for the global realisation of 
human rights and another giving preference to the interests of a certain 
state population. The Chahal case is a very accurate reflection of this 
choice. The Court was offered a particularist reading by the U.K. 
government, and Mr. Chahal's counsel seconded it with a universalist 
reading. The Court minority embraced the former, while the Court 
majority opted for the latter. Leaving aside the determinacy won in casu 
Chahal, the tension between these foundational paradigms persists and 
merits further exploration. 
181 Chahal, paras 79-82. See chapter 11 for a discussion of the 'absolute' character of the right 
enshrined in Art. 3 ECHR. 
182 Chahal vs. the U.K., Joint Partly Dissenting Opinon of Judges Golciiklii, Matscher, 
Freeland, Baka, Totchev, Bonnici and Levits, para. 1. 
183 It is not for this author to judge whether Mr. Chahal's qualification as a threat to national 
security was an adequate reflection of facts. At any rate, it does not affect the abstract 
tension between the interest of the individual protection seeker and the potential host 
community. 
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2.2 Universalism 
To start with, refugee law is about the inclusion of an individual in a 
collective protection system. A protection seeker no longer enjoys the 
protection of her184 home community and is thus compelled to seek such 
protection elsewhere. The claim to inclusion in a host community is a 
mere consequence of exclusion by the home community. It is premised on 
the idea that each individual is part of a global community, which has to 
secure a minimum level of protection, where the local community-i.e. 
the nation state-fails. This is a universalist reading, which sets the 
existential interest of the individual prior to that of a potential host 
community. The level of protection to be granted is specified in 
international human rights instruments, and states are not only singularly, 
but also collectively, the guarantors of their implementation. Simplifying, 
one could claim that, where one state fails, another one picks up its 
protection obligations. This conception seems to have inspired the Court 
majority in Chahal. 
Historically, legal universalism dates back at least to the days of the 
Roman Empire, where a need was felt to overarch the legal plurality of 
occupied territories with a single jus commune. To wit, this form of 
universalism drew on factual inequality. It was not applicable to the legal 
relationships between Romans (which were subject to jus civile), but 
solely governed those between Romans and Non-Romans, or those 
amongst Non-Romans. To find a common denominator for the multitude 
of societies forming part of the Roman Empire, law was compelled to 
assume a high level of abstraction. Its underlying assumption was the 
'sovereignty of the unqualified individual'. 185 By this abstraction, Roman 
184 In this work 'she' and 'her' refers to both sexes. Due to the lack of sufficiently detailed 
data, it is difficult to generalise about the percentage of female protection seekers and 
refugees. Data from refugee camps situated in the developing world suggest that 50.9 
percent of the refugee population is female. UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to 
UNHCR, 1998 Statistical Overview (1999, UNHCR, Geneva), pp. 32 and 36. Moreover, 
in 49 countries for which statistics were available, recognition rates for female protection 
seekers were significantly higher than for male protection seekers (47.6 percent opposed 
to 14.8 percent). Against this background, it seems appropriate to reflect the probability 
of a female majority among protection seekers and recognised refugees by using the 
female pronoun. For the sake of simplicity, this order is retained with regard to all 
groups of persons alluded to in the present work. By consequence, the personal pronoun 
used for unspecified police officers, judges or human smugglers is also 'she'. 
185 S. Tonnies, Der Westliche Universalismus (1995, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen), p. 70. 
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law gave universalism its decisive conceptual tool: the idea of equality. 
Later, this idea was combined with the concept of human rights, which 
gave universalism an enhanced potential for explaining and influencing 
societal relations. This combination is a distinct feature of enlightenment 
thinking at large and can be traced in the constitutional documents of the 
bourgeois revolutions. 
Therefore, it is of little surprise to find a manifestation of the 
universalist foundations of refugee law with the German enlightenment 
philosopher Immanuel Kant. In his treatise 'On Eternal Peace', he 
sketched out a pacified world community, featuring republican 
constitutions within states, a public international law based upon legal 
federalism among states and, finally, an individual right to hospitality for 
any 'world citizen'.186 
Kant formulates the latter right bluntly in the third operative article of 
his treatise: 
Das W eltbiirgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen 
Hospitalitat eingeschrankt sein.187 
The individual right to hospitality is based on two premises. As the Earth 
is formed as a globe, its inhabitants cannot disperse infinitely, but are 
compelled to meet sooner or later. Originally, nobody has a greater right 
to be at a certain place than anybody else. From these premises, Kant 
draws the weak conclusion 188 that each individual has a right of visit 
(Besuchsrecht), implying that she must not be treated in a hostile manner 
barely due to her arrival on the soil of another individual. The original 
inhabitant may, however, expel her, provided this can take place without 
exposing her to peril. 189 These cautious formulations must be seen against 
With the 'unqualified individual', Tonnies intends a person perceived without regard to 
her membership in a group and independent from her position in this group. 
186 I. Kant, Zurn ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwuif, 1984 ed. (Theodor Valentiner 
and Rudolf Malter eds), (1795, Reclam, Stuttgart). 
187 Kant, 1795, p. 21. ['Cosmopolitan law shall be restricted to conditions of general 
hospitality.' Translation by W. Schwarz, Principles of Lawful Poltics. Immanuel Kant's 
Draft Toward Eternal Peace (1988, Scientia Verlag, Aalen), p. 83]. 
188 R. Baubock, 'Ethical Problems of Immigration Control and Citizenship', in R. Cohen 
(ed.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration (1995, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge), p. 162. 
189 Kant, 1795, p. 21. 
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the background of European colonialism. Kant was careful to restrict the 
world citizen right in such a manner that it may not be abused for the 
domination or exploitation of host societies. 190 
This world citizen's right outlines the balance to be struck in positive 
law in a much later stage. The host society has a right to control the 
composition of its population, but this right finds its limits where the 
security of the expellee would be threatened. The latter limitation is 
indeed the nucleus of a norm that is regarded as the cornerstone of 
contemporary refugee law, namely the prohibition of refoulement, 
expressly codified in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Conve~tion191 and 
Article 3 CAT192• What remains extremely intriguing, thoµgh, is the 
element of free movement inherent in the Kantian right of visi~: the world 
citizen is entitled to enjoy social contacts abroad. The eyer stricter 
limitation of migration in our times stands out in stark contrast to this 
model liberty. At present, strict visa requirements prevent movements to 
other countries, where the individual could have invoked the modern 
counterpart to the protective element inherent in Kant's right of visit, 
namely the prohibition of refoulement. 
Kant justifies the necessity of the world citizen's right with the fact that 
the effects of legal violations can no longer be limited to one part of the 
world: 
Da es nun mit der unter den Volkern der Ertle einmal durchgangig 
iiberhand genommenen (engeren oder weiteren) Gemeinschaft so 
weit gekommen ist, dass die Rechtsverletzung an einem Platz der 
Ertle an alien gefi.ihlt wird: so ist die Idee eines W eltbiirgerrechts 
keine phantastische und iiberspannte V orstellungsart des Rechts, 
sondern einen notwendige Erganzung des ungeschriebenen Kodex 
sowohl des Staats- als Volkerrechts zum offentlichen 
Menschenrechte iiberhaupt und so zum ewigen Frieden, zu dem 
man sich in der kontinuierlichen Annaherung zu befinden nur 
unter dieser Bedingung schmeicheln darf.193 
190 Hoffe points out that the world citizen right has two countercurrent tasks, namely to 
protect the rights of arriving persons as well as of native populations. 0. Hoffe, Vernunft 
und Recht (1996, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt), pp. 127-8. 
191 See chapter 9.1.2.1 below. 
192 See chapter 9.1.2.2 below. 
193 Kant, 1795, p. 24. ['As the generally prevailing (more or less close) community among the 
peoples of the earth has now undeniably reached the point that the violation of right in 
one place of the earth is felt in all places, the idea of a cosmopolitan law is not a fantastic 
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Traditionally, this pos1t10n has been interpreted as Kant's attempt to 
counter the atrocities of colonialism. Simultaneously, this passage is an 
early formulation of the responsibility incumbent on all states to secure 
human rights on a global level. The causality is clear: approximating 
eternal peace presupposes complementing constitutional law and public 
international law with the granting of a hospitality right to every world 
citizen. By granting an individual interest the status of a carefully 
delimited right, Kant promotes the public interest of peace. Setting the 
individual interest prior, the public interest is nevertheless consumed by 
it. In its Kantian form, universalism does not offer itself as a one-sided 
perception of the whole, but takes on the cloak of a ready-made balance 
between the universal and the particular. Contemporary universalists 
reproduce this technique when defending their position. 194 
In sum, the universalist idea is that equality overrides the closure of 
nation states. This idea finds many expressions in the various discourses 
relevant for the understanding of extraterritorial protection. In political 
theory, Rawls has asserted the dominance of the fundamental right over 
the distribution of material goods195, which strikes against a limitation to 
the distribution of wealth solely within nation states, regardless of the 
pos1t10n of outsiders. Soysal argues migrant rights flow from 
'personhood': they are implemented by states, but draw legitimacy from a 
supranational discourse on universal human rights. 196 We shall return to a 
detailed presentation of certain contemporary universalist positions later 
in this chapter. 
and extravagant conception of right but a necessary complement of the unwritten code of 
both the law of the state and the law of nations for an encompassing public law and right 
of men and thus for eternal peace, which to approach continually one can flatter oneself 
only on this condition.' Translation by Schwarz, 1988, p. 87.] 
194 For a contemporary attempt to strike a balance predicated on Kant's treatise, see S. 
Chauvier, Du Droit d'Etre Etranger. Essai sur le concept kantien d'un droit cosmopolitique 
(1996, L'Harmattan, Paris). 
195 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,), pp. 62, 
274-83. 
196 Y. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (1994, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago), ch. 8. 
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2.3 Particularism 
A particularist would explain things differently. In its essence, a claim for 
protection is prima facie a claim for resources-be they material, political, 
social or other.197 Obviously, a claim of inclusion juxtaposes the claimant 
with a bounded host community. And the very idea of a bounded 
community is to match community tasks with community resources. 198 
Once this match has taken place, bounded communities are eager to avoid 
additional costs for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons has a bearing 
on human rights. Collective structures like states are a means to secure a 
certain standard of protection for citizens. Where protection presupposes 
the existence of a state, there are good reasons to protect the very 
existence of that state. Protecting its existence means inter alia restricting 
the access of new participants, so as not to destabilise the fiscal, social, 
political and physical resource base it rests upon. 199 Therefore, for the 
particularist, the universalist perspective is a dangerous one, which 
ultimately threatens to deteriorate the aggregate level of protection within 
a host community. It is precisely along these terms that Her Majesty's 
government proceeded in Chahal. The Court minority accepted this 
reasoning as an arguable approach under the ECHR. Ultimately, this 
community-centered argumentation leads the particularist to invoke an 
197 The prima facie-character of this claim is derived from the fact that even temporally and 
materially minimised forms of integration trigger costs, which will be borne by the host 
community. However, it must be recalled that protection seeker also contribute to the 
generation of resources by putting their competence and labour at the disposal of host 
communities. It is quite another matter that some legislations inhibit them from doing so 
by denying access to labour markets. At any rate, universalists tend to underscore the 
contributing potential of migration, while particularists typically stress its consumption 
of resources. For the usage of economistic metaphors in refugee law discourse, see, e.g., 
D. A. Martin, 'The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics and the Careful Use of a 
Scarce Resource', in H. Adelman, Refugee Policy. Canada and the United States (1991, 
York Lanes Press, North York), referring to asylum as a 'scarce resource'. 
198 'Smaller units would be hampered by their limited resource base; wider units, although 
for the reverse reason, would be unable to generate a distributive consensus.' D. Miller, 
'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', 98 Ethics 4 (1988), p. 661. 
199 'Freedom, wherever it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially limited. This 
is especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of the negative liberties, the 
freedom of movement; the borders of national territory or the walls of the city-state 
comprehended and protected a space in which men could move freely.[ ... ] [E]ven under 
modern conditions, the elementary coincidence of freedom and limited space remains 
manifest.' H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963, Faber & Faber, London, p. 279. 
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existential threat to the state for justifying restrictionist measures against 
protection seekers. 200 
While the universalist perspective focuses on the existential threat 
facing the individual, the particularist perspective is eager to avoid 
existential threats facing communities. The particularist professes one for 
all, while the universalist endorses all for one. If the universalist orders the 
world along the concept of equality, the particularist insists on freedom-
if necessary, a freedom from obligation and responsibility vis-a-vis 
individuals not part of the particularist community. Indeed, the price and 
risk of this freedom is the dimension of evil.201 
This does not necessarily mean that the particularist could not care less 
about refugees. But according protection seekers a claim to inclusion 
would be at odds with the present system of bounded communities-i.e. 
nation states.202 Let us illustrate particularist thinking through Michael 
Walzer, a renowned ~social scientist and one of the flagship names of 
communitarianism. Walzer suggests that the individual enjoyment of 
social goods at large is possible only through the intermediary of a 
community, which, in turn, presupposes some form of boundary between 
members and non-members: 
The theory of distributive justice begins, then, with an account of 
membership rights. It must vindicate at one and the same time the 
(limited} right of closure, without which there could be no 
communities at all, and the political inclusiveness of the existing 
communities. For it is only as members somewhere that men and 
women can hope to share in the other social goods-security, 
wealth, honor, office and power-that communal life makes 
possible. 203 
200 In the debate on the asylum provision of the German Constitution, Doehring has 
defended a !imitative position, drawing on the right of states to protect themselves as part 
of international law. K. Doehring, 'Asylrecht und Staatsschutz', 26 ZaORV(1966), p. 53 ff. 
201 R. Safranski, Das Bose oder Das Drama der Freiheit (1999, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 
GmbH, Frankfurt am Main), p. 193. 
202 For the issue of migration at large, Baubock formulates the problem as follows: 'If, prima 
facie, citizenship is a resource that requires bounded political communities for its 
generation, how can there be a prima facie case for free access to such communities?' 
Baubock, 1995, p. 551. 
203 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983, Basic Books, New 
York), p. 63. 
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The linkage is clear: equality among members is bought at the price of 
excluding non-members.204 While relationships among members are 
governed by an overarching standard of justice, the same is not true for 
the relationship between members and non-members: 
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the 
constraints of justice. [ ... ] At stake here is the shape of the 
community that acts in the world, exercises sovereignty, and so on. 
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal 
independence.205 
In reaching this conclusion, Walzer compares states to neighbourhoods 
and private clubs. This analogy enticed him to the widely quoted 
statement 'if states were to become large neighbourhoods, it is likely that 
neighbourhoods will become little states'206• Now, states' freedom in 
distributing membership is not unrestricted. Walzer introduces an 
obligation to provide help to others who are in dire need, even if we have 
not established bonds with them, under the precondition that such help 
can be rendered without excessive costs to ourselves.207 Consequently, 
Walzer denies that there is a general obligation to admit refugees, making 
exceptions for groups whose exodus the host nation caused, or to which it 
has ethnic or ideological bonds.208 A number of scholars have taken issue 
with Walzer's argument; amongst others, Joseph Carens has crafted 
powerful counter-arguments, to which we shall revert at a later stage. 209 
Generalising beyond Walzer's specific position, we may frame the 
particularist argument as follows. For particularist systems to survive, it 
has to be accepted as inevitable that single individuals be put in limbo. 
Hence, assistance to non-community members is a matter of benevolence 
or, in Walzer's terms, mutual aid. Where the community is strong, the 
prospects for benevolence vis-a-vis non-members are good. Therefore, 
strengthening the state means creating the very preconditions for assisting 
refugees. Regarded thus, the opposition of universalism and particularism 
204 We shall revert to this issue in chapter 13.1.3 below. 
205 Walzer, 1983, pp. 61-2. 
206 Walzer, 1983, p. 38. 
207 Walzer, 1983, pp. 33 and 45-6. 
208 Walzer, 1983, pp. 48-51. 
209 See chapter 2.6 below. 
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is theoretically sublated in the concept of protection. Both paradigms 
would ultimately aim at successively assisting the largest possible number 
of individuals in the most efficient way. Both claim to possess the key to 
securing its most widespread achievement-within and outside host com-
munities. In the particularist paradigm, the price is victimisation the single 
refugee denied protection for the sake of this noble collective aim. Thus, 
the collective interest is set prior, and the interests of the individual are 
consumed by it. This is precisely a reversion of the universalist argument. 
On an axiomatic level, universalism assumes that individuals' human 
rights must not be made conditional upon the existence of intermediary 
institutions such as states. Being a human is both necessary and sufficient 
for enjoying human rights. Particularists, on the other hand, set an in-
extricable linkage between rights and community prior: rights can only be 
enjoyed through the intermediary of a community, whose members grant 
them to each other. Thus, being a human is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the enjoyment of human rights. These axioms determine the 
distribution of the burden of proof: universalists claim that particularists 
need to prove the necessity of restriction, while particularists claim that 
universalists have to provide arguments for permitting expansion in 
providing access to protection seekers. 
2.4 Human Rights versus Sovereignty 
Against the background of the Chahal case, we have retraced and 
extrapolated the divide between a global implementation of human rights 
and the interests of a certain state as part of a larger conflict between 
universalism and particularism. Put bluntly, this opposes human rights 
with sovereignty.210 In the words of Hedley Bull: '[c]arried to its logical 
210 It is also clear that the concepts of state sovereignty and human rights respectively could 
be dissected with the dichotomy of universalism and particularism. The development 
from absolute sovereignty to popular sovereignty mirrors a shift from a particularist 
model of power exercise to a universalist one. See further G. Noll, 'The Democratic 
Legitimacy of Refugee Law', 66 NJIL 429 (1997), pp. 439-51, retracing this development 
and performing a sublation of state sovereignty in the realisation of individual autonomy 
(with the benefit of hindsight, it can be stated that this sublation should have been 
complemented by one which subsumed individual autonomy in the concept of state 
sovereignty). Moreover, the confrontation of first generation rights with second and 
third generation rights or the opposition of negative rights with positive rights reflects 
the front line between particularists and universalists in human rights law. 
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extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law 
is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organized as a 
society of sovereign states'. 211 
To be sure, international law not only limits, but also preserves states' 
sovereignty. The divide between particularism and universalism resurfaces 
in the UN Charter, which concurrently sets out the preservation of peace 
and the safeguarding of human rights among the organisation's goals 
enumerated in Article 1. Drawn further, the opposition of peace and 
human rights leads back to the opposition of a Hobbesian and a Kantian 
conception of international law. While the first is seized with seeking 
ways of mitigating a bellicose state of nature, the second seeks to create 
conditions for the liberation of man by natural reason.212 
Does international law offer a hierarchical order between these para-
digms? The goal of preserving international peace ultimately accepts states 
as an end in themselves and thus connects to the particularist perspective. 
In that respect, international law is relativist by nature, tolerating states 
regardless of their conduct, as long as they tolerate others by refraining 
from acts of aggression. Safeguarding international peace means re-
affirming state sovereignty, regardless of how it is exercised internally. 
The individual-focused goal of safeguarding human rights may all too easy 
conflict with the preservation of peace. What · if a state engages in 
genocide, which may only be halted by means of a military intervention? 
Fully in line with the argumentative pattern of consuming opposed 
paradigms, such situations have been redefined as a threat to peace, 
allowing the UN Security Council to pursue universalist goals under the 
cover of a particularist paradigm.213 One should be careful not to draw 
hasty conclusions from this ostensible sublation. On a pragmatic level, the 
211 H. Bull, TheAnarchial Society (1977, Macmillan, London), p. 146. 
212 An excellent opposition of the Hobbesian and Kantian perspectives on international law 
can be found with A. Honneth, 'Is Universalism a Moral Trap? The Presuppositions and 
Limits of a Politics of Human Rights', in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds), 
Perpetual Peace. EsS"')IS on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (1997, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA), pp. 155-78. See also C. Schmitt, Der Begrijf des Politischen (1963, Berlin), p. 59, 
elaborating the possibility of dividing theories of the state and the political into those 
which assume humankind to be good and those which assume it to be evil. 
213 For the establishment of the Ad-hoc tribunals, the Security Council reconstructed the 
issue as a threat to peace, which could be alleviated by adjudicating the perpetrators of 
the crimes. See further D. Shraga and R. Zacklin, 'The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia', 5 EJIL 360 (1994). 
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need for redefinition stems solely from the fact that the Charter offers 
specific procedures for the preservation of peace under Chapter VII, while 
it contains no procedures for protecting human rights. In Article 1 UNC, 
as well as in the preamble, both goals stand side by side. 
If there is any instrument of constitutional character in international 
law, it is the UN Charter. All the more, and quite understandably, its 
letter can reproduce, but not sever the Gordian knot of conflicting 
paradigms. And there are certainly reasons for that-one being the 
pedigree of the underlying conflict, which we shall retrace in the 
subsequent section. 
2.5 Artefact versus Organism 
The contemporary universalist narrative draws a picture of a world 
changing towards 'the better': the Westphalian system is being 
transgressed, the nation state finds itself dethroned as the primordial actor 
of international law, transboundary communities as well as the 
international rule of law proliferate around the globe.214 The particularist 
is sceptical of all such teleological optimism, denounces it as wishful 
thinking, and insists on the importance of territorially organised power.215 
For a particularist, the nation state is as an ultimate guarantor of some 
214 The heyday of international legal optimism coincided with the post-Cold War emergence 
of various global governance narratives. A pertinent example is D. Held, Democracy and 
the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1995, Polity Press, 
Cornwall), especially Chapter 12 on Cosmopolitan Democracy and the New World 
Order. From the angle of international law, a piece resounding with high-strung idealism 
can be found with P. Allot, 'Reconstituing Humanity-New International Law', 3 E]IL 
219 (1992), calling for the formation of a 'new international society' from which state-
societies would derive their social power (para. 40.3) and a new breed of international 
lawyers as 'agents of the self-perfecting human spirit' (para. 41.4). -However, there is a 
long-standing tradition of putting the predominance, or, indeed, the survival of the 
nation state into question, going back to French syndicalism of the late 19'h century and 
Harold Laski's writings in the early decades of the 20'h century. In that sense, the state-
scepticism of the 1990s is but a re-staging of this topos, predictably followed by counter-
arguments underscoring the continuing importance and vitality of the nation-state. 
215 For a good discussion of approaches centering on the responsibility of sending countries 
and the prevention of outflows and thus perceiving refugees as an anomaly, see D. 
Warner, 'The Refugee State and State Protection', in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds), 
Refugee Rights and Realities. Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (1999, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 262-8. 
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form of law and order. In all, the particularist seems to be more occupied 
with keeping chaos at bay than striving for a better state of affairs. 
Universalist thinking rests on a history of thought stretching from 
enlightenment rationalism to contemporary modernism, ultimately 
resting on the belief that reality can be modified through the will of man. 
Historically, this approach has been countered by such diverse !)trands of 
thought as romanticism, positivism, system theory, and, finally, post-
modernism. Within legal thinking, the repercussions of these paradigmatic 
crusades are manifold. Against the universalist thrust, countercurrents 
emerged, linking German 18'h century historicism to the scepticism of 
1920s anti-liberal thought and, finally, the indeterminacy critique 
formulated within the Critical Legal Studies movement.216 As Tonnies has 
expounded, the contesters of universalism share a common belief in 
organically grown rather than man-made orders.217 Therefore, she regards 
the dispute between universalism and particularism as just another 
variation of the tension between organism and artefact-the question 
being whether the dictates of nature or the dictates of man shall prevail in 
the formation of reality.218 
Within the discipline of international relations, the same pattern 
reverberates in the classical debate between idealists and realists.219 
Another fault line is the opposition · between essentialism and 
construct1v1sm in contemporary feminist theory.220 Within moral 
philosophy, the couplet of utlilitarian and deontological approaches 
reproduces this conflict once more. It goes without saying that the named 
schools of thought diverge to a great extent, and cannot be solely reduced 
216 The indeterminacy critique takes a prominent place both in anti-liberal thinking of the 
1920s and the Critical Legal Studies movement. See W. Scheuermann, Between the Norm 
and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (1994, MIT Press, London), 
pp. 245-8. 
217 S. Tonnies, Der Dimorphismus der1 Wahrheit (1992, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen), pp. 
17-33. 
218 For a comprehensive overview of dimorphism in legal theory, see Tonnies' work, supra. 
The debate on voluntarism and determinism is an important issue within Critical Legal 
Studies. For an introduction, see M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA), pp. 86-113. 
219 For an overview, see R. A. Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations 
(1999, Routledge, London). 
220 See e.g. E. Kingdom, 'Citizenship and Democracy: Feminist Politics of Citizenship and 
Radical Democratic Politics', in S. Millns and N. Whitty (eds), Feminist Perspectives on 
Public Law (1999, Cavendish Publishing, London), pp. 158-62. 
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to their affirmation or contestation of universalism. Moreover, as we shall 
see later on, there is no such thing as a purely universalist or purely par-
ticularist approach. Each of these paradigms falls apart into opposing 
strands, which internalise the divide between universalism and particula-
rism. 221 But there is also an argumentative interdependence between the 
paradigms. In order to win recognition by outsiders, particularism is 
usually argued with reference to universal concepts, while universalists 
feel compelled to particularist delimitations in order to secure the prag-
matic viability of their theories.222 
Within international law, this dimorphic pattern of thought is already 
present in the Grotian division, distinguishing natural law from man-
made law, and has been exposed to a multitude of variations ever since.223 
As one would expect, this divide and the dynamics caused by it also 
inform refugee research.224 We find a limitative school, which remains 
largely unwilling to discuss the migrational context of flight, other than 
those human rights violations being its immediate cause. It advocates a 
strict separation of migration and extraterritorial protection, pointing at 
the specific legal norms governing the latter. Moreover, this strand fears 
221 By way of example, utilitarianism comes in a rule-focused and action-focused variety. For 
an example from the area of political theory, see our analysis of Frost's approach (text 
accompanying note 249 below). 
222 See chapter 2.6 below. 
223 A pertinent example is Koskenniemi's 'From Apology to Utopia', structuring 
international law as an oscillating movement between utopian and apologetic arguments. 
See Koskenniemi, 1989, p. 193, exercising the sovereignty concept through this oscillating 
movement. For a traditional structuring of international law along universalist and 
particularist fault lines, see Verdross and Simma, 1984, p. 11 et seq. 
224 For an excellent analysis of the interplay between positivist and non-positivist refugee 
research since the sixties, see B. S. Chimni, 'The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View 
from the South', 11 journal of Refugee Studies 350 (1998). Chimni holds that the 
perseverance of positivist refugee law within refugee studies led to a fragmented 
approach, which turned a blind eye to the political contingency of norm-creating and 
interpretation. On the other hand, those refugee scholars criticising the positivists opened 
the door to what Chimni denounces as the 'repatriation turn' in the eighties, propagating 
assistance and protection in the region of origin. Chimni, 1998, pp. 351-5. In a 
thoughtful essay, Warner has broken down refugee discourse along a slightly different 
fault line. To him, there are two groups: one sees the state as the major problem, the 
other perceives it as the major solution. While the first conceives of the refugee as 
'paradigmatic in the sense of a physical representation of the dislocation of the modern 
condition', the second sees her as an atypical, special category of persons. Warner, 1999, 
pp. 253-4. 
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that an expansion of research to broader political issues would dilute the 
specific character of refugeehood-and the privileged position the refugee 
enjoys over other categories of migrants.225 Typically, its proponents 
adhere to a paradigm based on legal positivism. The expansive school 
holds that flight cannot be isolated from a wider migrational and political 
context. Its proponents are sceptical toward a depoliticised approach based 
on legal positivism, and wish to complement it with elements of economic 
and political analysis. This analysis draws mainly on the observation of 
global inequality: 
O the facilitated exchange of capital and goods around the globe has 
not been matched by a similar deregulation of migration. 
Seemingly out of tune with liberalisation, migration has become 
increasingly regulated and controlled throughout the last 
decades226; 
O global income disparities have increased in the same vein227; 
O the number of armed conflicts around the world is on the rise; and 
O in the light of these factors, demographers are surprised by the 
relative stability of migration.228 
225 See, e.g., Martin's argument, presented in chapter 2.3 above. 
226 'Regional trends support the view that in all parts of the developed and developing 
worlds, a growing number of Governments have adopted policies aimed and influencing, 
and, especially, lowering the immigration level. While in 1976, a majority of countries in 
Asia, Europe and Oceania had a policy of non-intervention towards immigration, the 
percentage of non-interventionist countries was down to about 15 per cent in each of 
these regions in 1995.' UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, International Migration Policies (1998, UN, New York), p. 5. 
227 The gauge of global income inequality combines inequality within countries with 
inequality between states. Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, which ranges 
between 0 (complete equality) and 100 (complete inequality). Milanovic has shown that 
the global Gini coefficient has increased from 63 in 1988, to 66 in 1993. B. Milanovic, 
True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculations, Based on Household 
Surveys Alone. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (1999, The World Bank, 
Washington DC), p. 51. 
228 'Despite the lack of comprehensive data on a global level, it is possible to affirm that the 
global number of international migrants has been growing at an increasing rate since 
1965. However, given the concomitant increase in the number of distinct units (countries 
and territories) constituting the world and the persistence of sharp economic and demo-
graphic disparities among countries and regions, coupled with the widespread prevalence 
of political instability and outright conflict, the percentage of people who have left and re-
mained outside their countries of origin is remarkably small and has been relatively stable 
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Proponents of a universalist approach wish to extend the study of refugee 
issues to possible causal chains leading from economic deprivation via 
factional conflict to persecution and flight. For such universalists, the 
individual quest for protection is inextricably linked to global redistri-
bution. Their argument is that any protection claim may be the result of 
an unjust world order, of which the potential host state is a profiteer.229 
Our crude synopsis may suffice to illustrate that the conflict between 
Mr. Chahal and the U.K. population is far from finding a determinate 
outcome through a theoretical shortcut. This overview also illustrates that 
neither the universalist nor the particularist strand are monolithic 
entitities. Being interested in refugees does not automatically make one a 
universalist, and preserving the nation state need not be an expression of 
egoistic particularism. Rather, both strands hold a number of smaller 
strategic and methodological conflicts, which mirror and reproduce the 
universalist-particularist divide within each strand. 
for a long period, oscillating between 2.1 and 2.3 percent of the world's population 
during 1965-90.' [Emphasis added] H. Zlotnik, 'Trends of International Migration since 
1965: What Existing Data Reveal', 37 International Migration 21 (1999), p. 42. 
229 The following two quotes from the eighties may provide interesting illustrations of this 
approach. 
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'Politische Repressionen insbesondere in den Landern der Dritten Welt werden vorrangig 
duch ein das westliche lnteresse befi:irdernde [sic] Weltwirtschaftssystem verursacht. [ ... ] 
Die i:iffentliche Stigmatisierung der Fliichtlinge aus der Dritten Welt als sogenannte 
Scheinasylanten ist Tei! des Verdrangungsprozesses einer Industriegesellschaft 
hinsichtlich der sozialen und politischen Folgen des Wirtschaftssystems im Siiden.' 
['Political repressions, especially in the countries of the third world, are primarily caused 
by a global economic system furthering Western interests.[ ... ] The public stigmatisation 
of refugees from the third world are part of a suppression process of an industrial society 
with regard to the social and political consequences of the economic system in the South.' 
Translation by this author.] R. Marx, Eine menschenrechtliche Begrnndung des Asylrechts 
(1984, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden), pp. 227-8. 
'The moral obligation of the North to share the global asylum burden rests on its 
enormous resource capabilities relative to those of the South, and on the transnational 
dynamics of social conflict in the contemporary world, which at least to some degree 
makes the North corresponsible for the upheavals in the South.' A. R. Zolberg, A. 
Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence. Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the 
Developing World (1989, Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 279. 
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2.6 Meandering Arguments 
Dividing positions on access to extraterritorial protection into a 
universalist and a particularist strand does, of course, injustice to the 
complexity of thought behind them. While we are unable to depict an 
impressively rich and refined debate here230, we would like to present a 
number of intermediary positions, showing-that universalists perforce 
integrate particularist elements into their arguments, and vice versa. This 
does not mean, though, that universalism and particularism end up in 
about the same result. Quite the contrary: both approaches dictate a 
certain procedure to be followed when negotiating access to the 
protection of communities. This necessarily has repercussions on the 
precise location of boundaries and the formulation of limits. 
Let us first look at Bruce Ackerman, who addressed fundamental 
questions of membership in his work 'Social Justice in the Liberal State'. 
The underlying idea of his theory is that, in discussions on the just 
distribution of various goods, the challenged party cannot respond by 
asserting the moral inferiority of the challenging party, when faced with 
the question of legitimacy.231 This is a specification of the principle of 
equality, identified earlier as the pivotal element in the universalist 
approach. Ackerman develops his theory along a dialogic form of 
reasoning, and elaborates very aptly that, in practice, the enjoyment of 
goods is made contingent on membership in a community. In that sense, 
membership is a good prior to all other goods. However, different from 
particularists, he does not stop there, but subjugates the distribution of 
membership to the same justificatory tests as applied to the distribution of 
other goods. This leads him to claim that 'the only reason for restricting 
immigration is to protect the ongoing process of liberal conversation 
230 A carefully compiled and instructive survey of the debate in political theory can be found 
with A. Somek, 'Einwanderung und soziale Gerechtigkeit', in C. Chwaszcza and W. 
Kersting (eds), Politische Philosophie der internationalen Beziehungen (1998, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main), structuring it along the divide between liberals and communitarians. 
For an interesting, although at times polemical, overview see C. Joppke, 'Immigration 
Challenges the Nation-State', in C. Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State (1998, 
OUP, Oxford), using the fault-line of globalists and non-globalists (one should disregard 
his misguided perception of human rights law as 'soft law'). 




itself'. 232 As an example, Ackerman refers to situations where 'the 
presence of so many alien newcomers will generate such anxiety in the 
native population that it will prove impossible to stop a fascist group from 
seizing political power to assure native control over the immigrant 
underclass'.233 We note the difference with respect to the particularist 
position: it is one thing to protect a specific community from a migratory 
influx, it is quite another to vouchsafe the 'ongoing process of liberal 
conversation'. If anything, the latter goal entails a greater argumentative 
burden to justify exclusion. Moreover, while the particularist is seized 
with protecting the resources-material or political-of the community in 
which membership is sought, Ackerman is concerned with preserving a 
political resource-the natives' consent to maintaining a liberal political 
order. This reproduces a Rawlsian approach, giving precedence to the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights over the enjoyment of material goods.234 
Another good illustration is provided by Joseph Carens' critique of 
Walzer. In particular, Carens takes issue with Walzer's assertion of states' 
freedom to determine inclusion and exclusion.235 Carens then observes 
that we let the right to free migration within states prevail over the seclu-
sionist wishes of cities and provinces, although migration has detrimental 
economic consequences to them, and might even change the character of 
these communities.236 'If freedom of movement within the state is so 
important that it overrides the claims of local political communities, on 
what grounds can we restrict freedom of movement across states?' asks 
Carens, suggesting that such restriction 'requires as stronger case for the 
moral distinctiveness of the nation-state as a form of community than 
Walzer's discussion of neighbourhoods provides'.237 
Secondly, and probably more decisively, Carens unravels that Walzer's 
defence of particularism draws on universalist language and rationality, 
and that communitarianism is dependent on a liberalist mode of thinking: 
232 Ackerman, 1980, p. 95. Emphasis in the original. 
233 Ackerman, 1980, p. 93. 
234 Somek, 1998, p. 415. 
235 Of lesser importance for our purposes, Carens also cnt1c1ses Walzer's comparison 
between states and private clubs for ignoring the divide between public and private 
spheres, which Walzer draws on in other parts of his theory. J. H. Carens, 'Aliens and 
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders', IL Review of Politics (1987), pp. 266-8. 
236 Carens, 1987, p. 267. 
237 Carens, 1987, p. 267. Emphasis in the original. 
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Any approach like Walzer's that seeks its ground in the tradition 
and culture of our community must confront, as a methodological 
paradox, the fact that liberalism is a central part of our culture. The 
enormous intellectual popularity of Rawls and Nozick and the 
enduring influence of utilitarianism attest to their ability to 
communicate contemporary understandings and shared meanings 
in a language that has legitimacy and power in our culture. 238 
Following Carens, '[t]o take our community as a starting point is to take a 
community that expresses its moral views in terms of universal 
principles'.239 Subsequently, Carens submits that Walzer's argument 
against states' right to expel certain residents or to restrict emigration is 
framed in universal terms, applying not only to our particular state, but to 
all states. With this universality of rules comes a universality of 
individuals' equal moral worth.240 And Walzer's stipulation of a state right 
to exclude would violate this basic liberal principle, ingrained in our 
community and expressed in universal terms. 
While basing his case for open borders on a liberal tradition repre-
sented by Rawls, Nozick and utilitarianism, Carens is careful not to strip 
membership qua citizenship of all distinctive meaning: 
To say that membership is open to all who wish to join is not to 
say that there is no distinction between members and nonmembers 
[sic]. Those who choose to cooperate together in the state have 
special rights and obligations not shared by noncitizens. Respecting 
the particular choices and commitments that individuals make 
flows naturally from a commitment to the idea of equal moral 
worth. [ ... ]What is not readily compatible with the idea of equal 
moral worth is the exclusion of those who want to join. If people 
want to sign the social contract, they should be permitted to do 
so.241 
Carens then asserts that our fears of immigration as threatening the 
distinctive character of our community or its resource base assume that 
many people would move if they only could. He counters this assumption 
238 Carens, 1987, pp. 268-9. Emphasis in the original. 
239 Carens, 1987, p. 269. Emphasis in the original. 
240 Carens, 1987, pp. 269-70. 
241 Carens, 1987, p. 270. Emphasis in the original. 
91 
CHAPTER 2 
by claiming that, at the end of the day, people only move if life is very 
difficult where they are. Thus, he concludes, when weighing the interests 
of migrants against those of the host community, the case of exclusion 
'will rarely triumph'. 242 
Notwithstanding Carens' primary interest in equality, this goes to 
show that he is principally prepared to set limits for access to the host 
community. So is Ackerman, as we noted earlier. The limits of access are 
to be assessed by weighing the interests of members against those of non-
members. So far, universalists and particularists use the same 
argumentative techniques. But the approaches differ in what factors they 
admit to the weighing process and the weight they attach to these factors. 
Quite clearly, particularists grant membership in a community-e.g. 
citizenship, nationality or ethnicity-a special weight. 
Let us briefly consider an example of how a particularist-
communitarian approach is put to work by a refugee lawyer. David 
Martin is a prime exponent of that profession in the U.S. and when he 
makes a case for a restrictive legal entitlement to asylum, he certainly does 
so in a thoughtful, balanced manner. Here is his argument. An 'overly 
expansive' legal entitlement to asylum should be avoided, because it drains 
domestic political support not only for asylum itself, but also for other, 
related political decisions (such as the granting of temporary protection, 
or the creation of safe havens).243 Thus, Martin's argument unfolds from a 
primacy of the host state's electorate. This may be considered realistic, but 
for us, the communitarian core of this argument is probably more 
interesting. However, most intriguingly, Martin does not stop with the 
preferences of host countries: 
Refugee law, taken to extremes, ironically can demean those it 
means to benefit. Its focus is solely on haven, on sheltering people 
who fear their governments-as though governments never had 
anything to fear from the people, as though the act of leaving in 
search of individual relief would have no impact on the ongoing 
struggle for community reform. With its "exilic bias" (a telling 
phrase used by Professor Hathaway), ambitious refugee law tends 
to treat people as history's pawns, never its players: as objects, 
242 Carens, 1987, p. 270. 
243 Martin, 1991, p. 37. 
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always on the receiving end of home government action, not as 
subjects capable of acting in their own right. 
A narrower political standard, of the kind I advocate here, 
respects this capacity in those persons. [ ... ] Such an approach also 
husbands the limited political reserves that keep asylum vital in the 
haven countries for those who are in greatest jeopardy.244 
Whatever one may think of its intrinsic merit, Martin's suggestion is a 
successful exploration of the structural power inherent in the particularist 
position, doing away with its egoistic overtones. Restriction of access to 
extraterritorial protection is necessary not only to preserve the interests of 
potential host societies, but also those of the refugees themselves. 
Rhetorically, there is some appeal to it: by focusing on the provision of 
haven only, we reify refugees. The underlying communitarian logic may 
read like this: haven is a false hope, because it juxtaposes the individual in 
flight to the wrong society. In the long term, the true potential of the 
individual can only be realised in her own society-the society she fled 
from. 
Nonetheless, there are important flaws to Martin's argument. To deny 
haven to outsiders for the benefit of a community is to reify outsiders. 
And, if we are eager to reframe the refugee as history's agent, rather than 
its object, how can we disrespect her decision for flight? Why should 
historical agency, including the right to transform communities, be 
confined to one's own community? Just as Carens questioned Walzer, we 
are compelled to question Martin: what are the compelling reasons for 
confining agency to the citizen, and barring the refugee from it? This 
brings us back to the preferential treatment of membership in the 
weighing process described earlier. Such preference is clearly incompatible 
with the universalist's insistence on equality. But beyond that, how can 
this privileged position be justified within a particularist approach? 
An answer may be sought with David Miller, who tried to argue for 
nationality as a privileged form of membership from a particularist 
perspective. At the outset, he underscores that national boundaries are not 
congruent with state boundaries, and identifies nationality as 
244 Martin, 1991, p. 46. 
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essentially a subjective phenomenon, constituted by the shared 
beliefs of a set of people: a belief that each belongs together with 
the rest; that this association is neither transitory nor merely 
instrumental but stems from a long history of living together 
which (it is hoped and expected) will continue into the future; that 
the community is marked off from other communities by its 
members' distinctive characteristics; and that each member 
recognizes a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness 
to sacrifice personal gain to advance its interests. 245 
To justify the trump status of nationality, Miller questions the rationality 
concept underlying universalist positions, and opposes it with a particu-
larist counterpart: 
Most theories of a universalist type do [ ... ] make room for 
individuals' particular duties, responsibilities and rights - the duties 
of parents, colleagues, and so on-but these are never regarded as 
fundamental commitments. The moral self is defined by its rational 
capacities, so only general principles can have this basic status; 
other commitments are contingent and subject to revision if, for 
example, new facts come to light which demand this. In contrast, 
consider a second view of ethical agency in which the subject is 
seen as already deeply embedded in social relationships. Here the 
subject is partly defined by its relationships and the various rights, 
obligations, and so forth that go along with these, so these 
commitments themselves form a basic element of personality. On 
this view, the agent can still aspire to rationality, but the rationality 
[ ... ] consists in the capacity to reflect on existing commitments, 
jettisoning some and reaffirming others, depending on how they 
stand up to scrutiny.246 
This conception of rationality entails a problem, however, which Miller 
unsuccessfully attempts to resolve. If the degree of human 'embeddedness' 
in communities is a trump criterion for establishing obligations towards 
others, how does a particularist tackle loyalty conflicts, by which the 
individual is torn between competing communities? If the choice is to be 
loyal towards, say, an ethnic community and a national community (a 
conflict actually canvassed by Miller), a particularist would be forced to 
245 Miller, 1988, p. 648. 
246 Miller, 1988, pp. 649-50. 
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abandon the latter for the former. Miller merely argues for harmonizing 
ethnic and national obligations, and makes an argument for 'having 
national allegiances that promise to protect your ethnicities [footnote 
omitted, GN]'.247 Basically, this reproduces the argument of the 
universalist who pushes for the primacy of human rights over 
membership: one day, the state may be unable or unwilling to protect 
you. Then, human rights are the only residual protection. Miller's 
argument is analogous: ethnicity may not be able to secure political 
autonomy, while nationality does.248 The smaller unit will fail to protect 
you, and therefore, it is better to grant primacy to the larger unit-be it in 
the form of human rights or nationality. So, for the particularist, the 
question of drawing the line poses itself somewhat differently. She has to 
choose between competing forms of embeddedness: family, friends, 
neighbourhoods, ethnicities, nationalities. In doing so, she has to take a 
perspective external to the compared embeddednesses. With the benefit of 
Carens' analysis, we may conclude why drawing this line is so difficult for 
particularists: after all, 'embeddedness' is a criterion grounded on the 
universalist rationality of a neutral observer's perspective. 
Mervyn Frost offers an interesting example of a particularist approach 
with a strong universalist twist. His 'constitutive theory of individuality' 
is a communitarian one, stressing that we are constituted as ethical beings 
within communities, and that only within these, we can sensibly conduct 
ethical discussion.249 Nonetheless, he does not identify a single community 
as constitutive, but resorts to a hierarchy of institutions whose boundaries 
do not coincide. 'In constitutive theory, migrants are not portrayed as 
outsiders, but as insiders within the hierarchy of our wider ethical 
community, global civil society.'250 This brings him to a conclusion 
reminiscent of universalist positions. Frost recognises the presumption 
that people have a right to freedom of movement and that '[d]emocratic 
states may only limit movement when they have good reason to believe 
247 Miller, 1988, p. 659. Although less radically formulated, the element of sacrifice is parallel 
to that of Carl Schmitt's delimitation of a political community, turning on an indi-
vidual's willingness to kill and to die for that community. See Schmitt, 1963, p. 46, and 
the discussion in chapter 13.1.2 below. 
248 In this argument, Miller disregards his initial distinction between nation and state. Miller, 
1988, pp. 422 and 453. 
249 M. Frost, 'Migrants, Civil Society and Sovereign States: Investigating an Ethical 
Hierarchy', XL VI Political Studies (1998), p. 878. 
25° Frost, 1998, p. 879. 
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that the migrant civilians are seeking to "tap in" to the services which the 
citizens have established exclusively for themselves?.251 If, however, 
migrants can show that they will not become free riders, they may not be 
excluded. It is strikingly quixotic that the communitarian axiom is 
complemented with an economistic criterion for determining inclusion 
and exclusion. The contradiction inherent in being 'embedded' into the 
largest unit conceivable-global civil society-annihilates Frost's credi-
bility as a communitarian. And his economistic delimitation criterion is 
too anti-egalitarian to convince universalists. While necessary, straddling 
over two paradigms also has its risks. 
In this chapter, our ambition was to profile the dynamics underlying 
the conflict between freedom and equality in the law of extraterritorial 
protection, and to reveal some of the typical manoeuvres performed by 
universalist and particularist actors. We have done that for the realm of 
political theory, illustrating how the dichotomy between universalism and 
particularism refines the question of delimitation by demarcating 
argumentative paths to be followed. It has also emerged that particularism 
cannot be theoretically defended without universalist arguments, and that 
universalism is in need of particularist delimitations to sustain its 
pragmatic dimension. In the legal analysis, we shall see this couplet of 
mutual affirmation reappear. 252 
Now, to clear our thoughts further on the interrelationship between 
the two approaches, we must leave the realm of abstraction and descend 
to the nitty-gritty of specific norms and everyday legal conflict. This 
brings us back to the initial questions. What norms govern the attribution 
of extraterritorial protection? How are they interpreted? Provided there is 
a balance between universalism and particularism implied in international 
law, it should emerge here. 
251 Frost, 1998, p. 885. Emphasis in the original. 
252 See chapter 10.1.1.1 below, analysing the reasoning of the ECtHR on the issue of 
extraterritorial protection as an amalgam of universalist and particularist arguments. 
96 
3 Determinants of Protection 
systems 
THE AVAILABILITY OF extraterritorial protection depends on a large 
number of factors. Do I have enough money to flee? Does my potential 
host state have the resources to protect me? Is there a flight connection to 
that host country? Can I get a passport? An entry visa? Is that country 
obliged to admit me? Will I really be admitted? Or will they send me 
back? Some of these factors are linked to law; others are not. In the 
following, we shall attempt to systematize those factors of a legal nature; 
in so doing, we find that not all of them are catered for in legal norms on 
extraterritorial protection. Certain questions asked by the protection 
seeker find their answer in norms relating to migration at large. 
To reach safety, a protection seeker simply has to migrate. This she has 
in common with other categories of persons who cross borders for 
reasons unrelated to protection in the narrow sense. That commonality is 
a risky one, and it can be approached in a particularist as well as a uni-
versalist fashion. 
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It enables particularist political discourse to relegate protection seekers to 
the categories of 'migrants' or, indeed, 'illegal migrants'.253 This re-
definition makes it easier to expose protection seekers to deflection and 
exclusion.254 Certainly, reducing protection seekers to 'illegal migrants', 
pure and simple, adds insult to the injury of the human rights violations 
triggering flight. To counter such tendencies, some refugee lawyers and 
advocacy organisations argue that issues of extraterritorial protection 
should be strictly severed from the discussion of migration. This is risky 
too, as access to extraterritorial protection is often contingent on the rules 
steering migration at large. A deliberate one-eyed approach tends to lose 
itself in the rights contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention and omits 
the impact visa requirements have on their enjoyment. 
Thus, the discussion of extraterritorial protection and migration seems 
to be caught between two extremes. The search for extraterritorial 
protection may neither be reduced to the quest for greener pastures, nor 
artificially decoupled from its migrational dimensions. After highlighting 
this double risk, we shall focus on access to extraterritorial protection and 
control of migration by host countries, proposing an approach that keeps 
them conceptually apart, without turning a blind eye to their factual 
inter linkages. 
253 An antidote to such confusion is the rigorous separation of means and motivation. 
Protection seekers may use the same means-i.e. migratory channels-as other categories 
of migrants, but their motivation is different. See J. Crisp, Policy Challenges of the New 
Diasporas: Migrant Networks and their Impact on Asylum Flows and Regimes, Report 
WPTC-99-05 (1999, UNHCR Policy Research Unit, Geneva), p. 9. -For the purpose of 
this work, we prefer the term 'undocumented migrants'. This term has been defined in 
the Cairo Conference Programme of Action as comprising 'persons who do not fulfil the 
requirements established by the country of destination to enter, stay or exercise an 
economic activity'. Programme of Action, International Conference on Population and 
Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994, para. 10.15, UN Doc. No. A/CONF.171/13. 
254 Sometimes, undocumented migration is named-and brandished-in the same vein as 
trafficking, sexual exploitation in host countries and other forms of modern slave trade, 
or the smuggling of narcotic substances. By crafting such linkages, protection seekers are 
made subject to an unwarranted 'guilt by association'. Therefore, it is worth reiterating 
that protection seekers often have no choice but to use unorthodox methods of flight, 
including the services rendered by human smugglers. It is important to recall that the 
illicit market of smuggling is not created by would-be protection seekers attempting to 
leave their countries of origin, but rather by state-crafted policies. The demand stems 
from an interplay of the occurence of human rights violations in countries of origin, and 
the ever more restrictive immigration and admission policies of potential host states. 
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To facilitate our understanding, we shall describe migration control and 
extraterritorial protection as systems.255 This implies, among other things, 
that both aim at serving specific functions. The function of migration 
control is the production of a population on a given territory through the 
regulation of transborder movement. More specifically, the system 
functions by managing the inflow, presence, and outflow of non-citizens 
on state territory. The code used for running this system is whether a 
person is allowed access to state territory, or not (access/deflection). 
It is important to recall that extraterritorial protection is qualitatively 
different from migration control. The former is not a sub-system of the 
latter, as both pursue different functions. The function of extraterritorial 
protection is to produce a subsidiary form of human rights protection. 
Or, more pointedly, and at the risk of being misunderstood, one could 
claim that extraterritorial protection aims at producing refugees. 256 Be that 
as it may, the system of extraterritorial protection attempts to realize its 
function by determining aliens that are defined to be in need of its 
benefits, and by according these benefits to them. The code underlying 
extraterritorial protection is whether a person is entitled to extraterritorial 
protection, or not (protection/rejection). 
255 Luhmann has described systems as 'Identitaten [ ... ], die sich in einer komplexen und 
veranderlichen Umwelt <lurch Stabilisierung einer Innen/ Auilen-Differenz erhalten'. 
['Identities [ ... ], which sustain themselves in a complex and changing environment by 
stabilising an interior/exterior-difference'. Translation by this author]. N. Luhmann, 
Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitdt (1991, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main), p. 175. By 
borrowing parts of its terminology, we do not purport to do justice to the discipline of 
systems theory, whose explicatory interests are much more far-reaching than the more 
modest ones pursued in this work. 
256 This claim does not distribute guilt onto a certain actor. To be sure, it does not say that 
host states are creating refugees by virtue of an ominous pull effect. To illustrate this 
claim further, we may revert to Soguk, who has depicted the refugee as a product of 
statecraft and territoriality. To him, 'the figure of the refugee is functionally central to 
statecraft even in his socially produced, discourse-bound marginality, a marginality that is 
vitally productive of the normative centrality of the citizen/ nation/ state hierarchy in 
life'. N. Soguk, States and Strangers. Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (1999, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis/London), p. 244. Put in somewhat simpler 
terms, the protection seeker represents the 'other' which enables the citizen to perceive 
her identity. It makes sense that states 'fight' this form of otherness, be it in the form of 
refugee-producing 'root causes' or by repeatedly alluding to the need of avoiding a 'mass 
influx' of protection seekers. Countering this 'other' means adding value to the 'id', that 
is, the identity produced by citizenship. 
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There should be little doubt that these differences are rather 
fundamental. 257 The concept of two dedicated systems suggests that it is 
not functional if one system performs tasks that should properly be 
performed within the other system. This would be the case if the 
protection system allowed persons not in need of protection to bypass 
migration control, or if the control system denied refuge on behalf of the 
system of extraterritorial protection. Let us illustrate this by giving two 
examples-one related to the return of rejected protection seekers, and the 
other to the deflection of would-be beneficiaries of extraterritorial 
protection. First, it has been claimed that failure to return rejected asylum 
seekers endangers the credibility of the protection system.258 As protection 
is a scarce commodity, it is of interest that only those with a valid claim 
enter the system of extraterritorial protection, thereby evading the risk of 
removal under the system of migration control. As both systems draw on 
the same financial base, a free rider in the protection system would take 
resources from individuals who are in real need of protection. The non-
return of rejected cases runs counter to the repartition of tasks between 
both systems, as the protection system never 'hands over' the rejected 
person to the control system, thus colonising its functions. 
To be sure, this constellation can also be turned around. It is 
undesirable that potential beneficiaries of the protection system are denied 
access to its benefits by the control system. This is what happens when 
the fear of unauthorized immigration incites states to block access for 
bona fide protection seekers as well. In this example, the state would take a 
free ride by saving protection expenses. This free ride is to the detriment 
of the would-be protection seeker. If the credibility of protection systems 
is endangered by the non-return of rejected cases, it is equally endangered 
by indiscriminate deflection policies. 
These examples may suffice to illustrate that both systems possess the 
capacity to interfere with each other, or, indeed, to colonize each other. 
257 However, there is also a fundamental commonality between migration control and 
refugee protection. Both systems operate in the same medium, namely law. Therefore, 
one could describe both migration control and extraterritorial protection as sub-systems 
of the legal system. To be sure, the legal system operates with the code legal/illegal, 
which is an abstraction of the codes access/ deflection and protection/ rejection. If one 
chooses to conceive both migration control and extraterritorial protection as sub-systems 
of law, it is important to realize that they are not hierarchically related to each other. 
258 IGCARMP, Report on Asylum Procedures. Overview of Policies and Practices in JGC 
Participating States (1997, IGCARMP, Geneva), Introduction, p. VII. 
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This is so because their fields of operation overlap. The overlapping area is 
of utmost importance for our further work. In the present chapter, we 
shall attempt to sketch a rough design of how extraterritorial protection 
and migration control interact, from the perspective of both host states 
and the protection seeker. 
3.:1 The State Perspective 
The availability of protection hinges to a large extent on the way its costs 
are distributed.259 This is clear not only from domestic social policies, but 
from international refugee law as well. One of the prime interests of states 
is to manage the costs of protection systems-be they fiscal, social or 
political. In this context, 'to manage' implies to keep costs within certain 
limits. Such limits can be informed by a wide range of factors, ranging 
from fiscal calculations to strong ethical convictions to a feeling for the 
politically feasible and opportune. Needless to say, these limits are beyond 
objective assessment. Setting them means to mould the conflict between 
universalism and particularism into the form of a specific political 
decision.260 
From the outset, we should recall the deficiencies of a cost-focused 
perspective. One is the tacit assumption that protection systems generate 
net costs rather than net benefits for a host state. As history has shown, 
this assumption need not be a correct one.261 Another deficiency is the 
fuzziness of cost calculation. The sum of fiscal costs generated by 
protection systems will vary, depending on which costs we decide to 
regard as protection-related and the time frame we choose to look at. A 
time frame spanning a short period will catch most of the integration 
259 Generally on the relationship between rights and costs: S. Holmes and C. Sunstein, The 
Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes {1999, W.W. Norton, New York). 
260 Determining the limits for 'acceptable' costs is challenging not only on the domestic level, 
but in a supranational setting as well. In a later chapter, we shall track the immense 
difficulties states have when deciding on common limits for the purpose of burden-
sharing. See chapter 8.3.2 below. 
261 The large-scale success of resettlement policies by Western countries in the aftermath of 
World War II shows quite graphica!ly that protection seekers are readily received where 
they fill the needs of the labour market. See, e.g. K. Salomon, Refogees in the Cold War 
{1991, Lund University Press, Lund), pp. 197-217. However, in his analysis, Salomon is 
careful not to reduce resettlement only to be a mere labour-market transaction. 
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costs, while neglecting the integration benefits. A time frame covering a 
longer period will probably turn costs into benefits, provided that 
integration is successful. The quantification of social and political costs is 
probably even more dubious: we may all know such costs when we see 
them, but we are at pains to measure them. Therefore, in the following, 
we shall limit ourselves to fiscal costs. Finally, a perspective focusing on 
costs runs the risk of depicting host states as cynical maximizers of 
egoistic utility, devoid of any capacity to reason in terms of human 
suffering. This is quite obviously not a description we wish to endorse. It 
has to be underscored that the reception of persons in need of protection 
encompasses important elements of altruism and compassion, which are 
irreducible to mere strategic thinking.262 
Nonetheless, if we keep these risks and shortcomings in mind, the idea 
of cost management can still serve as a structuring device to explain why 
states do what they do in the area of extraterritorial protection. It helps in 
taking the perspective of an-admittedly fictive-rationally acting state. 
Now, from this perspective, what factors have a bearing on the costs of 
operating a protection system? 
We suggest starting out with three general determinants: 
1. the number of beneficiaries of extraterritorial protection present 
on the territory of the host state, 
2. the level of individual rights accorded to these beneficiaries, and 
3. the degree of burden sharing. 
The relevance of these three determinants is rather self-evident: many 
beneficiaries, a high level of rights accorded to them, and no help from 
other states will yield high costs. A limited number of beneficiaries 
enjoying a low level of rights and forthcoming assistance from other states 
will yield low costs. Also, given that protection resources are assumed to 
262 Some contributors to the burden-sharing debate have attempted to make systematic use 
of these elements to improve the efficiency of burden-sharing schemes. Drawing on a 
communitarian paradigm, Hathaway and Neve have proposed a temporary protection 
scheme that attempts to pool protection seekers and host countries sharing 'functional' 
and 'cultural' commonalities. The underlying assumption for both criteria is that such 
systematic pooling will improve host states' willingness to receive protection seekers. See 
J. Hathaway and M. A. Castillo, 'Temporary Protection', in J. Hathaway (ed.), 
Reconceiving International Refugee Law (1997, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague), p. 16. 
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be finite, each determinant affects the two remaining determinants. Low 
numbers may entail fiscal and political margins to accord a higher level of 
rights, and vice versa. Or, the availability of burden sharing may 
exonerate the purse of a state that would otherwise have slashed rights or 
restricted access to its territory. Beyond these simple dynamics, any 
combination of the three determinants can be imagined. Simplifying, one 
may claim that the total reception costs of a state are a function of all 
three determinants. We have attempted to visualize the interdependence 
of these three determinants in Figure 2. 
This interdependence may take on many forms. A state receiving many 
protection claims due to its geographical situation may resort to a very 
restrictive practice of recognising beneficiaries in order to keep costs at 
bay.263 Or a state unable or unwilling to alter the level of individual rights 
may attempt to restrict access to its territory. This is an expression of the 
tension between immigration and integration}64 Finally, states unable to 
manage inflows and to alter the level of individual rights may choose the 
strategy of burden sharing to limit costs. 
263 This relationship between access and legal interpretation has been acknowledged by the 
German Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily in an interview: 'Und seien wir 
doch einmal ehrlich: Die alte Fassung des Grundrechts auf Asyl hat den Menschen zwar 
das liberalste Zugangsrecht nach Deutschland verschafft, hatte aber zugleich die 
illiberalste Anerkennungspraxis in Europa zur Folge.' ['And let us be honest: the old 
version of the constitutional right to asylum resulted in the most liberal right to access to 
Germany, but entailed simultaneously the most illiberal recognition practice in Europe.' 
Translation by this author]. Das Asylrecht !asst sich nicht halten, Die Zeit, No. 44, 28 
October 1999, p. 3. Indeed, the German restriction of the right to asylum entailed 
elevated recognition rates (In 1992, the Convention status recognition rate was 4.2 
percent, while the corresponding number in 1994 was 7.5 percent. Source: UNHCR, 
RefUgees and Others of Concern to UNHCR, 1998 Statistical Overview, (1999, Geneva), 
p. 72). 
264 For an excellent account of this tension, see J. Oberg, Granslos rattvisa eller rattvisa inom 
granser? Om moraliska dilemman i valfordsstatens invandrings- och invandrarpolitik (1994, 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, Uppsala), pp. 123-30. Oberg uses a matrix assembling 
four factors for structuring policy solutions: immigration policy can either be liberal or 
controlled, and integration policy can either be discriminating or equality-minded. To 
describe the unstable relationship between immigration and integration, Oberg suggests 

















Figure 2: Three determinants affecting the costs of protection regimes 
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We may now take another step and refine this crude model. The first two 
determinants-the number of beneficiaries and the rights accorded to 
them-can each be split up further. Looking at the number of 
beneficiaries, we may ask two questions: how many beneficiaries reach the 
territory of host states, and how long do they stay? Expressed simply, the 
regulation of entry and exit determines costs subsumed under the first 
determinant. It covers, first, the regulation of access to the territory of a 
host state and, second, the regulation of departure from that territory. 
Both areas of regulation will determine the number of beneficiaries 
present on the territory at a given point of time and the length of their 
stay. Entry regulation stretches over various forms of border controls as 
well as the enforcement of visa requirements. But we may also factor in 
safe third country arrangements, by which protection seekers may be 
removed immediately upon arrival in a formerly transited country. 
Ultimately, it is a matter of taste whether such arrangements are con-
sidered measures inhibiting entry or as speeding up exit. The decisive issue 
is that they impact the actual number of beneficiaries present in the host 
country. Finally, regulations on the termination of beneficiary status or 
measures on the physical enforcement of removal may be counted under 
the exit heading. Thus, the discussion on temporary protection is largely 
on the numerical limitation of beneficiaries, because one of its main issues 
is the replacement of permanent residence permits for certain beneficiaries 
with temporary ones. Precisely like the three general determinants, the 
regulation of entry and the regulation of exit are also interdependent. 
Confronted with a new inflow, a state may wish to promote the earlier 
return of beneficiaries who are already present. Conversely, where return 
is difficult due to the situation in the country of origin, a state may opt for 
blocking possible new inflows. 
Moving on to the level of individual rights, we may split this 
determinant into procedure and substance. First, it is clear that procedures 
determining the status of protection seekers trigger costs. A simple group 
determination is cheaper than individual determination, and a differ-
entiated system of multiple court appeals is more costly than an 
administrative decision-making process involving two tiers. 265 The point 
in such procedures is to distinguish persons in need of protection from 
persons wishing to enter for other reasons-thus, to single out 




beneficiaries. Second, equally obvious, the level of material rights 
accorded to beneficiaries is decisive for the costs of protection. Does 
protection merely imply that the presence of a beneficiary is tolerated? Or 
is the beneficiary entitled to housing, education and social assistance? 
Often, host countries operate with protection categories, splitting 
beneficiaries into distinct groups. Each category is linked to a certain level 
of rights. To name but one example, a refugee in the sense of the 1951 
Refugee Convention usually enjoys a higher level of rights than a person 
protected under a Temporary Protection scheme. Just as was the case with 
entry and exit, the regulation of procedure and substance are principally 
interdependent as well. 
The individual rights accorded to beneficiaries may include family 
reunion. This right is a special case. First and foremost, it relates to the 
second determinant, comprising the level of rights accorded. But as it also 
brings additional persons into the country, it possesses concurrently 
linkages to the first determinant, relating to the numbers of beneficiaries. 
Once more, it is a matter of choice whether to classify family members as 
beneficiaries of protection, or whether they should be counted under a 
separate heading. The issue of family reunion should serve as a caveat that 
the three determinants are not mutually exclusive in a strict sense. 
We recall that the legal devices used to regulate the number of 
beneficiaries and the level of rights enjoyed by them work as a system of 
filters. Generally speaking, this system will allocate protection to the 
deserving cases, and reject those not in need of it. Whether it actually 
fulfils this task is quite another matter, and shall be scrutinized in later 
chapters. 266 
This leaves us with the third determinant-burden sharing-which 
cannot be described as a filter. What is the place of burden sharing in 
protection systems? Roughly, the management of costs entailed by such 
systems may be depicted as a zero-sum game. For a moment, let us 
imagine a situation in which protection needs are constant. A state 
restricting access to protection will cut its own costs, but increase the 
costs borne by the protection seeker, by another host state, or by both. 
Just like measures targeting the single protection seeker, burden sharing is 
a way of externalising costs. The difference lies in who shall bear the 
externalized costs. In the case of burden sharing, costs are not shifted to 
266 See chapters 5 to 7 below. 
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the protection seeker, but to another, co-operating state. So burden 
sharing is about the consensual relationship between host states, rather 
than the non-consensual relationship between a host state and the indi-
vidual protection seeker. 
Due to its special characteristics, a separate chapter shall be dedicated to 
the issue of burden sharing. 267 Suffice it here to note that the degree of 
burden sharing affects the shaping of a single state's protection system. 
This dynamic works both ways. Consensus among states on a burden 
sharing arrangement can improve the openness of protection afforded by 
their domestic protection systems. On the other hand, the absence of 
burden sharing may set off a spiral of restriction in domestic protection 
systems. Where one Member State introduces restrictive legislation, other 
Member States risk experiencing a consequential rise in the number of 
protection claims. Therefore, as in a game of domino, all other Member 
States will introduce restrictive laws as well. 
3.2 The Perspective of the Protection Seeker 
Let us reconsider the steering devices used by states from the perspective 
of the protection seeker, who attempts to enter the protection system set 
up by a potential host state. This gives us an opportunity to explain the 
most pertinent filter devices in some detail, and to reflect upon the 
counter-strategies used by the protection seeker. After all, her prime 
interest is to evade a threatening violation of human rights at home.268 As 
a corollary, she wants to maintain maximum control over the process of 
267 See chapter 8 below. 
268 The literature on the motivational factors determining flight decisions is comprehensive. 
Among the classics, we find Kunz and Richmond. E. F. Kunz, 'The Refugee in Flight: 
Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement', 7 International Migration Review 125 (1973); 
E. F. Kunz, 'Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory', 15 International Migration Review 
42 (1980); A.H. Richmond, 'Sociological theories of international migration: The case of 
refugees', in B. E. Harrell-Bond and L. Monahan (eds), The sociology of involuntary 
migration (1988, SAGE Publications, London) (a revised version of this paper was 
published in: Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 6(1), 1993). For a good overview of 
scholarly writings and empirical research on the causes of refugee migration, see S. 
Schmeidl, 'Causes of Forced Exodus: Five Principal Explanations in the Scholarly 
Literature and Six Findings from Empirical Research', in A. P. Schmidt (ed.), Wither 
Refugee? The Refugee Crisis: Problems and Solutions (1996, PIOOM, Leiden). 
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flight, first and foremost to avert forcible return to the very threat she is 
fleeing, but also to secure a stable existence in the country of refuge.269 
To the protection seeker, the legal devices used by states to regulate 
protection systems appear as hurdles on the road to safety. Let us 
reconstruct the order in which a would-be protection seeker is confronted 
with these devices before, during and after flight. Following her itinerary, 
we can separate them into three categories: 
1. access to territory, 
2. access to full-fledged procedures, and 
3. access to protection. 
We shall now take a thorough look at each of these categories. 
3.2.1 Access to Territory 
The first difficulty the protection seeker meets is gaining access to the 
territory of a potential host state. Two groups of norms impact access to 
territory. The first group comprises pre-entry measures. Their function is 
to steer the access of aliens-including protection seekers-to state 
territory by extraterritorial means of control. The second group 
comprises post-entry measures, which allow for the immediate allocation 
of a protection seeker to another state, cutting her territorial contact to an 
insignificant minimum. 
The entry regulations set up by a potential host state represent the core 
of pre-entry measures.270 Generally, these comprise the demand for a valid 
passport and an entry visa. An entry visa is permission by the destination 
state to enter its territory. Such a visa must be sought before entering that 
state. Normally, one applies for a visa at a diplomatic representation of 
the destination country. 
How are visa requirements enforced? Of course, states wish to deflect 
those not meeting its entry requirements as early as possible, so as to 
269 Crisp has pointed out that 'even those asylum seekers who merit refugee status have clear 
preferences in relation to their ultimate destination', deploring that the polarized debate 
on asylum in Western Europe does not accomodate such insights. Crisp, 1999, p. 5. 
270 There are a number of factual impediments as lack of travel resources (money, 
infrastructure) or large geographical distances which are not of interest here. 
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avoid any territorial contact. In this context, so-called carrier sanctions 
constitute an important complement to visa requirements. Such sanctions 
are imposed by destination states on airlines, ship-owners and other 
carriers who bring persons without the necessary documentation-
passport and visa-into their territory. To evade these sanctions, carriers 
will check that passengers are in possession of such documentation before 
allowing them to embark. In fact, parts of the state border control have 
been moved over to the check-in counters at foreign airports-and into 
private hands. 271 In addition, some states place immigration officers at 
points of embarkation abroad to train and assist local authorities as well as 
carriers in checking the completeness and authenticity of travel 
documents.272 A further step is to entice the authorities of third countries 
to exercise exit control. Thus, beyond the state border and the airline 
check-in counter, a third front is established where the border police of 
third countries inhibit the migration attempts of persons without the 
necessary documentation. 273 
Taken together, these measures aim at blocking the entry of 
undocumented migrants, among whom we find persons in need of 
protection; such measures have therefore been described under the 
heading of non-arrival274 or non-entree275 policies. They constitute the first 
filter a would-be protection seeker meets. Where a visa requirement exists, 
and a visa is denied in accordance with the pertinent rules, a person in 
need of protection will not even be able to leave her country of origin. 
The only remaining option in such cases is to use informal channels: 
bribing an embassy officiaJ who issues visas, acquiring a falsified visa of 
271 This diminishes the leeway for protection considerations. Already in 191!9, Feller stated 
succintly that '[a] transportation company which is trying efficiently and profitably to 
move large numbers of passengers shares neither the motives, nor the expertise and 
training of State immigration authorities'. E. Feller, 'Carrier Sanctions and International 
Law', 1 I]RL 48 (1989), p. 57. See also la Cour B0dtcher A and J. Hughes, 'The effects of 
legislation imposing fines on airlines for transporting undocumented passengers', in M. 
Kjrerum (ed.), The Effects of Carrier Sanctions on the Asylum System (1991, Danish Refugee 
Council, Copenhagen). 
272 J. Vedsted-Hansen, Responding to the arrival of asylum seekers. Control vs. protection in 
asylum procedures, Paper prepared for the Technical Symposium on International 
Migration and Development, The Hague, Netherlands, 29 June-3 July 1998, Paper No. 
IX/2 (1998, Geneva), p. 15. 
273 Vedsted-Hansen, 1998, p. 16. 
274 Vedsted-Hansen, 1998, p. 14. 
275 J. Hathaway, 'The emerging politics of non-entree', Refugees (1992), pp. 40-1. 
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sufficient quality, or evading border controls at large. There is a black 
market offering such services, and accepting them implies taking a risk. 
Clients of human smugglers276 are often subject to various forms of 
exploitation.277 In a separate chapter, we will look into how Member 
States use visa requirements as a regulatory device.278 
While pre-entry measures are preventive, post-entry measures are 
reparative. Their aim is to cut short the presence of the protection seeker 
on state territory by allocating her to another country. To effectuate such 
an allocation without violating international refugee law and human 
rights law, states have devised the concept of safe third countries. 
What is the thinking behind that concept? On the way to a destination 
state within the EU, a large number of protection seekers travel through 
other countries. Provided they deem one of the transit countries as safe, 
Member States do not consider a protection claim on its merits, if the 
claimant could have sought protection there. Instead, the protection 
seeker will be sent back to that transit country. Such deflective 
mechanisms are also described with the concept of protection elsewhere.279 
A precondition to this form of deflection is the safety of the third 
country-meaning that a protection seeker is safe from refoulement to the 
country of origin. Thus, safe third country-arrangements acknowledge the 
possibility of a protection need. However, this need should be assessed 
and catered for in another country-the safe third country. Obviously, 
this reasoning denies the protection seeker the option to choose a country 
of protection. Nonetheless, this option is very valuable for the protection 
seeker, for at least two reasons. First, protection systems differ from 
276 Although the terms 'traffickers' and 'smugglers' are often used interchangeably in 
migration discourse, we shall follow the set-up of definitions elaborated by the United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. 'The smuggling of migrants can 
be defined as the procurement of illegal entry of a person into a State of which the latter 
person is not a national in order to obtain a profit. Trafficking can be defined as the 
recruitment, transportation or receipt of persons through deception or coercion for the 
purpose of prostitution, other sexual exploitation or forced labour.' United Nations 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Programme against Trafficking in 
Human Beings. An outline for action, Vienna, February 1999, p. 5. 
277 Such exploitation may take the form of ordinary fraud, i.e. charging for a service which is 
not rendered. Protection seekers have also been enticed to pay for being smuggled by 
trafficking drugs to their destination countries. 
278 See chapter 5.1.1 below. 
279 UNHCR, Re-Admission Agreements, 'Protection Elsewhere' and Asylum Policy (August 
1994, Geneva), Section 5. 
110 
PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
country to country, making it reasonable to choose a country where there 
are realistic prospects of protection.280 Or, in a worst case scenario, the 
safe third country may simply turn out not to be safe in practice, and a 
protection seeker returned there would soon find herself removed back to 
her country of origin. 281 Second, non-legal factors, such as family ties, the 
existence of diasporas, or a common language may play an important role 
for the successful establishment of a new life in exile.282 
To work properly, safe third country-arrangements presuppose the 
consent of the safe third country to take back protection seekers who 
have passed through its territory. This consent is often assured formally 
through the conclusion of a readmission agreement between destination 
states and transit states. 283 At a later stage, we will look into the effects of a 
multilateral safe third country arrangement among Member States, based 
on the Dublin Convention.284 
Following the itinerary of a typical protection seeker, we find that safe 
third country arrangements are the second hurdle on the way to the 
destination country. For the protection seeker, it is possible to circumvent 
280 'For example, some countries will return an asylum-seeker to a "first country of asylum" 
if they are satisfied that he or she will have access there to fair procedures for the 
determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention. No inquiry is made whether 
a refugee from armed conflict, who does not also fear persecution, would be granted 
protection in that country.' [Emphasis in the original]. UNHCR, Note on International 
Protection (submitted by the High Commissioner), 7 September 1994, UN Doc. 
No.Al AC.96/830, para. 43. 
281 'UNHCR is aware of a number of instances where asylum-seekers have been refused 
admission and returned to a country through which they had passed, only to be 
summarily sent onwards from there, without an examination of their claim, either to 
their country of origin or to another, clearly unsafe country. Where asylum-seekers are 
returned to third countries, this needs to be implemented with due regard to the 
principle of non-refoulement. Without the prior consent and the co-operation of the 
country to which an asylum-seeker is returned, there is a grave risk that an asylum-
seeker's claim may not receive a fair hearing there and that a refugee may be sent on, 
directly or indirectly, to persecution, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement and 
of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention.' UNHCR, Note on the Principle of Non· 
refoulement-EU Seminar on the Implementation of the 1995 EU Resolution on Minimum 
Guarantees for Asylum Procedures, November 1997, para. G. 
282 In recent years, the role of transnational social networks in the process of forced 
migration has received increased attention by researchers. For a brief overview of the 
significance of such networks and the research issues arising, see Crisp, 1999. 
283 For a typology of readmission agreements, see G. Noll, 'The Non-admission and Return 
of Protection Seekers in Germany', 9 IJRL 415 (1997a), pp. 416-24 
284 See chapter 5.2.1.1 below. 
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this hurdle by obfuscating her travel itinerary, destroying travel 
documents bearing traces of transit, and pretending that she has arrived 
directly from her country of origin. We shall see, however, that states seek 
to retaliate against such tactics. 285 
3.2.2 Access to Full-fledged Procedures 
Let us now assume that the protection seeker has managed to reach the 
territory of a given destination country and has indeed filed a protection 
claim. Before this claim is fully examined on its merits, it has to pass 
another filter-whose implementation Member States secure through a 
variety of terminology and practical arrangements-all however with a 
common core: the denial of access to full-fledged determination 
procedures. Thus, certain cases are screened out on predominantly formal 
grounds. 
This can be described as a two-tier process. First, a claim is screened 
regarding its admissibility. If, and only if, it passes the admissibility stage 
will it receive a full-fledged examination on its merits. In some Member 
States such formal screening is done in the framework of ordinary asylum 
procedures, while others deal with it in specific admissibility procedures. 
The rationale of admissibility procedures is to filter out cases that can be 
dealt with in a more expeditious manner, usually involving restricted legal 
safeguards and fewer appeal options. Such claims are often termed to be 
manifestly unfounded cases.286 
Which cases are rejected at the admissibility stage? The range of such 
grounds is comprehensive and may vary among Member States. Common 
to all Member States is, however, the formal rejection of cases where the 
claimant could have sought protection in a safe third country. 
As we have seen, safe third country-arrangements amount to a far-
reaching denial of an examination on the merits in the country of 
destination.287 This is, however, not the only category of cases where 
Member States cut down the profundity of examination. While we cannot 
285 On the procedural sanctions in the EU acquis, see chapter 6.1 below. 
286 To speak of pending cases as 'manifestly unfounded' is a contradiction in terms, as the 
European Commission has observed. See text accompanying note 700 below. 
287 The denial is not total, however, as the protection seeker may challenge the presumption 
of safety, which leads to reasoning on the substance. See chapter 12.2 below. 
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name all national practices in this overview288, the concept of safe countries 
of origin merits mentioning here. Under this concept, a full examination 
on the merits of each individual case is cut short through a formal 
presumption that the country of origin is safe. A protection seeker 
originating from a country of origin presumed to be safe will not receive a 
full-fledged examination of her claim unless she is able to rebut this 
presumption of safety. This concept has not been implemented by all 
Member States, but there are instruments of Union law alluding to it. 
Therefore, we shall revert to it in our later analysis.289 
For protection seekers, procedural filters of admissibility represent a 
considerable challenge. Rebutting presumptions of safety can be a 
demanding task. In the single case, it may appear easier to circumvent the 
admissibility screening by misrepresenting the travel route or the country 
of origin. However, where detected, such misrepresentations strike against 
the overall credibility of the claimant, putting the success of the claim at 
risk. 
3.2.3 Access to Protection 
In the last set-up of filters, it is determined how much protection is meted 
out to a claimant who has passed the previous filters. Actually, these 
filters can be best described as a range of definitions. Most famous is 
probably the definition of the term 'refugee', to be found in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and mirrored in the domestic legislation of Member 
States. Those who satisfy the criteria of this definition-as interpreted by 
the domestic decision-makers-are accorded a predefined package of 
rights. Usually, this package is the most beneficial one that protection 
systems have on offer. Nonetheless, protection options are not exhausted 
with Convention status. As we shall see, safety from return is also 
available under a number of international treaties for the protection of the 
individual, the content of which is sometimes mirrored in domestic 
legislation. Beyond that, domestic protection categories off er various 
alternatives, dubbed B-status, humanitarian status, war refugee status, 
temporary protection or otherwise. The delimitation of beneficiary 
288 For a more detailed comparison of state practice in Europe, North America and Australia, 
see IGCARMP, 1997, pp. 24-5. 
289 See chapters 6.1and6.2 below. 
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groups under these categories, as well as the rights enjoyed by them, vary 
from Member State to Member State. However, there are certain 
tendencies towards harmonisation, which we will track later on. 290 
In this context, we should recall that not all protection seekers whose 
claim is rejected in a final decision are removed from the territory of the 
state where protection was sought. For legal or factual reasons, 
deportation may be stayed temporarily. Legally, a person may not satisfy 
the exigencies of the refugee definition. Nonetheless, she may fall under 
the less demanding requirements of a mere prohibition of removal in 
domestic aliens' legislation. Factually, a rejected person may be unable to 
return, as there are no travel connections to her country of origin. 
Although stay of deportation places a person in a very volatile and 
precarious position, it represents a rudimentary form of protection and 
must therefore be counted under the present heading. Thus, it is 
insufficient to look exclusively at the filter consisting of status 
recognition. Our scrutiny must also extend to another filter-the law and 
practice of return. 
To be classified in a favourable protection category, there are few other 
strategies than good legal representation and, where necessary, the full use 
of appeal options. Strategies such as claiming false nationalities or making 
up alternative accounts of persecution may appear promising to avert 
rejection in determination procedures, but in reality they weaken the 
credibility of those parts of the claim that correspond to the truth. 
Confronted with rejection in the last instance, an unknown number of 
protection seekers choose to avoid removal by going underground. 
3.3 Two Loops 
In the discussion above, taking the state perspective helped us to 
understand the rationale of control as well as the interdependence of the 
general determinants decisive for the layout, capacity and practical 
operation of protection systems. Switching to the perspective of the 
protection seeker, the steering devices used by states presented themselves 
as a differentiated set-up of filters, through which any successful pro-
tection claim has to pass. These steering devices pertained to both the 
system of migration control and the system of extraterritorial protection. 
290 See text accompanying note 737 below. 
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Faced with them, the protection seeker develops a variety of counter-
strategies. In turn, potential host countries react by trying to fix what 
they perceive as loopholes. Thus, taking a bird's eye view, state strategies 
and protection seeker strategies evoke and affect each other, and their 
relationship is probably best described as a dialectical one. We are faced 
with a loop, where governmental efforts of control and the individual 
quest for extraterritorial protection feed back into each other. 
Crisp has described these dynamics very aptly with regard to the role 
of diasporas as facilitators of flight: 
The hypothesis [ ... ] is that by establishing and activating 
transnational social networks (aided to a considerable extent by 
new transport and communications technologies) a considerable 
number of asylum seekers were able to negotiate their way through 
the many obstacles to entry erected by the states of Western 
Europe. And the success of migration strategies was such that 
governments introduced ever more draconian measures (some of 
them in contravention of states' international legal obligations) to 
deter or prevent further arrivals. 291 
Let us for now disregard his assessment of the legality of governmental 
counter-measures and focus on the dynamics he describes. While states-
and the electoral constituencies behind them-remain the formal masters 
of legislative measures in the field of extraterritorial protection and 
migration control, protection seekers actually affect the content of such 
measures by their evasive and compensatory strategies. Thus, we may 
conclude that the conflict between universalist and particularist per-
spectives is not confined to the political constituencies crafting laws. It is 
equally present in the loop of implementation, circumvention and 
amendment following their original adoption. While the single protection 
seeker is excluded from law making, she may indirectly affect this loop by 
her strategies of circumvention. This loop juxtaposes the protection 
seeker, in the universalist position, and the potential host state, in the 
particularist position. 
To this loop between protection seeker and potential host state, we 
have to add the effects evoked by the degree of burden sharing among 
potential host states. This brings in a second feedback loop, which was 
291 Crisp, 1999, p. 10. 
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described above292, where non-co-operation among states yields a spiral of 
restriction and co-operation produces openness. Even this loop features an 
interplay of particularist and universalist positions. After all, heavily 
burdened host states seeking to arrange for burden sharing pursue both 
their own self-interest and the interest of the protection seeker. 
Looking at extraterritorial protection as a product of both loops lets us 
comprehend how contradiction and conflict emerge within law itself. In 
the next part of this work, we shall proceed to the law of the European 
Union, and clear our minds as to how it has regulated access to territory, 
to full-fledged procedures, and to protection. To do so, we shall set out by 
first summarising the flight movements confronting Europe throughout 
the last decade, and then look into the gradual development of the 
institutional framework seized with European integration during the same 
period. 
292 See chapter 3.1 above. 
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Extraterritorial Protection 
NECESSARY DELIMITATION of the Common Market or seclusionist 
fortification against an imaginary invasion? The story of integration in the 
field of immigration and asylum can be told in many different ways. 
Rather than adding to an impressive collection of exhaustive linear 
accounts293, we would like to proceed in three distinct steps, starting out 
with a macro perspective and ending with the presentation of single legal 
instruments. 
To our mind, three different layers should be discerned when telling 
the story of integration: the real world, the institutional world and the 
normative world. With the real world, we mean actual events impacting 
293 Comprehensive accounts are readily available elsewhere. See E. Guild, 'The impetus to 
harmonise: asylum policy in the European Union', in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey 
(eds), Refugee Rights and Realities. Evolving International Concepts and Regimes {1999, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) (covering developments until the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam); T. Brubach, Die Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europaischen Union au/ dem Gebiet lnneres und fustiz, unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung 
der Asyl- und Einwanderungspolitik sowie der polizeilichen Zusammenarbeit (1997, Shaker 
Verlag, Aachen) (covering the period until the 1996 IGC); C. Klos, Rahmenbedingungen 
und Gestaltungsmoglichkeiten der Europaischen Migrationspolitik {1998, Hartung-Gorre 
Verlag, Konstanz), pp. 27-87 (covering developments until the conclusion of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam). 
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on migration and the demand for protection, such as the outbreak of 
conflict and the advent of refugee crises. Below, a brief overview of the 
realities of flight to European host countries will be given, in the attempt 
to reflect some pertinent changes in this layer. Next, there is the 
institutional world: it comprises single states and state groupings, notably 
the EC, the EU and the Schengen Group. Further on in this chapter, we 
shall track the development of the institutional setting from Schengen to 
Amsterdam in greater detail. By means of these institutional structures, 
Member States have created norms in reaction to the real world layer: the 
acquis communautaire on asylum and migration.294 The subsequent three 
chapters shall be dedicated exclusively to this normative layer: the 
instruments spawned by the integration process shall be expounded in a 
subject-related order, starting with access to territory and finishing with 
the issue of return. 
For this as well as the following chapter, we would like to beg 
acceptance for a temporal limitation from 1985-99, a period spanning 
over two highly symbolic events, albeit on different levels: the White 
Paper of the Commission on the Completion of the Common Market295 
and the Kosovo intervention. Notably, four segments seem to recur more 
often than others: 1985 to 1989, 1989 to 1992, 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 
1999. We shall attempt to structure the following narrative around these 
four segments. 
294 At this stage, it might be appropriate to define what is meant by the term 'acquis 
communautaire'. As the concept is a flexible one, and its content changes as any other 
legal codification, we choose to delimit it as follows. The aquis communautaire on 
asylum and migration shall be what the Council of the Euopean Union considers it to be 
at any given point in time. The instruments belonging to the acquis are listed in: Council 
of the European Union, Draft list of the 'acquis' of the Union and of its Member States 
in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 20 March 1998, Doc. No. 6437/2/98 REV 3 
[hereinafter Draft List] and in the Addendum to this document [hereinafter Draft List 
Addendum]. Those parts of the list relevant for asylum issues are reproduced in P. J. van 
Krieken, The Asylum Acquis Handbook (2000, T .M.C. Asser Press, The Hague), pp. 86-98. 
295 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market. W'hite Paper from the Commission 
to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final [henceforth White Paper]. 
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4.1. The Real World: Flight Movements to and within Europe 
since 1.985 
Let us recap the development of flight and displacement in the real 
world.296 With the benefit of hindsight, the period 1985-9 must be 
regarded as relatively peaceful for host states in Western Europe. 
Certainly, the number of protection seekers was on the rise, but the 
Eastern borders of the EC and the transit routes leading to them were still 
managed by a cordon sanitaire of socialist states exercising rigorous exit 
control.297 
This would change with the dismantling of the Iron Curtain in the 
period from 1989-92, making physical access from Central and Eastern 
European countries to Member States of the EU easier. Mobility 
augmented not only for citizens of these states, but for transiting refugees 
from other parts of the world as well. After a decade of steady growth, the 
number of asylum applications took a sharp turn upwards at the end of 
the eighties. Within the EC, applications increased almost tenfold in the 
period between 1985 and 1992.298 The peak of protection claims in 1992 
was unprecedented in the post-war period: almost 700 000 persons sought 
refuge in European countries. 299 
296 The following does not purport to give a full overview of the complex migrational 
realities in the period 1985-99. For a survey of asylum migration to the EU, see A. 
Bocker and T. Havinga, Arylum Migration to the Eurapean Union: Patterns of Origin and 
Destination (1998, European Commission, Luxembourg). For a thorough presentation of 
forced migration and flight movements, see UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 
1993 (1993, Penguin, New York); UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1995. In 
Search of Solutions (1995, OUP, Oxford); and UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 
1997-98. A Humanitarian Agenda (1997, OUP, Oxford). For patterns of migration in 
general, see UN Commission on Population and Development, World Population 
Monitoring, 1997. Issues of international migration and development: selected aspects, 20 
December 1996, UN Doc. No. ESA/P/WP.132. For a historical account of flight and 
refuge throughout the 20'h century, see T. Kushner and K. Knox, Refugees in an Age of 
Genocide (1999, Frank Cass, London). 
297 However, these borders were sometimes permeable for transiting protection seekers. By 
way of example, the German Democratic Republic allowed Lebanese protection seekers 
to transit through its territory en route to Sweden in the early Eighties. See H. 
Quaritsch, Recht auf Asyl. Studien zu einem missdeuteten Grundrecht (1985, Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin), p. 24. 
298 By the end of 1992, the Member States hosted some 1.2 million refugees of a world 
refugee population comprising almost 19 million people. UNHCR, 1993, pp. 151-3. 
299 Source: IGCARMP, 1997, p. 21. 
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The 1992 statistics indicate that the majority of protection seekers 
originated from European countries, one of the main causes being the 
conflict in Former Yugoslavia, flaring since 1991.300 The implications of 
this conflict for migration and protection in Europe can hardly be 
overestimated, and it certainly represents the decisive event of the 1992-7 
period. For the first time since the Hungarian crisis in 1956, Western 
Europe was confronted with a substantial outflow of Europeans. 301 Soon, 
the focus of the conflict moved to Bosnia, which dominated the 
migrational agenda well beyond the Dayton peace agreement in 1995. 
While Germany sent a first wave of Bosnians back as early as 1996, other 
countries waited until 1997 before phasing in return movements. 302 
In the 1997-9 period, Bosnia gave way to Kosovo. After a successive 
build-up of aggression and persecution, the conflict erupted in early 1999, 
forcing a wave of over 800 000 protection seekers to seek refuge abroad. 
Kosovo differed from Bosnia in three respects. First, NATO intervened 
with considerable military resources, expressly pursuing the aim of 
stopping further displacement and creating the conditions for return of 
those already displaced. Second, deflection proved to be much more 
effective than it had been during the Bosnian crisis. After all, the majority 
of Kosovars were displaced internally or were hosted in Albania and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Third, attempts to share the 
receptive burden surfaced. Considerable resources were sent from 
Western Europe to the regional host countries, and a limited evacuation 
programme was launched to exonerate Macedonian refugee camps. 
On the numerical level, one may state that the real world layer brought 
a moderate rise in protection claims between 1985-98 and a steep rise to 
an unprecedented peak between 1989 and 1992. A decline followed, and in 
300 A survey of ten European countries shows that in 1992, 35 % of asylum applications were 
made by nationals of former Yugoslavia (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), UNHCR, 
1993, pp. 37, 158. 
·101 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia exceeded the 1956 Hungarian outflow by a factor 
of five. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal to the 
Council for a Joint Action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 2 (b) of the 
Treaty on European Union concerning Temporary Protection of Displaced Persons, 4 
March 1997, p. 2, para. 2. 
302 For an overview of the return policies and practices by EU Member States with regard to 
Bosnians, see R. Black, K. Koser and M. Walsh, Conditions for the return of displaced 




1995 the numbers had fallen below the 1989 level again. The period 1997-
9 saw rising demands, mostly due to the conflict in Kosovo. Beyond mere 
statistics, Western Europeans had to realize that they could no longer 
profit from the control exercised by the socialist regimes in the East: 
borders had become permeable, and the dismantling of state structures 
had led to the first large-scale refugee crises in decades. In that sense, 1989 
and 1992 are pivotal dates for the history of refugee protection in Europe. 
4.2 The Institutional World: From Schengen to Amsterdam 
Parallel to the changing dynamics of flight in the period from 1985 to 
1999, a reinforcement and diversification of multilateral institutions seized 
with migration and protection issues took place.303 \Xlhile both issues 
belonged-and still belong-to the domaine reservee for autonomous 
policy decisions by single European states, prudent preparations for a 
greater measure of multilateralism were made. We shall track this 
development in the process of European integration by highlighting five 
steps: the 1985 White Paper, the Schengen process, the European Political 
Cooperation, the Maastricht Treaty and, finally, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
3m Taking a wider perspective, this diversification can be tracked in other arenas as well. 
One may point at the decision of a number of industrialized states to sever parts of the 
discourse on migration and protection from the universal forum offered by UNHCR, 
and to start their own private discussion club by launching IGCAMRP in 1985. 
IGCAMRP offers states an environment where protection concerns occupy a more 
subordinate role than at UNHCR, and the perspectives of the South are largely excluded. 
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4.2.1 Freedom through Control: The 1985 White Paper and 
the Single European Act 
Although the harmonization of asylum systems in different European 
states had seized the Council of Europe for quite a while304, it was the 
emerging Common Market without internal border control that inspired 
serious work on common rules regarding asylum issues. Institutionally, 
this relocated the initiative from the Council of Europe to the EC 
Member States. Materially, it brought the issues of asylum and protection 
under the heading of migration control. 
For almost thirty years, the objective of free movement of persons had 
been a near-comatose item on the agenda of European integration. With 
the beginning of the eighties, the political process aiming at the realization 
of the internal market started to gain momentum.305 The 1985 White 
Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market306 was probably the most 
elaborate expression of this process. It attempted to offer a blueprint for 
the next seven years of integration, with completion of the internal 
market envisaged for the year 1992. The White Paper laid down the goal 
of the complete abolishment of internal border controls307 and pointed 
out that asylum law and the situation of refugees had to be considered in 
the discussion on measures compensating for the loss of control due to 
their abolishment. 308 
The thrust of the Commission White Paper was mirrored in the Single 
European Act309, adopted a year later. Two features of the SEA merit 
underscoring. First, an express provision confirmed the political 
304 Back in the Seventies and the early Eighties, the Council of Europe had already taken 
issue with harmonization aspects. See, e.g., Recommendation 787 (1976) on 
Harmonization of Eligibility Practice; Recommendation R (1981) 16 on the 
Harmonization of National Procedures Relating to Asylum. For an overview of 
harmonization efforts within the Council of Europe in that phase, albeit with a 
somewhat particularist bias on state interests, see K. Hailbronner, Miiglichkeiten und 
Grenzen einer europaischen Koordinierung des Einreise· und Asylrechts. Ihre Auswirkungen 
auf das Asylrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (1989, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden), pp. 27-34. 
305 For developments preceding the White Paper, see Brubach, 1997, pp. 2-15. 
306 See note 295 above. 
307 White Paper, para. 27. 
308 White Paper, para 11. 
309 Single European Act, 9 September 1985, OJ (1987) L 169/1. 
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determination of Member States to complete the internal market by 
1992.310 Second, the Member States laid down the following statement in 
the Final Act of the SEA. 
In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member 
States shall cooperate, without prejudice to the powers of the 
Community, in particular as regards the entry, movement and 
residence of nationals of third countries. 311 
The form of such co-operation would continue to be outside the 
institutional framework of the EC until the Maastricht Treaty. The 
quoted statement was without prejudice to the sovereign powers of the 
Member States in the named areas.312 Nonetheless, it flags that the message 
of the Commission White Paper had been heard and approved by the 
Member States: no internal market without measures on the movement of 
non-communitarians. Or, more succinctly: freedom had to be attained 
through the means of control. Thus, it has to be understood that the 
European harmonization of asylum law was never intended to be a 
comprehensive solution to the problems of refugee protection. It was 
conceived as a technical consequence of the abolition of internal borders. 
To a significant degree, this heritage still haunts the contemporary acquis. 
4.2.2 L'Europe acceleree: Schengen 
Meanwhile, pioneering work in the area of free movement was being done 
by a small integrationist elite. 1985 sees the birth of /'Europe a deux vitesses: 
an avant-garde of five EC Member States signs the Schengen Agreement313, 
drawing up a framework for the abolishment of internal border controls 
310 See Art. Sa (1) TEC. In a declaration on Art. Sa, the Member States clarified that the 
specification of a date for the completion of the common market would not imply a legal 
obligation. 
311 Final Act, Political Declaration by the Governments of the Member States on the Free 
Movement of Persons, annexed to the Single European Act. OJ (19S7) L 169/26. 
312 General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 of the Single European Act. Annexed to the 
Final Act of the Single European Act, OJ (19S7) L 169/25. See also Brubach, 1997, pp. 
lS-9. 
313 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of 
Checks at their Common Borders, June 14, 1985 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement]. 
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and the adoption of compensatory measures. This instrument introduced 
a number of concrete measures facilitating cross-border traffic among 
Contracting Parties and established a work programme for the complete 
abolishment of internal borders among its Contracting Parties. Among 
the necessary compensatory measures, the harmonization of visa policies 
and of certain areas of domestic aliens legislation was listed. 314 
Five years of negotiations on the topics of immigration, police and 
justice co-operation, drug policy and information exchange followed. 
Finally, a document subsequently known as the Schengen Convention315 
was signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Its normative core is contained in Article 2 SC, stating that 
the internal borders of Contracting Parties may be passed at any point 
without any checks on persons being carried out. As compensatory 
measures, the Schengen Convention contains inter alia provisions on the 
control of external borders, on visa requirements, on the responsibility 
for the processing of asylum applications, on information exchange under 
the so-called Schengen Information System (SIS) and on the introduction 
of carrier sanctions. The Convention provided for its own institutional 
framework by arranging for an Executive Committee316 and endowing it 
with the power to issue detailed and binding regulations on a number of 
issues. Under its Rules of Procedure, the Executive Committee was 
presumed to meet under seclusion of the public317, and its deliberations 
and votes were covered by the duty of confidentiality.318 Moreover, it was 
capable of deciding that its own decisions-which could very well have a 
binding effect and impact on individual rights or obligations-were 
314 Art. 20 of the Schengen Agreement. 
315 c;,nvention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their 
Common Borders, 19 June 1990 [hereinafter Schengen Convention, abbreviated SC]. 
316 Under Chapter VII SC. 
317 Schengen Executive Committee, Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee 
established pursuant to Title VII of the Agreement implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, 18 October 1993, Art. 3 (1). 
318 Ibid., Art 2 (1). 
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confidential.319 The opaqueness of procedures and the amount of secrecy 
engulfing the Committee's work provoked harsh criticism and were 
brandished as a 'democratic retrogression'. 320 It is noteworthy that the 
executive powers of the Schengen Committee were not balanced by any 
judicial review through the ECJ, and that its secretive modus operandi 
largely precluded corrections by domestic or supranational parliaments. 
A lengthy ratification process as well as complex technical preparations 
protracted the implementation of the Schengen Convention after its 
formal entry into force on 1 September 1993. Following a decision by the 
Execntive Committee321 , the instrument has been applied since 26 March 
1995.322 A number of Schengen States have concluded bilateral agreements 
with each other to facilitate the practical implementation of the 
Convention. 323 
319 Curtin and Meijers quote a particularly absurd example of the secrecy policies within the 
Schengen Committee. On the demand of a single Member State (Germany), a decision on 
a common list of countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa for entering 
Schengen states was classified as confidential. Thus, it was impossible for any outsider 
observer-e.g. a citizen of a Schengen state-to determine whether or not the imposition 
of visa requirements stemmed from international obligations under the Schengen 
Convention. D. Curtin and H. Meijers, 'The Principle of Open Government in Schengen 
and the European Union: Democratic Retrogression?', in B. G. Tahzib, C. Groenendijk, 
M. Vreugdenhill-Klap and J.M. van de Put (eds,), Democracy, Migrants and Police in the 
European Union: The 1996/GC and Beyond (1997, FORUM, Utrecht), p. 23. 
32° Curtin and Meijers, 1997, pp. 19-28. 
321 According to a declaration to Art. 139 SC by the Schengen Parties, the Convention 
would only enter into force if external border controls functioned properly. The smooth 
operation of SIS would be a precondition, too. In the light of the technical difficulties, 
the Executive Committee decided that the entry into force should take place on 26 
March 1995. See K. Wurz, Das Schengener Durchfuhrungsubereinkommen: Einfahrung, 
Erlauterungen, Vorschriften (1997, Boorberg, Stuttgart), p. 30. 
322 Starting with that date, the Schengen Convention was only applied in seven countries-
the five original contracting parties, Portugal and Spain. The other Schengen Members 
were to join successively, upon satisfaction of the technical requirements for the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis. The starting date of the Convention's 
implementation in a certain country is determined by unanimous decision of the 
Executive Committee. 
323 Such agreements have been concluded between a large number of Schengen states. See e.g. 
Accord relatif aux articles 40 et 41 de la Convention d'application de !'Accord de 
Schengen du 14.6.1985, relatif a la suppression graduelle des controles aux frontieres 
communes du 19.6.1990, JO 1995, p. 16445; Accord relatif aux articles 2 et 3 de I' Accord 
d'adhesion du Royaume d'Espagne a la Convention d'application de !'Accord de 
Schengen du 14.6.1985, relatif a la suppression graduelle des controles aux frontieres 
communes du 19.6.1990, JO 1995, p. 16445. 
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It must be emphasized that both the Schengen Agreement and the 
Schengen Convention are products of intergovernmental co-operation 
outside the Community framework. Community institutions were not 
involved in the drafting process. Nonetheless, the same bureaucrats were 
involved in the Community process and in the Schengen process. 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Schengen Group in many 
respects seemed to act upon the analysis presented in the Commission 
White Paper of 1985. And normative coherence with the Community 
framework was an explicit goal for the Schengen avant-garde; the 
Schengen Convention contains a savings clause for EC law in Article 134 
SC. 
By and by, the avant-garde project went mainstream. Successively, 
additional Member States acceded to both Schengen instruments.324 
Accession Protocols and Agreements were signed with Italy (on 27 
November 1990), Spain and Portugal (25 June 1991), Greece (on 
6 November 1992), Austria (on 28 April 1995) and Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden (on 19December1996). Ireland and the United Kingdom 
remained outside, however, denying the Schengen co-operation full 
congruence with the group of EU Member States. Institutional 
convergence was reached in 1997, when the Schengen acquis325 was 
incorporated into the framework of the European Union by means of a 
Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam326, taking into account the outsider 
role of Ireland and the United Kingdom.327 Concurrently, the role of the 
Schengen Executive Committee was taken over by the Council of the 
European Union. 
To preserve the free movement of persons already attained among the 
Scandinavian states by virtue of the Nordic Passport Union, Iceland and 
Norway were associated to the implementation of the Schengen acquis.328 
This implied that both countries were to handle external border controls 
on behalf of the Schengen Group. 
324 According to Art. 140 (2) SC, a prerequisite for accession is membership in the European 
Union. 
325 On the precise content of the Schengen acquis, see chapter 4.2.6 below. 
326 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union, 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 6 October 1997, Doc. No. CONF 4007/97, TA/P/en 5, [hereinafter 
Schengen Protocol}. 
327 See chapter 4.2.7 below. 
328 See text accompanying note 420 below. 
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4.2.3 Trying to Catch Up: The European Political Cooperation 
4.2.3.1 The Dublin Convention 
It would be wrong to depict the phase from 1985-92 as solely dominated 
by the avant-garde activism of the Schengen countries. The Twelve were 
pursuing the same track, albeit at a slower pace, within the non-
institutionalized framework of the European Political Co-operation 
(henceforth EPC). The vehicle of this co-operation was the Council of EC 
Immigration Ministers and, on a subsidiary level, the Ad-Hoc-Group on 
Immigration329; its prime product was the Dublin Convention.330 The 
Dublin Convention was signed by all Member States on 15 June 1990, and 
is still the core instrument in the area of asylum and migration law. 
Unlike the much broader Schengen Convention, the Dublin Convention 
deals exclusively with the allocation of asylum applications. Its allocation 
criteria are largely identical with those laid down as the Schengen 
Convention, and can be historically traced to an unsuccessful Draft 
Agreement stemming from discussions within the Council of Europe.331 
The Dublin Convention represents a gain over the Schengen Convention 
thanks to its expanded geographical scope, comprising all EU Member 
States. 
To avoid normative conflicts between the two Conventions, 
Contracting Parties to the Schengen Convention signed the so-called 
329 Further on the organisational aspects of the Council and the Ad-hoc Group on 
Immigration, see Klos, 1998, pp. 32-7; Brubach, 1997, p. 27-33. 
33° Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, 15 June 1990 
[hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
331 CAHAR drew up a Draft Agreement on responsibility for examining asylum requests in 
1988. With some minor deviations, this draft features the same allocation principles 
which were to be used in the Schengen and Dublin Conventions. A German-language 
version of the Draft agreement is reprinted in Hailbronner, 1989, pp. 228-32. Within the 
Council of Europe, disagreement on the Draft was considerable-countries of the South 
feared that the Draft agreement would shift reception burdens onto them (for a 
description of the various positions taken by states, see Hailbronner, 1989, pp. 29-31}. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one may claim that these fears turned out to be entirely 
justified, as shown in chapter 8.4.1 below. 
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Bonn Protocol.332 The Protocol provided that the rules on the res-
ponsibility for asylum applications laid down in Chapter VII SC were no 
longer applicable with the entry into force of the Dublin Convention.333 
After the final ratification by the Republic of Ireland, the Dublin 
Convention entered into force on 1 September 1997. It remains an 
instrument of international law, outside the EC framework. Precisely as 
the Schengen Convention has done, the Dublin Convention triggered the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements between Member States to facilitate its 
implementation.334 We shall have reason to revert to the details of the 
Dublin Convention and of the instruments related to it in a later 
chapter.335 
4.2.3.2 The Draft External Border Convention 
Beyond the Dublin Convention, the Ad-hoc Group on Immigration also 
elaborated a draft for a convention on the crossing of external borders336, 
which mirrored the approach taken in the Schengen Convention. In 
addition, the draft featured norms on access to the territory of Member 
States based on humanitarian grounds or on international obligations.337 
Nonetheless, due to a conflict between Spain and the U.K. on the status of 
Gibraltar, the draft never reached the signature stage. 
332 Protokoll zu den Konsequenzen des Inkrafttretens des Dubliner Ubereinkommens fiir 
einige Bestimmungen des Durchfiihrungsiibereinkommens zum Schengener Uber-
einkommen, Bonn, 26 April 1994, BGBI II 1995, pp. 737-8 [hereinafter Bonn Protocol]. 
333 See Art. 1 of the Bonn Protocol, stating that provisions in Title II Chapter VII SC as well 
as the definition of the terms 'application for asylum', 'applicant for asylum' and 
'processing of an application for asylum' in Art. 1 SC shall no longer be applicable. 
334 See, e.g., the German-Swedish agreement, determining the modalities of readmission, and 
the precedence of the Dublin Convention over an older readmission agreement between 
the two countries: Overenskommelse med Tyskland angaende tillampningen av 
konventionen den 15 juni 1990 rorande bestiimmandet av den ansvariga staten for priivning 
av en ansokan om asyl som framstiillts i en av medlemsstaterna i Europeiska gemenskaperna 
(SO 1997:4), Stockholm 19 November and 9 December 1998, SO 1998:28. 
m See chapter 5.2.1.1 below. 
336 Brubach, 1997, pp. 31-2. The Draft Convention has not been published. 
337 J. Ketelsen, 'Die Zustandigkeit der EG fiir die Schaffung eines EG-Asylrechts nach 
Maastricht', in K. Barwig, G. Brinkmann, B. Huber, K. Liircher and C. Schumacher 
(eds), Asyl nach der Anderung des Grundgesetzes (1994, Nomos, Baden-Baden), p. 358. 
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On 10 December 1993, the Commission presented a proposal based on 
Article K.3 TEU/Maastricht establishing the Convention on the crossing 
of the external frontiers of the Member States.338 The content of this 
proposal was largely identical to that of the aforementioned draft, but it 
was never adopted. Now, with the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty and the integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union 
framework, the situation has changed. Ireland and the United Kingdom 
can now easily opt in with regard to the Schengen acquis.339 Hence, the 
negotiation and conclusion of a treaty largely mirroring the Schengen 
Convention has become superfluous. 
4.2.3.3 Enter Soft Law: The London Resolutions 
In the year before Maastricht would change the institutional framework 
of integration, the EPC launched four non-binding instruments in the 
field of asylum and migration. This step marked the debut of soft law as a 
steering instrument in this field. The texts dealt with 
O manifestly unfounded applications for asylum; 
o the concept of safe third countries; 
o the concept of safe countries of origin; and 
O the expulsion of illegal third country nationals.340 
They have collectively become known as the 'London resolutions'. The 
content of these instruments shall be expounded contextually in later 
chapters.341 
338 European Commission, Proposal for a decision based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union establishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of 
the Member States, 10 December 1993, COM(93}684 final. 
339 See chapter 4.2.7 below. 
340 See text accompanying notes 585, 625, and 640 below. 
341 See chapters 6.1, 5.2.2.1and7.2.1 below. 
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4.2.3.4 Swapping Information: CIREA and CIREFI 
In the same year, the EC Immigration Ministers added an institutional 
layer to their co-operation by establishing the Centre for Information, 
Discussion and Exchange on Asylum (henceforth CIREA)342 and Centre 
for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers 
and Immigration (henceforth CIREFI)343, two fora of information 
exchange in asylum and migration matters.344 
CIREFI was assigned to collate intelligence on the crossing of Member 
States' external borders, inter alia serving as an early warning mechanism 
for the inflow of undocumented migrants. According to its present 
mandate, CIREFI shall 'assist the Member States in effectively studying 
legal immigration preventing illegal immigration and unlawful residence, 
in effectively combating immigration crime, in better detecting forged 
documents and in improving expulsion practice'.345 
CIREA, on the other hand, was tasked with the collection of 
information on the situation in countries of origin346, which was well in 
line with the provision on mutual information exchange enshrined in the 
Dublin Convention347 and in the London resolution dealing with safe 
342 Decision of 11 June 1992 setting up the CIREA (Centre for Information, Discussion and 
Exchange on Asylum), WGI 1107 (The acronym CIREA stems from the body's French 
name). 
343 EC Ministers responsible for immigration, Decision of 30 November and 1 December 
1992 to establish a Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of 
Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI). This instrument has not been published in the 
Official Journal. 
344 Since 1998, information on countries of origin is also collated within the High Level 
Working Group on Migration and Asylum. See text accompanying note 761 below. 
345 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of 30 November 1994 on the organization 
and development of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the 
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI), OJ (1996) C 274/50, pp. 50-1, para. 1. 
346 For a comparison of CIREA and other bodies dealing with asylum information within 
the EU, see Advisory Council on International Affairs, Asylum Information and the 
Eurapean Union (1999, AIV, The Hague), focusing inter alia on sources used, the degree 
of public access and the impact of collected information on asylum procedures. 
347 See Art. 14 DC. 
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countries of origin.348 Its information sources are the governments of 
Member States and the European Commission, and the information 
collated by it is in principle only accessible to the bodies directly involved 
in determination procedures at the administrative and ministerial levels. 349 
It discharges its tasks by compiling so-called 'joint reports' on the 
situation in countries of origin, based on guidelines drawn up by the 
Council. 350 
Although its function is primarily a consultative one, it cannot be 
excluded that CIREA's assessment of the situation in countries of origin 
may have a critical impact on the outcome of protection claims in 
Member States. CIREA documents are largely confidential, which blocks 
external screening of how it performs its tasks.351 As sceptics have pointed 
out, this may put protection seekers and their lawyers at a considerable 
disadvantage, as they do not know whether and to what extent a decision 
on an individual protection claim has been affected by information passed 
on through CIREA. 352 However, it is quite evident that Member States 
themselves do not consider their common data collection exercises as 
348 EC Ministers responsible for immigration, Conclusions adopted on 30 November 1992 
on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution, WGI 1281 
[henceforth SCO Conclusions]. Para. 2 states inter alia that 'Member States have the goal 
to reaching [sic!] common assessment of certain countries that are of particular interest in 
this context. To this end, Member States will exchange information within an 
appropriate framework on any national decisions to consider particular countries as ones 
in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution'. 
European Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: The 'Safe Country of Origin 
Principle' (1997, The European Parliament, Brussels), p. 24. Council of the European 
Union, Circulation and confidentiality of joint reports on the situation in certain third 
countries, 20 June 1994, OJ (1996} C 274/43. 
35° Council of the European Union, Guidelines for joint reports on certain third countries, 
20 June 1994, OJ (1996} C 274, pp. 52-5. 
351 In a recent case, the ECJ considered a Council decision not to allow public access to 
certain CIREA documents as unlawful. ECJ, Case T-188/98, Kuijer v Council of the 
European Union, Published April 14, 2000. 
352 This is said to violate the principle of 'equality in arms' in determination procedures. 
European Parliament, 1997, p. 24. Calls in a European Parliament Resolution to make 
the work of CIREA more transparent, and to admit non-governmental information to its 
dissemination system have remained unheard. European Parliament, Resolution on the 
harmonization within the European Communities of asylum law and policies, A3-
0337 /92, para. 33. 
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satisfactory.353 At best, this may imply that they exercise caution in using 
such data for decision-making. Nonetheless, as data collected through 
CIREA is disseminated among domestic authorities, the risk prevails that 
individual bureaucrats also use them, regardless of doubts at the 
ministerial level. 
4.2.4 Maastricht-Progress through Split Competencies? 
Comparing the normative output of the Schengen co-operation with that 
of the European Political Co-operation at the beginning of the nineties 
would make it perfectly clear that the EPC simply lagged behind. The 
EPC had only accomplished 22 binding norms enshrined in the Dublin 
Convention, while the Schengen Group had produced 142 articles on a 
broad variety of migration-related topics in the Schengen Convention 
alone. Within the Schengen Group, the abolishment of border controls 
was no longer unrealistic. Within the EC at large, it certainly was. 
The delegations to the 1991-2 Inter-governmental conference (hence-
forth IGC) preparing the Treaty of Maastricht were well aware of the 
limited output of the EPC. The integration process simply needed a 
tighter structure and a proper institutional framework. What could be 
accomplished in Maastricht were first steps in that direction: a partial EC 
competence was created for visa issues, and the brunt of remaining 
questions were to be handled by the newly-created Union framework. 
Hence, Maastricht split competencies into a supranational piece under the 
first pillar and an intergovernmental chunk under the third pillar. This 
made the geometry of integration more complex. To the separation of 
Member States into the Schengen avant-garde and a group of back-
benching governments, Maastricht would add a separation of asylum and 
migration issues into EC law and Union law. 
353 According to a 1998 draft strategy paper by the Austrian Presidency, 'data on overall 
figures (i.e. for instance, number of asylum seekers or illegal border-crossers apprehended 
in a particular year)' are missing in spite of joint collection exercises. Council of the 
European Union, Note from the Presidency to the K.4 Committee, Strategy paper on 
migration and asylum, 1 July 1998, Doc. No. 9809/98, para. 74. It must be considered a 
serious shortcoming, if basic data on the number of yearly applications at borders are 
missing. One may wonder how the Council is to make joint assessment of persecutory 




The Union competence was laid down and specified in Title VI of the 
TEU. Under Article K.l, Member States agreed to consider the following 
items as issues of common interest: (1) asylum policies; (2) rules on the 
passage of persons of the external borders of Member States, and the 
exercise of control thereon; (3) immigration policy and policies towards 
third country nationals as regards their entry and movement, conditions 
for their residence on the territories of Member States, including family 
reunification and access to employment, and combating illegal 
immigration. Precisely as was the case for the whole of the third pillar, 
these issues would be subject to unanimous decision-making by the 
Council. According to Article K.3 TEU/Maastricht, relevant measures 
could be given the form of joint positions, joint actions and conventions. 
Only the latter offered undisputed force to bind Member States in a legal 
sense. 354 To be sure, the ECJ has no competence to rule on measures 
adopted under the third pillar.355 However, supranationalism was not 
completely banned from the third pillar: a two-thirds majority was 
sufficient to decide on measures for carrying out a joint action or a 
convention. 356 
The Community competence was enshrined in Article lOOc TEC, 
empowering the Community to adopt a list of third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States. To wit, the transgression to 
supranationalism was softened by paragraph (3) of the said provision: 
until 1 January 1996, unanimity was required in the Council, but from 
that date on, a decision could be taken by qualified majority. In exercising 
this competence, the EC could make use of all instruments offered by 
community law, including those having binding force. 
By means of the passerelle in Article K.9 TEU357, measures concerning 
asylum and immigration could have been moved over to Community 
competence. The procedure was somewhat less demanding than a treaty 
354 See chapter 1.4.2.6 above on the legal effects of joint actions and joint positions. 
355 Nonetheless, the Commission may, of course, challenge any third pillar measures 
infringing EC competence. Moreover, a convention concluded under Art. K.3 (c) 
TEU/Maastricht may give competence to the ECJ on matters of interpretation and 
application. As no conventions were concluded under that provision, the ECJ never 
received that competence. 
356 Art. K.3 (2) (b) and (c) TEU/Maastricht. 
357 The french term passerelle (footbridge) is widely used as a metaphor for this norm. 
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amendment, but required the unanimous decision of the Council and 
acceptance by national constituencies. The passerelle was never used. 
Instead, the Amsterdam Treaty provided for a gradual shift of asylum and 
immigration issues to a supranational level. 
Until the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force and ended the 
Maastricht era in 1999, two visa-related instruments were adopted under 
the first pillar. As they were given the form of regulations, they had 
binding force. The third pillar did not yield a single convention under the 
same period. It brought about a number of non-binding texts, of which 
the majority was given the form of atypical instruments. 358 Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that the Maastricht acquis was criticized for its 
inefficiency. 359 
What issues dominated the Maastricht era? In the three areas of asylum, 
external border control and migration, the latter clearly dominated by the 
sheer number of adopted instruments, most of which relate to the topics 
of readmission and return. By virtue of the two visa regulations, the 
external border issue stands out as the only one that features binding 
instruments. In the asylum area, two instruments merit special mention, 
as they directly allude to the legal classification and the standing of 
individual protection seekers: the 1995 Resolution on Minimum 
Guarantees in Asylum Procedures and the 1996 Joint Action on the 
Harmonized Application of the Refugee Definition. Another noteworthy 
attempt to solve a central problem of harmonized protection was the 
adoption of a resolution on burden-sharing of displaced persons in 1995. 
The remaining instruments of the asylum acquis refined information 
collection procedures or provided for the monitoring of adopted 
instruments. 
358 In the asylum acquis, there is only one Joint Position, which is expressly deprived from 
any binding force in the domestic domain. Eleven atypical instruments were adopted in 
the asylum area (of which three stem from the EPC era). In the migration acquis, we find 
two Joint Actions, and, apart from the named two EC regulations, the astonishing 
number of 26 atypical instruments (of which one stems from the EPC era). The acquis on 
external borders features two joint actions, one joint position, two EC regulations and 
one atypical instrument. In the training area, four joint actions were adopted, of which 
one related to asylum. See Draft List and Draft List Addendum. 
359 See further R. Bank, 'The Emergent EU Policy on Asylum and Refugees. The New 




Among sceptics of the integration process, a recurrent theme in the 
critical assessment of the Maastricht era was the lack of transparency in 
decision-making360 and the absence of judicial scrutiny of adopted 
instruments.361 As we shall see below, cautious steps towards greater 
openness and accountability have been taken since the Maastricht period. 
However, in spite of their questionable democratic merits, the 
instruments adopted in that period are still applicable today and play an 
important role in the enlargement process. 
4.2.5 Planning the Economy of Harmonization: Amsterdam 
A major reshuffle of competencies, a binding time-table for future 
integration, the integration of the Schengen acquis and a protocol slashing 
the standing of protection seekers who happen to be Union citizens-
these were the key achievements of the Amsterdam IGC. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999 and presently governs the 
multilateral co-operation on asylum and immigration in the Union. In the 
following sub-sections, we shall look into the bundle of competencies and 
obligations spawned by Amsterdam as well as the geometry of integration 
under it. Together with the Amsterdam Treaty, a 'Protocol on asylum for 
nationals of Member States of the European Union' was adopted.362 This 
instrument-the so-called Spanish Protocol-shall be dealt with con-
textually in a later chapter.363 
36° For an elaborate argumentation, see Curtin and Meijers, 1997, pp. 29-42, suggesting that 
European integration implies a 'reduction of the democratic content of European society' 
(at p. 42). 
361 The role of the ECJ under the third pillar was a peripheral one. To wit, it had no 
competencies with regard to the instruments adopted in the asylum and migration area. 
For an overview, see C. A. Groenendijk, 'The European Court of Justice and the Third 
Pillar', in B. G. Tahzib, C. A. Groenendijk, M. Vreugdenhill-Klap and J. M. van de Put 
(eds), Democracy, Migrants and Police in the European Union: The 1996 IGC and Beyond 
(1997, FORUM, Utrecht). 
362 Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union, annexed to 
the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
6 October 1997, Doc. No. CONF 4007 /97, T AIP I en 24 [hereinafter Spanish Protocol]. 
363 See section 6.2 below. 
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4.2.5.1 Competencies and Obligations 
At first sight, the most striking change brought about by the Amsterdam 
Treaty is a wholesale transfer of asylum and immigration matters from 
the third to the first pillar. Although a corset of intergovernmental 
elements in decision-making has significantly reduced the impact of this 
transfer, new doors have been opened. The move to the first pillar makes 
the powerful legislative tools of Article 251 TEC available (that is, 
regulations, directives and decisions), offering undisputed bindingness, 
justiciability and, under certain preconditions, even direct effect. 
Henceforth, the Council may adopt regulations, directives and decisions 
in a wide array of specified issues relating to asylum, external borders and 
immigration, and not only in certain visa issues. Furthermore, scrutiny of 
adopted measures now comes under the ambit of the ECJ. 
Technically, this has been achieved by inserting a new Title N into the 
TEC. The portal provision of this title, Article 61, delimits the 
competencies of the Community under this title: 
In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and 
justice, the Council shall adopt: 
(a) within a period of five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, measures aimed at ensuring the free 
movement of persons in accordance with Article 14, in conjunction 
with directly related flanking measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum and immigration, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 62(2) and (3) and Article 63{1){a) and {2){a), 
and measures to prevent and combat crime in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 31{e) of the Treaty on European Union; 
(b) other measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and 
safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 63; [ ... ] 
The main ideas of the whole title are spelt out here. With the allusion to 
'an area of freedom, security and justice', a new telos is introduced or, 
rather, the 'abolishment of internal border controls' is cloaked in less 
technocratic apparel. The provision also couples free movement measures 
to 'flanking measures'. Here, freedom through control-a paradigm 
running through the history of integration since the mid-eighties-
resurfaces. However, the competencies meted out in the provision come 
with obligations. The Council is assigned to adopt both categories of 
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measures within five years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. This transitory period will end on 1 May 2004. The inclusion of a 
time-table makes the Amsterdam approach fundamentally different from 
the one taken in Maastricht: integration is sought not merely by 
enhancing competencies, but by setting out a binding schedule of 
achievements and by phasing in supranational decision-making 
corresponding to this time-table. Title IV suggests that the internal market 
needs a dose of planned economy. 
However, the Community competencies under Title IV are neither all-
embracing nor exclusive.364 Articles 62 and 63 TEC enumerate the issues 
within EC competence in an exhaustive manner. Thus, there is no 
comprehensive EC competence in the areas of visa, asylum, immigration 
and external borders. Those issues not specified in Articles 62 and 63 TEC 
remain within the competence of the Member States. The enumerative 
approach is markedly different from the sweeping competencies meted 
out in the third pillar by the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, as long as the 
Community has not made use of its competence, Member States remain 
free to legislate. The competence of Member States is also retained in areas 
where the Community has adopted measures setting out minimum 
standards, as long as domestic legislation accommodates those standards.365 
Finally, Article 64 TEC prescribes that Title IV 'shall not affect the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security'. 366 
364 K. Hailbronner, 'Die Neuregelung der Bereiche Freier Personenverkehr, Asylrecht und 
Einwanderung', in W. Hummer (ed.), Die Europaische Union nach dem Vertrag von 
Amsterdam (1998, Manz, Vienna), p. 180. 
365 Art. 63 TEC specifies this repartition of competencies further. Measures on immigration 
policy and measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third 
countries which are legally resident in one Member State may reside in other Member 
States do not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing national 
provisions which are compatible with the TEC and with international agreements. 
366 For an argument that Art. 64 (1) TEC does not prejudice the powers of the ECJ under 
Title IV, see G. Noll and J. Vedsted-Hansen, 'Non-Communitarians: Refugee and 
Asylum Policies', in P. Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human Rights (1999, OUP, 
Oxford), p. 374. 
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Which issues does the enumeration embrace? The Council is assigned to 
adopt the following measures within a period of five years after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
O measures on the crossing of internal borders367; 
o measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member 
States, establishing standards and procedures to be followed by 
Member States in carrying out checks on persons at such 
borders368 as well as rules on visas for intended stays of no more 
than three months369; 
o measures setting out the conditions under which nationals of third 
countries shall have the freedom to travel within the territory of 
the Member States during a period of no more than three 
months370; 
O criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted 
by a national of a third country in one of the Member States371 ; 
O minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in 
Member States372; 
O minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals 
of third countries as refugees373 ; 
o minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
or withdrawing refugee status374; 
O minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced 
persons from third countries who cannot return to their country 
of origin and for persons who otherwise need international 
protection375; and 
367 Art. 62 (1) TEC. 
368 Art. 62 (2) (a) TEC. 
369 Art. 62 (2) (b) TEC. 
370 Art. 62 (3) TEC. 
371 Art. 63 (1) (a) TEC. 
372 Art. 63 (1) (b) TEC. 
373 Art. 63 (1) (c) TEC. 
374 Art. 63 (1) (d) TEC. 
375 Art. 63 (2) (a) TEC. 
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O measures on illegal immigration and illegal residence, including 
repatriation of illegal residents.376 
For the sake of simplicity, we may call these measures 'the obligatory 
measures' in the following. 
The temporal obligation is not merely a political one, but possesses 
legal character. If the Council fails to act, the Member States and the other 
institutions of the Community may bring an action before the Court of 
Justice under Article 232 TEC.377 However, the drafters could not agree to 
affix temporal obligations to all of the issues enumerated under Title IV. 
Strikingly, Article 63 TEC exempts three types of measures from the 
obligation to legislate within five years: 
0 measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
displaced persons (burden-sharing)378; 
O measures on the conditions of entry and residence, and standards 
on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas 
and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family 
reunion (legal immigration)379; and 
0 measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals 
of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may 
reside in other Member States (mobility rights for legally present 
aliens).380 
In doing so, the drafters created a hierarchy within the competencies of 
Article 63 TEC, dividing measures into an obligatory and a facultative 
group. To be sure, measures adopted earlier set the parameters for those 
adopted later. The consequences of the exemption of burden-sharing from 
the list of obligatory measures shall be discussed extensively in a specific 
section of this work.381 
376 Art. 63 (3) (b) TEC. 
377 Hailbronner, 1998, p. 182. 
378 Art. 63 (2) (b) TEC. 
379 Art. 63 (3) (a) TEC. 
380 Art. 63 (4) TEC. 
381 See chapter 8.3.3 below. 
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4.2.5.2 Decision Making under Title IV 
How shall the Community exercise the competencies enumerated in 
Articles 62 and 63 TEC? Torn between demands of increased 
supranationality and the insistence of certain Member States on veto 
power, the Amsterdam drafters resorted to piecemeal engineering. To 
start with, the hopes and expectations of supranationalists were thwarted: 
the move to the first pillar did not imply automatic access to majority 
vote. Rather, Title IV relies on the gradual phasing in of supranational 
decision making. 
Title IV offers two distinct decision-making procedures. One turns on 
unanimity voting in the Council and is applicable to most of the measures 
enumerated in Articles 62 and 63 TEC. The other is based on a vote by 
qualified majority in the Council and applies to certain measures on visas. 
The unanimity procedure comes in two varieties-one applicable 
before 1 May 2004 and another thereafter. Before 1 May 2004, the 
procedure envisages that the Council take a unanimous decision on 
proposals from the Commission or on initiative by a Member State and 
after consultation of the European Parliament.382 One should note the 
overlapping time-frames: this predominantly intergovernmental 
procedure will be applied to the original adoption of the obligatory 
measures under the five-year period. Thus, the Member States have 
secured for themselves a strong position for determining the content of 
the first cohort of Community acts. This is no different from the 
intergovernmental procedure under the third pillar of the Maastricht era. 
After 1 May 2004, and without any further decision, the Commission 
acquires a monopoly right of initiative. From that date on, the Council 
shall act on proposals from the Commission, and the Commission shall 
examine any request made by a Member State that it submit a proposal to 
the Council. 383 Still, under both varieties of the unanimity procedure, the 
European Parliament has no power to amend or to veto a text. 
Continuing the tradition inaugurated by Article K.9 TEU/Maastricht, 
Title IV also features a new passerelle. Article 67 (2) TEC provides for an 
optional transition to the co-decision procedure after 1 May 2004: '[T]he 
Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, 
shall take a decision with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas 
382 Art. 67 (1) TEC. 
383 Art. 67 (2) TEC. 
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covered by this Title to be governed by the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 and adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the 
Court of Justice'. This provision opens an avenue towards expanded 
supranationalism, but it remains a non-binding offer. Although it uses the 
verb 'shall', there is no time set out-or, for that matter, implied-for the 
accomplishment of this obligation.384 Hence, should the Council remain 
passive, it would be hard to argue an infringement of this obligation under 
Article 232 TEC. In practice, if the Council does not wish to introduce a 
transition to the co-decision procedure, it simply refrains from taking that 
decision. This would imply that unanimity voting would continue to 
dominate this area.385 Should the Council decide to make use of the 
transitory offer, it remains free to choose which issues to transfer; after 
all, the transitory decision may refer to 'all or parts of the areas' covered 
by Title IV. 
The qualified majority procedure applies to certain measures regulating 
visas for intended stays of no more than three months. One group of 
norms is immediately placed under the qualified majority procedure, 
while another group shall be transferred to it on 1 May 2004. First, for 
those issues which had been located in the first pillar already during the 
Maastricht era, the situation remains unchanged: such measures are 
adopted by the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission and then consulting the European Parliament.386 This 
procedure applies to the adoption of a list of third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders (the so-called negative list)387 and of a uniform format for visas.388 
To those issues, the Treaty of Amsterdam added another, namely the 
384 This assessment is not altered by the non-binding Declaration on Article 730 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (Declaration No. 21 annexed to the Final 
Act of the Inter-Governmental Conference): 'The Conference agrees that the Council 
will examine the elements of the decision referred to in Article 73o(2), second indent, of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community before the end of the five year period 
referred to in article 730 with a view to taking and applying this decision immediately 
after the end of that period.' In the course of consolidation of the Treaties, Art. 730 was 
renumbered to Article 67. 
385 For an elaborated argument to this effect, see A. Weber, 'Moglichkeiten und Grenzen 
europaischer Asylrechtsharmonisierung vor und nach Amsterdam', 18 ZAR 4 (1998), p. 148. 
386 Art. 67 (3) TEC. 
387 Art. 62 (2) (b) (i) TEC. 
388 Art. 62 (2) (b) (iii) TEC. 
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adoption of a list of third countries whose nationals are exempt from a 
visa requirement when crossing external borders (the so-called positive 
list). 389 
Second, two further visa issues are maintained under the unanimity 
procedure until 1 May 2004, to be automatically transferred to the 
qualified majority procedure under Article 251 TEC afterwards. Those 
issues cover measures on the procedures and conditions for issuing visas 
by Member States and on rules on a uniform visa. 390 
Taking a birds-eye view on Title IV, it is fair to say that the veto 
principle still dominates this regulatory area. In effect, the solution chosen 
in Article 67 TEC is structurally identical to the old 'passerelle' in Article 
K.7 TEU/Maastricht and the question imposes itself, whether any 
substantial progress has been attained. During the Amsterdam IGC, 
neither Germany nor the U.K. were willing to cede the unanimity trump 
in numerous areas.391 Thus, the gains for supranationalism consisted of 
partial advances. The price to be paid for them was a confusing multitude 
of decision-making procedures. 
4.2.5.3 The Role of the ECJ 
The Amsterdam Treaty has given the ECJ competence of interpretation 
in the areas circumscribed in Title IV TEC. This must be counted among 
the most important supranationalist onslaughts in the field. It opens 
measures on asylum, external borders and immigration to judicial review, 
and it provides for the resolution of interpretatory conflicts, both on the 
supranational and the national level. In principle, the ECJ may be seized 
and act through the procedures laid down for it in the TEC392, with two 
important modifications, of which one is relevant in the present 
389 Art. 62 (2) (b) (i) TEC. 
390 Art. 67 (4) TEC compared to Art. 62 (2) (b) (ii) and (iv) TEC. 
391 Hailbronner, 1998, p. 191. 
392 The relevant norms can be found in Part Five, Title I, Chapter 1, Section 4 TEC. 
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context.393 The threshold for se1zmg the ECJ for purposes of 
interpretation has been elevated. Article 68 (1) TEC expounds when a 
referral to the ECJ shall take place: 
Article 234 shall apply to this Title under the following 
circumstances and conditions: where a question on the 
interpretation of this Title or on the validity or interpretation of 
acts of the institutions of the Community based on this Title is 
raised in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, 
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
The difference with respect to the standard procedure under Article 234 
TEC is obvious. Not any court, but only such courts, against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy in the domestic system, may refer a 
question to the ECJ. In contrast to the procedure under Article 234 TEC, 
that Court is not under an unqualified obligation to make a referral, but 
shall do so 'if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment'. This opens a margin of discretion to the 
relevant domestic court, tempting some commentators to conclude that 
referral as such is facultative.394 As Gialdino has pointed out, such an 
interpretation would, inter alia, run counter to the wording and context 
of the very provision.395 After all, the drafters opted for the term 'shall' 
and against inclusion of the phrase 'may request', which was used when 
regulating the competence of the ECJ in Article 35 (3) TEU. Therefore, 
the margin of appreciation under Article 68 (1) TEC is limited: where a 
relevant court has established that it is confronted with a question of 
393 Following Art. 68 (2) TEC, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to rule on any measure or 
decision on the crossing of internal borders under Art. 62 { 1) TEC relating to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. This exception is 
of no further importance for the areas of asylum, external borders and immigration. 
Accord: Bank, 1999, p. 25, Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, p. 374. See also Hailbronner, 
1998, p. 192. 
394 For an account of such positions, see C. C. Gialdino, 'Schengen et le troisieme pilier: le 
controle juridictionnel organise par le traite d' Amsterdam', 1998 Revue du Marcbe Unique 
Europtien 2 {1998), pp.105-6. 
395 See Gialdino, 1998, pp. 106-7, adducing further arguments for an obligatory referral. 
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interpretation under Article 68 (1) TEC, it is under an obligation to refer 
the case to the ECJ.396 
An innovation for the whole area of EC law is the competence of the 
ECJ to give advisory rulings on interpretative questions under Title IV. 
According to Article 68 (3) TEC, 
[t]he Council, the Commission or a Member State may request the 
Court of Justice to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of 
this Title or of acts of the institutions of the Community based on 
this Title. The ruling given by the Court of Justice in response to 
such a request shall not apply to judgments of courts or tribunals 
of the Member States which have become res judicata. 
Together with the ECJ competence in contentious cases, this mechanism 
could very well contribute to a more harmonious interpretation of Title 
IV and the measures conceived under it. However, the !imitative moments 
built into judicial control must be seen against the background of the 
substantially augmented competencies of the EC and the availability of 
binding instruments under Article 249 TEC. This accumulated 
empowerment is not matched by an equivalent empowerment for the 
ECJ. Therefore, in the grand total, Title IV amounts to a weakening of 
the individual's legal standing.397 
After the transitory period of five years, the Council may adapt the 
rules on the competence of the ECJ. As earlier mentioned, Article 67 (2) 
TEC states that 
the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament, shall take a decision with a view to providing for all or 
parts of the areas covered by this Title to be governed by the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 and adapting the provisions 
relating to the powers of the Court of Justice. 
Thus, provided that the Council decides to move all or parts of the 
relevant areas over to the co-decision procedure after the transitory 
period, this decision must also provide for a congruent adaptation of the 
ECJ competencies. However, the quoted provision does not prescribe the 
precise nature or extent of such an adaptation. 
396 Gialdino, 1998, p. 106. 
397 Accord: Gialdino, 1998, p. 104; see also Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, p. 373. 
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4.2.5.4 The Position of Denmark, Ireland and the U.K. 
In the course of the Amsterdam negotiations, Denmark, Ireland and the 
U.K. were not prepared to accept a further communitarization in the area 
of asylum, external borders and immigration.398 However, none of these 
countries opposed movement of these issues to the first pillar by the 
remaining twelve Member States, provided that the rights and obligations 
of the three outsiders remained untouched by such a move. Thus, the 
communitarization described earlier has been achieved not for all Member 
States, but only among twelve of them, creating a 'variable geometry' of 
integration. The practical arrangements have been laid down in the 
Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland399 and in the 
Protocol on the Position of Denmark.400 Principally, all three sceptics are 
not participating in the adoption of instruments under Title IV TEC. 401 
Therefore, adopted measures or interpretative decisions of the ECJ in this 
area are not binding, applicable, or otherwise entitling or obliging upon 
the three states.402 Protocol No. 4 lays down an opt-in mechanism for 
Ireland and the U.K., allowing each of these states, or both, to participate 
in the elaboration, adoption and application of measures under Title IV 
TEC.403 Such a mechanism does not exist for Denmark.404 
Thus, on issues relating to Title IV TEC, the Member States are not a 
homogeneous group. This has consequences. First, it entails detailed rules 
398 However, Denmark has to co-operate on those visa issues already within EC competence 
in the Maastricht era (measures determining the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States and 
measures relating to a uniform format for visas). Prot. 7, Art. 4. 
399 Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland; annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 6 October 
1997, Doc. No. CONF 4007/97, TA/P/en 15 [hereinafter Irish-British Protocol]. 
400 Protocol on the Position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, 6 October 1997, Doc. No. CONF 
4007 /97, T A/P/ en 19 [hereinafter Danish Protocol]. 
401 Irish-British Protocol, Art. 1, Danish Protocol, Art. 1. 
402 Irish-British Protocol, Art. 2, Danish Protocol, Art. 2. 
403 Irish-British Protocol, Art. 3 (1). 
404 However, Art. 7 of the Danish Protocol provides for a comprehensive opt-in to co-
operation within Title IV: 'At any time Denmark may, in accordance with its 
constitutional requirements, inform the other Member States that it no longer wishes to 
avail itself of all or part of this Protocol. In that event, Denmark will apply in full all 
relevant measures then in force taken within the framework of the European Union.' 
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on the weighing of voices in the Council and on the financing of measures 
and their administration.405 Second, for each measure adopted under Title 
IV TEC, the geographical scope of application must be established 
individually, taking into account any opt-in by the three outsiders. 
4.2.6 The Integration of the Schengen acquis 
Bringing the Schengen avant-garde back into the Union mainstream was 
one of the more ambitious aspirations of the Amsterdam IGC. The task 
was not an easy one, and entailed an extraordinarily complex normative 
apparatus, involving both the third and the first pillar, and catering for the 
specific situation of Denmark, Ireland and the U.K. With Iceland and 
Norway, two countries outside the Union had to be involved to secure 
the viability of the Nordic Passport Union. There is no need to include an 
exhaustive presentation of this integrative effort here406-it is sufficient to 
examine those issues having a bearing on asylum and immigration issues. 
The integration of the Schengen acquis is provided for in the Schengen 
Protocol407 attached to the treaty of Amsterdam, to be regarded as an 
integral part of it, and binding under international law. Simultaneously 
with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen acquis 
has become applicable among the Thirteen, and the Council has 
substituted itself for the Schengen Executive Committee.408 
The Schengen acquis consists of the following norms: 
0 The Schengen Agreement; 
O The Schengen Convention, with related Final Act and common 
declarations; 
0 The Accession Protocols and Agreements to the 1985 Agreement 
and the 1990 Implementation Convention with Italy, Spain, 
405 For a detailed presentation, see K. Hailbronner and C. Thiery, 'Der neue Titel im EGV: 
Freier Personenverkehr, Asylrecht und Einwanderung', 1998 EuR 5 (1998), pp. 597-602. 
406 See J. de Zwaan, 'Opting Out and Opting In: Problems and Practical Arrangements 
under the Schengen Agreement', 1 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
(1998). 
407 See note 326 above. 
408 Schengen Protocol, Art. 2 (1). 
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Portugal, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden with 
related Final Acts and declarations; and 
O Decisions and declarations adopted by the Schengen Executive 
Committee, as well as acts adopted for the implementation of the 
Convention by the organs upon which the Executive Committee 
has conferred decision making powers. 
The Council, acting unanimously, shall determine, in conformity with 
the relevant provisions of the Treaties, the legal basis for each of the 
provisions or decisions that constitute the Schengen acquis.409 As the 
norms pertaining to the Schengen acquis stretch over a broad array of 
issues, there are two choices. Either such provisions or decisions can be 
based on Title IV TEC or, failing that, on the third pillar. Norms 
allocated to the first pillar are EC law, while those allocated to the third 
pillar are norms of international law.410 So far, a number of Schengen 
instruments have been transposed.411 
The allocation of Schengen norms among the first and third pillar also 
impacts the role of the ECJ. The Schengen Protocol states: 'With regard 
to such provisions and decisions and in accordance with that 
determination, the Court of Justice of the European Communities shall 
exercise the powers conferred upon it by the relevant applicable 
provisions of the Treaties'. 412 
It merits recalling that the competencies of the ECJ are much broader 
under the first pillar (Article 68 TEC) than they are under the third 
(Article 35 TEU). In any event, the Schengen Protocol states that the ECJ 
shall have no jurisdiction on measures or decisions relating to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.413 
This exception is much broader than the one introduced in Article 68 (2) 
TEC, as the latter solely encompasses measures relating to the 
abolishment of checks at internal borders. This means that the judicial 
409 Schengen Protocol, Art. 2 (1). This provision also prescribes that, as long as the measures 
referred to above have not been taken, the provisions or decisions that constitute the 
Schengen acquis shall be regarded as acts based on Title VI TEU. On the exact 
delimitation of the Schengen acquis, see Hailbronner and Thiery, 1998, pp. 607-8. 
410 Hailbronner and Thiery, 1998, p. 608. 
411 See OJ (1999) L 119/49, L 176/1, Ll76/17, L 176/31, L 176/34, L 176/35. 
412 Schengen Protocol, Art. 2 (1). 
413 Schengen Protocol, Art. 2 ( 1). 
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control of Schengen norms allocated to the first pillar is less dense than 
that of other norms under the same pillar. 
Beyond the mere qualification of the existing Schengen acquis, the 
institutions are competent to adopt further measures within its scope. 
Such elaboration is faced with the same choice, depending on the subject 
matter; relevant measures shall be adopted either under the first or the 
third pillar.414 To be sure, the aforementioned limitation of the Court's 
competence with regard to law and order as well as internal security415 
does not apply to such norms. 
4.2. 7 The Variable Geometry of Integration 
At this stage, a rather complex picture of co-operation has emerged, 
stretching over the first and the third pillar as well as over international 
law beyond the institutional framework of the Union. Before we proceed, 
it should be sufficient to briefly reiterate which regime applies to each 
single country involved in the co-operation. To facilitate comparison, the 
most essential features of the regime are presented in Table 1. 
For the Schengen Group, the situation is relatively simple. With the 
exception of Denmark, all Schengen states will participate in the co-
operation under Title IV TEC without any reservations. 
Denmark is not participating in the co-operation under Title IV TEC, 
save for measures determining the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States, or measures relating to a uniform format for visas.416 
Denmark will apply the parts of the Schengen acquis that were adopted 
before the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. However, Denmark 
is not participating in the further development of the Schengen acquis 
under Title IV TEC. By means of an opt-in procedure, Denmark can 
accept to be bound by a measure developing the Schengen acquis. This 
creates an obligation under international law between Denmark and the 
m Schengen Protocol, Art. 5 (1). 
415 See text accompanying note 413. 
416 Danish Protocol, Art. 4. 
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other Schengen countries.417 There is no such opt-in procedure for other 
measures adopted under Title IV TEC.418 
The United Kingdom does not participate in the co-operation of 
Member States under Title IV TEC, nor is it member in the Schengen 
Group. However, the United Kingdom can avail itself of an opt-in 
procedure, allowing it to accept single measures adopted under Title IV 
TEC, whether or not they build on the Schengen acquis. It can also accept 
any of the instruments and decisions contained in the Schengen acquis by 
the same procedure. 
In order to preserve the 'Common Travel Area' between both 
countries, Ireland has decided to take the same position as the United 
Kingdom. However, Ireland has set a lower threshold for entering co-
operation under Title IV TEC. It may notify the President of the Council 
in writing that it no longer wishes to be covered by the terms of Protocol 
No. 4. In that case, the normal treaty provisions will apply to Ireland.419 
To ensure the continued functionality of the Nordic Passport Union 
and the free movement of persons realized therein, Norway and Iceland 
have associated themselves with the Schengen co-operation. To that effect, 
an association agreement was concluded between both countries and the 
Schengen states on 19 December 1996.420 After the integration of the 
Schengen acquis into the Union framework, a new agreement between the 
named states, which shall replace the 1996 agreement421, was signed in 
1999. The rationale of this agreement is to extend the application of 
417 Danish Protocol, Art. 5 (1). 
418 But see note 404 above. 
419 Irish-British Protocol, Art. 8. 
420 Co-operation Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgiwn, the French Republic, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic, 
the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of 
Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, Contracting Parties to the Schengen Agreement and the 
Schengen Convention, and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the 
abolition of controls on persons at their common borders, signed in Luxembourg on 19 
December 1996. 
421 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of 
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter's association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, signed on 17 May 
1999 [hereinafter 1999 Agreement}. 
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norms pertaining to the law of the European Union and related to the 
abolishment of internal border control to Iceland and Norway: 
O The existing Schengen acquis is implemented and applied by 
Iceland and Norway.422 
o Certain existing EC acts are implemented and applied by Iceland 
and Norway, inter alia the Visa Regulation.423 
O Future acts and measures by the EU amending or building upon 
the aforementioned norms shall be accepted, implemented and 
applied by Iceland and Norway.424 
O An agreement on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the 
State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in any 
of the Member States or in Iceland or Norway should be concluded 
before the existing acquis enters into force in Iceland and 
Norway.425 This agreement would fulfil the same function as is 
fulfilled by the Dublin Convention among Member States. 
The adoption of new acts or measures is explicitly reserved to the 
competent institutions of the European Union.426 Such acts have to be 
formally accepted by Iceland and Norway, and a specific procedure has 
been laid down in the agreement.427 However, non-acceptance of any of 
these measures may lead to the wholesale termination of the agreement 
between the non-accepting party and the other parties.428 In other words, 
the costs of non-acceptance are very high. To mitigate the transfer of 
sovereign powers effectuated under the agreement, a mixed commission 
422 Art. 2 (1) 1999 Agreement. The relevant norms are listed in Annex A. 
423 Art. 2 (2) 1999 Agreement. The relevant norms are listed in Annex B. 
424 Art. 2 (3) 1999 Agreement. This provision covers all norms listed in Annex A and B. 
425 Art. 7 1999 Agreement. 
426 Art. 8 (1) 1999 Agreement. 
427 Art. 8 (2) 1999 Agreement. 
428 Art. 8 (4) 1999 Agreement. 
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has been established to operate as a consultation body in this co-
operation. 429 
Furthermore, as Ireland and the U.K. may opt into all or parts of the 
Schengen acquis, it has become necessary to regulate the legal relationship 
of those countries with Norway and Iceland. Based on the Schengen 
Protocol, a separate agreement has been drawn up, specifying the rights 
and obligations between the named four countries.430 
429 See Art. 3 of the 1999 Agreement. The working procedure of the mixed committee is laid 
down in Decision No. 1/1999 of the EU/Iceland and Norway Mixed Committee 
established by the agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter's association in 
the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis of 29 June 1999 
adopting its Rules of Procedure, 29 June 1999, OJ (1999) C 211, pp. 9-11. 
430 See Schengen Protocol, Art. 6 (2). The agreement is entitled as follows: Accord conclu 
entre le Conseil de !'Union Europeenne et la Republique d'Islande et le Royaume de 
Norvege sur l'etablissement des droits et obligations entre l'Irlande et le Royaume-Uni de 
Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, d'une part, et la Republique d'Islande et le 
Royaume de Norvege, d'autre part, dans !es domaines de l'acquis de Schengen qui 
s'appliquent a ces Etats. It is attached to the following Council decision: Decision du 
Conseil relative a la conclusion de !'accord avec la Republique d'Islande et le Royaume de 
Nor\Tege sur l'etablissement des droits et obligations entre l'Irlande et le Royaume-Uni de 
Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, d'une part, et la Republique d'Islande et le 
Royaume de Norvege, d'autre part, dans Jes domaines de l'acquis de Schengen qm 
s'appliquent aces Etats, 25/06/99, Doc. Nos 9551/99 JAi 54, 9357 /99 JAI 50. 
151 
CHAPTER 4 
Denmark Ireland United Other Norway and 
Kingdom Member Iceland 
States 
Participating No No No Yes No 
in the adoption but opt-in but opt-in save for 
of measures possible possible consul-
under Title IV (Prnt.4. (Prot.4. tations 
TEC Art.3) Art.3) 
Applying No No No Yes No 
measures exception but opt-in but ophn exception 
under Title IV of certain possible possible of five 
TEC visa-related (Prot.4. (Prot.4, enurnerated 
rne.nsures Art.4) Art. 4) acts 
Applying Yes No No Yes Yes 
the pre- but opt-in but opt-in 
Amsterdam possible poss;b!e 
Schengen {Schengen (Schengen 
acquis Protocol. Protocol. 
Art. 4) Art. 4) 




of the Schengen 
acquis under 
Title IVTEC 
Applying No No No Yes Upon 
the post- but opt-in acceptance 
Amsterdam possible of each new 
Schengen (Prot. 5. measure 
acquis ArL 5) 




4.2.8 Enlarging the Union 
On 30 March 1998, formal negotiations on accession were opened with 
the thirteen states applying for membership in the European Union. Of 
these, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia are considered to possess the best prospects for early 
membership. As the accession process is most advanced with respect to 
these states, it is reasonable to touch upon their position under the acquis 
communautaire and under the international law relating to extraterritorial 
protection in the course of this work. 431 
The enlargement of the European Union results in a shift of the 
Union's external borders. Given that intra-Union freedom of movement 
is one of the central features of the single market, this shift needs to be 
managed carefully if Member States wish to avoid losing their capacity to 
control migration. But enlargement is not solely about border control, it 
is also about the extension of protection capacities to candidate countries. 
The advantages are obvious. At best, enlargement may imply a form of 
burden-sharing for Member States, and lead to an expeditious 
improvement of extraterritorial protection available in candidate 
countries. Yet the risks are equally obvious. The accession process may 
also degenerate to burden-shifting eastwards and the export of protection 
standards could 'replicate EU failings'432 or remain a dead letter. 
Therefore, it must be deemed reasonable that the adaptation of 
domestic migration and asylum policies in the candidate countries has 
been accorded an important role in the pre-accession phase.433 Exporting 
431 In Parts III and IV of this work, the named first wave candidate countries will be 
included into the scope of presentation. 
432 ECRE, ECRE Position on the Enlargement of the European Union in Relation to Asylum, 
September 1998, Conclusions and Recommendations, para. 3. 
433 For an excellent analysis of the gains and risks of enlargement in the area of asylum, see 
R. Byrne, 'Future Perspectives: Accession and Asylum in an Expanded European Union', 
in R. Byrne, G. Noll, and J. Vedsted-Hansen, New Asylum Countries? Migration Control 
and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union (2000), whose main point is that 
the deficiencies of the acquis will be amplified when implemented by candidate countries, 
and that the experience of protection in the East should inspire the reformulation of 
refugee policy in the West. For a political science perspective, see S. Lavenex, Safe third 
countries. Extending EU asylum and immigration policies to Central and Eastern Europe 
(1999, Central European University Press, Budapest). For a brief overview, based mainly 
on a statistical analysis, see IOM/ICMPD, Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: 1999 
Review (1999, IOM, Geneva). See also UNHCR, J'd International Symposium on the 
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the acquis related to protection is not unproblematic, though. After all, 
from the perspective of the candidate countries, the accession process is 
about being integrated and not necessarily about integrating 'the other'. In 
other words, the prime goal of the candidate countries is to receive 
membership, rather than to extend membership. 
The criteria adopted by the 1993 European Council meeting in 
Copenhagen434 constitute the basis for the accession process. These criteria 
reflect the tension between universal goods and particular interests 
underlying enlargement. On the universalist side, membership in the 
Union requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing inter alia human rights. 435 Needless to say, this 
includes the protection of certain groups of aliens, including refugees. On 
the particularist side, 'the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership' is one of the preconditions for accession.436 Among these 
obligations, we find the duty to guard the external border of the Union. 
As pointed out by the Council upon the opening of accession 
negotiations with six of the candidates, membership obligations comprise 
the acquis as it evolves; future conventions and instruments, as well as the 
agreed points of instruments still under negotiation, will have to be taken 
into account.437 The candidate countries will have to implement all 
instruments belonging to the EU acquis according to their legal nature.438 
The same applies to the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by 
the institutions within its scope.439 In its basic document underlying the 
Protection of Refugees in Central Europe, 23-25"' April, Budapest. Report and Proceedings 
(1997, UNHCR, Geneva); K. Hakala (ed.), Migration and Refugee Policy on the Eastern 
Border of the European Union (1998, University of Jyvaskyla, Jyvaskyla) and M. King, 
'The Impact of Western European Border Policies on the Control of Refugees in Eastern 
and Central Europe', in V. Robinson (ed.), Migration and Public Policy (1999, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham). 
434 Conclusions of the Presidency (Copenhagen Summit Conclusions) reprinted in H. Bull, 
European Communities, June 1993, points 1.1-4.1. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. 
437 Draft List, p. 2, para. 4. 
438 The Draft List merely states that the various elements of the acquis do not all have the 
same legal status. The list itself contains no indication as to the extent to which a 
particular instrument is legally binding. 'This might be dealt with in explaining the 
"acquis" to the candidate countries during the screening process.' Draft List, p. 5, para. 
12. 
439 Schengen Protocol, Art. 8. 
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Union's enlargement strategy, dubbed Agenda 2000440, the Commission 
proposed bringing together the different forms of pre-accession support 
provided by the Union within a single framework, the Accession 
Partnerships. At its meeting on 12-13 December 1997, the Luxembourg 
European Council endorsed the Accession Partnership as a new instru-
ment destined to be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession 
strategy.441 As a complement to the Accession Partnership, each candidate 
country has been invited to adopt a National Programme for the 
Adoption of the acquis. 
Since the opening of negotiations, the EU institutions and single 
Member States have embarked on large-scale monitoring exercises, 
training programmes and resource transfers eastwards.442 By means of a 
dedicated Joint Action, the Council has established a group of experts, 
which is tasked with the 'collective evaluation' of progress made with the 
implementation of the acquis in the area of justice and home affairs.443 
Moreover, the Luxembourg European Council has assigned the European 
Commission the task of compiling so-called regular reports analyzing the 
progress made in the capacity of each candidate country to implement the 
acquzs. 
On the ground, the export of the asylum and migration acquis has been 
largely channelled through the Union-funded PHARE Horizontal 
Programme, whose aim is to explain the content of the acquis to 
candidates and to identify gaps in their protection systems. This 
programme has provided for extensive training and information events, 
disseminating knowledge of the asylum acquis in the administrations of 
candidate countries. On the basis of the assessment of each candidate 
country's capacity to implement the acquis, National Action Plans are 
440 European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe, 15 July 1997, 
COM (97) 2000 final/1. 
441 Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12 December 1997, Doc. No. 
SN 400/97, paras 14-6. 
442 For an overview of the enlargement process from an institutional perspective, see 0. 
Seiffarth, 'The Enlargement Process and JHA Co-operation', in P. J. van Krieken (ed.), 
The Asylum Acquis Handbook (2000, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague). 
443 Council of the European Union, Joint Action of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on 
the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for 
collective evaluation of the enactment, application and effective implementation by the 
applicant countries of the acquis of the European Union in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs, OJ (1998} L 191, pp. 8-9. 
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drawn up, along which the candidate countries and international actors 
proceed in order to fill the remaining gaps. To that end, they may receive 
assistance through other PHARE programmes. 
Taking a step back, two aspects of the accession process are particularly 
striking. The first is the hardening of soft law in the accession process, the 
second the selling of an outdated product to the cousins in the East. While 
the present Member States are far from having implemented the asylum 
acquis themselves, they demand strict compliance of the queuing non-
members. 444 It is something of a paradox that the rules of the club apply 
first and foremost to outsiders. What is soft law in the West, may very 
well take on a harder edge in the East, as Union membership is 
conditional on its implementation. And, while the shortcomings of the 
acquis have been identified and become the subject of an overhaul within 
the Union, the very instruments carrying those defects are being exported 
to candidate countries.445 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter began by depicting the dynamics of flight to and within 
Europe, and continued by tracking integration in the field of immigration 
and asylum law. Now, having sifted through recent crises as well as the 
major institutional developments on the way from Schengen to 
Amsterdam, it might be asked whether it makes sense at all to subsume 
this process under the heading of integration? 
444 The issue is predominantly a political one. The non-compliance of Member States with 
the non-binding parts of the acquis is regularly documented in monitoring exercises (see 
e.g. note 608 below). There is no sufficient political leverage to produce greater 
compliance within the Union. However, this leverage exists with regard to the queuing 
candidate countries, for which the soft law of the acquis becomes de facto binding 
through its conditional linkage to future Union membership. 
445 'While the accession process is driving the replication of the asylum acquis, the 
Commission driven reform underway is acknowledging some of the endemic problems 
in the asylum practices that the European Union has already exported eastward.' Byrne, 
2000, Section II, in fine. It is quite noteworthy that UNHCR is involved in this transfer 
within the framework of the PHARE Horizontal Programme, given that it has criticized 
pivotal elements of the acquis. The Office must have considered that the opportunity to 




Let us recapitulate. The real world layer was dominated by imploding 
state control in the East. Borders became permeable again-sometimes to a 
degree with which liberal governments in the West were quite un-
comfortable-and power struggles filling the void left by totalitarianism 
led to large-scale displacement within Europe. Both issues were more than 
single Member States could manage unilaterally in the long run. Thus, 
theoretically, the changing reality of flight and displacement offered good 
reasons for an advance of multilateralism in the institutional world and, 
consequently, a boost for regional integration. 
Did the institutional layer respond to this challenge? Does it really 
make sense to speak of European integration with regard to asylum and 
immigration? The scale of possible responses stretches from outright 
affirmation to prudent scepticism to determined denial. 
For those wishing to answer in the affirmative, good arguments are on 
offer. In little more than a decade, both issues have moved from a fringe 
position to the centre, from ad-hoc co-operation outside EC institutions 
to the first pillar of the Union. In an unprecedented expansion, the 
number of fora seized with matters related to asylum and migration has 
multiplied throughout the period. The avant-garde project of Schengen, 
and its ensuing mainstreaming into the Union framework, is probably the 
best illustration of these integrative dynamics. Both the Schengen and 
Dublin Conventions boasted their own executive committees, and co-
operation involved an increasing number of administrative echelons in the 
Member States. There is no precedent in Europe or in other regions of the 
world with regard to the diversity and depth of co-operation on issues 
related to flight and migration. The importance of the acquis thus 
elaborated was further boosted through the enlargement process, which 
de facto exported a whole regime of protective norms to Central and 
Eastern European candidate countries. 
A prudent sceptic would accept such arguments but point to the side 
effects of this rapid development. True enough, intergovernmental forms 
of co-operation largely replaced the prevailing atmosphere of uni-
lateralism, and such co-operation was later channelled into a supranational 
setting by the Amsterdam Treaty. However, a price had to be paid. From 
the outset, integration was bought by sacrificing transparency, 
accountability and judicial control, which did not follow the shift to the 
intergovernmental level. The move to the first pillar has not compensated 
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for these shortfalls, and integration remams stuck with a considerable 
legitimacy deficit. 446 
Finally, a radical sceptic would find at least two reasons to support a 
negative response. First, in more than a decade, the normative output in 
both fields has been limited in substance. As the following chapter will 
show, few instruments possess the character of hard law. In addition, 
many non-binding instruments are vaguely phrased or make deference to 
domestic law. Second, the term 'integration' suggests a movement towards 
unity. In the area of protection, there is little evidence in favour, and 
much in disfavour.447 Domestic legislation still differs to a great extent, 
and protection burdens are concentrated rather than shared. In spite of 
ever more elaborate supranational mechanisms, there are good reasons to 
believe that unilateralism will retain an important role in the shaping of 
practice. The persistence of the veto in decision-making under Title IV is 
probably the most prominent of these reasons. 
To elaborate the multifaceted image of integration further, we need to 
zoom in on the norms developed on the way from Schengen to 
446 'As long as the EP is not given a more powerful position in the procedure, its role can 
hardly be described as "controlling" the legislative process.' Bank, 1999, p. 24. However, 
Bank acknowledges that the transfer from the third to the first pillar made important 
parliamentary control mechanisms accessible-such as the right to set up Committees of 
Inquiry, to examine petitions, and the processing of claims by the Ombudsman. Ibid. See 
also Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, pp. 372-4, considering that Amsterdam has brought 
limited progress in the area of transparency and accountability, whereas the degree of 
judicial control provided for under the Treaty of Amsterdam is less satisfactory. 
447 However, even the radical sceptic has to acknowledge that substantial integration is 
taking place in the area of deflective measures: as we will see below, visa requirements are 
harmonised to a large extent, and the allocation of responsibility for processing asylum 
claims is governed by common rules. 
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Amsterdam and beyond. In the remaining chapters of Part II, we shall 
look into the normative world of the acquis as it stands today. The 
perspective of the protection seeker informs the order of presentation. 
First, we shall expound norms regulating access to territory (chapter 5); 
second, we will present norms regulating access to full-fledged procedures 
(chapter 6); and third, we shall proceed by expanding on those norms 
governing access to protection (chapter 7). The fourth and last step shall 




s Access to Territory under the 
EU acquis 
WHICH NORMS ADOPTED within the framework of European 
integration have a bearing on the ability of protection seekers to gain 
access to a Member State's territory? As explained earlier, the multitude of 
existing norms can be divided into two groups. The first group comprises 
pre-entry measures, and consists of the EU visa acquis as well as norms 
complementing it. The second group comprises post-entry measures 
steering the allocation to states within and outside the Union, as well as 
norms complementing them. Each shall be dealt with in turn below. 
5.1 Pre-entry Measures 
Pre-entry measures affect the possibility of protection seekers to reach the 
territory of potential host states. Amongst these measures, visa require-
ments are the prime tool of control. However, to improve their 
efficiency, states have devised a number of complementary norms, which 
shall also be dealt with in the present section. They comprise carrier 
sanctions and measures countering human smuggling as well as pre-
frontier training and assistance programmes. 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _006
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1.1 The Harmonisation of Visa Regimes 
Visa harmonisation involves formal and material issues. On the material 
side, the harmonisation of visa requirements operated by single Member 
States occupies an important position. A further step towards material 
harmonisation would be to agree on conditions for the issuing of visas. 
The formal side stretches over procedural and technical co-operation, e.g. 
modes of sharing information on applicants or the standardisation of visa 
documents. As we are seized with the impact of visa policies on the 
seeking of extraterritorial protection, the main focus of this subsection 
shall be on a particular material aspect, namely the harmonisation of visa 
requirements. Beyond that, other forms of material co-operation as well as 
procedural and technical co-ordination shall be covered to the extent they 
touch upon the position of protection seekers. 
Why is it so important to harmonise visa requirements in an area 
without internal border controls? Let us explain by means of a simple 
example. A is a citizen of country X. She wishes to go to Germany, where 
members of her family are staying. For citizens of X, a visa is requested to 
enter Germany. She applies for a visa at the German embassy in Sarajevo, 
but her application is turned down. Subsequently, A finds out that Italy 
does not require a visa from citizens of X. Hence, A goes to Italy. Once 
there, she takes advantage of the abolition of internal border controls 
among the Schengen states, and travels on to Germany. In an area without 
internal border controls, divergences in visa requirements undermine the 
efficiency of entry control. Therefore, 'the operation by Member States of 
visa controls on the movement of third-country nationals is, in practical 
terms, irreconcilable with the complete abolition of border controls'. 448 
Compared to a non-Schengen state, for example the U.K., Germany has 
very limited chances of exercising its personal sovereignty. 
How have the Schengen group and the EC approached the problem of 
diverging regimes? First, the co-operating states agree on which 
nationalities shall be required to hold an entry visa by all states in an area 
of free movement. This is the so-called 'negative list'. Second, the co-
operating states can also draw up a list of third countries whose citizens 
are free to enter without a visa. This is the so-called 'positive list'. Beyond 
both lists, there are states whose nationals are requested to hold an entry 
448 Case C-170/96, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European 
Union, Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, 5 February 1998, para. 19. 
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visa by some Member States, but not by others. These residual countries 
are entered onto the so-called 'grey list'. Eliminating countries from the 
grey list and moving them over to the negative or the positive list is the 
goal of harmonisation. An empty grey list is the ultimate desideratum, 
and it would mean that visa regimes within the area of free movement are 
fully integrated. Constellations as the one described earlier would be 
inconceivable then-A could not have entered Italy, . which would have 
blocked her secondary movement to Germany. 
This is the status quo of harmonisation on visa lists449 : At the time 
when the Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU framework, its 
negative visa list embraced 132 entries450, and its positive list contained 44 
entries. The grey list of the Schengen group comprised only one entry. 
The EC as a whole has a less demanding negative list, including over 101 
entries.451 With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EC has 
received competence for adopting a positive list.452 To date, this compe-
tence has not been made use of. A comparison of the Schengen acquis 
with its EU counterpart indicates that harmonisation had proceeded much 
farther within the Schengen group. 
In the EC, the harmonisation of visa requirements is limited to visas 
for an intended stay of no longer than three months. 453 The 
harmonisation mandate under the Schengen Convention goes further, but 
the focus is also on short-term visas. For intended stays no longer than 
three months, the Schengen Convention has introduced the so-called 
Schengen visa, valid in the whole Schengen area. 
Focusing on short-term visas means concentrating harmonisation 
efforts in an area where the latter yield maximum effect. Quite logically, it 
is generally easier to be granted a short-term rather than a long-term visa. 
Due to the much larger migratory volumes using them, short-term visas 
are more vulnerable to irregular behaviour by the immigrant, such as 
secondary movements or overstaying. Therefore, a harmonisation of 
449 Source indications are given in the subsequent sections on visa harmonisation in the EU 
and within the Schengen framework. 
450 The term 'entry' is chosen because it covers recognised states as well as entities not 
recognised as states by all co-operating states. 
451 Of these entries, one relates to an entity not recognised as a state by all the Member 
States, namely Taiwan. 
452 Art. 62 (2) (b) (i) TEC. 
453 See Art. 10 (1) SC, Art. 62 (2) (b) TEC and Art. 5 Visa Regulation. 
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requirements for short-term visas 1s a rational entry point for the 
integration process. 
5.1.1.1 Visa Harmonisation in the EU 
As mentioned earlier, a persistent split in competencies hampers 
harmonisation in the EU, involving both the first and the third pillar. The 
framework for the harmonisation of visa requirements is laid down in the 
binding and directly applicable454 
o Council Regulation (EC) No 574/99 of 12 March 1999 
determining the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States.455 
Regulations are the most interventive form of Community law-making: 
they leave no discretion whatsoever to Member States as to the 
transposition of norms into domestic legal systems. Within the whole 
acquis impacting on migration and extraterritorial protection, this is the 
only regulation on offer, and it is no coincidence that it relates to the 
prime device of migration control, namely visa requirements. 
This instrument defines the term 'visa' as an authorisation given or a 
decision taken by a Member State, which is required for entry into its 
territory with a view to: 
- an intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States 
of no more than three months in all; 
454 It is explicitly stated in its Art. 7 that the Visa Regulation 'shall be binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States'. 
455 OJ (1999) L 072, 18/03/1999, pp. 2-5 [hereinafter Visa regulation]. This regulation 
replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 2317/95 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States, 25 September 1995, OJ (1995) L 234/1. The 1995 Regulation was 
successfully challenged by the Commission before the ECJ, as the EP had not been 
consulted. See Parliament vs. Council, European Communities Reports of Cases 1997 I, 
3231. 
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- transit through the territory of that Member State or several 
Member States, except for transit through the international zones 
of airports and transfers between airports in a Member State456 
Nationals of those third countries on the common list annexed to the Visa 
Regulation shall be required to be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders of the Member States.457 The Visa Regulation excludes 
the following groups from a common regulation: (1) nationals of states 
and holders of passports or travel documents issued by non-recognised 
territorial entity or authority not on the common list and (2) stateless 
persons and recognised refugees.458 The competence to determine visa 
requirements regarding these groups rests with the Member States, who 
are obliged to inform the other Member States and the Commission on 
the measures taken by them. 459 
The Visa Regulation contains a savings clause for 'any further 
harmonization between individual Member States, going beyond the 
common list'.460 This allows members of the Schengen Group to operate a 
more demanding negative list, without infringing upon their obligations 
under the Visa Regulation. 
Even though a country has been entered on the common list, its 
nationals may be exempted from visa requirements in specific cases: 'This 
shall apply in particular to civilian air and sea crew, flight crew and 
attendants on emergency or rescue flights and other helpers in the event 
of disaster or accident and holders of diplomatic passports, official duty 
passports and other official passports.'461 Protection-related reasons are not 
named in this non-exhaustive enumeration. 
From the perspective of the protection seeker, it is relevant to ask what 
considerations informed the decision to enter a country on the common 
list. The preamble provides an answer, stating that 'risks relating to 
456 Art. 5 Visa Regulation. 
457 Art. 1 (1) Visa Regulation. For cases of state succession, Art. 1 (2) prescribes that 
'[n]ationals of countries formerly part of countries on the common list shall be subject to 
the requirements of paragraph 1 unless and until the Council decides otherwise under the 
procedure laid down in the relevant provision of the Treaty'. 
458 Art. 2 Visa Regulation. 
459 Art. 2 (4) Visa Regulation. 
460 Art. 6 Visa Regulation. 
461 Art. 4 (1) Visa Regulation. 
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security and illegal immigration should be given priority consideration 
when the said common list is drawn up'.462 
The exact implications of the term 'risks relating to illegal immigration' 
remain undefined. However, a look at the common list suggests that those 
countries producing substantial numbers of protection seekers must have 
been entered due to the 'risks relating to illegal immigration' connected 
with them. On the common list, one can find the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Iraq and Turkey. Numerically, these three countries top the 
list of sending countries, representing 42 percent of total asylum 
applications filed in Europe in 1998.463 The same countries also top a list 
of countries ordered along the number of recognitions in the period 1989-
98 (relating to both Convention refugee status and humanitarian status), 
surpassed only by Bosnia-Herzegovina.464 There can be little doubt that 
the number of protection seekers impacts on the assessment of 'risks 
related to illegal immigration' for the purposes of drawing up the 
common list. 
Airport transit has been another open flank for migration control. 
Consider the following case. Y wishes to seek asylum in F ranee. Her 
nationality is subject to French visa requirements. Her application for a 
French visa is turned down. She books an airline ticket to a destination 
outside Europe. Her flight connection involves a transit at Paris Charles 
de Gaulle airport. In the transit zone, she approaches an official of the 
French border police with an asylum claim. Due to its obligations under 
Article 33 GC, France has to process the claim. 
Thus, for states wishing to control the entry of aliens, airport transit is 
a very sensitive matter. Certainly, in some jurisdictions, transiting air 
passengers present in an airport transit zone do not enter the country in a 
462 Visa Regulation, preamble, para. (3). 
463 In 1998, the FRY stood for 93 836 applications, Iraq accounted for 34 521 applications, 
while the corresponding number for Turkey was 21 027 applications. The total number 
of asylum applications filed that year in Europe was 352 404. The survey draws on 
statistics from all EU Member States, with the exception of Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Finland, adding Switzerland, Poland, Norway and Hungary. Source: UNHCR, 1999, p. 
78. 
464 Iraq: 92 267 recognitions, FRY: 74 676 recognitions, Turkey: 68 854 recognitions. The 
total of recognitions in the period added up to 730 624. Source: UNHCR, 1999, p. 84. 
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technical sense.465 However, the transit situation provides an opportunity 
for filing an asylum claim, which, in turn, may lead to a de jure entry into 
the territory of the transit state.466 Or, as the Council remarks, 'the air 
route, particularly when it involves applications for entry or de facto 
entry, in the course of airport transit, represents a significant way in with 
a view in particular to illegally taking up residence within the territory of 
the Member States'.467 For these reasons, the Council has introduced so-
called Airport transit visas (ATV).468 The vehicle has been a non-binding 
instrument adopted under the third pillar: 
O Joint Action of 4 March 1996, adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K.3 of the EU Treaty, on airport transit arrange-
ments469 
An actualised version of this instrument is presently being discussed, and 
would replace the 1996 Joint Action upon adoption: 
O Draft Joint Action of the Council on airport transit arrangements, 
16 July 1998470 
465 See e.g. Section 59 of the German Aliens Act of 24 February 1997 (BGBI. Ip. 310) and 
Section 18 (a) (3) of the German Asylum Procedures Act. Such solutions do not relieve 
the state on whose territory the airport is situated from its obligations under human 
rights law. In Amuur, the ECtHR saw itself competent to consider an alleged deprivation 
of liberty taking place in the international zone of an airport before entry into French 
territory in the technical sense. ECtHR, Amuur vs. France, Judgment of 25 June 1996, 
Reports 1996-III. 
466 Compare Section 18a (6) of the German Asylum Procedures Act. 
467 A TV Joint Action, note 469 below, preamble. 
468 The definition of the term 'visa' in Art. 5 of the Visa Regulation explicitly excludes 
airport transit visas from the scope of the regulation. 
469 OJ (1996) L 63/8 [hereinafter ATV Joint Action]. The Commission requested the ECJ to 
annul this Joint Action for encroaching upon EC competencies under Art. lOOc(l). The 
Court maintained that it had jurisdiction in the case, and stated that A TV did not concern 
the crossing of the external borders of the Member States. The application was thus 
dismissed. Case C-170/96, Commission of the Eurupean Communities v Council of the 
European Union, Judgment of 12 May 1998. For a comment, see A. Oliveira, 'Case C 
170/96, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union, 
Judgment of 12 May 1998, [1998] ECR I-2763', 36 CMLR 1 (1999). 
410 Not published in OJ yet. 
167 
CHAPTER 5 
For the purposes of the ATV Joint Action, an ATV is defined in its 
Article 1 as 'the authorisation to which nationals of certain third countries 
are subject, as an exemption to the principle of free transit laid down in 
Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, for 
transit through the international areas of the airports of Member States'. 
The core of the ATV Joint Action is laid down in Article 3: 
Each Member State shall require an airport transit visa of nationals 
of third countries included on the joint list in Annex I hereto who 
do not already hold an entry or transit visa for the Member State in 
question when passing through the international areas of airports 
situated within its territory. 
The list attached as Annex I comprises ten countries471 : Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka and 
Zaire. The majority of these countries have a poor human rights record472 
and produce substantial numbers of protection seekers473• 
An A TV is issued by the consular services of the Member States, who 
shall determine the conditions of its issue 'subject to adoption by the 
Council of criteria relating to the preliminaries for and issue of visas'.474 
Article 2 of the A TV Joint Action underscores specifically that '[i]n all 
cases, the consular services must ascertain that there is no security risk or 
risk of illegal immigration'.475 This would mean that a consular officer will 
deny an A TV if she suspects that the transit passage will be used for the 
purposes of filing a protection claim. 
471 The Draft Joint Action currently under discussion adds Bangladesh, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Pakistan to the list, while Zaire is omitted. It should be noted 
that Zaire has changed its name to the Democratic Republic of Congo after the successful 
insurgency of Laurent Kabila. 
472 On the human rights situation, see generally the U.S. Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices 1998, available at < http://www.state.gov/www/ 
global/human _rights/ 1998 _ hrp _repon/98hrp _report_ toe.html > (accessed on 1 Decem-
ber 1998). 
473 The 1998 statistics for asylum applications filed in Europe indicate that Iraq occupies 
second place, Afghanistan is fourth, Sri Lanka fifth, Somalia sixth, Iran eighth, and 
Nigeria fourteenth among the top seventeen countries of origin of asylum seekers. See 
UNHCR, 1999, p. 82. 
474 ATV Joint Action, Art. 2. 
475 See also the preamble of the A TV Joint Action, alluding to 'the objectives of security and 
control of illegal immigration of the Treaty'. 
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It must be underscored that, at present, the A TV Joint Action is binding 
merely on a political level. So far, the Visa Regulation and the ATV Joint 
Action remain the only instruments aiming at a material harmonisation in 
the visa field. 
On the procedural aspects of visa harmonisation, the Council has 
adopted a non-binding 
O Council Recommendation of 4 March 1996 relating to local 
consular cooperation regarding visas476 
The rationale of this instrument is to curb 'visa shopping' -a practice by 
which a third country national would seek to augment her chance for 
obtaining a visa by filing an application with several Member States 
simultaneously. To counter visa shopping, the quoted instrument 
recommends a number of measures promoting the co-operation of local 
consular services. 
On the technical aspects of visa harmonisation, a binding instrument 
has been adopted under the first pillar: 
O Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995, laying 
down a uniform format for visas477 
Standardising visa formats facilitates entry control and the detection of 
false visas. Precisely as procedural harmonisation, such standardisation has 
an indirect bearing on the interests of protection seekers. For a desperate 
protection seeker who cannot obtain a visa of a Member State by regular 
means, visa shopping or the use of false documents may be the only 
remaining avenue to protection. 
5 . .1 . .1.2 Visa Harmonisation in the Schengen Group 
When it comes to harmonising visa matters, the Schengen Group has 
outstripped the EU in many respects. The reason is simple: in the 
Schengen area, internal border control has already been abolished, while 
this step has not been taken within the EU at large. Abolishment creates a 
476 OJ (1997} C 80, pp. 23-7. 
477 OJ (1995} L 164, pp. 1-4. 
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strong pull towards adopting and implementing flanking measures. This 
becomes particularly clear in the visa area. While both the EU at large and 
the Schengen Group maintain a negative list, only the Schengen Group 
has adopted a binding positive list as well. While the A TV list of the EU is 
only politically binding, the Schengen Group has agreed on a legally 
binding counterpart. While the EU has launched a non-binding re-
commendation on consular co-operation, the Schengen Group has 
elaborated a binding code harmonising all procedural and technical issues 
connected with the issuing of visas. The benefit for the individual wishing 
to stay no longer than three months is a uniform Schengen visa, valid not 
only in the issuing state, but in all states of the Schengen area. There is no 
equivalent to the uniform Schengen visa in the EU at large. 
In the Schengen area, visa issues are regulated exhaustively in two 
instruments: 
O the Schengen Convention, in particular Articles 9-18, and 
o the Common Consular Instruction to the Diplomatic Missions 
and the Consular Posts of the Contracting Parties to the Schengen 
Convention, which are Headed by Career Consular Officers with 
its Annexes478 • 
The base for all visa harmonisation within the Schengen Group 1s 
contained in Article 9 SC: 
1. The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt a common policy 
on the movement of persons and in particular on the arrangements 
for visas. They shall give each other assistance to that end. The 
Contracting Parties undertake to pursue by common agreement 
the harmonization of their policies on visas. 
478 Gemeinsame Konsularische Instruktion an die diplomatischen Missionen und die 
Konsularischen Vertretungen der Vertragsstataten des Schengener Durchfiihrungs-
iibereinkommens, die von Berufsbeamten geleitet werden [hereinafter Common 
Consular Instruction, abbreviated CCI], reprinted in A. Hildebrandt and K. Nanz, 
Visumpraxis. Voraussetzungen, Zustiindigkeiten und Verfahren der Visumerteilung in den 
Staaten des Schengener Abkommens (1999, Verlag R.S. Schulz, Starnberg}, pp. 209-324. A 
revised version of the CCI was adopted in 1999: Schengen Executive Committee, 
Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the definitive versions of the 
Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions. Hitherto, none of the named 
versions has been available in the OJ. 
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2. The visa arrangements relating to Third States, the nationals of 
which are subject to visa arrangements common to all the 
Contracting Parties at the time when this Convention is signed or 
later, may be amended only by common agreement of all the 
Contracting Parties. A Contracting Party may exceptionally 
derogate from the common visa arrangements with respect to a 
Third State for over-riding reasons of national policy that require 
an urgent decision. It must first consult the other Contracting 
Parties and, in its decision, must take account of their interests and 
of the consequences of that decision. 
It follows that the Schengen co-operation aims at adopting not merely a 
harmonised, but a common visa policy. Based on this provision, the 
Schengen Group has drawn up a negative list and a positive list, which are 
annexed to the CCI.479 Both are legally binding. Already in the Schengen 
Convention, provision is made for a common visa. A TV, transit visas, 
visas for short term stay, visas for multiple entries and group visas are all 
subject to common rules, provided that the accumulated stay in the area 
of the Contracting Parties does not exceed three months.480 Visas for 
longer periods of stay are subject to the discretion of the Member States.481 
As earlier mentioned, the negative list contains 132 entries, the positive 
list features 44 entries, while the grey list holds a sole entry. Regarding the 
issue of airport transit visas, the negative list of the Schengen Group is 
somewhat more comprehensive than its counterpart in the presently valid 
A TV Joint Position. The Schengen list contains the following countries: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The 
list laid down in the 1998 Draft ATV Joint Action is actually identical 
with the Schengen list. Thus, an adoption of the former instrument would 
imply a further integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union 
framework. Nonetheless, the Schengen list is legally binding, while a Joint 
Action is not. 
479 Annex 1 to the CCI contains the negative, the positive and the grey list. These lists have 
been updated by means of two Schengen Executive Committee Decisions: Decision of 
the Executive Committee of 15 December 1997 on the harmonisation of visa policy and 
Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 December 1998 on the abolition of the grey 
list of States whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement by certain Schengen 
States. 
480 Arts 10 (1) and 11 SC; CCI, Chapter I, para. 2.1. 
481 CCI, Chapter I, para. 2.2. 
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The procedure to be followed when issuing a Schengen visa is regulated in 
a detailed fashion, and Contracting Parties are bound to follow it. The 
CCI contain rules on the determination of the responsible state482, the 
procedure to be followed by the claimant when making a request483, the 
processing of that request and decision-making484, the administration of 
visa issues485 and the co-operation of local consular posts. 486 
A central element in these procedures is the question of the claimant's 
true intentions. Is there a risk for defection, once the claimant has reached 
the Schengen territories? Does she wish to immigrate, rather than to 
return or travel on after the envisaged short-term stay? The CCI alludes 
repetitiously to the element of intent. In the admission phase, the 
credibility of the claimant is looked into: 'The claimant has to convince 
the consular post seized with the claim that [ ... ]return to the country of 
origin is warranted'.487 If doubts persevere, credibility should be further 
investigated in the personal interview with the claimant. 488 The decision-
making process is also geared toward the credibility issue. The CCI 
underscores that one of the essential elements in decision-making is the 
risk for unauthorised immigration. 'Special attention should be directed at 
"circles of persons with an increased risk factor" as unemployed persons 
or persons not possessing regular incomes'.489 It should be underscored 
that the CCI contain no instructions whatsoever for cases where a visa is 
sought for protection-related grounds. 
Contracting Parties-and their consular posts-are bound to issue a 
Schengen visa only if specified preconditions are fulfilled. According to 
Article 5 SC, a Schengen visa may be issued provided that the applicant 
fulfils the following conditions: 
0 she is in possession of a valid document or documents permitting 
them to cross the border, as determined by the Executive 
Committee; 
482 CCI, Chapter II. 
483 CCI, Chapter III. 
484 CCI, Chapter V. 
485 CCI, Chapter VII. 
486 CCI, Chapter VID. 
487 CCI, Chapter III, para. 3. 
488 CCI, Chapter III, para. 4. 
489 CCI, Chapter V. 
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O if applicable, she submits documents substantiating the purpose 
and the conditions of the planned visit and has sufficient means of 
support, both for the period of the planned visit and to return to 
their country of origin or to travel in transit in a Third State, into 
which their admission is guaranteed, or is in a position to acquire 
such means legally; 
O she has not been reported as a person not to be permitted entry; 
and 
O she is not considered to be a threat to public policy, national 
security or the international relations of any of the Contracting 
Parties. 490 
How do these conditions link to the right to entry? To start with, the 
possession of a visa does not entitle the holder to entry. It merely entitles 
the holder to seek entry or transit at a border post, and the border post 
may still reject the alien in possession of a visa.491 On the other hand, 
entry to the territories of the Contracting Parties must be refused to any 
alien who does not fulfil all these conditions and, where required, is in 
possession of a visa. 492 Nonetheless, there is an opening for protection-
related cases in Article 5 (2) SC: where a Contracting Party considers it 
necessary, it may derogate from that principle on humanitarian grounds 
or in the national interest or because of international obligations. In such 
cases permission to enter will be restricted to the territory of the 
Contracting Party concerned, which must inform the other Contracting 
Parties accordingly.493 Article 15 SC states explicitly that these rules shall 
not preclude the application of special provisions concerning the right of 
asylum. 
For the three exceptional reasons enumerated in Article 5 (2) SC, a 
Contracting Party may not only allow entry to its territory, it may also 
issue a visa. However, in cases where a Contracting Party makes use of its 
right to exceptional derogation, it shall restrict the validity of the visa 
490 Art. 5 SC compared to Art. 15 (a), (c), (d) and (e) SC. 
491 CCI, para. 2.1. 




issued to its own territory and inform the other Contracting Parties of its 
decision. 494 
For protection seekers, the message boils down to the following. 
Provided that 'international obligations' flowing from refugee law or 
human rights law enshrine a right to entry or, at least, a right to non-
rejection for protection-related grounds, this right shall override the rules 
of the Schengen Convention. If such obligations can be shown to exist in 
international law495 , the Contracting Party concerned must allow entry in 
such cases. Beyond that, a Contracting Party may allow entry on 
humanitarian grounds or in the national interest. 
5.1.1.3 Mainstreaming the Schengen Visa acquis: The 
Commission Proposal 
The Commission has presented a proposal for a revised visa regulation 
which draws on the new first pillar competencies made available through 
the Treaty of Amsterda..'11 as well as reacting to the incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis into the Union framework. The new regulation would in 
fact amalgamate the EC Visa Regulatiol'l presently in force with parts of 
the Schengen visa acquis: 
O Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders ;:md those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement. 496 
Provided that it is eventually adopted, this instrument would give a telling 
example of the variable geometry reigning in Title IV. Curiously enough, 
it could be binding for countries outside the Union (that is, Iceland and 
494 Art. 16 SC. 
495 See chapters 10.2 ".nd 12.1 on the question of entry. 
496 At the time of writing this document has not been published in the OJ. Henceforth Visa 
Regulation Proposal. 
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Norway), without even binding all Member States.497 It is based on Article 
62 (2) (b) (i) TEC, which endows the Community with competency of 
drawing up not only a negative list (as it was already empowered to do 
during the Maastricht era), but also a positive list. 
The proposed negative list is brought up to the length of the Schengen 
visa acquis, adding 34 entries to the list annexed to the 1999 EC Visa 
Regulation, thus bringing the total up to 134. Going further than earlier 
instruments, the proposed positive list suggests the exemption of 48 
entries from visa requirements in the Union. This means that Member 
States are precluded from unilaterally determining visa requirements once 
the Visa Regulation Proposal is adopted. In other words, the grey list will 
be relegated to history. 
Just as in the existing EC Visa Regulation, Member States are entitled 
to make a number of exhaustively listed exceptions for nationals other-
wise falling under its visa requirements under the proposed Regulation. 
Nonetheless, the relevant paragraph still makes no mention of protection-
related grounds. 498 
5.1.2 Measures Complementing Visa Regimes 
In the preceding section, the current status of visa harmonisation has been 
expounded at some length. Yet the effectiveness of the visa system would 
be greatly diminished if aliens could reach international airports or sea 
ports of the issuing states without a visa. In principle, the border police of 
the issuing state in the course of passport control could reject them. 
However, International law may inhibit their forcible return once they 
have made contact with the territory of a potential host state or they may 
simply not have the financial means to return. To avoid such situations, 
497 For Ireland and the U.K., the validity of the Regulation would hinge on an opt-in. For 
Iceland and Norway, validity would presuppose consideration in the Joint Committee set 
up under the 1999 Agreement between the Council, Iceland and Norway. With regard to 
Denmark, a division of opinions seems to exist. The Commission considers that the 
competencies conferred upon the Community by Art. 100c/Maastricht are congruent 
with that under Art. 62 (2) (b) (i) TEC (see the Explanatory Memorandum attached to 
the Visa Regulation Proposal). It is unlikely, however, that Member States will accept 
this interpretation, given that they have opted for an explicit change in the wording of 
Article 1 OOc/Maastricht. 
498 Art. 5 Visa Regulation Proposal. 
175 
CHAPTER 5 
states have been eager to make the possession of a valid visa a precondition 
for departure from a third country. Thus, control is externalised and 
shifted to the pre-deparfur~ stage. One method is to make carriers liable 
for transporting aliens not in possession of a valid visa. By means of such 
sanctions, carrier are incited to control visas and travel documents before 
embarkation. Carrier sanctions move the border control of the 
destination state to the check-in counter at airports in third countries. 
Another method of control targets the informal sector offering travel 
services, the tool being to fine human smugglers. A third method is to 
send staff or equipment to third countries, which are thus enabled to carry 
out more efficient departure controls. This method goes by the name of 
pre-frontier assistance and training. In the absence of these comple-
mentary measures, the effectiveness of visa requirements as a means of 
entry control would be markedly diminished.499 
5.1.2.1 Carrier Sanctions 
Article 26 SC contains an obligation for states to introduce rules on the 
responsibilities of carriers in their national legislation. This responsibility 
is preventive and reparative. On the preventive side, carriers 'shall be 
obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure that an alien carried by air 
or sea is in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the 
territory of the Contracting Parties'.500 On the reparative side, the carrier 
is tasked with the removal of aliens denied entry: 
If an alien is refused entry into the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties the carrier which brought him to the external 
border by air, sea or land shall be obliged to assume responsibility 
for him again without delay. At the request of the border 
surveillance authorities the carrier must return the alien to the 
Third State from which he was transported, to the Third State 
which issued the travel document on which he travelled or to any 
other Third State to which he is guaranteed entry.501 
499 For an overview of the nrious components in European and U.S. migration control 
systems, see B. P. Christian, 'Visa Policy, Inspection, and Exit Controls: Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Migration Management', 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 1 (1999). 
500 Art. 26 (1) (b) SC. 
soi Art. 26 (1) (a) SC. 
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The obligation to incorporate these rules on the preventive and reparative 
responsibilities of carriers is expressly made subject to the obligations 
flowing from the 1951 Refugee Convention.soi 
To the preventive and the reparative rules, the Schengen Convention 
adds a punitive rule: 
The Contracting Parties undertake, subject to the obligations 
arising out of their accession to the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the New 
York Protocol of 31 January 1967, and in accordance with their 
constitutional law, to impose penalties on carriers who transport 
aliens who do not possess the necessary travel documents by air or 
sea from a Third State to their territories. 503 
Carrier sanctions as a result evolve into a market mechanism: the 
aggregate costs of reparative and punitive measures exceed the gains 
carriers make by selling tickets to undocumented travellers. Sanctions 
therefore incite carriers to check the travel documents of their passengers 
scrupulously. so4 
Of ten EU Member States included in a 1997 survey, eight had 
introduced penalisation rules in their domestic legislation.sos Another 
502 Art. 26 (1) SC. 
503 Art. 26 (2) SC. According to Art. 26 (3) SC, the preventive and punitive rules shall also 
apply to carriers of groups by coach over international road links, with the exception of 
border traffic. 
504 UNHCR has observed the detrimental effects of carrier sanctions prescribed in the 
Schengen Convention at an early stage: 'In symbiotic relation to visa requirements are 
the documentation review obligations States in effect impose upon carriers. Forcing 
carriers to verify visas and other travel documentation helps to shift the burden of 
determining the need for protection to those whose motivation is to avoid monetary 
penalties on their corporate employer, rather than to provide protection to individuals. 
In so doing, it contributes to placing this very important responsibility in the hands of 
those (a) unauthorized to make asylum detenninations on behalf of States (b) thoroughly 
untrained in the nuances and procedures of refugee and asylum principles, and (c) 
motivated by economic rather than humanitarian considerations. Inquiry into whether 
the absence of valid documentation may evidence the need for immediate protection of 
the traveller is never reached. UNHCR believes that the concerns which States attempt 
to address through carrier sanctions and visas can be better addressed through the careful 
harmonization of standards of application, treatment and implementation'. UNHCR, 
Position on Conventions Recently Concluded in Europe (Dublin and Schengen 
Conventions), Geneva, 16 August 1991. 
505 IGCARMP, 1997, p. 434. 
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source describes the level of co-ordination between Member States as low, 
and points out that Finland, Spain and Sweden merely oblige carries to 
take financial and practical responsibility for repatriation.506 The German 
legislation attempts to alleviate the negative effects of carrier sanctions by 
exempting carries from sanctions where undocumented protection seekers 
have been accorded some form of protective status.507 It goes without 
saying that such patchwork benevolence cannot halt the market dynamics 
imposed by the sanctions instrument. After all, airlines and other carriers 
pursue the interests of their shareholders, and not those of protection 
seekers. A look at recognition rates would suggest to airlines that 
transporting protection seekers without documents is too high a risk and 
therefore, bad business. 
5.1.2.2 Sanctions against Human Smugglers 
Article 27 (1) SC contains an obligation for Contracting Parties 'to impose 
appropriate penalties on any person who, for purposes of gain, assists or 
tries to assist an alien to enter or reside within the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties contrary to the laws of that Contracting P;i;.ty on the 
entry and residence of aliens'. 
Of ten EU Member States screened in a 1997 Survey, six had penalised 
human smuggling, one had not, and three did not make information 
available. Penalties ranged from a fine to eight years' imprisonment.508 
; 06 European Parliament, 2000, p. 15. 
;o7 F. Loper, 'Das Dubliner Ubereinkommen iiber die Zustandigkeit fur Asylverfahren', 20 
ZAR 1 (2000), p. 54. Laper names a corresponding construction in French law and 
practice, whereby carriers only fined if claimants are entered on a black list, or if 
protection claims are dismissed by the French authorities as manifestly unfounded. Thus, 
following the logic of the German and French solutions, a rational, profit-minded airline 
would need to carry out a small-scale determination procedure at the check-in counter to 
assess whether transport would entail a gain or a loss. This is manifestly absurd: for the 
airline, it would entail transactional costs consuming the eventual gains of transporting 
undocumented protection seekers. 
508 IGCARMP, 1997, p. 434. 
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5.1.2.3 Pre-frontier Assistance and Training 
Both the EU acquis and the Schengen acquis contain instruments on pre-
frontier assistance and training. A non-binding in~trument adopted by the 
EU Council has provided an organisational framework for common 
measures in this field, adding to the bilateral exchanges among Member 
States and third countries. The relevant instrument is the 
O Joint Position of 25 October 1996 defined by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 (2) (a) of the Treaty on European Union, on 
pre-frontier assistance and training assignments. 509 
This instrument aims to render the control of travel documents and visas 
prior to embarkation on flights destined for Member States more effective. 
Assistance assignments have as their objective the provision of assistance to 
officers locally responsible for checks either on behalf of the local 
authorities or on behalf of the airlines.510 The purpose of joint training 
assignments shall be among other things to describe Member States' 
document and visa requirements and the methods by which the validity of 
documents and visas may be checked.511 Joint assistance or training 
assignments are carried out by specialist officers designated by the Member 
States. 512 Where costs are not covered by the relevant third country or the 
airline involved, they are borne by the Member States agreeing to 
participate in the implementation of an assistance or training assign-
ment. 513 
Within the Schengen Group, parallel measures have been taken. In a 
1998 Decision514, the Executive Committee affirms that the Schengen 
states 'find it necessary' to post 'liaison officers from the Schengen States 
to countries of origin and the transit countries' whose task would be to 
advise on the 'preventing of illegal migration [ ... ] so as to fight against 
509 OJ (1996) L 28111 [hereinafter Pre-frontier Joint Position]. 
510 Art. 1 (2) of the Pre-frontier Joint Position. 
511 Art. 2 (2) of the Pre-frontier Joint Position. 
512 Art. 3 (1) of the Pre-frontier Joint Position. 
513 Art. 3 (3) of the Pre-frontier Joint Position. 
514 Schengen Executive Committee, Decision of the Executive Committee of 27 October 
1998 on the adoption of measures to fight illegal immigration, 27 October 1998. 
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illegal immigration into a Schengen State' .515 This initiative has been 
pursued further by means of the 
O Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 December 1998 on 
coordinated deployment of document advisers.516 
Under this instrument, Schengen states are intended to second executive 
staff as document advisers, whose task is to assist airlines or shipping 
companies, consular representations of Schengen states in third countries, 
and border or immigration authorities at airports or seaports of departure 
in third countries. 517 Assistance is delivered in the form of training on 
counterfeited and falsified documents as wells as controls in pre-boarding 
checks at airports and ports of exit.518 
The instrument lists 46 locations in 35 countries as suitable postings for 
document advisers, and assigns them to single Schengen countries. Among 
these 35 countries, we find the worldwide elite of refugee-producing 
countries. Two locations in Turkey are pointed out, and one of them is 
assigned a priority status (Istanbul). In the year the Decision was adopted, 
Turkey held second place on the list of countries whose nationals are 
recognised as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention in Europe.519 
Of the 22 top refugee-producing countries of origin listed in the UNHCR 
1998 statistics, six are represented on the list of locations: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey and Vietnam. 520 
It would be of the utmost interest to discover how 'document advisers' 
and EU training staff are instructed to react to protection-related cases. 
The instruments themselves do not give explicit instructions on this 
point, and thus there is the impending risk that individuals in such cases 
are regarded simply as undocumented migrants to be filtered out. But 
apart from amplifying the risks of delivering individuals to persecution, 
the instruments presented in this section evoke unhappy memories of the 
past. Just like the deployment of military advisers in the decades before 
the fall of the Iron Curtain, posting document advisers is a strong signifier 
515 Ibid., para. 3. 
516 Henceforth Document Adviser Decision. This decision has not been published in the OJ. 
517 Para 1 (a) of the Implementation Principles attached to the Document Adviser Decision. 
518 Ibid. 
519 UNHCR, 1999, p. 79. 
520 Ibid. 
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that the burden of conducting the Cold War against protection-induced 
and other migration is stealthily but inexorably being shifted to third 
countries. 
5.1.3 Conclusion 
The speedy harmonisation of visa requirements and the increasing co-
ordination of measures complementing them are probably the clearest 
indicator that internal free movement is to be bought at the price of 
intensified control. The proliferation of visa requirements is probably the 
most serious threat to the personal mobility that a person needs in order 
to seek refuge.521 It is important to recall, however, that the issuing of 
visas on protection-related grounds does not run counter to the visa 
regimes adopted within the EU or the Schengen Group. Nonetheless, the 
risk prevails that the consular officer equates the invocation of protection-
related grounds by the visa claimant with the intent to immigrate in an 
unauthorised manner. Therefore, in practice, the filter function of visa 
requirements ultimately hinges on the existence of express domestic rules 
on the issuance of visas in protection-related cases. Some, but not all, 
Member States have made provisions for asylum applications at their 
consular posts and instructed them accordingly.522 Others, however, 
521 Christian, 1999, p. 234. 
522 In Denmark, such applications fall under section 7 (4) of the Aliens Act. In 1994, 1995 
and 1996, 1 341, 4 951 and 1 498 persons respectively applied for asylum at a Danish 
consular post. In the three named years, 90, 41 and 17 applications respectively were 
approved. In France, embassies have been entitled to grant a residence permit to enable 
the claimant to seek asylum on French territory. The Netherlands accepts asylum requests 
filed with the Dutch Embassy in the claimant's country of origin. A positive decision 
entails the issuance of an entry visa. In Spain, the only asylum requests accepted by 
embassies are those in which the claimant has already left the country of origin. The U.K. 
accepts asylum claims at its embassies abroad. Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy and 
Sweden do not accept asylum claims to be filed at consular posts. Source: IGCARMP, 
1997, p. 435. In Austria, Section 12 (2) of the Asylum Law enables aliens to apply for 
asylum with Austrian diplomatic missions abroad. Greece and Luxembourg do not accept 
asylum applications to be filed with consular posts. Source: F. Liebaut and J. Hughes, 
Legal and Social Conditions for Asylum Seekers and RefUgees in Western European Countries 




expressly discourage their consular authorities from issuing visas if there 
are indications of persecution, as this aggravates the risk of 'defection' .523 
The extent to which international law obliges states to grant entry on 
protection-related grounds remains an unanswered question. Where such a 
right can be shown to exist, it could subsequently entail a duty to issue a 
visa to the beneficiary. This question shall be pursued in a later chapter.524 
5.2 Post-entry Measures: The Concept of Safe Third 
Countries 
In Western Europe, domestic rules for granting asylum vary greatly. This 
has two consequences. First, a rational protection seeker would not seek 
protection in just any potential host country, but rather in one having 
higher recognition rates than others. In other words, a rational protection 
seeker would prefer to choose between potential host countries. Secondly, 
it is also perfectly rational for a rejected protection seeker to file a new 
application in another European country, as chances are fair that the latter 
will assess her case differently than the country which rejected her. This 
phenomenon has become by the pejorative label 'asylum shopping'. 
However, it is important to recall that the behaviour of the protection 
seeker is not based on a malicious intent to manipulate, but is instead a 
523 The information on country-related visa practice provided by the Swedish Statens 
Invandrarverk [State Immigration Board] is indicative in this regard. With regard to 
Cuba, it is suggested that a visa should be denied where the claimant 'has problems of a 
political nature'. With regard to Bulgaria, the occurrence of 'discrimination, mainly of 
gypsies' is pointed to, so 'a certain caution' should be exercised when processing visa 
claims from members of this group. For Iraqis, the 'risk of defection' is said to be very 
high, so it is 'very difficult for Iraqis to make credible' that they solely intend to visit 
Sweden. Statens Invandrarverk, Region mitt, Visumenheten, Information angaende 
viseringsarenden, 21 October 1999 and 12 November 1999, Doc. No. SIV 19-99-4115, 
with attachments Praxisinformation Bulgarien, Praxisinformation Kuba, and Praxis-
information Irak. 
It is quite noteworthy that for 'prominent politicians or journalists, who risk to be 
exposed to threats or violence in their professional activity and who wish to "take a rest" 
outside Algeria for a limited duration, there is no impediment for granting a visa'. Ibid., 
Praxisinforrnation Algeriet. From a universalist position, it is certainly to be welcomed 
that strict visa rules are somewhat relaxed for specific groups. However, it gives rise to 
concern that the beneficiaries of such relaxations happen to be social elites. 
524 See chapter 12.1 below. 
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rational reaction to the disharmony of European protection systems.525 It 
is a form of market-adapted behaviour that is otherwise praised in 
Western economies. 
Naturally, repeated evaluation of the same case in different European 
states is a waste of resources. It also renders the interpretation of statistics 
more difficult, as one person could be behind a number of applications 
submitted in different states. 526 
Theoretically, two remedies offer themselves-modifying the market 
offer or closing down the market. The first remedy would consist in 
slashing the incentive to choose by harmonising the protection offer: if all 
European states offered roughly the same procedural and material 
standards, asylum shopping would not make much sense anymore.527 
Invariably, this process would take time. To be effective, it would also 
imply deep intrusions into the aliens and asylum legislation of Member 
States, which are on the whole jealously guarded as belonging to the 
latter's sovereignty. 
The solution actually devised by single Member States resembles a 
procedural fix rather than a material cure. Instead of intensifying the 
harmonisation of protection systems, whose divergence was the very 
cause of secondary movements, states stipulated the fictive equality of 
these systems, and allocated protection ·seekers to them under a 
mechanical rule. The mechanical rule is based on the concept of safe third 
countries: where a number of formal criteria indicate that the protection 
seeker could have sought protection in a third country through which she 
passed, her claim shall be rejected, and she shall be asked to turn to that 
525 This is explicitly acknowledged by the European Commission: 'Substantive asylum law 
and asylum procedures have not yet been approximated and the recognition rates for 
certain nationalities can vary significantly from one Member State to another, so it is 
understandable that people in need of international protection may find one Member 
State a more attractive destination than another'. European Commission, Commission 
staff working paper. Revisiting the Dublin Convention: developing Community legislation 
for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum 
submitted in one of the Member States, SEC (2000) 522, 21 March 2000 [henceforth Dublin 
Working Paper], para. 30. 
526 All restrictive measures notwithstanding, it is still unclear to what extent the statistics of 
applications mirror the actual number of protection seekers, or merely their mobility 
between European host states. 
527 However, making multiple applications still retains the advantage of delaying removal to 
the country of origin. 
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country.528 Denmark was among the first countries to introduce the safe 
third concept in its domestic legislation-the so-called Danish clause.529 
The idea underlying the Danish clause proliferated quickly and found its 
way into the Dublin and Schengen Conventions, albeit in a more 
sophisticated form. A crude version of it underpinned a number of 
bilateral readmission agreements between EC Member States and their 
European neighbours. 
Essentially, the safe third country concept embraces two elements. 
First, responsibility for the processing of a given protection claim must be 
established by a set of allocation criteria. Second, the physical readmission 
of the protection seeker to the responsible country must be secured. As 
states are under no obligation to readmit non-nationals under customary 
international law, the readmission obligation must be created by way of 
treaty. The Dublin Convention joins both elements in one instrument. By 
contrast, allocation to states outside the Union is usually governed by a 
readmission agreement only, while the allocation criteria are laid down in 
domestic law and, to a certain extent, in Union law. 
The safe third country concept denies the protection seeker the 
opportunity to choose among potential host countries and does away 
with a state obligation to process each claim in substance.530 Rather, the 
host country responsible for processing her claim is determined by the 
travel route or other allocation criteria. In theory, the market of 
protection offers has been abolished and replaced by a market of ever 
more efficient border control. In practice, however, allocation under the 
safe third country concept will only work if a number of preconditions 
are fulfilled. The identity and the travel route of the protection seeker 
have to be established, and the third country must be willing to take over 
the protection seeker and her case. Establishing the protection seeker's 
528 See R. Byrne and A. Shacknove, 'The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law', 9 
Harvard Human Rights Journal (1996), p. 186. 
529 This radically formalistic solution had been launched by the Danish legislature in 1986. 
By virtue of the Danish clause, asylum seekers could be sent back to safe third countries 
regardless of appeal. The circle of safe third countries was determined by administrative 
practice. 
53° For a good overview of the debate on both issues, see K. Landgren, Deflecting International 
Protection by Treaty: Bilateral and Multilateral Accords on Extradition, Readmission and the 
Inadmissibility of Asylum Requests (1999, UNHCR, Geneva), pp. 22-9. On the issue of 
choice, see also N. Albuquerque Abell, 'The Compatibility of Readmission Agreements 
with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees', 11IJRL1 (1999), pp. 75-80. 
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identity is necessary in order to inhibit multiple applications under the 
disguise of false names. Establishing the travel route is mandatory for 
identifying a relevant third country to which she can be sent back. With 
these necessities in mind, states have devised methods of information 
exchange and fingerprinting to meet both threats against the workability 
of the safe third country concept. To ensure the willingness of third 
countries to take over protection seekers and their cases, international 
agreements have been concluded. All of the measures described comple-
ment the safe third country concept. 
In the following, we shall first look into allocation to other Member 
States under the Dublin Convention, including the complementary 
measures linked to it. In a second step, allocation to safe third countries 
outside the Union will be expounded together with the complementary 
device of readmission agreements. 
5.2.1 Allocation to other Member States 
5.2.1.1 The Dublin Convention 
Allocation among Member States is regulated in a comprehensive and 
legally binding manner by the Dublin Convention: 
O Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining 
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of 
the European Communities531 
The rationale of the Dublin Convention is twofold. First, it allocates 
responsibility for the examination of asylum applications lodged on the 
territory of a Member State and, second, it lays down readmission 
obligations incumbent on the responsible Member State. Among the goals 
531 15 June 1990, OJ (1997) C 254, 19 August 1997, pp. 1-12. For a background on the 
Dublin Convention, see Guild and Niessen, 1996, at 112 et seq. See also J. van der 
Klaauw, 'The Dublin Convention, the Schengen asylum chapter and the treatment of 
asylum applications', in P. R. Giuseppin and W. M. Jansen (eds), Het Akkoord van 
Schengen en vreemdelingen. Eeen ongecontroleerde grens tussen recht en beleid? (1997b); K. 
Hailbronner and C. Thiery, 'Schengen II und Dublin-Der zustandige Asylstaat in 
Europa', 17 ZAR 2 (1997). For a description from the perspective of a German 
government official, see Loper, 2000. 
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of the Convention, the preamble names a desire to speed up procedures, 
to guarantee a material determination to claimants in one of the Member 
States and to avoid orbit situations, where claimants are sent back and 
forth between Member States unwilling to consider their case.532 The idea 
behind the Dublin Convention can be described as 'one for all'. One, and 
only one, Member State conducts a determination procedure, and it does 
so on behalf of all other Member States. At least in theory, the Dublin 
Convention should do away with the much-detested phenomenon of 
asylum shopping. 
The Dublin Convention provides for its own institutional framework. 
Under its Article 18, a committee has been established consisting of one 
representative of each Contracting Party as well as a representative of the 
European Commission.533 Among the tasks of the so-called Article 18-
Committee, we find the examination of 'any question of a general nature 
concerning the application or interpretation of this Convention'.534 Where 
a Contracting Party experiences major difficulties as a result of substantial 
change of circumstances since the conclusion of the Dublin Convention, 
it may bring the matter before the Committee, which can ultimately 
decide on the suspension of the Dublin Convention for that state.535 In 
deviation from the otherwise prevailing unanimity rule, decisions of 
suspension under this clausula rebus sic stantibus are taken by a two-thirds 
majority in the Article 18-Committee.536 
m Preamble of the Dublin Convention, para. 4. Orbiting refugees were a considerable 
protection problem during the seventies and eighties. See G. Melander, Refugees in Orbit 
(1978, International University Exchange Fund, Geneva). For an early analysis of the 
incapacity of the Dublin Convention to solve the problem of orbiting, see J. J. Bolten, 
'From Schengen to Dublin: The New Frontiers of Refugee Law', in J. M. Steenbergen, 
Schengen. Internationalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Privacy, 
Security and the Police (1992, Stichting NJCM-Boekerij, Leiden), pp. 18-28. Today, with 
the benefit of statistical hindsight, we may state that Dublin has cloaked the phenomenon 
of orbiting in new garb. Grahl Madsen is right to seek the underlying cause for the 
orbiting phenomenon in the differences between domestic legal systems-a cause still 
existing in the EU. A. Grahl Madsen, Territorial Asylum (1980, Almqvist & Wiksell, 
Stockholm), p. 95. 
533 Art. 18 (1) DC. The Commission representative is only entitled to take part in 
discussions, without being involved in the decision-making process. 
534 Art. 18 (2) DC. 
535 Art. 17 (2) DC. 
536 Art. 18 (3) DC. 
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The Article 18-Committee has adopted a number of instruments to 
facilitate the implementation and application of the Dublin Convention: 
O Decision 1/97 of 9 September 1997 concerning provisions for the 
implementation of the Dublin Convention537, 
O Decision 2/97 of 9 September 1997 establishing the Rules of 
Procedure of the Committee set up by Article 18 of the Dublin 
Convention538, and 
o Decision 1/98 of 19 June 1998 of the Article 18 Committee of the 
Dublin Convention, concerning provisions for the implemen-
tation of the Convention539• 
On the basis of concerns about inefficiencies in the application of the 
Dublin Convention, the Article 18-Committee also adopted a Programme 
of Action in June 1998.540 
Moreover, the implementation of the Dublin Convention has also 
attracted the interest of the Council, which adopted the 
O Council Conclusions of 27 May 1997 concerning the practical 
implementation of the Dublin Convention.541 
In spite of these attempts to create greater clarity in the sometimes rather 
cryptic norms of the Dublin Convention, numerous ambiguities in its 
interpretation and application remain. Such problems encompass various 
areas, ranging from divergent readings of the responsibility criteria to 
requirements of proof. 542 
Regarding the territorial applicability of the Dublin Convention, we 
recall that Iceland and Norway have become involved with the Schengen 
co-operation aiming at an area without internal border control. Therefore, 
these countries must be involved in the system established under the 
537 OJ (1997) L 281, pp. 1-25. 
538 OJ (1997) L 291, p. 26. 
539 OJ (1998) L 196, p. 49. 
540 Not published in OJ. See Dublin Working Paper, para. 12. 
541 OJ (1997} C 191, pp. 27-8. This instrument is not included in the acquis list. 
542 For a good overview, taking into account the divergent positions among Member States, 
see Loper, 2000. 
187 
CHAPTER 5 
Dublin Convention. As the Dublin Convention can only be signed or 
acceded to by Member States543 , however, an alternative route has to be 
used. It is planned that the Commission shall negotiate with Iceland and 
Norway an agreement aimed at extending to these two countries the rules 
applied by the EU Member States under the Dublin Convention.544 
How, then, are the two goals of the Dublin Convention-
establishment of responsibility and readmission obligations-pursued? Let 
us look at the issue of responsibility first. The Member State responsible 
for processing an asylum application is established by means of the 
following responsibility criteria, listed in order of priority: 
1. Family: If the applicant's spouse or child under 18 has been recognised 
as a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention by a Member State, 
and is legally present in its territory, that State shall be responsible for 
the application, provided the applicant so desires.545 As the concept of 
family is a very narrow one, and the group of recognised Convention 
refugees is limited546, this criterion has only a minor numerical impact 
in practice. 
2. Residence and entry permits: If the applicant has been issued a valid 
residence permit or a valid visa, the issuing State shall be responsible 
for the application. This criterion offers a detailed set-up of collision 
norms for cases where permits have been issued by more than one 
Member State, including cases where permits have expired. 547 
3. Illegal entry: If the applicant arrived irregularly from outside the 
Union, the Member State through which she first entered the 
territory of the Member States shall be responsible for the 
application. 548 
4. Controlled entry: The Member State responsible for controlling the 
entry of the applicant into the territory of the Member States will be 
responsible for examining the application for asylum. An exception is 
543 Art. 21 (1) DC. 
544 See text accompanying note 425 above. 
545 Art. 4 DC. 
540 In 1998, this group consisted of 31 248 persons in Europe, which must be contrasted to a 
total of 352 404 asylum applications. See UNHCR, 1999. 
547 Art. 5 DC. 
548 Art. 6 DC. 
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made for cases where the applicant first entered a Member State 
where the visa obligation is waived, before presenting an application 
for asylum in another Member State where the visa obligation is also 
waived. In this case, the latter State shall be responsible for examining 
the application for asylum.549 Thus, this criterion only applies if there 
is a differential visa policy between two Member States-a pheno-
menon which visa harmonisation will eventually put an end to. 
5. State in which the application was first lodged: If no other contracting 
State can be made out, the first Member State in which the applicant 
has lodged her application shall be responsible for it.550 
It should be stressed that the responsibility criteria only relate to asylum 
applications-that is, according to the definition spelt out in Article 1 (1) 
(b) DC, applications for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Therefore, we have to speak of asylum seekers, and not of protection 
seekers, when alluding to the personal scope of the Dublin Convention in 
the following.551 
The first four criteria send out a very clear message to Member States. 
In general terms, refugee recognition, the granting of visas and residence 
permits, liberal visa requirement policies and lax controls of external 
borders may lead to responsibility. The essence of these criteria can be 
expressed as follows: that state initially causing the presence of an asylum 
seeker on the territories of Member States shall bear the responsibility for 
her. Even the fifth criterion falls in line with this message: the Member 
State in which an applicant has lodged her first claim in Union territory 
shall see to it that this applicant does not embark on secondary 
movements. If she does, responsibility under the Dublin Convention will 
not move with her, but shall rest with the first state. The practical effects 
of this criterion are illustrated by the case of Bosnian protection seekers in 
Germany. Faced with the expiry of their toleration permits and the 
549 Art. 7 DC. 
550 Art. 8 DC. 
551 This confinement to persons seeking protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
entails two problems. First Member States disagree as to whether the Dublin Convention 
also regulates the readmission of recognised refugees. Secondly, as the importance of 
other forms of protection categories increases, it is unsatisfactory that the Dublin 
Convention only regulates the allocation of responsibility for a single category. See 
Dublin Working Paper, paras 47-50. 
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implementation of return policies, some of the Bosnians moved on to 
other Member States-which had not yet embarked on return-to seek 
asylum there. Due to the fifth criterion, the formal responsibility for 
processing their claims rested with Germany. 
However, the Dublin Convention provides for an opt-out clause, 
allowing a state to assume responsibility for a case filed on its territory, 
although it is not obliged to do so under the four criteria: 
Each Member State shall have the right to examine an application 
for asylum submitted to it by an alien, even if such examination is 
not its responsibility under the criteria defined in this Convention, 
provided that the applicant for asylum agrees thereto. The Member 
State responsible under the above criteria is then relieved of its 
obligations, which are transferred to the Member State which 
expressed the wish to examine the application. The latter State shall 
inform the Member State responsible under the said criteria if the 
application has been referred to it. 552 
This clause is usually referred to as the 'sovereignty clause'. It can be used 
either to the benefit or to the detriment of an asylum seeker. It is 
beneficial when a Member State uses the sovereignty clause to preserve 
family unity beyond the narrow confines of the first criterion. It is also 
beneficial when the state using the sovereignty clause maintains a more 
liberal recognition practice than the state to which allocation would have 
taken place under the Dublin criteria. This simple equation can be turned 
around, however. The sovereignty clause has detrimental effects for the 
asylum seeker when the state invoking it maintains a more restrictive 
practice than the state to which allocation would have taken place under 
the Dublin criteria. In certain cases, Germany has used Article 3 (4) DC to 
achieve rejections and effectuate return to the country of origin rather 
than feeding the case into the Dublin system.553 To be sure, Article 3 (4) 
DC requires that the asylum seeker give her consent to an opt-out from 
552 Art. 3 (4) DC. 
553 J. van der Klaauw, 'Refugee protection in Western Europe: A UNHCR perspective', in J. 
Y. Carlier and D. Vanheule (eds), Europe and Refugees-A Challenge? (1997a, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague), pp. 235-6, giving examples from the period preceding the 
entry into force of the Dublin Convention, where allocation was governed by Chapter 
VII SC. The analogy is valid, as the content of Chapter VII SC is almost identical to the 
content of the Dublin Convention. 
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the criteria. In the case of Germany, the authorities opined that this 
consent had implicitly been given when the asylum application was filed 
with German authorities.554 
We recall that the Dublin Convention is based on a fictive equality of 
divergent domestic asylum systems. All too easily, a Member State might 
see itself confronted with the following situation. If a protection claim 
were examined in substance by its own authorities, the claimant would be 
allowed to stay due to the prohibition of refoulement. If, however, the 
Dublin criteria were to be applied, the claimant would be allocated to 
another Member State with a more restrictive practice, which would 
reject her and effectuate return. The conflict is obvious: deviating from 
the Dublin criteria implies the risk of undermining the Dublin 
Convention; at the same time, adhering to its criteria means accepting 
chain refoulement, which would be at odds not only with Article 33 GC, 
but also with Article 2 DC: 
The Member States reaffirm their obligations under the Geneva 
Convention, as amended by the New York Protocol, with no 
geographic restriction of the scope of these instruments, and their 
commitment to co-operating with the services of the United 
Nations High Comn;iissioner for Refugees in applying these 
instruments. 
In such situations, the sovereignty clause could be used to avert an 
outright conflict between Geneva and Dublin. 
The sovereignty clause in Article 3 (4) DC is complemented by Article 
9 DC, which allows states other than those receiving the application to 
volunteer for processing the case. This norm is usually referred to as the 
'humanitarian clause': 
554 Ibid. 
Any Member State, even when it is not responsible under the 
criteria laid out in this Convention, may, for humanitarian reasons, 
based in particular on family or cultural grounds, examine an 
application for asylum at the request of another Member State, 
provided that the applicant so desires. If the Member State thus 
approached accedes to the request, responsibility for examining the 
application shall be transferred to it. 555 
555 Art. 9 DC. Compare also Art. 3 (4) DC. 
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What does responsibility under the Dublin Convention entail? According 
to Article 10 (1) DC, the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for asylum according to the named criteria shall be obliged to: 
O take charge of an applicant who has lodged an application for 
asylum in a different Member State; 
0 complete the examination of the application for asylum; 
0 readmit or take back an applicant whose application is under 
examination and who is irregularly in another Member State; 
O take back an applicant who has withdrawn the application under 
examination and lodged an application in another Member State; 
and 
O take back an alien whose application it has rejected and who is 
illegally in another Member State. 
The responsibility to readmit and to take back encourages Member States 
to prevent secondary movements and to effectuate the speedy removal of 
rejected asylum seekers from their territory to the country of origin. 
Let us give a brief description of how an asylum claim will be handled 
by a Member State, taking into account the allocation mechanism set out 
in the Dublin Convention. 
1. An asylum seeker files an asylum application with a contracting State. 
2. The contracting State receiving the application assesses whether there 
is any third State to which it wishes to return the asylum seeker 
according to its national legislation. 556 
3. The State responsible for the application will be determined by the 
contracting States along the lines of the criteria given in the Dublin 
Convention. 
4. The asylum seeker and her application are taken charge of by the 
responsible State. 
556 Art. 3 (5) DC. Paragraph 3 (a) of the Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions 
concerning host third countries gives prevalence to return to a host third country before 
considering return to a Member State, 30 Nov.fl Dec. 1992, Doc. No. SN 4823/92. See 
Guild and Niessen, 1996, pp. 121-2. 
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5. The responsible State carries out an individual determination 
procedure. 
The order of priority is clear: first and foremost, the asylum seeker should 
be allocated to a country outside the Union. Only where this is not 
feasible, allocation under the Dublin Convention is considered. This runs 
counter to the intention, stated in the preamble, to ensure that one of the 
Member States will examine a protection claim on its merits. Referral to a 
non-Member State implies the opposite: no material examination shall 
take place by any of the Member States. Thus, allocation under the 
Dublin Convention is not a closed, self-contained mechanism with a 
predictable outcome. After all, Member States have different legal and 
factual preconditions for allocating asylum seekers to states outside the 
Union. Domestic legislation on safe third countries varies557, as does the 
availability of workable readmission arrangements with third states. 
The Dublin Convention has been exposed to massive criticism from 
the moment of its inception, most of it emanating from a universalist and 
protection-minded perspective. 558 However, even governments of Member 
States have voiced concerns about the ineffective functioning of the 
Convention. Therefore, it is no surprise that Member States assigned 
themselves to reconsider the suitability of the rules laid down in the 
Dublin Convention in the next years. By 2004, the EC shall have adopted 
a measure on the very issue regulated today by the Dublin Convention. 
We recall that Article 63 (1) (a) TEC obliges the EC to adopt, within a 
period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
'criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a 
national of a third country in one of the Member States'. 
Following the non-binding Action Plan on the Implementation of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, a 'continued examination of the criteria and con-
ditions for improving the implementation of the Convention and of the 
possible transformation of the legal basis to the system of Amsterdam'559 
557 See Council of the European Union, Monitoring the implementation of instruments 
adopted concerning asylum-Summary report of the Member States' replies to the 
questionnaire launched in 1997, 17 July 1998, Doc. No. 8886/98, ASIM 139, pp. 23-31. 
558 For an outright rejection, see Bolten, 1992. 
559 Action Plan, para. 36 (b) (i). 
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should take place within two years after the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, shortening the period set out in Article 63 TEC. 
In early 2000, the Commission drew up a detailed working paper on 
the Dublin Convention and its replacement by a Community measure, 
which elaborates on the goals pursued by the Dublin Convention and 
attempts to identify whether the content and implementation of the 
Convention lives up to them. 560 The Dublin Working Paper reflects some 
of the criticism voiced against the Convention. In the following, we shall 
summarise pivotal elements of this criticism. 
1. Long processing delays 
One of the goals of the Convention was to avoid orbit situations, where 
asylum seekers are left in doubt for too long as regards the likely outcome 
of their applications or where they are referred successively from one 
Member State to another without any of these States acknowledging itself 
to be competent to examine their application. It is quite obvious that this 
goal is far from being reached. The Commission states that the average 
time for processing Dublin cases exceeds the target of one month set out 
in Article 4 (1) of Decision 1/97. For some Member States the average 
delay is as much as 90 days, which is the maximum allowed under Article 
11(4) DC, before the state to which the request was made is automatically 
deemed to have accepted responsibility. The Commission notes further 
that the Convention itself sets generous time limits: where all margins are 
made full use of, the time-span from individual application to transfer to 
the responsible Member State may take up to nine months. Such long 
delays cause great insecurity for the asylum seeker and approximate the 
limbo of the very orbit situations that the Convention was originally set 
to solve.561 Paradoxically, the Dublin process may consume more time 
than a substantial determination procedure would have done, thus 
harming protection and control interests alike. 'During the process, it is 
560 Dublin Working Paper. See note 525 above. 
561 Dublin Working Paper, paras 14-20. 
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not practicable to keep the asylum seeker detained' states one U.K. 
official, admitting that 'it is often very difficult to keep track' of her.562 
2. Low efficiency of allocation mechanism 
Another goal was to prevent asylum applicants from being able to pursue 
multiple asylum applications, either concurrently or consecutively, in 
different Member States and thus to deny asylum seekers the possibility of 
choosing among Member States. Here, the Commission cautiously 
indicates that the efficiency of the Dublin system cannot presently be 
assessed due to the lack of statistics, but spells out some hope for 
improvement if and when the Eurodac system will have become fully 
operational. 563 The incomplete statistics currently available suggest that 
some four percent of all asylum applicants are transferred between 
Member States under the Dublin Convention.564 The U.K. official quoted 
earlier suggests that '[t]he reality is that, at present, most asylum seekers 
can effectively choose their country of asylum within the EU'. 565 
The reasons for the limited efficiency of the allocation mechanism are 
primarily to be sought in the difficulties of gathering sufficient evidence 
relating to the responsibility criteria.566 Referring to U.K. case law, the 
Commission also takes note of the fact that referrals are also inhibited by 
the divergent interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention among 
Member States, inducing Courts to declare transfers as unlawful.567 Given 
that domestic and international courts are prepared to question the safety 
562 J. Johnston, 'Dublin Convention', in UNHCR, 4th International Symposium on the 
Protection of Refugees in the Central European and Baltic States, 27-29 September 1998, 
Bled/Slovenia. Report and Proceedings (1999, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 51. This reflects 
another choice imposed by lengthy Dublin procedures, namely that between detention 
and defection. The legality of detention is subject to the narrow legal confinements of 
Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR. See G, Noll, 'Unsucessful Asylum Seekers-The Problem of 
Return', 37 International Migration 1 (1999), pp. 280-1. 
563 Dublin Working Paper, para. 22. 
564 Dublin Working Paper, para. 38. 
565 Ibid. 
566 The Dublin Working Paper gives a detailed account of evidentiary problems in paras 
42-5, enumerating the general lack of evidence, the incentives to destroy documents, and 
the problems experienced in situations where indicative evidence only is available. 
567 Dublin Working Paper, para. 23. 
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of Member States568, it is somewhat surprising that UNHCR is apparently 
not: the Office has refrained from demanding that appeals against Dublin 
removals have suspensive effect.569 
3. Splitting of families 
As already noted, the family criterion is doubly confined through its 
limitation to recognised refugees and its very narrow concept of family. 
As UNHCR has rightly pointed out, the Dublin Convention can, at 
worst, lead to persistent family splitting.570 While the sovereignty clause 
and the humanitarian clause may mitigate this problem somewhat, their 
use is at the discretion of states. Apparently, there is no quick fix to this 
problem, as the Article 18-Committee has been unable to agree on a draft 
decision concerning the transfer of family members under both clauses. 571 
By conclusion, the Convention offers neither a legal obligation nor an 
568 Apart from the U.K. courts named in the Dublin Working Paper and in chapter 12.2 the 
ECtHR has affirmed its competence to scrutinise Dublin removal decisions with a view 
to their compliance with the ECHR: 'The Court finds that the indirect removal in this 
case to an intermediary country, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its 
decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can 
the United Kingdom rely automatically in that context on the arrangements made in the 
Dublin Convention[ ... ]. The Court has therefore examined below whether the United 
Kingdom have complied with their obligations to protect the applicant from the risk of 
torture and ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention'. ECtHR, Decision as to 
the Admissibility of Application 43844/98, T.I. vs. the U.K., 7 March 2000, p.16. 
569 UNHCR suggests that 'the applicant should be offered an opportunity to request a 
review of the decision on a Member State's responsibility, in so far as the applicant can 
forward further elements relevant to the application of the Dublin criteria and 
procedures in his or her particular case'. The limited scope of review in this demand 
stands out in marked contrast to the requirement that removal to non-Member States 
should entail a general appeal option with suspensive effect, set out in the same document 
(see note 613 below). UNHCR, Implementation of the Dublin Convention: Some UNHCR 
Observations (May 1998, Geneva). 
570 UNHCR, Implementation of the Dublin Convention: Some UNHCR Observations (May 
1998, Geneva). In its observations, UNHCR suggests that Member States use the 
humanitarian clause (Art. 9 DC) at least in cases where a family member is gravely ill, has 
a serious handicap, or is of old age, where one of the applicants is pregnant or has a new-
born child, and where minors risk being separated and left unattended. Moreover, the 
Office calls for guidelines encouraging Member States to apply a broader notion of 
'family' than has been laid down in Art. 4 DC. 
571 Dublin Working Paper, para. 32. 
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incitement to preserve family unity.572 The Amsterdam Action Plan 
acknowledges this when it spells out that a study 'should be undertaken to 
see to what extent the [Dublin, GN] mechanism should be supplemented 
inter alia by provisions enabling the responsibility for dealing with the 
members of the same family to be conferred upon one Member State 
where the application of the responsibility criteria would involve a 
number of States [ ... ]'.573 
4. Inequitable distribution of asylum seekers among Member States 
'The Convention', states the European Commission, 'has been criticised 
in some quarters on the grounds that it puts too great a burden on 
Member States which have external borders which are particularly 
exposed to migratory pressures'. 574 The Commission goes on to state that 
'the number of transfers is relatively modest', concluding that, 'at present, 
the system can not be said to be putting an excessive burden on any 
Member State'. 575 In a later chapter, we shall look into this critique at 
greater length, pursue a closer analysis of the statistical material available· 
and contest the moderate conclusion of the Commission. 576 
Concluding on the aggregated critique, the European Commission 
finally states in its Dublin Working Paper that there 'do not appear to be 
many viable alternatives' to the Convention.577 It is noteworthy, though, 
that two NGOs have launched a proposal for a draft directive replacing 
the Dublin Convention, which allocates responsibility to the Member 
State where an application was first filed, allowing for a number of 
exceptions (family reunion, or close links to another Member State). 578 
Accepting this proposal would imply admitting the complete defeat of the 
Dublin project. Thus, it seems fair to assume that a new Community 
instrument will refrain from developing an approach radically different 
from the existing Convention, and that causing the presence of an asylum 
572 This is also confirmed in paras 32-4 of the Dublin Working Paper. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Dublin Working Paper, para. 35. 
575 Ibid. 
576 See chapter 8.4.1 below. 
577 Dublin Working Paper, para. 59. 
578 ILPA/MPG and S. Peers, The Amsterdam Proposals. The ILPA/MPG Proposed Directives 
on Immigration and Asylum (2000, ILPA/MPG, London, Brussels), pp. 58-9. 
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seeker on the territory of a Member State will continue to entail 
responsibility for processing her claim. 
5.2.1.2 Complementing Dublin: The Eurodac Proposal 
In March 1996, Member States began negotiations on a Convention to 
establish an identification system based on the fingerprints of asylum 
seekers. The so-called Eurodac system579 would gather fingerprint data 
collected by Member States and transmit it to a Ce~tral Unit, which 
would compare individual sets of fingerprints to the data retained in the 
system at the request of a Member State. In addition, Member States also 
prepared a draft Protocol, which was intended to further facilitate the 
application of the Dublin Convention by providing for the collection of 
fingerprint data relating to persons apprehended in connection with the 
irregular crossing of an external border. This data would be available for 
the purposes of comparison with the fingerprints of people who 
subsequently claimed asylum in one of the Member States. In addition, 
the Protocol provided a facility for checking with Eurodac in certain 
circumstances to determine whether a person found illegally within a 
Member State had previously claimed asylum in another Member State. 
The text of a draft Convention and a draft Protocol under Title VI of the 
Treaty on European Union was prepared and consensus was reached 
within the Council in March 1999 to freeze the text pending the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.580 
After the entry into force of the latter, the Eurodac systems falls under 
EC competence by virtue of Article 63 (1) (a) TEC. On the basis of the 
frozen texts, the Commission presented a proposal in 1999 aiming at the 
adoption of a binding and directly effective Eurodac Regulation.581 The 
legal form of a regulation was chosen, as the technical nature of Eurodac 
makes uniform implementation of the system necessary. 
579 For a brief overview, see M. Toussaint, 'Eurodac: un systeme informatise europeen de 
comparaison des empreintes digitales des demandeurs d'asile, Revue du marche commun et 
de /'union europeenne 429 (1999). 
580 Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Eurodac Regulation, para. 1.2. 
581 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) concerning the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of the fingerprints of applicants for 
asylum and certain other aliens, 1999/05/26, COM/99/0260 final-CNS 99/0116 
[hereinafter Draft Eurodac Regulation]. 
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The draft Eurodac Regulation covers three groups of persons: asylum 
seekers582, persons apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing 
of an external border583, and persons found illegally present within a 
Member State584• Taking fingerprints from asylum seekers allows for 
tracking multiple applications and thus offers considerable advantages for 
the application of the Dublin criteria. By way of example, fingerprinting 
persons apprehended at external borders facilitates the application of 
Article 6 DC, linking illegal border crossing to responsibility under the 
Dublin Convention. Furthermore, fingerprinting persons found illegally 
present within Member States facilitates the application of Article 10 {1) 
paras (c) and (e) DC, relating to the obligation to readmit or take back 
applicants, incumbent on the responsible state. 
Upon ajoption, Eurodac will have considerable impact on the situation 
of protection seekers. Circumvention of the Dublin criteria by using 
multiple identities or by manipulating the travel itinerary will become 
much more difficult. Inhibiting manipulation may be considered a good 
thing. It presupposes, however, that the protection offer in various 
Member · States is more or less of the same standard, and that no 
protection lacunae exist in any of the Member States. While this is not the 
case, any perfection of the Dublin Conve~tion will modify, rather than 
solve, the problems attached to its application. 
5.2.2 Allocation to Non-Member States 
5.2.2.1 The 1992 Resolution on Host Third Countries 
Allocation between Member States and third countries is addressed in a 
non-binding resolution on the safe third country concept: 
0 EC Ministers Resolution of 30 November-1 December 1992 on a 
Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third 
Countries585 
582 Arts 4-7 Draft Eurodac Regulation. 
583 Arts 8-10 Draft Eurodac Regulation. 
584 Art. 11 Draft Eurodac Regulation. 
585 WGI 1283 [hereinafter STC Resolution]. 
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The STC Resolution sets out a number of non-binding norms on the 
procedural aspects of the safe third country-concept, including its 
relationship to the Dublin Convention, and the qualification of third 
states as safe. 
The procedural rules position the safe third country concept-or, in the 
original language of the resolution, the concept of 'host third countries' -
in the asylum procedures conducted by Member States. The overarching 
interest is one of procedural economy, expressing itself in the following 
five principles: 
(a) The formal identification of a host third country in principle 
precedes the substantive examination of the application for asylum 
and its justification; 
(b) The principle of the host third country is to be applied to all 
applicants for asylum, irrespective of whether or not they may be 
regarded as refugees; 
(c) Thus, if there is a host third country, the application for refugee 
status may not be examined and the asylum applicant may be sent 
to that country; 
(d) If the asylum applicant cannot in practice be sent to a host third 
country, the provisions of the Dublin Convention will apply; 
(e) Any Member State retains the right, for humanitarian reasons, 
not to remove the asylum applicant to a host third country.586 
Principle (a) introduces a split into formal and substantive procedures. By 
this step, a doubling of substantial assessment is avoided. The referring 
state limits its assessment to formal aspects, where referral to a safe third 
country or a responsible Member State can take place. Substantial 
assessment is catered for by the receiving state. The hierarchy of referral 
introduced in Article 3 (5) DC is reiterated in principle (d), and a 
sovereignty clause reminiscent of Article 3 (4) DC is laid down in 
principle (e). 
586 Art. 1 STC Resolution. 
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Article 2 of the STC Resolution enshrines the criteria for the qualification 
of a third country as safe: 
Fulfilment of all the following fundamental requirements 
determines a host third country and should be assessed by the 
Member State in each individual case: 
(a) In those third countries, the life or freedom of the asylum 
applicant must not be threatened, within the meaning of Article 33 
of the Geneva Convention. 
(b) The asylum applicant must not be exposed to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment in the third country. 
(c) It must either be the case that the asylum applicant has already 
been granted protection in the third country or has had an 
opportunity, at the border or within the territory of the third 
country, to make contact with that country's authorities in order 
to seek their protection, before approaching the Member State in 
which he is applying for asylum, or that there is clear evidence of 
his admissibility to a third country. 
(d) The asylum applicant must be afforded effective protection in 
the host third country against refoulement, within the meaning of 
the Geneva Convention.[ ... ] 
Thie: article is problematic in that it focuses solely on extraterritorial 
protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Other explicit or implicit 
prohibitions of refoulement587 are simply not taken into account, al-
though they may offer wider protection in some cases than the 
prohibition of refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The 
criterion offered by paragraph (b) does not cover such forms of 
extraterritorial protection, as it is limited to mistreatment taking place in 
the third country. Given the wide scope of the instrument's application, 
as spelt out in Article 1 (b), this omission is of concern. Moreover, the 
criteria set out in the present article focus solely on negative state 
obligations, oblivious of the importance of positive obligations for 
extraterritorial protection worth its name. 588 
587 See chapters 9.1.2 and 9.1.4 below. 
588 Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, p. 396 with further references in note 122. 
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Article 3 of the STC Resolution sets out the relationship between the 
Dublin Convention and the allocation to a safe third country: 
(a) The Member State in which the application for asylum has been 
lodged will examine whether or not the principle of the host third 
country can be applied. If that State decides to apply the principle, 
it will set in train the procedures necessary for sending the asylum 
applicant to the host third country before considering whether or 
not to transfer responsibility for examining the application for 
asylum to another Member State pursuant to the Dublin 
Convention. 
(b) A Member State may not decline responsibility for examining 
an application for asylum, pursuant to the Dublin Convention, by 
claiming that the requesting Member State should have returned 
the applicant to a host third country. 
(c) Notwithstanding the above, the Member State responsible for 
examining the application will retain the right, pursuant to its 
national laws, to send an applicant for asylum to the host third 
country. 
(d) The above provisions do not prejudice the application of 
Article 3(4) and Article 9 of the Dublin Convention by the 
Member State in which the application for asylum has been lodged. 
It is made clear that allocation to a safe third country remains a facultative 
measure, and refraining from it does not entail any consequences for the 
application of the Dublin Convention. However, it is pointed out in 
paragraph (c) that allocation among Member States does not preclude 
subsequent allocation to a safe third country outside the EU. 
The STC Resolution has been criticised on a number of counts. On the 
procedural side, some authors have taken the position that removal of a 
protection seeker to a Non-Member State without a substantial 
examination of her claim would contravene the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention.589 Moreover, they have pointed out that the STC Resolution falls 
back behind the standards set in EXCOM Conclusions.590 Somewhat 
589 Standing Committee of experts in international immigration, refugee and criminal law, 
Commentary on the Draft Conclusions of the European Ministers responsible for Immigration 
Affairs meeting in London on 20.11.1992 and the not yet adopted Resolution concerning 
Family Reunification (1993, Forum, Utrecht), p. 16. 
590 Ibid., p. 17. 
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more cautiously, UNHCR has underscored that decisions on removal to 
host third countries should only be made by the authority normally 
competent in asylum matters, that the consent of the host third country 
should be sought before removal, that protection seekers should not be 
returned to countries where they have been in mere transit and that the 
availability of treatment according to basic human standards should be 
taken into account when determining the status of a third country as 
safe.s91 
5.2.2.2 Complementing A/location to Non-Member States: 
Readmission Agreements 
During the nineties, readmission agreements were concluded at an 
amazing pace both in and outside Europe, leaving a profound mark on the 
system of extraterritorial protection. 592 What is a readmission agreement, 
and what role does it play in the return of protection seekers to safe third 
countries?593 The Report on the Implementation of Readmission 
Agreements elaborated by the Working Group of the Budapest Group 
contains a working definition of what constitutes a readmission agree-
ment: 
A readmission agreement shall be understood in general as an 
international agreement stipulating the procedures for the return 
and readmission of individuals (with the exception of extradition). 
The objective of such an agreement[ ... ] is to: 
591 UNHCR, Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions concerning Host Third 
Countries. UNHCR Position, December 1992, paras 1-5. 
592 The number of readmission agreements involving European states is large, but difficult to 
specify, as many agreements remain unpublished or are published with a considerable 
delay. The IGCARMP maintains a non-public directory of agreements, which is available 
to participating states only. It has been suggested that, since the late 1980s, some 220 
bilateral readmission agreements have been concluded world-wide. IGCARMP, JGC 
Report on Readmission Agreements (1999, IGCARMP, Geneva), p. 4. 
593 For a typology of readmission agreements and an overview of the technical solutions 
used by states see Noll, 1997, pp. 416-24. For the perspective of industrialised goal states, 
see IGCARMP, 1999. 
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- combat illegal migratio.I {and in this sense to maintain public 
order and political stability in the countries affected by the 
immigration influx) 
- share the burden of illegal migration by more countries 
- have a preventive influence on the thinking of potential 
immigrants 
and thus to meet one of the conditions for the gradual reduction or 
abolition of the control on the internal borders of the countries 
which follow the readmission principles. 594 
This definition stretches over readmission agreements in general. While 
some agreements exclusively cover nationals of the State Parties, others 
are applicable to nationals of third countries as well. The rationale for 
concluding the former type of readmission agreements is to facilitate 
return of nationals of the receiving state illegally present in the sending 
state. This type of agreement shall be looked into in a later section dealing 
with return issues. 595 Readmission agreements of the latter type (also 
covering third-country nationals), however, have a wider ambit. With 
respect to third-country nationals, such agreements represent a co-
operation between a transit country and a destination country. Returning 
third country nationals to a country other than the country of nationality 
or habitual residence presupposes some form of agreement between the 
two states.596 Therefore, a readmission agreement of the latter type is a 
precondition for return to safe third countries. In the present context, we 
need only deal with such agreements. 
Due to the absence of provisions guaranteeing the observance of the 
prohibition of refoulement, UNHCR has expressly discouraged the use of 
'classical bilateral readmission agreements [ ... ] to return asylum-seekers, 
even where this is technically possible'.597 Nonetheless, this has had little 
impact on the determination of Member States to make continued use of 
; 94 Working Group of the Budapest Group, Report on the Implementation of Readmission 
Agreements, Doc. No. BGll/96 C, p. 2. 
595 See chapter 7.2 below. 
;% See chapter 7.2.1 below. 
597 UNHCR Division of Internacional Protection, Note for the Standing Committee of the 
Executive Committee, Composite Flows and the Relationship to Refugee Outflows, 
EC/48/SC/CRP.29, 25 May 1998, para. 19. 
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readmission agreements to remove protection seekers to third countries 
deemed safe. 
5.2.2.2.1 The EU acquis on Readmission 
Presently, the EU acquis comprises three instruments relating to the 
readmission of third-country nationals to transit countries. In 1994, the 
Council drew up a specimen agreement, covering the readmission of both 
nationals and third-country nationals, and recommended its use in a non-
binding instrument: 
O Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning a specimen 
bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State of the 
European Union and a third country598 
The specimen agreement was designed to serve as a model to be used 
flexibly by Member States when negotiating agreements with non-
Member States. 
A year later, the specimen agreement was followed by guiding 
principles for drawing up readmission protocols. Readmission protocols 
are typically concluded simultaneously with readmission agreements. 
While the agreement regulates the scope and content of the obligation to 
readmit in a general fashion, the protocol sets out detailed procedural 
rules to be followed by the authorities seized with readmission. The 
guiding principles were laid down in the 
0 Recommendation of 24 July 1995 on the guiding principles to be 
followed in drawing up protocols on the implementation of 
readmission agreements. 599 
In 1996, the Council took further steps to disseminate readmission 
obligations covering both nationals and third-country nationals by 
adopting the 
598 OJ (1996) C 274, pp. 20-4 [hereinafter EU specimen agreement]. While earlier drafts of 
the specimen contained substantial provisions safeguarding rights and interests of 
protection seekers, those are lamentably absent in the finalised text. See Guild and 
Niessen, 1996, p. 407. 
599 OJ (1996) C 274/25. 
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O Council Conclusions of 4 March 1996 concermng readmission 
clauses to be inserted in future mixed agreements.600 
Following this instrument, when mixed agreements between the Member 
States of the EU and third states are negotiated in the future, it shall be 
considered whether to include an option to future readmission 
agreements. By virtue of such a clause, the contracting third state would 
be obliged to conclude a bilateral agreement on the readmission of third 
country nationals with Member States which so request. This is the first 
tangible expression of the Council's wish to exploit the accumulated 
bargaining power of the Fifteen to facilitate the conclusion of readmission 
agreements with non-Member States. 
None of the three instruments adopted in the area are legally binding. 
In practice, the scope and content of bilateral readmission agreements 
concluded by Member States and third states continue to vary to a 
considerable extent.601 
5.2.2.2.2 Competencies after Amsterdam 
After the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the conclusion of 
readmission agreements touches upon the competencies of the EC. Article 
63 (3) (b) TEC prescribes that the Council shall adopt, within the 
transitional period of five years, measures on illegal immigration and 
illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents. Article 63 TEC 
also states explicitly that such measures adopted by the Council shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas 
concerned national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and 
with international agreements. 
This raises the question to what extent the Council, all Member States, 
or single Member States may still conclude readmission agreements 
without infringing upon EC competencies. The Legal Service of the 
600 Docs No. 4272196 ASIM 6 and 5457 /96 ASIM 37. 
601 Even within one and the same country, important variations in the chosen solutions may 
occur. Germany is a case in point. For an overview, see G. Lehnguth, H. MaaEen and M. 
Schieffer, Ruckfuhrung und Ruckubernahme. Die Ruckubernahmeabkommen der Bundes-
republik Deutschland (1998, R.S. Schulz, Starnberg). 
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Council has attempted to clarify this issue, and its reasonmg shall be 
briefly reflected in the following. 602 
According to the constant case law of the European Court of Justice, 
an instrument adopted within the Council or by all Member States acting 
outside the Council may not encroach upon the powers of the EC. 
Therefore, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Council or all Member States jointly may no longer conclude such 
agreements. 603 
Whether or not the conclusion of readmission agreements by a single 
Member State with a third country would violate the EC Treaty hinges 
on two factors. 
First the Council and, if necessary, the Court of Justice has to assess 
whether readmission agreements are inseparably bound up with the 
achievement of the Community's immigration policy objectives. If this is 
the case, it should not be possible for one or more Member States alone to 
continue to conclude such agreements with third countries, on account of 
the potential resulting distortions for other Member States in the context 
of an area without internal border controls. This factor is largely 
considered to be a matter for the Council's political judgement.604 
Second, it has to be verified whether or not there are any internal 
Community rules on repatriation which might be affected by the 
conclusion of such an agreement. To wit, such rules do not exist to date, 
apart from Article 23 SC. According to the Council's Legal Service, this 
provision is not incompatible with the conclusion of a readmission 
agreement by one or more Member States and a third country.605 
Interestingly, the first factor takes into account that the removal of 
third country nationals possesses a dimension of solidarity. It would be 
unfair if single Member States secured readmission by swiftly concluding 
bilateral readmissiun agreements with third countries, thereby exploiting 
their own political or economical leverage at the cost of other, less 
influential Member States. 
602 The following presentation is based on an article in Migration News Sheet. With the 
Amsterdam Treaty Now in Force, Member States May Not Collectively Conclude Re-






In later 1999, and reacting on the effects of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Council adapted its earlier position taken on readmission clauses in mixed 
agreements by means of the following instrument: 
o Consequences de l'entree en vigueur du traite d'Amsterdam sur les 
clauses de readmission dans les accords communautaires et dans les 
accords entre la Communaute europeenne, ses Etats membres et 
des pays tiers (accords mixtes)-Adoption d'une decision du 
Conseil606 • 
This decision contains specific specimen readmission clauses, which are to 
be inserted in future community agreements and mixed agreements. The 
scope of these clauses is indeed the widest possible. 607 First, a reciprocal 
obligation to readmit nationals and to issue identification documents for 
that purpose is included. Second, the contracting parties (that is, the 
Community and a third state) oblige themselves to conclude a agreement 
upon request, which would contain specific readmission obligations, 
including the duty to readmit third-country nationals or stateless persons. 
Third, until such an agreement has been concluded, the third state obliges 
itself to conclude bilateral agreements with single Member States upon 
request, which would, again, regulate specific readmission obligations, 
including a duty to readmit third-country nationals or stateless persons. 
Thus, the instrument makes clear that bilateral arrangements are 
provisional, and will cease to apply when a Community agreement or a 
mixed agreement enters into force. 
While the specimen clauses primarily target undocumented migrants 
and rejected protection-seekers, they could also be used to return 
protection seekers with pending claims to third countries considered as 
safe. However, it is reasonable to expect considerable resistance by third 
states against the octroi of readmission obligations vis-a-vis non-nationals. 
On the other hand, the accumulated bargaining power of the Fifteen is 
considerable. 
606 Adopted on 2 December 1999. Neither an English-language version, nor the document 
number was available at the time of writing. 
607 Ibid, Annex, Arts A-D. 
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5.2.3 Conclusion 
Certain aspects of the EU acquis related to allocation give rise to concern. 
Firstly, it has been noted that states employ different concepts of what 
constitutes a safe third country. Within the EU, disparities in the 
understanding and the application of the concept have been documented 
in a survey prepared by the Council.608 In Central and Eastern European 
countries, the prime partners for readmission at present, the concept is 
interpreted in very different manners by states applying it.609 This means 
that it is virtually impossible for the first requesting state to predict where 
the requested state may return a given protection seeker to a further 
(fourth) state. She might be sent on to a country that would not have been 
considered safe by the state starting the return movement. The risk of 
chain refoulement is systemically aggravated610, and cases of actual refoule-
ment have been reported.611 It has been observed with justified concern 
that '[t]exts of readmission agreements-even the model readmission 
agreement drawn up by the EU-fail to specify guaranteed access to status 
determination procedures, nor do they reiterate the obligation of non-
refoulement'. 612 
Secondly, the lack of communication between requesting and 
requested state might put the legal certainty of protectfon seekers at stake. 
If it is not made clear to the authorities of the requested state that a 
returned person made a protection claim which has not been decided in 
substance, the risk prevails that such a case will be treated simply as an 
608 Council of the European Union, Monitoring the implementation of instruments adopted 
concerning asylum-Summary report of the Member States' replies to the questionnaire 
launched in 1997, 17 July 1998, Doc. No. 8886/98 ASIM 139 [hereinafter 1998 Council 
Survey], pp. 23-30. By way of example, not all Member States have laid down the criteria 
enumerated in para. 2 STC Resolution in their domestic legislation. Furthermore, the 
concept of safe third countries is applied to situations of 'mere transit' in five Member 
States, while eight Member States refrain.from doing so. 
609 For an overview of state practice in Central and Eastern Europe, see F. Liebaut, Liebaut, 
Legal and Social Conditions of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Central and Eastern Europe 
(1999, Danish Refugee Council, Copenhagen). 
610 See A. Achermann and M. Gattiker, 'Safe Third Countries: European Developments', 7 
IJRL 19 (1995). 
611 In a 1995 study, ECRE compiled 16 cases of chain refoulement in 1994. ECRE, 'Safe 
Third Countries'. Myth and Realities (1995, London), Appendix B. 
612 Landgren, 1999, p. 29, referring to the EU specimen agreement. 
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illegal migrant which can be returned to the country of origin.613 
Readmission agreements usually do not address this need for 
communication. Although a non-binding EU instrument demands that 
'[t]he third country authorities must, where necessary, be informed that 
the asylum application was not examined as to substance'614, state practice 
in the EU diverges widely on this important issue.615 In this respect, 
removal among Member States under the Dublin Convention offers an 
advantage: it is clear from the outset that the claimant thus removed has 
not enjoyed a substantial determination of her claim. 
Thirdly, allocation to another Member State or a safe third country 
may deteriorate the legal standing of the protection seeker. Within the 
EU, asylum and aliens legislation still varies considerably, and allocation 
to a Member State with a restrictive practice can greatly diminish the 
chances of being protected. Allocation to a safe third country outside the 
Union may result in even greater protection losses. This is due to a more 
limited protection offer and a restrictive recognition practice. In general, 
Western European countries offer various forms of subsidiary protection 
613 Therefore, UNHCR has suggested that the consent of the receiving country be obtained 
before a protection seeker is sent to that country, and that it 'be informed in advance of 
the return of any asylum-seeker whose application has not yet been substantively 
examined so that appropriate notification can be given to the border officials and the 
necessary protection guaranteed'. UNHCR, Readmission Agreements, 'Protection 
Elsewhere' and Asylum Policy, August 1994, para. 5. With regard to the Dublin 
Convention, UNHCR has demanded that transfers to non-Member States under Art. 3 
(5) DC should be goverened by specific guidelines, ensuring that the sending state seeks 
the consent of the receiving state '(i) to readmit the asylum seeker; (ii) to consider the 
merits of the claim; and (iii) to provide effective protection as long as required'. 
Moreover, the sending state should inform the receiving country in writing that no 
decision of the substance of the claim has taken place, and that the applicant should 
receive an opportunity to request review of the removal decision, including suspensive 
effect. UNHCR, Implementation of the Dublin Convention: Some UNHCR 
Observations, May 1998. One may wish to add that there are good reasons to demand 
that these guidelines should also govern transfers between Member States (given that Art. 
3 (5) entails the risk of transfer to a fourth country outside the Union). However, 
UNHCR has refrained from this demand, giving the impression that the Office applies 
double standards. 
614 EU Council Resolution on minimum guarantees for Asylum Procedures, 20 June 1995, 
Doc. No. 5585/95, para. 22, OJ (1996) C 274/13. 
61 ; Five Member States inform the third country concerned, although only one does operate 
a procedure based on written reports. Other Member States do not inform the country 
concerned. See 1998 Council Survey, p. 30. 
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in domestic law.616 In Central and Eastern European states, the protection 
offer is largely limited to the Convention refugee category.617 Moreover, 
recognition rates in the Central and Eastern European Countries are 
generally lower than in the EU.618 Thus, reallocation to Eastern neigh-
bours implies a considerable deterioration of protection prospects for the 
average claimant. 
Finally, as the discussion on Eurodac, evidence and time limits has 
shown, allocation mechanisms are open to manipulation by the 
individuals subjected to them. It is conceivable that some protection 
seekers prefer continued illegality in the destination country to being 
allocated to a safe third country. While they might vanish from the 
asylum statistics of the destination state, they do not necessarily vanish 
from its territory. Rather than solving the problem, control measures 
merely shift it to another arena. 
616 An overview of diverging practices in Member States is given in European Council, 
Summary of replies concerning the national instruments of protection falling outside the 
scope of the Geneva Convention-Subsidiary protection, 6 January 1998, Doc. No. 
13667/97 ASIM 267. 
617 For an overview, see F. Liebaut, Legal and Social Conditions of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Central and Eastern Europe (1999, Danish Refugee Council, Copenhagen). 
618 See chapter 8.4.2 below. 
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6 Access to Full-Fledged 
Procedures under 
the EU acquis 
GLOBALLY, AS WELL AS REGIONALLY, asylum procedures differ 
widely. In some EU Member States, the dete~mination of claims is carried 
out in a two-tiered system by specific authorities619, while others involve 
courts at the appeal stage, allowing for up to four tiers.620 Time limits for 
appeals range widely, and so do the rules governing repeat applications.621 
To be sure, certain states split up asylum procedures in a so-called 
admissibility stage and the ordinary procedure. At the admissibility stage, 
a decision is taken whether a case shall be dealt with in the ordinary 
procedure, or whether it shall be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 
619 In Sweden, decisions at first instance are taken by the State Immigration Board, while 
appeals are decided by the Aliens Appeals Board. Exceptionally, the latter can refer cases 
to the government. 
620 In Germany, the initial decision is taken by an authority, while appeals are handled by 
two additional tiers of administrative courts (Administrative Courts as the second 
instance and Higher Administrative Courts as the third). In certain cases, a fourth tier is 
available (referral to the Federal Administrative Court or the Federal Constitutional 
Court). 
621 IGCARMP, 1997, pp. 440 and 436. 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _007
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc by-nc 4.0 license.
CHAPTER 6 
Since the eighties, European states have shown concern about the 
excessive length of asylum procedures resulting primarily from an 
increasing number of claims unmatched by a proportional rise in states' 
resources for processing them. Substantial backlogs of cases awaiting 
decision developed, entailing a long wait for the final decision. 
Without doubt, lengthy procedures are detrimental both to the 
individual and the host state. The individual is left uncertain about her 
future, and this has a negative psychological impact. Cases clearly falling 
under one of the protection categories on offer are kept in the inferior 
status of a protection seeker longer than necessary, thus postponing 
integration into the host society. The additional costs flowing from 
postponement-such as delayed entry into the labour market-are also 
detrimental from the perspective of the host state. Finally, the longer the 
determination of a claim takes, the more difficult it is to return the 
claimant upon a negative decision. 
In response, European states resorted to what were dubbed 'accelerated 
procedures'. Taking the example of a car, acceleration can be improved by 
fitting a more powerful engine or by cutting down weight. Generally, the 
latter method was chosen-determination procedures were switched to 
lean production. Depth was traded off for speed by augmenting the use of 
presumptions. Host states usually made up their own package of 
measures, serving themselves from a toolbox of restrictive solutions.622 
The acceleration of procedures by using presumptions made its way to 
the EU acquis. First, the concept of 'manifestly unfounded applications' 
was introduced and, second, the concept of the safe country of origin was 
launched. Nonetheless, the procedural acquis presented below largely 
failed to produce a harmonisation of both concepts in the domestic law of 
the Member States.623 The 1998 Council Survey showed that substantial 
divergence persisted. 624 
622 IGCARMP, 1997, p. 23. 
623 IGCARMP, 1997, p. 23. 
624 1998 Council Survey, pp. 6-56. The lack of harmonisation was also taken note of by the 
European Commission. See text accompanying note 684 below. 
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6.1 The EU acquis Related to Procedure 
Manifestly unfounded applications should be singled out and rejected very 
quickly in a simplified procedure. This is the underlying assumption of 
the non-binding 
O EC Ministers Resolutions of 30 November-1 December 1992 on 
Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum.625 
Instead of being rejected after a full determination in substance, manifestly 
unfounded applications should be rejected at an initial stage.626 For these 
ends, Member States could split procedures into two parts. In the 
'admissibility stage', manifestly unfounded applications would be rejected, 
and only the deserving cases would go on to the second stage, involving a 
full scrutiny on their merits.627 The resolution suggests that initial 
decisions on manifestly unfounded applications should be reached within 
one month.628 Appeal or review procedures may be more simplified than 
those generally available in the case of other rejected asylum 
applications.629 The procedural guarantees drawn up to balance these 
intrusions into the depth of scrutiny appear rather cryptic and are worded 
in weak language. 630 
According to this resolution, an application for asylum shall be 
regarded as manifestly unfounded if it is clear that it meets none of the 
substantive criteria under the 1951 Refugee Convention, either because 
'there is clearly no substance to the applicant's claim to fear persecution in 
625 WGI 1282 REV 1 [hereinafter MUA Resolution]. 
626 'Member States may include within an accelerated procedure (where it exists or is 
introduced), which need not include full examination at every level of the procedure, 
those applications which fall within the terms of paragraph 1, although an application 
need not be included within such procedures if there are national policies providing for 
its acceptance on other grounds.' Para. 2 MUA Resolution. 
w 'Member States may also operate admissibility procedures under which applications may 
be rejected very quickly or objective grounds.' Para. 2 MUA Resolution. 
628 Para. 3 MUA Resolution. 
629 Ibid. 
630 'A decision to refuse an asylum application which falls within the terms of paragraph 1 
will be taken by a competent authority at the appropriate level fully qualified in asylum 
or refugee matters. Amongst other procedural guarantees the applicant should be given the 
opportunity for a personal interview with a qualified official empowered under national 
law before any final decision is taken.' MUA Resolution para. 4 (emphasis added). 
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his own country', or because 'the claim is based on deliberate deception or 
is an abuse of asylum procedures'.631 Both categories exceed the definition 
adopted by the UNHCR Executive Committee.632 Under the former 
category, the resolution lists the following cases: 
O applications the terms of which raise no question of refugee status 
within the terms of the Geneva Convention, inter alia those 
lacking credibility633; 
O applications where the claimant cou.ld have resorted to an internal 
flight alternative634; and 
o applications where the claimant resorts from a country of origin 
presumed as safe.635 
Some of the listed cases raise grave misgivings. 636 Determining credibility 
or the availability of an internal flight alternative must not be done solely 
in a formalised manner. Both hinge on a substantial rather than a formal 
631 Para. 1 (a) MUA Resolution. 
632 See EXCOM Conclusion No. 30 (1983) in which the Executive Committee defined the 
category of 'manifestly unfounded' asylum applications in a comparably restrictive 
manner. Available at http://www.unhcr.ch/ refworld/unhcr/ excom/xconc/ excom30.htm. 
633 Para. 6 MUA Resolution. The paragraph gives a number of examples: 'This may be 
because: (a) the grounds of the application are outside the scope of the Geneva 
Convention: the applicant does not invoke fear of persecution based on his belonging to 
a race, a religion, a nationality, a social group, or on his political opinions, but reasons 
such as the search for a job or better living conditions; (b) the application is totally 
lacking in substance: the applicant provides no indications that he would be exposed to 
fear of persecution or his story contains no circumstantial or personal details; (c) the 
application is manifestly lacking in any credibility: his story is inconsistent contradictory 
or fundamentally improbable'. 
634 MUA Resolution, para. 7. For the purposes of this work, the term 'internal flight 
alternative' relates to cases where the claimant fears 'persecution which is clearly limited 
to a specific geographical area where effective protection is readily available for that 
individual in another part of his own country to which it would be reasonable to expect 
him to go' (para. 7 MUA Resolution). 
635 Para. 8 MUA Resolution. 
636 See G. S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. (1996, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford), p. 346; Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, p. 397. 
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assessment.637 Therefore, it seems inappropriate to deal with both types of 
cases in accelerated procedures. 
The resolution exemplifies a deliberate deception or abuse of asylum 
procedure with the cases where the claimant has 
(a) based his application on a false identity or on forged or 
counterfeit documents which he has maintajned are genuine when 
questioned about them; 
(b) deliberately made false representations about his claim, either 
orally or in writing, after applying for asylum; 
(c) in bad faith destroyed, damaged or disposed of any passport, 
other document or ticket relevant to his claim, either in order to 
establish a false identity for the purpose of his asylum application 
or to make the consideration of his application more difficult; 
(d) deliberately failed to reveal that he has previously lodged an 
application in one or more countries, particularly when false 
identities are used; 
(e) having had ample earlier opportunity to submit an asylum 
application, submitted the application in order to forestall an 
impending expulsion measure; 
(f) flagrantly failed to comply with substantive obligations imposed 
by national rules relating to asylum procedures; 
(g) submitted an application in one of the Member States, having 
had his application previously rejected in another country 
following an examination compnsmg adequate procedural 
guarantees and in accordance with the Geneva Convention on the 
Status of Refugees. To this effect, contacts between Member States 
and third countries would, when necessary, be made through 
UNHCR.638 
The listed examples interlock with visa policies, the Dublin Convention 
and the concept of safe third countries, as described above. If the 
protection seeker circumvents any of these three norm clusters-e.g. by 
637 UNHCR thinks it inappropriate to consider applications raising the issue of an internal 
flight alternative in the same manner as a manifestly unfounded application: UNHCR, 
UNHCR's Position on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, December 1992, 
para. 2 (iii). Accord: Standing Committee of experts in international immigration, 1993, 
p. 12. 
638 Para. 9 MUA Resolution. 
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destroying travel documents revealing her itinerary through a safe third 
country-she may bi> punished with an accelerated procedure. However, 
the resolution adds Jn important caveat to the decision-makers in para-
graph 10, stating that the factors listed above 
are clear indications of bad faith and justify consideration of a case 
under the [manifestly unfounded, GN] procedure [ ... ] in the 
absence of a satisfactory explanation for the applicant's behaviour. 
But they cannot in themselves outweigh a well-founded fear of 
persecution under Article 1 of the Geneva Conventir _. and none of 
them -carries any greater weight than any other. 
Again, to assess the existence of such a fear, a consideration of the merits 
is required. The resolution seems to be torn between two extremes. On 
the one hand, it works with the fiction of a clinical cut between form and 
matter; on the other, it acknowledges that the cases listed as manifestly 
unfounded cannot be solely determined on formal grounds. 
In addition to the two named categories, the resolution also gives 
leeway to further categories of cases which Member States wish to 
consider under accelerated procedures. The resolution names cases falling 
under the exclusion clause-Article 1.F GC-and cases involving a threat 
to public security as examples.639 Neither of these categories possesses a 
clear-cut formal character. Rather, both necessitate complex substantial 
reasonmg. 
As earlier mentioned, the MUA Resolution suggested that applications 
filed by persons coming from a safe country of origin could be dealt with 
on the presumption that they are manifestly unfounded. The concept of 
safe countries of origin is developed more fully in the non-binding 
O Conclusions adopted on 30 November 1992 concerning countries 
in which there is generally no serious risk of persecutions.640 
Before presenting the content of this instrument, let us briefly reflect on 
the background of the concept of safe countries of origin.641 Basically, this 
639 Para. 11 MUA Resolution. UNHCR considers the processing of such cases under 
accelerated procedures as inappropriate. UNHCR, UNHCR's Position on Manifestly 
Unfounded Applications for Asylum, December 1992, para. 2 (ii). Accord: Standing 
Committee of experts in international immigration, 1993, p. 13. 
640 WGI 1281 [hereinafter SCO Conclusions]. 
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concept entails a repartition of labour between the domestic legislator and 
the authority determining the individual claim. First, the legislator makes 
an abstract assessment of the general safety from persecution in countries 
of origin. A country passing certain benchmarks is listed as 'safe'. Second, 
where a person claims to risk persecution upon return to such a country, 
this claim is determined in an expedited and simplified procedure. To wit, 
the abstract assessment by the legislator is complemented by a summary 
procedure in casu. These procedures are built on the presumption that the 
claim is 'manifestly unfounded'. In comparison to a full-fledged asylum 
procedure, the profoundness of scrutiny and the access to legal remedies 
are substantially reduced. 
Generally, a presumption of safety attached to certain countries of 
origin entails two problems. First, even in states deemed safe on valid 
grounds, single and exceptional cases of persecution may occur. Due to 
the general presumption of safety, its victims are exposed to a 
disadvantageous procedural position when claiming asylum. Second, the 
institutionalised presumption of safety is dangerous when sudden changes 
take place in countries of origin. Striking them off the list takes time, 
which exposes intertemporal cases to augmented risks. 
According to the SCO Conclusions, the term 'safe country of origin' 
denotes a 'country which can be clearly shown, in an objective and 
verifiable way, normally not to generate refugees or where it can be 
clearly shown, in an objective and verifiable way, that circumstances 
which might in the past have justified recourse to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention have ceased to exist'. 642 
Following the text of the Resolution, the purpose of introducing this 
term was to create a rebuttable presumption that applicants from those 
countries are not in need of protection.643 This presumption should assist 
641 On the manifestation of this concept in the domestic law of European countries, see H. 
Martenson and J. McCahrty, 'Field report. "In general, no serious risk of persecution": 
safe country of origin practices in nine European states', 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 304 
(1998) (covering nine countries) and European Parliament, 1997 (covering the EU 
Member States). For a brief update, see European Parliament, 2000, pp. 18-9, indicating 
that eleven Member States currently make use of the concept (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
U.K.). 
642 Para. 1 SCO Conclusions. 
643 Para. 2 SCO Conclusions. 
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in speeding up procedures.644 The qualification of a country as safe should 
be based, at least645, on the previous numbers of refugees and recognition 
rates, the observance of human rights, the existence of democratic 
institutions and the stability of these three factors. 646 
Below, we shall be compelled to return to this concept, when dealing 
with a specific instrument qualifying all Member States as safe countries of 
origin.647 
In 1995, the Council adopted a non-binding instrument dealing with 
asylum procedures in a more comprehensive fashion: 
0 EU Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on Minimum Guarantees 
for Asylum Procedures648 
This resolution starts out with a general deference to domestic law: the 
regulations on access to the asylum procedure, the basic features of the 
asylum procedure itself and the designation of the authorities responsible 
for examination of asylum applications are to be laid down in the 
individual Member State's legislation.649 The resolution does offer a 
number of minimum rules, though, on the instructions given to border 
authorities and other authorities receiving applications650, on the quali-
fication of the decision-making bodies651 , on their duty to establish 
relevant facts ex officio652, on the right to appeal to an independent 
body653 and the resources to be allocated to decision-making bodies654• 
644 Para. 3 SCO Conclusions. 
645 Para. 3 SCO Conclusions. 
646 Para. 6 SCO Conclusions. Among the criteria for determining safe countries of origin, 
UNHCR also lists the accessiblity of a safe country of origin to independent national and 
international organisations for the purpose of verifying and supervising respect for 
human rights. UNHCR, UNHCR's Position on Conclusions on Countries in which 
there is Generally no Serious Risk of Persecution, December 1992. 
647 See chapter 6.2 below on the Spanish Protocol. 
648 OJ {1996) C 274/13 [hereinafter Asylum Procedures Resolution]. 
649 Para. 1 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
650 Para. 7 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
651 Para. 6 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
652 Para. 5 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
653 Para. 8 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
654 Para. 9 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
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It also lays down a number of procedural rights of the protection seeker: 
right to lodge a claim, right to data protection, right to information in a 
language one understands, right to a personal interview and a right to 
appeal. 655 However, procedures relating to allocation under the Dublin 
Convention are excluded from the ambit of this instrument, and shall be 
regulated by the Article 18-Committee instead. So far, the Committee has 
not come up with any minimum rights. 656 
Of specific interest is the question of whether an applicant may remain 
on the territory of a Member State until a final decision has been taken. In 
this question, the Resolution replicates the restrictive innovations in the 
domestic legislation of the Member States.657 At the outset, it reaffirms the 
suspensive effect of an application in paragraph 2: 
In order to ensure effectively the principle of "non-refoulement", 
no expulsion measure will be carried out as long as no decision has 
been taken on the asylum application. 658 
In paragraph 17, this protection is extended to the appeal stage, but 
deference is made to more restrictive domestic legislation: 
Until a decision has been taken on the appeal, the general principle 
will apply that the asylum-seeker may remain in the territory of 
the Member State concerned. Where the national law of a Member 
State permits a derogation from this principle in certain cases, the 
asylum-seeker should at least be able to apply to the bodies referred 
to in paragraph 8 (court or independent review authority) for leave 
to remain in the territory of the Member State temporarily during 
procedures before those bodies, on the grounds of the particular 
655 Paras 10-1and13-6 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
656 European Commission, Towards Common Standards on Asylum Procedure, 3 March 
1999, SEC(1999) 271 final [hereinafter Asylum Procedures Proposal], p. 8, para. 12. 
657 The relevant provisions seem to be tailor made to accommodate the reformed German 
asylum law, adopted two years earlier. See Noll, 1997a, pp. 425 and 428 on the non-
suspensive effect of appeal against deportation to safe third countries in the German 
legislation. 
658 See also para. 12 Asylum Procedures Resolution: 'As long as the asylum application has 
not been decided on, the general principle applies that the applicant is allowed to remain 




circumstances of his case; no expulsion may take place until a 
decision has been taken on this application. 
The very core of the suspensive effect of appeal is to be found in the 
second sentence of the quoted paragraph: even if domestic law permits 
removal before the appeal is decided on in its totality, the protection 
seeker always enjoys suspension from removal until her application for 
leave to remain is decided on. However, the rather confusing language of 
the provision-not to mention the legal character of the whole 
instrument-is all too vague to provide effective protection. Connecting 
the verb 'should' to a stay of deportation approximates this paragraph to a 
devout plea. 
This minimum form of protection from removal also applies to 
applications considered manifestly unfounded in accordance with 
paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Asylum Procedures Resolution. Both 
paragraphs allow for exceptions from the 'principle in paragraph 17'-
which refers to its first sentence. But neither paragraph 21 nor 22 touch 
upon the very core of paragraph 17-its second sentence. As Terlouw and 
Boeles rightly assert659 , an application for suspensive effect submitted to a 
review body shall entail non-removal even in cases considered to be 
manifestly unfounded. This applies also to cases where the asylum 
application is filed at the border.660 It is deeply troubling that the 
European Commission circulates a commentary on the Asylum 
Procedures Resolution among candidate countries that states precisely the 
opposite. 661 
The Asylum Procedures Resolution also introduces specific provisions 
for applications filed at the border of Member States. Curiously, the 
659 For a comprehensive argumentation, see A. Terlouw and P. Boeles, 'Minimum 
Guarantees for Asylum Procedures', in B. G. Tahzib, C. A. Groenendijk, M. 
Vreugdenhill-Klap, and]. M. van de Put (eds), Democracy, Migrants and Police in the 
European Union: The 1996 JGC and Beyond (1997, FORUM, Utrecht), pp. 99-100, 
involving para. 19 into their contextual interpretation. 
660 The specific provisions in the Asylum Procedures Resolution on applications filed at the 
border have generated some confusion on this point (para. 24 in particular). However, 
the second sentence of para. 17 also applies to cases falling under para. 24. Terlouw and 
Boeles, 1997, p. 101. 
661 European Commission, Commentary on the Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for 
Asylum Procedures, reprinted in van Krieken, 2000, pp. 233-44, at pp. 242-3. There is no 
mention made of Terlouw and Boeles' analysis in the commentary, and the Commission 
does not even attempt to support its reading with some form of analysis. 
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Resolution exempts the body processing such applications from some of 
the procedural requirements valid in all other cases.662 This may lead to 
the qualitative downgrading of the processing of protection claims in 
border situations. Moreover, in the interest of expediency, those cases 
considered as manifestly unfounded are exempted from the requirement 
that appeal to an independent court should be provided for. 663 Finally, in 
derogation from a general rule prescribing a written communication of 
decisions on asylum applications664, rejections of applications considered 
manifestly unfounded and applications filed at borders need only be 
communicated orally.665 The numerous possibilities for exceptions and 
deferrals have given rise to concern among observers. 666 
While the Asylum Procedures Resolution features rudimentary 
minimum standards to protect women and unaccompanied minors667, the 
needs of the latter group are more comprehensively addressed in the non-
binding 
o Resolution of 26 June 1997 on unaccompanied minors who are 
nationals of third countries668 
The Resolution enshrines the right to apply for asylum enjoyed by 
unaccompanied minors, and regulates their representation during 
procedures, the assessment of their age and their placement during 
procedure. 669 Moreover, the instrument contains specific rules on hearing 
662 Para. 25 provides that exception may be made from para. 17 in cases where the host third 
country is applicable. Para. 17, in tum, reads: 'The authorities responsible for border 
controls and the local authorities with which asylum applications are lodged must receive 
clear and detailed instructions so that the applications, together with all other 
information available, can be forwarded without delay to the competent authority for 
examination'. It is not clear which of the requirements in para. 7 may be derogated from. 
Terlouw and Boeles, 1997, p. 102. 
663 Para. 19 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
664 This requirement is enshrined in para. 15 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
665 Paras 22 and 25 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
666 'The psychological effect of these exceptions[ ... ] is the promotion of disrespect for basic 
principles.' Terlouw and Boeles, 1997, p. 103. 
667 See paras 26 and 27 Asylum Procedures Resolution. 
66\l OJ (1997) C 221, pages 23 to 27, [hereinafter Unaccompanied Minors Resolution]. 
669 An. 4 Unaccompanied Minors Resolution. 
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the unaccompanied minor670 and reaffirms the validity of non-refoulement 
rules under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the ECHR and the CA T671 • 
All of the four instruments suffer from a substantial shortcoming-the 
lack of binding force. This shortcoming is equally detrimental for the 
Union and for the single protection seeker. The harmonisation effect 
brought about by the four instruments is insufficient, and they cannot be 
invoked in defence of a protection seeker ex"posed to domestic practices 
undercutting the stated rights. Another criticism directed against the 
procedural acquis, as it stands today, is its comprehensive deference to 
domestic law.672 Finally, the procedural acquis is far from complete; 
important areas, such as the standard of proof required for a positive 
decision, have not been addressed. The Commission has drawn up a list of 
shortcomings, the details of which will be presented in the concluding 
sub-section. 
6.2 The Spanish Protocol 
At the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam, the Spanish 
delegation proposed an instrument qualifying Member States as safe 
countries of origin. 673 This move has to be seen against the background of 
a protracted Spanish-Belgian conflict involving asylum claims by Basque 
separatists in Belgium. In spite of protestations by UNHCR and NGOs, 
Member States agreed on a specific instrument to this effect.674 Upon its 
670 Ibid. 
671 Art. 5 Unaccompanied Minors Resolution. 
672 Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999, p. 399. 
673 One should note that the ground for this proposal was prepared two years earlier in para. 
20 of the non-binding Asylum Procedures Resolution: 'The Member States observe that, 
with due regard for the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, there should be no de facto 
or de jure grounds for granting refugee status to an asylum applicant who is a national of 
another Member State. On this basis a particularly rapid or simplified procedure will be 
applied to the application for asylum lodged by a national of another Member States, in 
accordance with each Member State's rules and practice, it being specified that the 
Member States continue to be obliged to examine individually every application for 
asylum, as provided by the Geneva Convention to which the Treaty on European Union 
refers'. 
674 For an interesting account of the comprehensive diplomatic manoeuvres preceding the 
adoption of this instrument and the marginalisation of UNHCR's comments in the 
process, see Landgren, 1999, pp. 8-22. 
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adoption, the 'Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the 
European Union'675 was annexed to the TEC. Within the framework of 
European integration, this instrument is unique, insofar as the Member 
States consciously place their own citizens in a less favourable position 
than citizens of third states, raising claims of discriminatory treatment. 676 
This runs counter to the legislative leitmotiv of the foundational treaties, 
which seeks to promote integration through entitlement. 
The sole article of the Spanish Protocol merits quoting in full: 
Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
by the Member States of the European Union, Member States shall 
be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in respect of 
each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum 
matters. Accordingly, any application for asylum made by a 
national of a Member State may be taken into consideration or 
declared admissible for processing by another Member State only 
in the following cases: 
(a) if the Member State of which the applicant is a national 
proceeds after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
availing itself of the provisions of Article 15 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to 
take measures derogating in its territory from its obligations under 
that Convention; 
(b) if the procedure referred to in Article F.1(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union has been initiated and until the Council takes a 
decision in respect thereof; 
(c) if the Council, acting on the basis of Article F.1(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, has determined, in respect of the 
Member State which the applicant is a national, the existence of a 
serious and persistent breach by that Member State of principles 
mentioned in Article F(l); 
(d) if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of 
the application of a national of another Member State; in that case 
the Council shall be immediately informed; the application shall be 
dealt with on the basis of the presumption that it is manifestly 
675 Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union, annexed to 
the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
6October1997, Doc. No. CONF 4007/97, TA/P/en 24 [hereinafter Spanish Protocol]. 
676 See chapter 12.3 below for a separate analysis of the discrimination claim with regard to 
the Spanish Protocol. 
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unfounded without affecting in any way, whatever the cases may 
be, the decision-making power of the Member State. 
It is not easy to make sense of this construction, which might be explained 
by the conflict of intentions underpinning the drafting process. First, the 
instrument sets out with a general rule that an asylum application in a 
Member State filed by the national of another Member State will not be 
processed, save for four exceptional cases. Three of these-paragraphs (a) 
to (c)-define the circumstances during which the presumption of safety is 
lifted. It is noteworthy that these circumstances are strictly formalised and 
hinge on either a derogation of rights under the ECHR by the Member 
State of origin or on proceedings on the basis of Article 7 (1) TEU 
(formerly Article F.1, as referred to in the text of the Spanish Protocol). 
Regarding the latter provision, critics have rightly questioned whether the 
Council's 'politically charged and cumbersome sanctioning procedures 
will in fact be sensitive enough to identify persecution where it is at an 
individual level'. 677 
Second, sub-paragraph (d) seems to restore the decision-making power 
of the Member State with which asylum is sought, obliterating the 
complex procedures set out in the preceding sub-paragraphs. However, 
this power is bought at the price of notifying the Council and at an 
automatic relegation of the claim to the category of 'manifestly un-
founded claims'. 
The Spanish Protocol is a binding instrument and forms an integral 
part of the Treaty.678 What exactly is the bottom line of the obligation 
Member States have taken upon themselves when adopting it? The answer 
lies in the last sub-paragraph. Any Member State can process an 
application falling under the ambit of the Spanish Protocol, regardless of 
the criteria given in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c). But where it does, it has to 
inform the Council and to process such a claim on the presumption that it 
is manifestly unfounded. 
677 ECRE, Analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam in so far as it relates to asylum policy, 10 
November 1997, p. 9. The criticism voiced by ECRE touches upon a more principal 
level: 'But of course the main threat of the Protocol is one of principle, as it set a very 
bad precedent for other regions of the world, linking the legal right to asylum to the 
political and economic alliance of neighbouring countries'. Ibid. 
678 This flows from Art. 311 TEC. 
226 
ACCESS TO PROCEDURES 
Through the Spanish Protocol, the Council sends out two messages. The 
first is that Union citizens have no reason to seek asylum. Suffice it here 
to note that such a message is structured as a liar's paradox. The second is 
that those Union citizens disloyal enough to seek asylum within the 
Union will he sanctioned with procedural disentitlement, as far as it is 
within the power of the Member States. This is not to claim that the 
Member States, when deliberating the Spanish Protocol, actually reasoned 
in terms of betrayed personal loyalty. However, one cannot help but read 
the outcome as a sanctioning of the unfaithful. To conclude, the Spanish 
Protocol endows Union citizenship with a Janus face. While Union 
citizenship was originally conceptualised as a benefit by the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Spanish Protocol adds the dimension of a fetter to it, impeding 
the full enjoyment of human rights by the unfaithful. It is all the more to 
be lamented that the European Commission endorses this perspective 
when excluding Member State nationals from the personal scope of a 
proposed burden-sharing scheme. 679 
Finally, the enlargement process sheds its own light on the Spanish 
Protocol. With Turkey, one of the main refugee-producing countries in 
Europe is applying for membership in the European Union. Certainly the 
accession process possesses considerable leverage, and may indeed trigger 
comprehensive improvements in the human rights records of candidate 
countries. Yet the conversion from a main producer of displacement into 
a safe country of origin is an enormous task. With all due respect for the 
human rights leverage of the enlargement process, it is by no means clear 
that Membership will wait until the very moment all forms of persecution 
and violations have been abolished. With enlargement essentially being a 
tit-for-tat business, the risk of politicising and bartering human rights 
protection is far from merely hypothetical. 
6.3 Competencies after Amsterdam 
With the Amsterdam Treaty, competencies in the procedural field have 
been moved over to the first pillar. Pursuant to Article 63 (1) (cl) TEC, 
'minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or 
withdrawing refugee status' shall be adopted within the transitional period 
679 See chapter 8.3.6 on the ERF proposal below. Member State nationals do not qualify as 
'refugees' or 'displaced persons' under Article 2 of this proposal. 
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of five years. The Action Plan on the Implementation of the Amsterdam 
Treaty gives the exercise of this competence higher priority, and states 
that minimum standards should be adopted within two years of the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.680 
Hitherto, the issue of which reception standards protection seekers are 
entitled to during procedures has not been addressed by the existing 
acquis. The Treaty of Amsterdam put the issue of reception during 
procedure on the agenda of the EC institutions by assigning them to 
adopt minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member 
States within the transitional period of five years. The Action Plan gives 
the institutions two years to achieve this goal.681 Today, reception 
standards vary widely among Member States682, and it is feared that this 
will create unwanted secondary movements by scheming protection 
seekers.683 But even from the perspective of the protection seeker the 
situation is unsatisfactory, as her basic living conditions fluctuate greatly 
depending on which country she is allocated to. 
While the latter competence has not been made use of at the time of 
writing, the process based on the former has started. In 1999, the 
European Commission initiated discussions on the drafting of an 
instrument stipulating minimum procedural standards. 684 Its proposal 
offers no specific draft text, but draws the attention of the institutions to 
topical issues, which a future instrument should address. In many aspects, 
the proposal highlights the shortcoming of the existing acquis. In line 
with an earlier Communication put forward by the Commission, such an 
instrument is proposed to take a binding form 'to ensure legal certainty 
for both asylum applicants and Member States'.685 The Commission 
points out that two approaches offer themselves-either a harmonisation 
680 Action Plan Amsterdam, para. 36 (b) (iii). 
681 Action Plan Amsterdam, para. 36 (b) (v, 
682 For a detailed overview, see Liebaut and Hughes, 1997; and IGCARMP, 1997. A synoptic 
table is available on p. 447 of the latter publication, suggesting that, in particular, the 
right to work, Lu right to social assistance and the right to housing vary considerably 
among the ten 1v.:::mber States · 1uded in the survey. 
683 Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 199'.·, fl· 399. 
684 European Commission, Towards Common Standards on Asylum Procedure, 3 March 
1999, SEC(1999) 271 final [hereinafter Asylum Procedures Proposal]. 
685 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 3, para. 3, referring to the 1994 Communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament on immigration and asylum policies, COM (94) 23 
final, Brussels 23 February 1994, paras 86-90. 
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establishing an obligatory minimum set of rules, and the possibility to opt 
in on measures accelerating procedures, or an all-out-integration, 
prescribing a single European asylum procedure.686 Given the two-year 
time frame stipulated by the Action Plan, the Commission proposes to act 
on the former approach, without excluding the latter 'in the slightly 
longer term'.687 In the eyes of the Commission, the existing acquis 'can be 
viewed as the first steps towards common minimum standards on asylum 
procedures'.688 However, these first steps have apparently been taking a 
questionable direction, as the Commission deems it fit to draw several 
parts of the acquis into question. 'The Commission takes the view that it 
will be necessary to revisit some of the concepts and principles found in 
the soft law and to propose the removal of some of the exceptions and 
derogations which weaken these instruments. ' 689 After initial observations 
on the scope of a future instrument, the Commission shares its critical 
reflections on the existing acquis with the reader. 
With regard to the Dublin Convention, the Commission notes the 
absence of procedural safeguards for the allocation process and believes 
that such should be included in a binding legal instrument.690 The 
Commission also criticises the inadequate separation of formal and 
substantial grounds for rejecting a claim in the MUA Resolution. In the 
opinion of the Commission, an 'admissibility procedure' should be 
restricted to determining whether Member States shall consider an 
application in substance, or whether the applicant should be reallocated to 
another Member State or to a safe third country.691 Furthermore, the 
Commission underscores that the practices of Member States with regard 
to the concept of safe third countries vary significantly. In this respect, the 
Commission would find a clarification of the following issues useful: the 
need for contacts between Member State and the safe third country, the 
availability of an effective remedy in the third country, the obligation to 
reassess the qualification of a third country as safe in the individual case, 
686 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 7, para. 9. 
687 Ibid. 
688 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 7, para. 10. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 8, para. 12. 
691 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 9, para. 13. 
229 
CHAPTER 6 
the scope for common assessments of third countries as safe and the 
application of the concept in situations of 'mere transit' .692 
While the Commission acknowledges that procedures should be sped 
up to avoid both uncertainty for the individual and the abuse of 
procedures to prolong the presence of people not in need of protection, it 
warns that the basic safeguards laid down in the Asylum Procedures 
Resolution cannot be reduced. Therefore, 'this issue should be approached 
from the starting point of increasing efficiency rather than weakening 
existing safeguards'. 693 Streamlining the working practices of decision-
making bodies is proposed, but also a simplified two-tier asylum 
procedure.694 The latter impacts clearly on the legal safeguards enjoyed by 
the protection seeker and goes to show that the Commission would accept 
a watering down of domestic safeguards for the sake of increasing speed-a 
scenario very much in contrast to its quoted intention. 
The Commission furthermore questions the usefulness of the one-
month time limit for taking initial decisions695 set by the MUA 
Resolution, which has proven to be 'over ambitious [sic] and unrealistic in 
many cases'.696 'The imposition of a time limit', states the Commission, 
'does not in itself provide Member States with a tool to reduce the 
duration of the asylum procedure'. 697 Rather, it is suggested to focus on 
the adequate provision of resources to decision-making bodies, and to 
ensure efficient working practices.698 The acquis left unaddressed such 
important elements as repeat applications and standards of proof, and the 
introduction of European legislation on this point should be considered.699 
On the acquis regarding manifestly unfounded applications, the 
Commission is rather outspoken. First, it considers it inadequate to term 
such applications as manifestly unfounded, stating that it is 'inaccurate to 
describe a case as manifestly unfounded whilst the procedures to 
determine whether or not the case is well founded are still in operation'.700 
692 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 9, para. 14. 
693 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 10, para. 15. 
694 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 10, paras 16-7. 
695 See note 628 above. 
696 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 11, para. 18. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 11, paras 19-20. 
700 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 12, para. 21. 
230 
ACCESS TO PROCEDURES 
Second, the procedural consequences of applying the concept must be 
specified to a higher degree. Finally, the Commission calls for a re-
consideration of placing issues of credibility and exclusion from refugee 
status respectively in the bracket of manifestly unfounded cases. 701 A clear 
distinction between manifestly unfounded cases falling under the concept 
of safe third countries and other manifestly unfounded cases, where 
substantial elements of an application are examined, is called for. 702 
With regard to the concept of safe countries of origin, the Commission 
underscores that the relevant qualification practices vary widely between 
Member States. The Commission proposes a review of the concept, 
including the option to abolish it altogether.703 The Commission also 
reflects on a further elaboration of the protection yielded to vulnerable 
groups (such as women and children), and recommends that existing 
safeguards shall be built upon further. Specifically, it should be considered 
whether dedicated provisions for torture victims and victims of sexual 
violence should be drawn up.704 Finally, the Commission states that it is 
not warranted to regulate the issue of cancellation in a future instrument, 
but insists that an extension of safeguards relating to cessation should be 
considered.705 
Given its insistence on a clear-cut separation of formal and material 
aspects when singling out cases for accelerated procedures, one would 
have expected the Commission to criticise a further aspect of the MUA 
Resolution. We recall that this instrument includes the availability of an 
internal flight alternative in the list of cases considered to be manifestly 
unfounded.706 As this remains a matter of individual assessment, involving 
material issues of each single case, it is astonishing that the Commission 




703 Asylum Procedures Proposal, pp. 12-3, para. 22. 
704 Asylum Procedures Proposal, p. 13, para. 23. 
705 Asylum Procedures Proposal, pp. 13-4, para. 24. 




Essentially, the existing acquis in the area of procedures is unfit to bridge 
the gap between Member States' determination practices. This is due not 
only to the non-binding nature of the central instruments comprising the 
acquis but also to the idiosyncrasies contained in them. The sole binding 
instrument on procedures, namely the Spanish Protocol, adds further to 
these idiosyncrasies and must be rated as a particularly badly drafted 
instrument. For the pursuit of particularist interests, its impact is largely 
symbolic, as the number of asylum applications falling under it are 
negligible. Acting as a political dam-breaker, it may very well lead other 
regions of the world to adopt similar exclusionary orders. 
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the EU acquis 
THE RULES REGULA TING ACCESS to material protection are the 
final filtering device in protection systems. Such protection may take 
many forms, ranging from formal refugee status under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention to de facto toleration. This chapter deals with two different 
manifestations of protection. One is the formal granting of some form of 
protected status; the other is mere non-return. Thus we shall proceed in 
two steps. First, those parts of the acquis that have an impact on the 
granting of a formal protection status shall be scrutinised. Second, we shall 
look into norms of the acquis regulating the return of rejected protection 
seekers. 
7.1. Protection Categories 
Rationally, one would expect that all Member States should answer the 
questions 'who is a refugee?' or 'who is a beneficiary of extraterritorial 
protection?' in roughly the same manner. Three reasons support such an 
expectation. 
First, all Member States are State Parties to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, to the ECHR and to CAT. To be sure, the paramount 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _008
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importance of landmark instruments in the field has been acknowledged 
by the EU Council, when it made clear that the 1951 Convention as well 
as the 1967 Protocol are part of the EU acquis in the fields of Justice and 
Home Affairs. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has 
been endowed the same status; accession to it now forms a precondition 
for the admittance of candidate countries into the Union. Protocols Nos 
4, 6 and 7 to the ECHR also form part of the acquis, but merely on a non-
obligatory basis.707 
The 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol and the ECHR have 
been qualified as 'inseparable from the realisation of the Union's 
objectives', and, consequently, states aspiring for Union membership must 
have acceded to them before admission.708 Their guiding function has also 
been acknowledged in a number of instruments pertaining to the acquis as 
well as in the foundational treaties.709 Identical legal obligations under 
international law, one would believe, should lead to largely converging 
protection categories. 
Second, a requirement of harmonisation also flows from the operation 
of the Dublin Convention. As expounded above, this instrument denies a 
claimant the possibility of choosing between different countries of asylum 
in the EU. From the perspective of the claimant, predictability and 
equality in treatment requires that Member States operate protection 
categories under international law with an identical material scope.710 
7w It should be noted though, that the ECHR and its protocols do not figure under the 
heading of asylum in the Draft List of the acquis, but rather under the less specific 
heading of human rights. Draft List, p. 31, para. XII. A. b. and D. Protocols 4, 6 and 7 to 
the ECHR are considerered as 'instruments which have not all been signed and/ or 
ratified by all Member States, and the Member States are not mutually bound to ratify 
them, although in the case of some of them there is a political commitment by their 
Governments to initiate the internal process of ratification. States applying to join the 
European Union should endeavour to become parties to these Conventions on the same 
basis as the Member States'. Ibid., Introduction. Protocol 6 is of special interest in this 
context, as it contains a provision on the abolishment of the death penalty in Art. 1. See 
also Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration on the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, CONF 4007/97, AF/TA/en2. 
708 Draft List, p. 7, para. I. A. b. 
70'J See Art. 63 (1) TEC, Art. 6 (2) TEU. 
710 This was acknowledged in a discussion paper on subsidiary protection prepared by the 
Danish delegation for the EU Council. Note by the Danish delegation to the Migration 
and Asylum Working Parties, 'Subsidiary Protection', Doc. No. 6746/97 ASIM 52 (17 
March 1997). 
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Third, a high degree of convergence would also flow from a purely 
theoretical point of view. The rationale of harmonised protection 
categories is to counter an evolving market mechanism, where states 
compete for minimised reception by means of restricting the categories of 
beneficiaries. Such competition would be detrimental not only for persons 
in need of protection, but also for the interest of those Member States 
whose burden of reception is increased by their more successful 
competitors. 
For all these reasons, it is hardly surprising that the Commission's 1994 
Communication on Asylum and Immigration Policy identified three 
subjects of harmonisation. The first is the refugee definition, the second 
relates to 'policies concerning those who cannot be admitted as refugees, 
but whom Member States would nevertheless not require to return to 
their country of origin in view of the general prevailing situation in that 
country' and the third to temporary protection. 711 
However, reality defies theory. In the Union, protection categories are 
far from being harmonised. The most striking indications are delivered by 
statistics on recognition rates. Among Member States, recognition rates 
for Convention refugee status range between 0.7 percent (Finland) to 29.6 
percent (Italy) in 1998.712 This is astonishing, as the beneficiaries of this 
status have been defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention.713 Adding 
recognitions under humanitarian status to those for Convention refugees, 
the percentages stretch from 5.3 (Austria) to 54.5 (Denmark).714 The term 
'humanitarian status' is not defined in international law, which makes the 
divergence among Member States somewhat easier to explain. 
Still, these divergences may also stem from the fact that different 
Member States are confronted with different groups of protection seekers. 
Within these groups, actual protection needs can vary to a great extent. 
Naturally, this may result in diverging recognition rates. Therefore, let us 
narrow our perspective and look at the recognition rates of a specific 
711 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM/1994/23Final, 23 
February 1994, p. 42, paras 6, 8 and 9. 
m UNHCR, 1999, p. 72. 
713 In a survey including inter alia ten EU Member States, it emerged that Germany and the 
Netherlands had not incorporated the refugee definition in Art. 1 (A) (2) GC into their 
domestic legislation. See IGCARMP, 1997, p. 437. 
714 UNHCR, 1998 Statistical Overview, p. 73. 
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group throughout the Union. The aggregate numbers of asylum appli-
cations in Europe in the period 1989-98 show that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia takes the top position among countries of origin.715 The 
recognition percentages of Yugoslav citizens granted Convention status or 
granted humanitarian status between 1989 and 1998 vary by some fifty 
percent among Member States. While Spain takes the bottom position 
with an overall recognition rate of 3.1 percent, Finland tops the list, 
recognising 53 percent of all applicants under one of the named statuses. 
Shifting protection needs within the group of Yugoslav asylum applicants 
can account for certain differences among recognition rates, but hardly for 
differences of such magnitude. Therefore, it must be concluded that the 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the protective scope 
of humanitarian status in domestic law vary to a substantial degree among 
Member States.n6 
With regard to the interpretation of the refugee definition, this 
conclusion has been confirmed by comparative research on Member 
States' domestic approaches.717 According to the most recent study, the 
internal law of the Member States diverges with regard to the origins of 
persecution, the phenomenon of 'refugies sur place', the relationship of 
the subjective and the objective element in the Convention definition and 
the understanding of its five grounds of persecution.718 
Drawing on the three reasons for convergence developed above, and 
developing the insights of the Commission further, one may state the 
following. A successful harmonisation of protection categories needs to 
fulfil three basic requirements: it has to be all-encompassing, binding and 
precise. It will not do to harmonise some categories, while leaving others 
to the free interplay of forces. Therefore, in line with the Commission's 
715 The following percentages are calculated on the basis of statistics made available in 
UNHCR, 1999, pp. 82-4. 
716 The question why recognition rates differ may be explained in part by the consequences 
of non-recognition. In some Member States, the probability of removal upon non-
recognition is rather high; in others, it is lower. It is reasonable to assume that the 
probability of removal impacts on the mind-set of the decision-maker. Thus, return 
policies and recognition rates must be analysed together. 
717 See inter alia Carlier, Vanheule, et al., 1997 and M. Wolter, Auf dem Weg zu einem 
gemeinschaftlichen Asylrecht in der Europaischen Union. Rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung des 
materiellen Asylrechts der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf eine Vergemeinschaftung der 
Materie (1999, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden). 
718 Wolter, 1999, p. 536. 
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1994 Communication, the harmonisation of categories has to cover not 
only the 1951 Refugee Convention, but also subsidiary protection and 
temporary protectiOn. Furthermore, any legal instrument purporting to 
create uniform definitions of beneficiaries must be formally binding as 
such. And, finally, the categories defined in it need also to be sufficiently 
concrete and devoid of any deference to national law in order to be 
effective. 
7.1.1 The EU Acquis Related to Protection Categories: 
Questions of Scope 
How has the harmonisation process handled the divergence of protection 
categories in the EU? Starting out with the Convention refugee category, 
an attempt to come to terms with the disparity in interpretation among 
Member States was made in 1996 with the non-binding 
o Joint Position Defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application 
of the definition of the term 'Refugee' in Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees.719 
The very existence of the Refugee Joint Position is evidence that Member 
States wish to avoid an evolving spiral of restriction in defining refugees. 
It is all the more lamentable that this effort has to fail even on purely 
formal grounds. A mere look at paragraph 3 in the preamble confirms 
that Member States were not in a position to revamp their domestic 
asylum systems for the sake of harmonisation: 
This joint position is adopted within the limits of the 
constitutional powers of the Governments of the Member States; it 
shall not bind the legislative authorities or affect decisions of the 
judicial authorities of the Member states. 
719 OJ (1996) L 63, p. 2. 
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Whatever the mandatory force of a Joint Position may be, this paragraph 
clearly indicates the non-binding nature of the definitional efforts en-
shrined in the instrument.720 
The acquis does not contain an instrument harmonising the category of 
subsidiary protection.721 Moreover, the discourse on temporary protection 
has indicated that Member States have been reluctant to define categories 
of beneficiaries of such an order. This reluctance is expressed quite 
unambiguously in the 'Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on 
Burden-Sharing with Regard to Admission and Residence of Displaced 
Persons on a Temporary Basis of 25 September 1995'.722 Its personal scope 
comprises various categories of vulnerable persons 'whom Member States 
are prepared to admit on a temporary basis under appropriate conditions 
in the event of armed conflict or civil war, including where such persons 
have already left their region of origin to go to one of the Member 
States'. 723 Clearly, these categories must be taken as mere examples 
without any definite character. The European Commission's proposal for 
a 'Joint Action on Temporary Protection' 724 uses the same technique of 
exemplifying rather than defining. Article 1 of this proposal contains a 
non-exhaustive list of beneficiary groups, at best serving inspirational 
purposes. Article 3 regulates how a temporary protection regime is 
initiated in a given situation. A relevant Council decision shall also 
determine the groups of beneficiaries. This solution may be characterised 
as an ad hoc harmonisation of protection categories. While it retains a 
great margin of discretion for Member States in picking and choosing 
categories of beneficiaries for a given Temporary Protection regime, 
Article 3 of the Proposal has the advantage of blocking the spiral of 
restriction for the period after the launching of the regime. 
no Apparently, the cited paragraph was inserted on the initiative of the British and German 
delegations. See van der Klaauw, 1997a, p. 240. 
721 However, paragraph 4 of the 1997 Unaccompanied Minors Resolution acknowledges that 
the ECHR and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter CAT) may 
have a bearing on the removal of unaccompanied minors. 
722 OJ (1995) C 262/1. 
713 Ibid., Art. l(a). 
724 Amended proposal for a Joint Action concerning temporary protection of displaced 
persons (presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 189a(2) of the EC Treaty), 
COM(1998) 372 final/2, OJ (1998) C 268. 
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In conclusion, neither the requirement of all-encompassing harmonisation 
nor the requirement of bindingness has been satisfied hitherto. 
7 .1.2 The Substantial Content of the Refugee Joint Position 
Earlier; we identified definitional precision as a necessary ingredient in the 
project of harmonising protection categories. Let us now look at the sole 
achievement of category harmonisation, the Refugee Joint Position, and 
contemplate some of its material implications. Indeed, the Refugee Joint 
Position is a comprehensive instrument, albeit it generally maintains a 
rather high level of abstraction. It contains norms on the individual or 
collective determination of refugee status, the establishment of evidence, 
the content of the term 'persecution', the origins of persecution and the 
grounds underlying it, relocation within the country of origin, the 
phenomenon of becoming a refugee sur place, conscientious objection and 
related practices, as well as cessation and exclusion clauses. 
Fully in line with its non-binding nature, the harmonising effect of the 
Joint Position has been low. None of the Member States has amended its 
legislation, with the exception of Sweden, which amended it along its own 
statement for the Council minutes, made in connection with the adoption 
of the Refugee Joint Position.725 In the 1998 Council Survey, Member 
States also quote examples where their law or practice maintains more 
inclusive positions than those offered by the Refugee Joint Position. 726 It 
must be recalled that the stark divergence in recognition rates quoted 
earlier was based on the 1998 statistics.727 This divergence mirrors a 
situation as it existed two years after the adoption of the Refugee Joint 
Position. 
At least with respect to two important issues, the Joint Position fails to 
offer sufficiently precise guidance. These issues happen to be of utmost 
practical importance for delimiting the scope of protection offered by the 
1951 Refugee Convention. One is the question of the extent to which the 
725 1998 Council Survey, p. 57. 
726 1998 Council Survey, pp. 58-9 and p. 65. France and Ireland do not apply the concept of 
an internal flight alternative, as related to in para. 8 of the Refugee Joint Position. 
Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Sweden profess to operate a broader concept of persecution 
by third parties. On the latter aspect, see text accompanying note 729 below. 
727 See text accompanying note 712 above. 
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1951 Refugee Convention offers protection to the victims of persecution 
by third parties.728 Given the increasing number of persecutory acts 
carried out by non-state actors, this issue is of enormous numerical 
importance. The other is the question of whether and when protection 
can be denied with reference to an internal flight alternative. 
When pondering this issue, the following situations must be kept apart: 
1. persecution by state agents; 
2. acquiescence by state agents of persecution carried out by non-state 
agents; and 
3. incapacity of state agents to hinder persecution carried out by non-
state agents. 
Cases of direct violations under the first and second category are rather 
unproblematic in tliis context, while the third category represents the 
focal point of the dispute on persecution by third parties. Precisely as in 
the second category, violations are committed by private actors. 
Differently from the second category, however, the state is simply unable 
to protect. In extreme cases, the inability to control is due to the 
vanishing of state structures altogether. 
A comparative analysis commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs concludes that for Canada, the U.K., Sweden, Italy, and 
the Netherlands' District Court governmental complicity in persecution 
is inessential, while the opposite is true for Germany, Switzerland, France 
and the Netherlands Council of State.729 
The Refugee Joint Position mirrors the difference in interpretation 
between individual Member States in a very graphic fashion. To start 
with, paragraph 5.2 of the Refugee Joint Position states that: 
Persecution by third parties will be considered to fall within the 
scope of the Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the 
grounds in Article lA, is individual in nature and is encouraged or 
728 See the criticism voiced in UNHCR, Expresses Reservation over EU Asylum Policy, 
Press Release, 24 November 1995; and in ECRE, Note from the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles on the Harmonization of the Interpretation of Article 1 of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, June 1995. 
729 B. Vermeulen, T. Spijkerboer, K. Zwaan and R. Femhout, Persecution by Tbird Parties 
(1998, University of Nijmegen/Centre for Migration Law, Nijmegen), p. 34. 
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permitted by the authorities. Where the official authorities fail to 
act, such persecution should give rise to individual examination of 
each application for refugee status, in accordance with national 
judicial practice, in the light in particular of whether or not the 
failure to act was deliberate. The persons concerned may be eligible 
in any event for appropriate forms of protection under national 
law. 
This wording was the result of a French compromise proposal, mediating 
between inclusionary and exclusionary positions. 730 It suggests de-
liberateness in state failure to act as the guiding criterion. Does this imply 
that persecution by third parties not 'permitted' by the state is excluded 
from the protective ambit of the 1951 Refugee Convention? One reading 
would be that such cases are indeed excluded. The establishment of a 
guiding criterion appears meaningless if free choice between inclusion 
under and exclusion from the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention was 
intended to continue. But it could also be argued that the wording does 
not expressly inhibit states to include such cases under the scope of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, the intention with paragraph 5.2 would 
be to include at least direct and indirect forms of state persecution. This 
interpretation would point to the phrase 'in accordance with national 
judicial practice' in the second sentence and 'in any event' in the third 
sentence as indicators of a discretionary margin. The fact that paragraph 
5.2 condones the existence of irreconcilable interpretations of the refugee 
definition is most problematic from an integration perspective. As a U.K. 
Court succinctly stated, the Refugee Joint Position is, indeed, an 
'agreement to disagree'.731 
However, one Member State felt the need to express that the third 
category may very well be included under the scope of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. In a statement for the Council Minutes, the Danish and 
Swedish delegations declared themselves to be 
of the opinion that persecution by third parties falls within the 
scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention where it is encouraged or 
permitted by the authorities. It may also fall within the scope of 
73° For the drafting history of the Refugee Joint Position, see Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, 
Zwaan and Femhout, 1998, pp. 31-2. 
731 U.K. Court of Appeal (Civil Division), R vs SSHD ex parte Adan and others, 23 July 1999, 
[henceforth Adan and others], para. 74. 
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the Convention in other cases, when the authorities prove unable 
to offer protection.732 
This manifest divergence explains the limited harmonisation potential of 
the Refugee Joint Position. It gives rise to concern, though, that a 
restrictive position gained entry into the document, while the inclusive 
position was relegated to a mere interpretatory statement. The least that 
can be said about the Refugee Joint Position is that it offers a presumption 
for the exclusion of cases under the third category. We will be compelled 
to return to the issue of persecution by third parties in a later chapter of 
this work. 733 
7.1.3 Competencies after Amsterdam 
Article 63 (1) (c) TEC provides an EC competence to harmonise the 
interpretation of the Convention refugee definition. It stipulates that, 
within five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the Council shall adopt: 
(1) measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties, within 
the following areas: 
[ ... ] 
(c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of 
nationals of third countries as refugees. 
The Action Plan merely confirms the time-frame of five years.734 It is 
worth noting that the wording limits the EC competency to 'nationals of 
third countries', thus amplifying the questionable exclusionary approach 
with regard to EU citizens taken in the Spanish Protocol. 
However, EC competencies are not exhausted with this entitlement. 
Article 63 (2) (a) TEC provides a legal basis for the Council to discuss the 
harmonisation of both subsidiary protection categories and temporary 
732 Statement for the Council minutes, attached to the Refugee Joint Position. 
733 See chapter 12.2.2 below. 
734 Action Plan, para. 38 (b) (i). 
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protection practices. This prov1s10n stipulates that the Council shall 
adopt, within the transitional period of five years, 
(2) measures on refugees and displaced persons within the 
following areas: 
(a) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to 
displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their 
country of origin and for persons who otherwise need 
international protection 
A careful reading indicates that this provision actually covers two groups 
for which certain minimum standards shall be devised.735 One would 
contain certain displaced persons from third countries. This group would 
be given temporary protection. The other group would consist of persons 
who otherwise need international protection. The protection to be 
accorded to them is not qualified in the quoted provision. The non-
binding Action Plan envisages that measures '[d]efining minimum 
standards for subsidiary protection to persons in need of international 
protection (Article 63(2) (a) second part)'736 shall be adopted by the 
Council within five years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. It should be noted that there is no express reference to the 
qualification of beneficiaries as in Article 63 (1) (c) TEC. Moreover, the 
Action Plan only alludes to standards enjoyed by the beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection, and is tacit on the issue of qualifying those 
beneficiaries. It could be argued that Article 63 (2) (a) TEC would allow 
for the EC institutions to adopt such a definition, without laying down an 
obligation to do so. 
As a consequence of a Danish initiative within the Council, a 
questionnaire on protection subsidiary to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
735 This reading is supported by the wording of the provision, which relates to 'minimum 
standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons [ ... ] and for persons who 
otherwise need international protection' (emphasis added). For a detailed argumentation 
drawing on the different language versions of the TEC, see G. Noll and J. Vedsted-
Hansen, 'Temporary Protection and Burden Sharing: Conditionalising Access, 
Suspending Refugee Rights?', in E. Guild and C. Harlow (eds), Implementing Amsterdam, 
Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (2000, Hart, Oxford), (page numbers were not 
available at the time of writing). 
736 Para. 38 (b) (ii) Action Plan. 
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has been circulated amongst Member States. 737 Moreover, a study on the 
same subject has been undertaken by the Secretariat of the Council.738 It is 
still too early to predict the outcome of this initiative. The Council is also 
preparing an instrument on temporary protection, which, however, 
largely relies on an ad-hoc determination of beneficiaries. Proposals 
discussed in 1999 suggest that no abstract definition is envisaged.739 
7 .1.4 Conclusion 
Harmonisation in the field of protection categories is neither 
comprehensive, nor binding, nor precise. The market dynamics tempting 
states to limit recognition under the relatively favourable Convention 
category remains largely unchecked. For the functional reasons 
expounded above, the present state of affairs is clearly dissatisfying, as 
continued divergence between protection categories may effectuate 
reception inequalities between Member States as well as protection 
differences for individuals. It follows that future co-operation needs to 
widen the scope of harmonisation from the refugee definition to other 
categories and has to be given a binding and concrete form devoid of 
exceptions. 
7.2 Return 
Throughout the last decade, individual Member States have sought ways 
and means to render their domestic return policies more effective. The 
domestic legislation of all Member States f ea tu res the principle that 
undocumented aliens-of which rejected protection seekers form a 
737 Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Migration and Asylum Working 
Parties, Summary of replies concerning the national instruments of protection falling 
outside the scope of the Geneva Convention-Subsidiary protection, Doc. No. 13667 /97 
ASIM 267 (6 January 1998). 
738 Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Migration and Asylum Working 
Parties, Study on the international instruments relevant to subsidiary protection, Doc. 
No. 10175/98 ASIM 178 (13 July 1998). 
739 One of the 1999 Council drafts suggests that it would be for the Council to decide 'the 
specific group of persons to which the temporary protection regime applies'. European 
Council, Draft Joint Action concerning temporary protection of displaced persons, 16 
February 1999, Doc. No. 5682/1/99 REV1, Art. 3 (3) (a). 
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fraction-ultimately are under an obligation to leave state territory. 
Beyond this convergence in principle, 'there is no uniform application of 
return policy'740 in the Union. 
The reasons for factual divergences among Member States are manifold. 
First, it must be recalled that the issue of return articulates itself 
differently in the individual member states. l'hose who have functioned as 
countries of destination for some time have been confronted with return 
issues for a longer period (e.g. Germany and the Scandinavian Member 
States) than those who have only recently shmed from the role of a transit 
to that of a destination state (e.g. Italy or Spait1.). The geographical 
situation, political ties to third countries and the existence of domestic 
immigrant communities may all impact upon the specifics of a Member 
State's return policy. Secondly, stringent retum practices require 
considerable financial, personal and organisational resources-either by 
creating incentives or by enforcing compliance. Allocating these resources 
is a matt~r of available means and political will. Member States differ in 
the amount of resources earmarked for return purposes. While all of them 
agree on the importance of return in the abstract, the degree of concrete 
political commitment is highly individual. 
One example is the negotiation of bilateral readmission agreements 
with countries of origin to render return more effectlve. While the use of 
these agreements is rather widespread amongst Member States, there are 
considerable differences as to the number of agreements negotiated, the 
countries targeted, the technical solutions chosen and the financial or 
other benefits linked to the conclusion of such agreements. 
So far, EU co-operation reflects an aspiration to increase harmonisation 
of return policies and practices. This can be derived from the impressive 
number of EU instruments related to return. However, these instruments 
have by no means created a harmonised Union-wide approach to return. 
Technically, the majority of irtstruments adopted are non-binding, and the 
monitoring of their implementation is undevdoped.741 A more 
740 State Secretary Cohen's Note on the Dutch Return Policy, Ministry of Justice [The 
Netherlands], 25 June 1999, section 1. 
741 Evaluating the asylum and immigration acquis achieved before Amsterdam, the Council 
has confirmed this criticism: 'However, the instruments adopted so far often suffer from 
two weaknesses: they are frequently based on "soft law", such as resolutions or 
recommendations that have no legally binding effect. And t~y do not have adequate 
monitoring arrangements'. Amsterdam Action Plan, para. 8. 
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comprehensive explanation would be that return is probably the most 
sensitive area in the construction of a state's demos. Hitherto, Member 
States have simply not been prepared to compromise their sovereignty in 
this respect. Thus, co-operation in the Council has not altered the array of 
diverging domestic practices among the Union's Member States. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the need for a co-ordinated 
approach to return has been consistently stressed within the EU 
framework. The Commission's 1994 Communication on Immigration 
and Asylum Policies identified the repatriat~on of those who are found to 
be in an irregular situation to be one of four key elements in the 
countering of illegal immigration.742 Although the Council has yet to 
adopt a strategy on migration and asylum issues, a recent position posits 
return as an important element of a comprehensive policy, underscoring 
the importance of expulsion, readmission agreements, voluntary return 
and reintegration.743 
Generally, in the return policies of destination states, five different 
considerations can be discerned, which will be briefly presented in the 
following. 744 A primary consideration of return policies is to ensure the 
individual's voluntary compliance with the obligation to leave the host 
country. Promotion of voluntary return ranges from simple measures 
informing on the situation in the country of origin to programmes 
involving financial assistance. Concerning the latter, states are usually 
anxious not to create unintended incentives, where return assistance 
would attract further migrants.745 
742 The other elements are the prevention of entry, the identification of persons illegally 
resident and the definition of minimum standards of treatment for such persons. 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, 23 February 1994, COM(94) 23 final, paras 
111-7. 
743 Council of the European Union, Guidelines for a European Migration Strategy, 1 June 
1999, Doc. No. 8815/99 ASIM 23, para. 28. 
744 For a comprehensive overview on the issue of return and a case study on Germany, see 
G. Noll, Responding to the Arrival of Arylum Seekers. Unsucessful Arylum Seekers-The 
Problem of Return (1998, Geneva), United Nations ACC Task Force on Basic Social 
Services for All (BSSA), Working Group on International Migration. 
745 See the sixth recital in the preamble to the Council of the European Union Decision of 
26 May 1997 on the exchange of information concerning assistance for the voluntary 
repatriation of third-country nationals, OJ (1997) L 147 /3: 'Whereas it should be avoided 
that such assistance leads to undesired incentive effects;[ ... ]'. 
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A second consideration for returning states is to devise measures 
responding to non-compliance with the obligation to leave under 
domestic law. Some of these measures are intended to secure the 
preconditions for removal; they include measures of identification (i.e. by 
means of fingerprinting, database checks or language tests), docu-
mentation (obligations to assist with travel document procurement), 
localisation (reporting obligations and detention) and, finally, the actual 
removal (expulsion orders and escorts). 
Disputes on nationality, delays in issuing travel documents or an 
outright denial of readmission by countries of origin may also inhibit 
efficient return practices. Thus, a third consideration of returning states is 
to ensure the co-operation of the country of origin. 
A fourth consideration is to secure the co-operation of third states in 
return operations. This may take the form of forming negotiating cartels 
to exert pressure on recalcitrant countries of origin. To give another 
example, returning states may also approach potential transit states lying 
en route on the migratory trajectory in _order to negotiate agreements on 
readm~ssion, or transit, or both. 
Finally, a fifth consideration for returning states is to secure a sustainable 
return. In the individual case, this means alleviating the pressures leading 
to renewed attempts of undocumented migration. The measures taken 
vary according to the nature of the emigration pressure. In a wider 
perspeetive, this mechanism compels returning states to take an increased 
interest in the realisation of civic and political as well as economic, social 
and cultural rights in countries of origin. Ultimately, the returning state 
assists in the protective tasks of the country of origin. 
In the following, we shall look into how these five considerations 
manifest themselves in the EU acquis as well as in the Schengen acquis. 
7 .2.1 The EU acquis Related to Return 
In the EU context, all five categories of return activities listed above have 
been the subject of continued intergovernmental deliberations. These have 
resulted in few binding and many non-binding norms. Let us now explore 
the return acquis along the structure of the five considerations. 
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Regarding the promotion of voluntary return, it is somewhat surprising that 
the Council did not bother to deal with the most dignified and least costly 
solution earlier than in 1997746, when it adopted the 
O Council Decision of 26 May 1997 on the exchange of information 
concerning assistance for the voluntary repatriation of third-
country nationals.747 
This Decision called for the collection of information on Member States' 
programmes supporting voluntary return for purposes of comparison and 
dissemination. 
The period from 1997 to and including 1999 saw the adoption of 
experimental instruments that made Community funds available on a 
yearly basis to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of displaced persons 
who have found temporary protection in the Member States and asylum-
seekers.748 Formally, these instruments were Joint Actions directed at the 
Community, and thus legally binding on it. Together with the 1997 
Decision, these Joint Actions stand out against the multitude of 
instruments dealing with implementation of return against the will of the 
individual. 
A considerable number of instruments deal with the second 
consideration of securing the preconditions of removal and actually carrying 
it out. From earlier discussion, we recall that the Dublin Convention 
contains an obligation for State Parties to readmit a rejected asylum seeker 
who has entered the territory of another State Party without being 
authorised to reside there, provided that it has not expelled the alien 
(Article 10 (e) DC). It should be noted that, so far, this norm is the only 
one in the whole EU asylum acquis that is legally binding upon Member 
States. Clearly, it provides an incentive for a consistent expulsion strategy, 
as State Parties want to avoid the responsibilities flowing from the 
obligation to readmit. 
746 Already in its 1994 Communication, the Commission had called for an approximation of 
voluntary return schemes, underscoring that such schemes are 'cost-effective, when 
compared with the costs of involuntary repatriation'. Communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament on immigration and asylum policies, COM (94) 23 final, 
Brussels 23 February 1994, 30, at para. 111. 
747 OJ (1997) L 147/3. 
748 For a detailed presentation, see chapter 8.3.5 below. See· also chapter 8.3.6 below on the 
funding of voluntary return projects through the proposed European Refugee Fund. 
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Moving on to non-binding instruments, we find that two 
Recommendations, namely the 
O Recommendation of 30 November 1992 regarding practices 
followed by Member States on expulsion749, and the 
O Recommendation of 1 June 1993 concerning checks on and 
expulsion of third-country nationals residing or working without 
authorization750, 
spell out the basic rule that persons found to have failed definitively in an 
application for asylum and to have no other claim to remain should be 
expelled, unless there are compelling reasons, normally of a humanitarian 
nature, for allowing them to remain. Two further instruments attempt to 
mitigate problems with travel document procurement. First, the 
O Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning the adoption 
of a standard travel document for the removal/ expulsion of third-
country foreign nationals751 
recommends Member States to make use of a one-way travel document to 
facilitate the expulsion of persons lacking the necessary travel docu-
ments.752 Second, the 
O Recommendation of 22 December 1995 on harmonizing means of 
combating illegal immigration and illegal employment and 
improving the relevant means of control753 
states that, in case an alien is, or is likely to be, detained before expulsion, 
the period of detention should be used to obtain the necessary travel 
documents for expulsion.754 
749 WGI 1266, reprinted in Guild and Niessen, 1996, p. 219, para. 2. 
750 WGI 1516, reprinted in Guild and Niessen, 1996, p. 275, para 1. 
751 OJ (1996) C 274/18. 
752 For a critical commentary, see Guild and Niessen, 1996, p. 388. 
753 OJ (1996) C 5/1. 
754 Ibid., para. 10. 
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In this area, important normative lacunae remain. Member States have 
largely failed to address issues related to the rights and interests of rejected 
asylum seekers. 755 By way of example, the tragic deportation incidents of 
1998 and 1999 have shown that the use of force is insufficiently regulated 
among Member States.756 After the three fatal incidents in connection 
with forcible removals, the 1 relevant Member States amended their 
guidelines unilaterally. Interestingly, border police authorities started to 
make contact with each other spontaneously to compare existing 
guidelines.757 A benevolent observer would find this to be a practical 
expression of the subsidiarity principle. However, one might also ask if a 
Council instrument on the use of force during deportation might have 
contributed to prevent the fatal incidents from happening. 
With regard to securing the co-operation of countries of origin, the 
existing acquis offers further non-binding norms, most of them in the area 
of readmission. The 
O Recommendation of 22 December 1995 of concerted action and 
cooperation in carrying out expulsion measures758 
states that Member States should implement specific mechanisms to 
improve the procurement of the necessary documentation from the 
consular authorities of the third state to which third-country nationals are 
755 This has been observed by the Commission in its 1994 Communication, where it 
recommended Member States to sign and ratify the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of their Families, 
adopted by GA Res. 45/158 (1990). This instrument has a bearing on the matter, as it also 
covers illegal migrant workers. Up to now, no Member State has followed this 
suggestion. 
756 On 22 September 1998, a rejected Nigerian asylum seeker, Ms. Semira Adamu, died of 
asphyxia, after Belgian police officers had pressed a cushion in her face during a 
deportation attempt at Brussels Airport. Less than half a year later, on 1 May 1999, Mr. 
Marcus Omofuma died during a deportation attempt by the Austrian authorities. His 
death was caused by suffocation; his mouth had been covered with adhesive tape and he 
had been tied to his passenger seat. Twenty-eight days later, a rejected Sudanese asylum-
seeker, Mr. Aamir Ageeb, died due to suffocation during a deportation attempt by 
German authorities. A full-faced motorcycle helmet had been placed on his head to 
prevent him form hurting others and himself, and a German border guard held down his 
head during take-off. 
757 Interview with Lieutnant Dirk Beersmans, Dutch Border Police, Zaventem, 6 August 
1999. 
758 OJ (1996) C 5/3. 
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to be expelled when they lack travel or identity documents.759 It should 
also be noted that the instruments of the acquis dealing with readmission 
agreements have a direct bearing on return of rejected protection seekers, 
as they also affirm and specify the obligation to take back one's own 
nationals. We recall that the Council has drafted a bilateral specimen 
agreement and guidelines for readmission protocols. Moreover, the 
insertion of readmission clauses into futu-l;'e mixed agreements and 
Community agreements plays an important role in the return process. 
These parts of the acquis have been presented earlier.760 
Finally, the creation of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and 
Migration (HL WG) in 1998761 has brought about an interesting 
institutional change impacting the area of return. The HL WG has been 
established as an integrated cross-pillar approach targeted at the situation 
in the most important countries of origin of asylum seekers and migrants. 
Its task is inter alia to identify these countries and to establish a plan 
concerning some of them.762 
Amongst the elements which could be part of such plans, the terms of 
reference name 
a) the insertion of readmission clauses in an association agreement or a 
mixed agreement or both,763 and 
b) the conclusion of an EC readmission agreement with the country in 
question.764 
Moreover, the HL WG has also been tasked to explore measures aimed at 
favouring voluntary return to the named countries.765 
759 Ibid. para. 1. 
760 See chapter 5.2.2.2 above. 
761 The HLWG was established by a Council Decision on 8 December 1998. See Council of 
the European Union, Terms of reference of the High Level Working Group on Asylum 
and Migration; preparation of action plans for the most important countries of origin and 
transit of asylum-seekers and migrants, 25 January 1999. 
762 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Albania and the neighbouring region, Morocco, Somalia and Sri 
Lanka have been selected for the preparation of an action plan. Council of the European 
Union, Terms of reference of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration; 
preparation of action plans for the most important countries of origin and transit of 
asylum-seekers and migrants, 25 January 1999, para. 3. 
763 Ibid, para. 1 (c) (v). 
764 Ibid, para 1 (c) (vi). 
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Concerning the co-operation of third states, it should be noted, first, that the 
whole array of EU instruments adopted in the field and the institution of 
the HL WG represent an effort to co-operate among the Member States. 
More specifically, provisions for the transit of removed persons through 
other Member States are made in the 
O Recommendation of 30 November 1992 regarding transit for the 
purposes of expulsion.766 
In addition, Member States are recommended to carry out expulsions, in 
appropriate instances, as a concerted effort with other Member States. 767 
An example of such co-operation is the exchange of information among 
Member States on available seats on expulsion flights. 
Another instrument is dedicated to the monitoring of the return 
acqms: 
O Decision of 16 December 1996 on monitoring the implementation 
of instruments adopted by the Council concerning illegal 
immigration, readmission, the unlawful employment of third 
country nationals and cooperation in the implementation of 
expulsion orders.768 
The fifth consideration of securing the sustainability of return has not yet 
spawned an instrument of its own. However, the terms of reference given 
to the HL WG indicate that this consideration could be integrated into the 
action plans regarding single countries of origin, which the group is tasked 
to draft. On a more general level, the efforts by the EU to promote 
human rights in third countries by means of its external relations should 
be named.769 
765 Ibid, para. 1 (c) (x). 
766 WGI 1266. Reprinted in Guild and Niessen, 1996, p. 239. 
767 Conclusion of 4 March 1996, note 600 above, at para. 6. 
768 OJ (1996) L 342/5. 
769 For an overview of EC support to democratic transition and human rights, see B. Simma, 
J.B. Aschenbrenner and C. Schulte, 'Human Rights Considerations in the Development 
Co-operation Activities of the EC', in P. Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human 
Rights (1999, OUP, Oxford), pp. 595-614. For a general analysis of the role of human 
rights in the external relations of the EU, see A. Clapham, 'Where is the EU's Human 
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7 .2.2 The Schengen acquis Related to Return 
The Schengen acquis adds a few elements, mainly related to securing co-
operation among Schengen states, to what has already been elaborated 
within the Union. The cornerstone is a binding norm: Article 23 SC spells 
out the principle that an alien without permission to stay on the territory 
of a State Party must leave the common territories without delay. The 
same provision obliges State Parties to expel such an alien. 77° Compared to 
the Dublin Convention, there is no 'responsibility principle' to the effect 
that Non-Schengen-nationals are transferred to a Schengen state con-
sidered to be responsible for their illegal presence. 771 In addition, the 
Schengen Convention comprises a comprehensive information exchange 
by means of the Schengen Information System (SIS), facilitating inter alia 
the identification of aliens illegally staying on the territories of State 
Parties. 772 
Apart from general affirmations on the importance of returnm, the 
Schengen Executive Committee has also agreed on specific forms of co-
operation. Through a 1998 Decision, the Schengen states agreed on a 
transit document to be used in connection with the expulsion of foreign 
nationals by air. 774 Another decision, taken the same year, attempts to 
Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How is it Manifested in Multilateral Fora?', in P. 
Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human Rights (1999, OUP, Oxford). 
770 Art. 23, para. 3 SC. 
771 Compare Art. 10 (e) DC. However, Art. 23 para. 2 DC makes an exception for those 
aliens admissible in other Schengen states: 'An alien who holds a valid residence permit 
or temporary residence permit issued by another Contracting Party must enter the 
territory of that Contracting Party without delay'. -At present, a Finnish draft 
Regulation is discussed in the Council, which aims at establishing readmission obligations 
between Member States for the readmission of third-country nationals. Initiative of the 
Republic of Finland with a view to the adoption of a Council Regulation determining 
obligations as between the Member States for the readmission of third-country nationals, 
7 December 1999, OJ {1999) C 353, pp. 6-9. 
772 Art. 38 SC. 
773 By way of example, the Decision of the Executive Committee of 27 October 1998 on the 
adoption of measures to fight illegal immigration calls for '[i]mmediate and systematic 
return of third-country nationals who have entered the Schengen States without 
authorization provided no right to stay exists and there are no obstacles based on 
compelling" humanitarian grounds or international law' in its para. 12. 
774 Schengen Executive Committee, Decision of the Executive Committee of 21 April 1998 




tackle difficulties in document procurement for the purposes of return 
caused by recalcitrant consulates of the country of origin in Schengen 
capitals. In such cases, Schengen states have agreed to make use of each 
others' ambassadors in the country of origin for mounting local pressure 
there.775 
7 .2.3 Competencies after Amsterdam 
Return is included in the legislative agenda set by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. According to Article 63 (3) (b) TEC, the Council shall adopt 
measures on 'illegal immigration and illegal residence, including 
repatriation of illegal residents' within the five-year transitory period.776 
According to the Action Plan on the Implementation of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the establishment of 'a coherent EU policy on readmission 
and return' should be achieved in an even shorter period, namely two 
years. 777 Furthermore, the Action Plan confirms that, within a five-year 
period, 'the possibilities for the removal of persons who have been refused 
the right to stay through improved EU co-ordination implementation of 
readmission clauses and development of European official (Embassy) 
reports on the situation in countries in origin'778 is to be improved. 
7 .2.4 Assessment of the EU acquis Related to Return 
The assessment of return policies is mainly hampered by the lack of 
coherent statistics. For many countries, relevant data are simply 
unavailable. This is all the more surprising, as return has been high on the 
agenda of asylum countries in the industrialised world. While the number 
of protection claims as well as recognitions under various categories are 
775 Schengen Executive Committee, Decision of the Executive Committee of 23 June 1998 
on measures to be taken in respect of countries posing problems with regard to the issue 
of documents required for expulsion from the Schengen territory, 23 June 1998. 
776 Art. 63 (3) (b) TEC. Measures adopted under this paragraph do not prevent Member 
States from maintaining or introducing national provisions that are compatible with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and with international agreements. 
777 Ibid., para. 36 (c) (ii). 
m Ibid., para. 38 (c) (i). 
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known and eagerly disseminated779, it remains largely obscure how many 
rejected claimants return voluntarily and how many move on to third 
countries.780 
Existing domestic statistics suffer from the absence of a coherent 
methodology, making Europe-wide comparisons impossible.781 However, 
neither the number of removals nor the number of voluntary departures 
tells us anything as such. To make sense, they have to be related to the 
total number of rejected protection seekers. Counting this group involves 
two problems. 
First, there is only a slim chance of specifying the number of those 
with whom the authorities do not maintain any contact. Have they left 
for another country? Have they remained in-country? Or did they return 
home? It is extremely difficult to estimate how many rejectees actually 
remain in the territory of the state where the determination procedure 
was carried out. 
Second, to provide a base for measuring the efficiency of control 
policies, only those whose removal is not inhibited by reasons related to 
protection must be counted. Let us take the example of a person whose 
asylurP claim has been rejected in Germany. Although this person is 
formally under an obligation to leave, he or she may still benefit from a 
stay of removal (Duldung). As a decision on stay of removal is based on 
considerations of protection, this person should not be counted in among 
the group of removables, as long as the decision on stay of removal 
remains valid. This example goes to show that the German statistics on 
undocumented migrants under an obligation to leave cannot be taken as 
data according to which actual departures can be measured. Before 
measuring actual departures, that is, categories that cannot be removed 
due to protection-related considerations must be subtracted. Otherwise, 
any assessment of efficiency will be distorted. 
This lack of information has been acknowledged in a strategy paper 
drafted by the EU presidency stating that 'the Union is still not able to 
779 For a compilation, see UNHCR, Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe in 1998: A 
Statistical Assessment with a Special Emphasis on Kosovo Albanians (1999, UNHCR, 
Geneva). 
780 This is acknowledged in a strategy document prepared by the Austrian Presidency for the 
K.4 Committee. Note by the Presidency to the K. 4 Committee, 'A Strategy for 
Migration and Asylum Policies', Doc. No. ASIM 170 (1July1998), at para. 72. 
781 In one country, the number of expulsions might relate to legal decisions, while another 
will count persons actually removed from its territory. 
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give accurate information regarding the number of third country nationals 
illegally on the territory of its Member States or exact details of asylum-
seekers and immigrants who have disappeared to an unknown 
destination'. 782 The absence of data is in stark contrast to the existing 
political rhetoric of return, taking for granted that the numbers are 
sufficiently high to call the credibility of the asylum system into question. 
By consequence, it is impossible to assess whether the measures taken by 
Member States hitherto are efficient or proportional to the importance of 
the problem. 
Apart from inquiring into the magnitude of the return problem, one 
might also ask whether the strategy taken by Member States is 
appropriate. To yield maximum effect, which actor should be targeted-the 
individual, the country of origin, or transit states? In other words, is it 
self-evident that the reluctance of the individual is at the core of the 
problem? Of course, the overall lack of statistics prohibits a generalised 
answer to this question. However, a look at domestic statistics allows us 
to derive some valuable indications. 
A recent paper by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior attempts to 
identify the scope of the return problem in the Netherlands.783 Indeed, the 
Netherlands is, in some respects, representative. It remains one of the 
most important destination countries for protection seekers in Europe, 
and the return of rejected cases has acquired increasing prominence in 
domestic politics. 
As of 1 May 1999, 63 116 aliens were registered as inhabitants in the 
Dutch reception system. Of those, some 58 000 persons were seeking 
asylum or another form of protection.784 The remaining 5 046 persons 
were 'removable persons', i.e. persons without any claim for a continued 
presence on Dutch territory. 
Of those 5 046 persons, 4 013 persons could not be removed due to 
either political or technical impediments. For the purposes of the Dutch 
782 Council of the European Union, Strategy paper on migration and asylum policy, Date 
unavailable. This paper represents the second revision of the draft of 1 July 1998, and has 
been officially 'noted' by the JHA Council as a basis for the Union's future migration 
policy. 
783 State Secretary Cohen's Note on the Dutch Return Policy, Ministry of Justice, 25 June 
1999. The following presentation of statistics is based on subsections 2 and 3 of the Note. 
784 The quoted document states the number of 58 000 persons. However, provided that the 
number of persons not in procedure is identical with the number of removable persons, 
the exact number of persons in procedure must be 58 070. 
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stat1st1cs, 'political impediments' means that return is not implemented 
due to the general situation in the country of origin. As of 1 May 1999, 
such impediments existed for removal to Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. To be sure, the 779 persons whose return was impeded due 
to the general situation in their country of origin benefit from a 
rudimentary form of protection. As refugees and other categories of 
protected persons are not considered part of the return problem as 
delimited here, these 779 persons would also fall outside its limits. The 
reasons inhibiting their return are neither connected to their own 
recalcitrance, nor to that of their country of origin, but flow from the 
human rights situation in the latter. 
Further, 3 084 persons originate from countries to which return is 
difficult to achieve due to 'technical impediments'. Such impediments are 
usually connected to the lack of travel documents and difficulties in 
obtaining them. This group is composed of people of 13 nationalities. 
No such impediments existed in the remaining 1 033 cases. To 
conclude, in only about one fifth of the screened cases, is it evident that 
the implementation of removal can be decisively facilitated by targeting 
the individual will of the migrant.785 In the majority of cases, the critical 
actor is not necessarily the individual, but rather the country of origin, 
which retains de facto power over the formal preconditions of return. 786 
Provided the Dutch situation is sufficiently representative of the whole 
of the EU, the efforts of Member States would first and foremost need to 
target countries of origin. 
As we have seen above, the Union's activities have remained relatively 
weak in this area, with the majority of instruments relating to the second 
785 Following our reasoning above, these 1 033 cases should be contrasted with the total of 
4 017 cases where return was not barred by reasons related to the human rights situation 
in the country of origin. This means that the fraction increases to roughly one fourth of 
the cases in point. -It is of interest that the State Secretary explicitly denies that 
removable persons go underground to a substantial extent: 'I have no indications that this 
would be substantially the case'. State Secretary Cohen's Note on the Dutch Return 
Policy, note 783 above, section 2. Thus, the conclusion made here is not invalidated by 
the fact that a large number of removable persons defect from the reception system. 
786 This is not to say that the individual's willingness to return is without importance for the 
actual possibilities of return. In some cases, diplomatic representations issue a travel 
document for willing return migrants, but refrain from doing so when their citizen is 
unwilling to return. Nonetheless, such cases show that the ultimate decision on return 
lies de facto with the country of origin. 
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consideration-securing the preconditions of return-rather than to the 
third, which concerns securing the co-operation of the country of origin. 
The latter consideration has been for the most part dealt with unilaterally 
by certain Member States, and the degree of co-operation or harmo-
nisation has been rather limited. Depending on the outcome of its work, 
the establishment of the HL WG could represent a paradigm shift, 
however. 
Targeting countries of origin is not an easy task, and the reach of single 
Member States as well as the EU is limited. As international relationships 
are based on the sovereign equality of states, it is obvious that a sensitive 
approach is needed. Compared to securing the co-operation of countries 
of origin, targeting individuals is of secondary importance. Notwith-
standing this, it may be politically convenient for some returning states to 
single out individuals as the primary target of return policies. As it is not 
within the returning state's power to rectify the recalcitrant behaviour of 
countries of origin, it turns to recalcitrant individuals. In doing so, it 
demonstrates to the domestic electorate that something is being done 
about the return problem. Even from an efficiency-oriented particularist 
perspective, however, such behaviour remains questionable. 
The thrust of the above analysis is confirmed in an EU strategy 
document drafted by Austria: 'The speeding up of the voluntary return of 
illegal immigrants was as strikingly unsuccessful throughout Europe 
(although there were major repatriation initiatives in individual cases) as 
the steps taken to establish the widest possible network of readmission 
agreements [ ... ]. A problem hardly referred to in the 1994 paper [the 
Commission Communication on Asylum and Migration Policies, GN] 
was the increasing refusal of a growing number of States of origin to take 
back their own nationals from the country which they had entered 
illegally' .787 
What does this imply for the rejected protection seeker? In single cases, 
return may be facilitated through joint transport arrangements or co-
ordinated pressure on third countries, but it is too early to assess the 
impact of the EU acquis on the probability of return. The importance 
return policies have acquired on the political agenda of the Member States 
is reflected by the number, but not the quality, of legal instruments 
787 Council of the European Union, Strategy paper on migration and asylum policy, Date 
unavailable, para. 20. This paper represents the second revision of the draft of 1 July 
1998. 
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dealing with return. The absence of an instrument laying down minimum 
standards of treatment for forcible removals is particularly striking. In 
other words, return is still a national affair. A rejected protection seeker 
would better look to the domestic authorities, and not to Brussels, when 
calculating the probability of return in her case. 
7.3 Intermediary Conclusion: Access to Protection in the EU 
European integration in the area of immigration and asylum suffers from 
a double fragmentation: one is institutional, the other normative, in 
nature. 
Institutionally, immigration and asylum issues were fully exposed to 
the tension created by the two speeds and two pillars of integration. 
Consider the 1992 Maastricht treaty, which moved visa issues to the 
supranational first pillar, whereas asylum and migration issues were 
hosted in the intergovernmental third pillar. The normative tool-box of 
the third pillar was rather disappointing and a far cry from what the first 
pillar had on offer. Formally, this tension was mended with the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, providing for a transfer of asylum and migration 
issues to the first pillar. However, both issues remained entangled in a 
strait-jacket of intergovernmental decision-making, at least for the 
duration of the transitional period. Effectively, a veto is retained for all 
Member States during this period. Therefore, it is questionable to 
celebrate the Amsterdam Treaty as a victory of supranationalism. 
However, the potential of Amsterdam for overcoming material 
fragmentation should not be underestimated. It made binding EC 
instruments available in the field of asylum and migration and opened a 
window for judicial review by the ECJ. Amsterdam also succeeded with 
the integration of the avant-garde: the Schengen Group and its 
achievements were merged with the Union framework. Due to the special 
status of Denmark, the U.K. and Ireland, this did not mean the complete 
abolishment of two speeds, however. 
Within the institutional world, the tendency is clear. Although a slow 
move towards limited supranationalism is taking place, it is hampered by 
the perseverance of veto and a variety of formal opt-outs. Still, the 
Community will remain unable to react with the same swiftness as a state 
or a minor state grouping. 
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The regulation of competencies through the treaties is not the sole factor 
impacting the institutional setting. The circle of participants, determined 
by the ongoing enlargement process, must be regarded as equally 
important. Although the candidates are required to implement the EU 
acquis as it stands on the day of accession, they will, of course have a voice 
in decisions taken after that day. It is too early to predict exactly how this 
reconfiguration will affect the efficiency and profundity of co-operation. 
But the variables are clear. To what extent will Member States succeed in 
the abolishment of the remaining veto on migration and asylum issues 
during the five-year period? Which candidates shall be admitted? Will they 
be admitted under or after the veto era? Undoubtedly, the enlargement 
process has a potential for exacerbating the existing fragmentation 
tendencies. 
Apart from the institutional setting, fragmentation persists in the 
normative world as well. If we look into the topics dealt with at the 
multilateral level, the following pattern emerges. First, the period 1985-92 
stood for a rather successful development of deflection tools. 788 From 1992 
onward, deflection was continuously refined, but saw few innovations789 • 
This made room for the discussion of protection-related issues such as 
temporary protection, burden-sharing, and, most radically, the inter-
vention into root causes.790 However, it is striking that fourteen years of co-
operation yielded only four major instruments of binding nature laying down 
specific rules for the management of migration and asylum. 791 All of them 
deal with control rather than protection, and all of them have an impact 
on the protection seeker's access to territory: 1990 saw the conclusion of 
the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, setting the overall framework for 
788 Apart from the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, the non-binding 1992 London 
Resolutions should be named in this context. 
789 In this context, the Pre-frontier Joint Position is relevant. 
790 Those debates found their expression inter alia in the 1995 Resolution on Burden-sharing 
(see text accompanying note 882 below), the 1996 Refugee Joint Position (see text 
accompanying note 719 below), the Commission Proposal on Temporary Protection and 
Solidarity (see text accompanying note 910 below), and, finally, the discussions on the 
root causes of migration within the HL WG (see text accompanying notes 762 and 763 
below). 
791 We are not considering Joint Positions and Joint Actions here, as the scope of their 
binding force is very limited. See chapter 1.4.2.6 on legal effects of Joint Positions and 
Joint Actions. Further, we disregard from the binding Decisions by the Schengen 
Executive Committee, as these are intrinsically linked to the implementation of the 
Schengen Convention. 
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deflecting unauthorised migrants and allocating asylum claims. Further-
more, in 1995, the Council issued a regulation determining those 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing 
the external borders of the Union. 792 And, finally, in 1997, the Member 
States agreed on a binding instrument governing procedures-the Spanish 
Protocol. The discussion of protection-related issues by EU institutions did not 
yield a single binding instrument. In a later chapter, we shall subject central 
elements of these four instruments to closer scrutiny with a view to their 
conformity with international law.793 
The divide between protection and control is further exacerbated by 
the schedule set for future measures in the field of asylum and 
immigration. Both the Amsterdam Treaty itself and the Action Plan 
drawn up by the Council prioritise mostly control-oriented measures.794 
Thus, control continues to enjoy a first mover's advantage over 
protection. 
Why is this so? We recall that one determinant of protection systems 
has hitherto not been dealt with: the availability of burden-sharing. In the 
following chapter, we shall look into the way burden-sharing is regulated 
in international law, and the law of the European Union. As shall emerge, 
this determinant is the key to understanding the persistent divide between 
protection and control, and, consequently, the perseverance of /'Europe a 
deux vitesses in the immigration and asylum area. 
792 This instrument was replaced by a new one in 1999, and is presently merged with the 
Schengen visa 1,t. See text accompanying note 455 below. 
793 See chapter 12 below. 
794 We recall that Art. 63 TEC exempted measures on burden-sharing, on long-term visas 
and residence permits and on mobility rights for legally present aliens from the 
mandatory five-year time-frame. See also paras 36, 37 and 38 of the Action Plan. 
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8 Sharing the Burden? 
8.1. The Concept and Function of Burden-sharing 
INDISPUTABLY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR refugee protection is unequally 
shared-whether among the States of the North and South or at regional 
level. Globally, one could mention Iran, which has been at the top of 
reception statistics for seven years, sheltering nearly two million 
refugees.795 Regionally, Germany hosts 1.2 million refugees, which is more 
than all other Western European States taken together.796 Both examples 
are absolute numbers, and it goes without saying that relating those to the 
size of the host economy or the host population will produce quite 
different results. 797 Whatever the measurement adopted, it is reasonable to 
assume that receptive inequalities impact on law. Moreover, it is also 
reasonable to assume that actors seek to influence these inequalities 
through the instrument of law. 
795 UNHCR, 1997, pp. 286-9. 
796 Ibid. 
797 Comparing the number of annual asylum applications with the total national population 
leaves Sweden as the largest receiver, while Germany is pushed back to eighth rank 
among European countries. UNHCR, Asylum in Europe: Arrivals, Stay and Gender From 
a Data Perspective (1998, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 12. 
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In spite of its obvious importance, the issue of burden-sharing798 has 
triggered comparatively little research. Before touching upon single 
contributions in the course of this chapter, it is worthwhile to note the 
broadness of the approaches within this limited corpus of research, 
spanning over analogies to military alliances, ·~nvirnnmental regulation 
and development co-operation. The case studies of burden-sharing in 
larger refugee crises offered by Hans and Suhrke799 are an excellent 
starting point. Later, Suhrke has complemented this overview with a 
critique of the underlying logic from the perspective of the political 
scientist. 800 
Lawyers, on the other hand, seem to have been attracted to a de lege 
ferenda approach to burden-sharing. First attempts to draw up a blueprint 
for a fairer redistribution of protection obligations were advanced as early 
as the Sixties. 801 Probably the most elaborate and best known work on 
burden-sharing is that carried out within the interdisciplinary 
Reformulation Project. Based on the knowledge accumulated within the 
project, Hathaway and Neve proposed nothing less than a new refugee 
regime. Its centrepiece was the concept of 'common but differentiated 
responsibility' to be assumed by states and it rested largely on a 
communitarian approach with strong self-regulatory elements. 802 On the 
market-liberal side of the spectrum, we find Schuck's model, according 
states quota-like protection obligations, which they may trade at a form of 
798 In spite of its prejudicial timbre, the term 'burden-sharing' will be used as an overarching 
concept throughout the text. Better terminological alternatives have failed to gain entry 
into the language used by actors of international law on the global level. Moreover, it is 
questionable to speak about 'international solidarity' or 'responsibility sharing' when the 
object of this solidarity is de facto dealt with as if it were a burden. 
799 A. Hans and A. Suhrke, 'Responsibility Sharing', in J. Hathaway (ed.), Reconceiving 
International Refugee Law (1997, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague). 
800 A. Suhrke, 'Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus 
National Action', 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 4 (1998). 
801 See A. Grahl Madsen, 'Wege und Chancen zu Internationaler Zusammenarbeit, A W'R 
Bulletin 2-3 (1983), for a reworked version of his 1965 proposal. 
802 J. Hathaway and A. Neve, 'Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection', 10 Harvard International 
Law Journal (1996). Of all normative proposals stemming from academic discourse, this 
one has probably commanded most attention. For an outright adaptation in the burden-
sharing discourse among industrialized governments, see TGCARMP, 1998. For an 
example of academic discipleship, see C. J. Harvey, 'The European regulation of asylum: 
constructing a model of regional solidarity?', 4 Eurapean Public Law 4 (1998). 
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international stock exchange.803 His model trusts in the invisible hand of 
the market and is largely reminiscent of emission rights trading within the 
environmental regulation sector. By proposing that the United Nations 
should lease territories for refugee reception, Einarsen makes a pragmatic 
attempt to decouple access to territory from burden-sharing.804 In many 
respects, his Kantian approach is marked by the lawyer's belief in 
institutionalized solutions; lamentably, it begs the question of who is 
going to foot the bill.805 
However, for all their merits, none of the approaches cited above 
devotes much attention to the potential of the existing legal framework 
and its implications for the prospects of burden-sharing. Furthermore, 
academic, governmental and institutional actors tend to link the issue of 
burden-sharing to the concept of mass influx, thus adopting an 
unnecessarily narrow perspective. By contrast, we would like to under-
score that the redistribution of responsibility among states will always 
impact-in one way or another-the remaining parts of the migration and 
protection systems, irrespective of whether the number of protection 
seekers is large or small. Against this background, the present chapter 
aims to explore the relationship between the actual sharing of 
responsibility for protection seekers and the normative framework on 
asylum and immigration offered on the global as well as on the EU level. 
8.1.1 The Objective of Burden-sharing 
The logic of burden-sharing rests on the axiom that an equitable 
distribution of costs and responsibilities in protection will generate not 
only a maximum of fairness among states, but also a maximum of 
openness vis-a-vis protection seekers. Where a collective of states shares 
803 P. H. Schuck, 'Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal', 22 Yale Journal of 
International Law 2 (1997). 
804 T. Einarsen, 'Mass Flight: the Case for International Asylum', 7 IJRL 4 (1995). 
805 Without elaborating further details, Einarsen suggests that the G7 States should pay for 
the proposed scheme (Einarsen, 1995, p. 572). This can be countered with a quote from 
Suhrke: 'Unlike international environmental regimes which typically address the causes 
of a problem, asylum regimes only address the symptoms. This makes the costs of 
participation in formalized sharing schemes over time uncertain and beyond the control 
of individual states. States are customarily reluctant to commit themselves to pay for 
developments over which they have no control;[ ... ).' Suhrke, 1998,p. 413. 
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the task of protection, peak costs will be avoided, while existing resources 
will be fully exploited. There are two beneficiaries to such arrangements 
-host States and protection seekers. First, states engaging in burden-
sharing cut their total costs. Second, the number of protection seekers 
finding haven is larger than it would be in the absence of burden-sharing 
arrangements. In analyzing actual burden-sharing schemes, these two 
beneficiaries should be kept apart. Indeed, we are once more faced with a 
triangular relationship; the protection seeker is first opposed with a state 
of first arrival, which in its turn is opposed with other states; finally, the 
protection seeker is opposed with those other states. 
To wit, the core desideratum of any burden-sharing arrangement is the 
creation of predictability. Like an insurance contract, burden-sharing 
arrangements allow states to calculate maximum costs in future crisis 
situations. The insurance parallel suggests that burden-sharing cannot be 
an ad hoc affair. Predictability presupposes that principles of distribution 
are agreed upon in a sufficiently detailed fashion before a crisis materia-
lizes. s06 From that perspective, a major problem of present approaches to 
burden-sharing is the absence of such predetermined distributive 
principles. 807 
On the other hand, it can be argued that states would take an 
unnecessarily cautious approach, if pushed to predetermine principles of 
distribution for all conceivable crises of the future.sos By contrast, a mere 
negotiating framework, allowing for flexible and situation-adapted 
solutions, might, yield a better, i.e. more generous, outcome. This 
argument disregards, however, that states had ample opportunity to 
practise such ad hoc burden-sharing, and that they made insufficient use of 
this option. 809 The persistent discussions on burden-sharing and the 
806 Further exploiting the insurance metaphor in the following, we shall distinguish between 
underwriting, i.e. the selection of risks to be covered, and rating, i.e. the pricing system 
used to compensate for accidental losses. See 'insurance' Encyclaptedia Britannica Online, 
< http://www.eb.com:180/bol/topic?idxref=86242&pm= 1 > [Accessed March 17, 
1999). 
807 See chapter 8.3 below for an analysis of instruments and proposals within the EU 
framework. 
808 'If the states choose to institute a sharing formula, the temptation would be to peg 
commitments at low admission levels and restrictive rights. Ambitious sharing schemes, 
particularly if they were institutionalized with long-term time horizons, might encourage 
states to define a refugee flow out of existence by declaring it to consist of "migrants".' 
Suhrke, 1998,p. 414. 
809 See chapter 8.2 below. 
266 
SHARING THE BURDEN? 
tendency towards measures of deflection support this assessment. 810 
Moreover, it should be underscored that predetermined principles of 
distribution represent a minimum common denominator of assistance. 
Nothing inhibits states from agreeing on more generous aid in single 
cases, exceeding the exigencies of an underlying burden-sharing 
arrangement. A fixed normative framework prevents states from 
remaining completely passive when others are struck by a crisis. They are 
free to do so, though, under a negotiating framework. In light of these 
arguments, the ensuing analysis is based on the assumption that regulating 
burden-sharing beforehand is better than negotiating it ad hoc. 811 
8.1.2 The Scope of Burden-sharing 
But what exactly does it mean to distribute costs and responsibilities more 
equitably? The malleability of the burden-sharing-concept makes it 
simultaneously attractive and repulsive. While its underlying axiom is 
generally accepted, states do not necessarily agree on how to frame the 
burden to be shared. Recurring to insurance terminology, we can assert 
that determining the scope of burden-sharing is a first, rough selection of 
risks as part of the underwriting process. 812 
This selection process may be split into two steps. The first is about 
determining the circle of participants in a burden-sharing scheme, and the 
second is about delimiting the specific risks these participants are willing 
to share with each other. 
Regarding the first step, most actors in the North agree that regional 
burden-sharing is a more realistic option than a global scheme. One of the 
reasons is precisely that risks in a regional scheme are a priori more 
810 The analysis of the receptive unwillingness persisting in Europe is facilitated by looking 
back to the South Asian refugee crisis of the seventies and eighties. At the time, the 
reluctance by countries in the region to receive refugees could be mitigated by launching 
an elaborate and predictable burden-sharing scheme. It could be argued that a European 
burden-sharing scheme could mitigate the tendency towards ever more deflective policies 
proliferating among European asylum countries. 
811 The divergence between proponents of a negotiation solution and a prescription solution 
in burden-sharing is only one manifestation of this argumentative topos in law. The 
argument between proponents of framework legislation and proponents of detailed 
regulation depicts the same underlying opposition. 
812 See note 806 above. 
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circumscribed than those in a global one, which increases predictability 
and facilitates consensus among would-be participants. Thus, the question 
of which states should participate in any given scheme is of the utmost 
importance for its problem-solving capacity.813 
At any rate, we have confined this work to the regional context of the 
EU, which entails a fixed circle of participants and obviates the need to 
explore global burden-sharing. Let us therefore move on the delimitation 
of the specific risks that participating states could share. 
For our needs, it makes sense to distinguish between 
O sharing the burden of preventing and resolving refugee crises; 
O sharing the burden of preventing and deflecting arrivals; and 
O sharing the burden of reception. 
The first item stretches from diplomatic efforts to the expenditures of 
military intervention.814 While the linkages to refugee reception are clear, 
the scope of such burden-sharing is extremely large and difficult to 
delimit. Would U.S. defence expenditures be deductible at large under a 
scheme sharing the burdens of prevention, because the military deterrence 
813 Again, the insurance analogy is enlightening. Each new participant admitted to a given 
scheme changes both the collective risk prognosis and the resource base of that scheme. 
The composition of the circle of participants is something of a water-shed between the 
various models proposed in contemporary discourse. Global schemes often involve a 
development perspective (see e.g. A. Acharya and D. B. Dewitt, 'Fiscal Burden Sharing', 
in J. Hathaway (ed.), Reconceiving International Refugee Law (1997, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague) and Einarsen, 1995), while regional ones typically endorse an 
alliance perspective (again, the negotiations within the EU may serve as an excellent 
illustration, as will emanate below in this chapter). On the threat-focused characteristics 
of an alliance perspective, see Acharya and Dewitt, 1997,p. 127. 
814 It should be recalled that intervention raises a number of intricate legal and practical 
issues. For an analysis of five options of intervention (punishment, safe zones, safe 
havens, enforced truce and offensive war), see B. Posen, 'Can Military Intervention Limit 
Refugee Flows?', in R. Miinz and M. Weiner (eds), Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy. 
U.S. and German Policies towards Countries of Origin (1997, Berghan Books, Providence). 
For an overview of preventive intervention, see P. Freedman, 'International intervention 
to combat the explosion of refugees and internally displaced persons', 9 Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 565 (1995). Arguing that states have a right to use force to 
defend themselves against a massive influx of refugees: B. K. McCalmon, 'States, 
Refugees, and Self-Defense', 10 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 215 (1996). See also 
S. P. Subedi, 'The legal competence of the international community to create "safe 
havens" in "zones of turmoil"', 12 Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1999). 
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potential of the USA might play a decisive role in pacifying refugee-
creating conflicts? 
Preventing and resolving refugee crises is probably the most complex of 
the three issues listed above. It is highly reminiscent of the discussion on 
distributing defence burdens within the framework of NA T0815 , and 
links the availability of refugee protection to the inconsistently regulated 
area of international peace and security. This form of preventive burden-
sharing will certainly remain on the agenda, but given its complexity, it is 
problematic to make other forms of burden-sharing contingent on its 
availability. Therefore, it is highly questionable that the 1995 EU 
Resolution deals with military action and refugee reception under one 
single sharing criterion.816 Crowding these intrinsically different 
contributions into one and the same instrument risks weakening its focus 
and diminishing prospects for its negotiation and practical functioning. 
Regarding the second item, persuasive examples of the feasibility of 
burden-sharing already exist. The areas of visa requirements, the control 
of aliens' movements within a group of states and border control at large 
have been made the subject of such sharing. Consider the rather 
inexpensive instrument of common visa lists (as devised within the 
Schengen co-operation and the EU). 817 Consider also the Schengen 
Information System, a costly computer network jointly financed by the 
Schengen Parties. A further example is provided by the 1993 agreement 
on co-operation in migrational movements between Germany and 
Poland818, under which Poland received 120 Million DEM to reinforce 
'technical equipment for preventing uncontrolled migratory move-
ments'. 819 Finally, consider the array of 'flanking measures' ensuring 
815 J. Khanna, T. Sandler et al., 'Sharing the financial burden for U.N. and NATO peace-
keeping, 1976-1996', 92 AJIL 2 (1998); H. Weber, Lastenteilung in Verteidigungs· 
biindnissen: ein anwendungsorientierter Ansatz zur Verteilung von Lasten in militarischen 
Biindnissen auf der Grundlage der iikonomischen Theorie der Allianzen (1994, Peter Lang, 
Frankfurt am Main). 
816 Para. 4 1995 Resolution. See chapter 8.3.2 below for a detailed analysis. 
817 See chapter 5.1.1 above. 
818 Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung 
der Republik Polen iiber die Zusammenarbeit hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen von 
Wanderungsbewegungen [Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Republic of Poland on co-operation regarding the effects of migratory movements], 
7 May 1993, BGBI. 1997 II, pp. 1734-6. 
819 Ibid., Art. 3. 
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control of external borders of the European Union as well as its financial 
and training support to Central and Eastern European neighbours' border 
control under the PHARE, TACIS and ODYSSEUS programmes. While 
the costs of these co-operations were not trivial, their sharing could be 
successfully negotiated. To conclude, governments seem to find little 
difficulty in acting 'in a spirit of solidarity' when it comes to the burden 
of deflection. 
Precisely as for the two forms of preventive burden-sharing, co-
operation on the actual reception of refugees may take many forms. It is 
reasonable to distinguish between three main approaches. 
0 Harmonizing refugee and asylum legislation (sharing norms); 
0 reallocating funds (sharing money); and 
O distributing protection seekers (sharing people). 
As this work focuses on the access of protection seekers to protecting 
territories, we shall limit our inquiry to the sharing of reception burdens. 
In the following, each of the three main approaches will be analyzed in 
greater detail. 
8.1...2.1.. Sharing Norms 
A comparatively simple step is to harmonize domestic refugee and asylum 
legislation within a group of States, thereby neutralizing inequalities in 
distribution due to differences in the protection offer made by single 
countries. In this sense, binding instruments such as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as well as non-binding instruments such as the UNHCR 
EXCOM Conclusions can be understood as a rudimentary starting point 
for burden-sharing. In the EU context, variations in the protection offered 
by Member States have been perceived as creating distortions in an 
equitable distribution of protection seekers among the Fifteen. 820 
Consequently, the Council has launched a number of instruments to 
promote normative harmonization. 821 Apart from protection categories 
82° Cf. the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1998 Commission Proposal, ascribing 
differences in protection levels under temporary protection to 'distortionary effects'. 
821 See chapters 5 to 7 above. 
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and procedural aspects, vanat10ns in social rights offered to asylum 
seekers have also been presumed to impact on their distribution. 
Why is the adoption of common norms a form of burden-sharing? By 
agreeing to sustain a minimum level of protection, states make a 
commitment not to minimize reception by means of normative dumping. 
Let us suppose that the prohibition of refoulement had not been laid 
down as a legally binding norm in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Apart 
from moral and political restraints, states would then be free to compete 
with each other in the area of returning refugees to persecution, thus 
exonerating themselves from protection costs. Stipulating a prohibition of 
refoulement pacifies the area of return from interstate competition. The 
state commitment made by accepting this norm is costly. It can be 
regarded as an insurance fee paid to a solidarity system, guaranteeing 
refugees as well as states a minimum level of protection. 
Harmonizing the protection offered is a liberal solution, drawing on 
the idea of self-regulation and trusting the protection seeker's capacity to 
make rational decisions. However, a caveat should be issued-
harmonization can merely address those forms of unequal distribution 
based on differences in domestic legislation. Refugee legislation is but one 
determinant affecting the choice of destination made by a person seeking 
haven. Other factors-geographical proximity of a potential destination 
country or the availability of social networks there-could be of far 
greater importance. Further, harmonization may indeed amplify the 
concentrating effects of such factors. Where a more remote country offers 
better protection to a certain group of persons in need, these may opt for 
reaching this country, thus exonerating states closer to the crisis region. 822 
Obviously, a 'marketplace of protection' may also level out inequalities in 
distribution. The spiral of restriction dominating contemporary European 
asylum legislation relegates this reflection to the realm of pure theory, 
though. Finally, given the situation of existential distress a refugee is in, it 
would be naive to frame her as a perfectly rational customer, picking and 
choosing on a market of varying protection offers. 
822 It must be noted, though, that such freedom of choice is impaired by safe third country-
mechanisms. See chapter 5.1.3 above. 
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8.1.2.2 Sharing Money 
In contradistinction to the other two approaches, harmonizing the 
protection offer is largely a preventive approach in that it seeks to avoid 
the emergence of unequal distribution. The reallocation of funds, on the 
other hand, is reparative in nature, as it seeks to level out existing 
inequalities through various forms of financial transactions. A major 
difficulty in fiscal burden-sharing is the establishment of a distributive 
key. This involves decisions about what shall be regarded as a loss under 
the scheme823 and how such loss should be rated. In the present context, 
defining a loss means determining the level of reception and expenditure, 
where other states are obliged to assist. Rating such losses means 
translating refugee reception into fiscal terms. And, finally, based on these 
deliberations, the contributions which participating states need to off er to 
the common scheme have to be specified. 
Are there any examples of fiscal burden-sharing as it is? In fact, 
UNHCR could be described as such a reallocation mechanism, albeit in 
an imperfect form. Donors make means available to UNHCR, enabling 
the office to run various forms of assistance programmes in refugee 
hosting countries. Ultimately, this form of distribution is contingent 
upon, first, yearly decisions to be taken by the Executive Committee and 
the General Assembly and, secondly, the charity of donors.824 In all, this 
allows for considerable fluctuations in funding, thus diminishing the 
predictability of such burden-sharing. Moreover, funding is inequitably 
distributed among regions and crises.825 On the other hand, UNHCR 
823 Further drawing on the insurance analogy, a loss means a situation in which assistance is 
yielded under a burden-sharing scheme. 
824 For a brief overview over the financing of UNHCR, see V. Turk, Das Fluchtlingshoch· 
kommissariat der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR} (1992, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), pp. 
127-34. 
825 The main group of donors consists of industrialized countries. As of 12 March 1999, the 
USA, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, Germany, 
Belgium and the European Commission were the top 10 non-private donors to UNHCR 
(ordered according to the size of their contribution). With all due respect for the 
commitments of industrialized countries towards programmes targeted at the South, it 
must be acknowledged that funding follows a clear preference for refugee issues in the 
North. In the UNHCR budget for 1999, the operations in Former Yugoslavia and 
Albania remain the most resource consuming item with some 156 million US$. At a 
distant second place, one can find the Great Lakes Operation with some 97 million US$. 
If regional allocation is related to the number of refugees assisted, the preferential 
treatment of refugees in Europe emerges even more clearly. UNHCR Funding Overview 
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operations boast an almost global coverage, which gives the mechanism a 
universal potential. It must be recalled, however, that UNHCR was not 
conceived as a burden-sharing mechanism and should not necessarily be 
judged as one. 
Fiscal burden-sharing also takes place through other channels. States 
may support other states on a bi- or multilateral basis. States or non-state 
actors fund NGOs which support refugees in other countries, thus 
exonerating public expenditure there. Even in that case, fluctuation in 
funding is a considerable threat, preventing receiving countries from 
trusting the availability of assistance in the long term. The persistence of 
the burden-sharing debate indicates that reallocations through UNHCR as 
well as other channels are perceived as insufficient to secure openness in 
the reception of refugees. 
8.1.2.3 Sharing People 
The underlying presumption of fiscal burden-sharing is that reception 
costs are quantifiable. Obviously, this is not entirely true. While it is 
comparatively easy to determine the costs of food and housing in terms of 
Euros, Dollars or Yen, setting numbers on the costs of integration is 
much more difficult, if not impossible. This is why some major receiving 
countries militate for sharing schemes involving the redistribution of 
protection seekers. 826 From a state perspective, the attraction of people-
sharing lies in the redistribution of the perceived source of all conceivable 
costs linked to reception, be they fiscal, social or political. Clearly, 
redistributing protection seekers is more intrusive vis-a-vis the individual 
than sharing money. First, people-sharing may lead to an undesirable 
second uprooting. Second, the presence of family members or the 
existence of social networks in a specific country can play a crucial role in 
the protection seeker's prospects for integration. Where a sharing scheme 
1999, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/weekover.htm> (accessed on 15 March 
1999). Therefore, allocating funds to UNHCR remains an imperfect form of burden-
sharing, which manages to level out reception inequalities only to a limited degree. 
826 However, people sharing also has its academic proponents. Already in 1965, Grahl-
Madsen presented an elaborate people sharing proposal, featuring a distributive key based 




denies the protection seeker access to this advantage, it may augment the 
total cost of protection in the group of receiving states. 
By sending and receiving protection seekers under such schemes, states 
share responsibility rather than mere cost. Therefore, these forms of co-
operation are properly designated as responsibility-sharing. Precisely as 
for fiscal burden-sharing, the viability of responsibility-sharing hinges on 
the establishment of a distributive key. 
In the context of responsibility-sharing, it is advisable to recall 
experiences with the institution of resettlement. Resettlement implies that 
special categories of persons, who cannot find adequate protection in their 
country of first arrival, are moved to a third country willing to receive 
them. A limited number of countries regularly offer resettlement places, 
which they distribute by their own initiative, or through the intermediary 
of UNHCR.827 Resettlement has been used as a protection tool in Africa, 
Latin America, South East Asia and Europe. Since the conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Vietnamese refugees, however, the role 
of resettlement has declined.828 
It should be underscored that resettlement is oriented to the needs of 
refugees, not those of states. This is clear from Conclusion No. 67 adopted 
by the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1991: 
The Executive Committee, 
Reaffirming the link between international protection and 
resettlement as an instrument of protection and its important role 
as a durable solution in specific circumstances, 
(a) Calls on governments in a position to assist, to establish 
refugee admission ceilings, in the context of international burden-
sharing; 
[ ... ] 
(g) Emphasizes that UNHCR pursues resettlement only as a last 
827 The following countries are currently offering resettlement places via UNHCR: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzer-
land, Sweden and the USA. 
828 In the late 1970s, UNHCR assisted over 200 000 refugees to resettle. In 1996, the 
corresponding number was down to 27 000 refugees. UNHCR, 1997, p. 86 
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resort, when neither voluntary repatriation nor local integration is 
possible, when it is in the best interests of the refugees and where 
appropriate. 829 
Presently, resettlement states offer quotas on an annual basis, and these 
quotas do not meet the actual resettlement need. Resettlement has 
typically involved industrial countries as receivers and developing 
countries or countries in transition as senders. Irrespective of the low 
numbers, the institution of resettlement still provides a valuable exampl~ 
of interstate co-operation in protection. Due to its exceptional character, 
it is not practised within an economically homogenous group of states 
such as, e.g., the European Union. For all these reasons, resettlement 
features only a very limited degree of predictability. It does not represent 
an overall solution to the concentration of refugee reception. As a 
consequence, it may contribute to, but cannot safeguard, long-term 
openness by countries of first arrival. 
8.1.3 Assessing Burden-sharing Schemes 
The preceding synopsis of various approaches to burden-sharing has 
shown that the creation of predictability has many facets. They all 
impinge upon the fundamental choice between politics and law. Which 
issues should be solved by applying predetermined norms laid down as 
law, and which should be tackled through ad hoc negotiations of a 
predominantly political character? The conflict between rigidity and 
flexibility is fought out in two arenas, and the outcome is obviously of 
crucial importance for the practical value of any scheme. 
The first is the question of underwriting: which risks should be 
included and which excluded? Where the scope of burden-sharing is set 
too wide, doubts can be raised about the stability of the system in extreme 
situations. A comprehensive scheme might cope with one refugee crisis in 
the vicinity of participating states, but what if two crises coincide? On the 
other hand, if the scope is set too narrowly, those risks excluded from the 
829 Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 67 (XLII) Resettlement as an Instrument of 
Protection, 42nd Session (1991). For a recent affirmation, see Executive Committee, 
General Conclusion on International Protection, 47th Session (1997), No. 81, para. (r), 
and Executive Committee, Conclusion on International Protection No. 85 (XLIX), 48th 
Session (1998), para. (jj). 
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scheme may trigger insecurity with participating states. Where burden-
sharing is limited to a certain subgroup of protection seekers, states are 
left with unpredictable costs for other subgroups. In other terms, the 
underwriting issue calls for a balance between the comprehensiveness and 
the stability of a given scheme. 
The second issue is the establishment of a distributive key. The 
spectrum of proposals spans from mathematically determined equality830 
to the freedom of pledging831 • The degree to which states choose to specify 
this key impacts heavily on the degree of predictability produced by the 
scheme. Where a distributive key is formulated in abstract or vague terms, 
its frictionless adoption may be more likely, but the probability of 
interpretive conflicts increases. Where a distributive key approaches 
mathematical formalism, such conflicts may be avoided, but states will 
have a hard time committing themselves in a binding fashion. Thus, both 
solutions place the conflict differently-either at the moment of 
negotiation, or at the moment of interpretation. 
Determining contributions might be the most intricate issue, as 
contributive capacities vary among states. Obviously, Luxembourg and 
Germany are not on an equal footing with regard to their 'absorptive 
capacity' vis-a-vis refugees. Proposals for sharing schemes typically revert 
to such parameters as total population, population density and gross 
national product when determining the contributive capacity of states. 
However, the successful protection of refugees relies heavily on factors 
much more difficult to measure. The importance of ethnic and religious 
ties between host community and refugee community has been 
highlighted832, but remains difficult to translate and incorporate into 
models relying on a formal equality of all participating states. 
Underwriting and the establishment of a distributive key are 
interrelated issues. Quite obviously, it is hard to specify a rating system 
and a distributive key for a scheme encompassing not only physical 
83° For the academic discussion, see, e.g. Grahl Madsen, 1983, proposing a distributive key 
based on GNP and population, as well as the recent and thoughtful elaboration of criteria 
for proportional redistribution in'Schuck, 1997, pp. 279-82. In the EU context, see the 
German proposal described in chapter 8.3.1 below. 
831 Among academics, see Acharya and Dewitt, 1997, who suggest a distributive-
developmental framework financed by donors. In the EU context, see the pledging 
procedure proposed by the German presidency in 1999 (described in text accompanying 
note 931 below). 
832 Hathaway and Castillo, 1997, p. 16. 
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protection, but also preventive diplomacy and intervention. Limitations 
in underwriting pay off in facilitating consensus on a specified distributive 
key. When evaluating burden-sharing schemes, it is reasonable to focus on 
the degree of specification attained in both arenas. 
8.2 Burden-sharing and International Law 
While it is undisputed that each state is responsible for the protection of 
its citizens and persons otherwise under its jurisdiction, the responsibility 
for refugees is not as clearly attributable. The 1951 Refugee Convention 
contains no individual legal claim vis-a-vis a receiving state to be granted 
asylum. However, as a result of Convention obligations and practical 
circumstances, such a state may find that it has no choice but to keep a 
refugee once she has set foot on its territory. To wit, the prohibition of 
refoulement contained in Article 33833, in addition to the unwillingness of 
third states to receive a certain refugee amounts to a stalemate in which a 
refugee's stay on its soil has to be accepted by a state. As long as a state 
cannot hermetically seal its borders and a redistribution scheme for the 
exoneration of heavily burdened states does not exist, one has to live with 
an uneven distribution of refugees and asylum-seekers. The drafters of the 
1951 Refugee Convention were very much aware of this. This flows inter 
alia from the following passages in its preamble: 
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy 
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a 
problem of which the United Nations has recognized the 
international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation, 
Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and 
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees will do everything 
within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause 
of tension between States,[ ... ] 
Have agreed as follows: [ ... ] 
833 '(1) No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 




The 'international co-operation' required for sharing the burden of 
refugees was, however, not the subject of the Convention. Nevertheless, 
the pressing need for regulation was clearly perceived. In the Final Act 
adopted by the 1951 United Nations conference of plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, the topic of burden-sharing 
emerges once more: 
The Conference,[ ... ] 
Recommends that Governments continue to receive refugees in 
their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of 
international co-operation in order that these refugees may find 
asylum and the possibility of resettlement. 834 
According to this document, continuing refugee reception and inter-
national co-ordination and co-operation to exonerate heavily burdened 
states are indispensable elements of a global protection order. This 
conception still appears to demarcate the state of the art with respect to 
burden-sharing. 
In 1967, the need for implementation of this insight persisted, as Article 
2 (2) of the non-binding Declaration on Territorial Asylum reveals: 
Where a State finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant 
asylum, States individually or jointly or through the United 
Nations shall consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, 
appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that State.835 
Similar wording, nonetheless conceived as a binding rule as part of a 
treaty instrument, can be found in Article 2 (4) of the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention836: 
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant 
asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to 
other Member States and through the OAU, and such other 
834 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, Geneva, 2-25 July 1951, section IV, D, UN Doc. 
A/Conf.2/108. 
835 GA Res. 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967. 
836 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 
September 1969, 14 UNTS 691 [hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention]. 
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Member States shall in the spmt of African solidarity and 
international co-operation take appropriate measures to lighten the 
burden of the Member State granting asylum. 
In Paragraph 5 of the same article, the linkage between temporary re-
ception, burden-sharing and resettlement surfaces: 
Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country 
of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country 
of asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending 
arrangement for his resettlement in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph. 
However, as the verb 'may' indicates, the Contracting Parties avoided 
stipulating an individual right, which would have put systemic pressure 
behind international burden-sharing efforts. It must be acknowledged that 
the implementation of these norms has not been a success. 837 
Apart from this regional pioneering effort to elaborate on the content 
of international co-operation in a binding manner, no corresponding 
clarity has been attained on a universal level. The problem of sharing the 
burden flowing from persecution and flight has been handled in practice 
with varying degrees of success. Burden-sharing has repeatedly been 
alluded to in the Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee. As 
widely acknowledged, these are not binding by themselves, but may 
provide argumentative support when determining customary law 
obligations. 838 
Suffice it here to cite recent Conclusions in order to reflect how the 
concept of burden-sharing is conceived by states participating in the 
Executive Committee. 
The 1995 General Conclusion on International Protection839 adopted 
by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR indicates that there is still a 
need for action: 
837 The massive refoulement practices during the Great Lakes crisis may serve as a recent 
example. See Executive Committee, Note on International Protection (submitted by the 
High Commissioner), UN Doc. No. EC/48/SC/CRP.27, 25 May 1998, para. 13. 
838 Apart from EXCOM Conclusions quoted below, references to burden-sharing and 
international solidarity are made in the following Conclusions: No. 15 (XXX) 1979; No. 
22 (XXXII) 1981; No. 52 (XXXlX) 1988; No. 61(XU)1990; No. 67 (XLll) 1991; No. 68 
(XLIII) 1992; No. 71 (XLIV) 1993; No. 74 (XL V) 1994. 
839 UNHCR EX COM Conclusion No. 77 (XL Vl) 1995. 
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The Executive Committee,[ ... ] 
(o) Calls on all States to manifest their international 
solidarity and burden-sharing with countries of asylum, in 
particular those with limited resources, both politically and in 
other tangible ways which reinforce their capacity to maintain 
generous asylum policies, through cooperation in conjunction with 
UNHCR to support the maintenance of agreed standards in respect 
of the rights of refugees; reiterates the critical importance of 
development and rehabilitation assistance in addressing some of the 
causes of refugee situations, as well as their solutions, including 
voluntary repatriation when deemed appropriate; and also in the 
context of development of prevention strategies. 
In the 1996 General Conclusion on Protection840, burden-sharing and 
international solidarity figure as 'principles'. 
The Executive Committee[ ... ) 
(h) Recognizes that countries of asylum carry a heavy burden, 
including in particular developing countries with limited resources 
and those which, due to their location, host large numbers of 
refugees and asylum-seekers; reiterates in this regard its 
commitment to uphold the principles of international solidarity 
and burden-sharing and calls on governments and UNHCR to 
continue to respond to the assistance needs of refugees until 
durable solutions are found. 
If there is to be any consistency in the terminology of EXCOM 
Conclusions, the drafters' intention must have been to express that 
burden-sharing is the object of a binding norm of international law. The 
prohibition of refoulement, generally regarded as a customary law norm, is 
usually referred to as the principle of non-refoulement in EXCOM Con-
clusions. In that particular context, the term 'principle' seems to refer to 
the fundamental nature and legally binding character of the norm. While 
it must be reiterated that EXCOM Conclusions are not of a binding 
character, the language of state representatives in EXCOM could be 
indicative of states' opinio juris regarding burden-sharing. However, even 
if one interprets these statements as manifestations of opinio juris, it 
840 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII) 1996. 
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would still prove difficult to trace a clear and consistent practice. State 
behaviour during the Bosnian conflict is indicative in this regard. For the 
time being, the quoted 1996 General Conclusion can be taken as support 
for the existence of a hortatory norm prescribing burden-sharing. To 
what extent this position is a tenable one shall be discussed at the end of 
this section. 
The 1996 Conclusion on Comprehensive and Regional Approaches 
within a Protection Framework841 places non-refoulement and burden-
sharing in a catalogue of elements constituting such approaches: 
The Executive Committee[ ... ] 
(e) Encourages States, in coordination and cooperation 
with each other, and with international organizations, if 
applicable, to consider the adoption of protection-based 
comprehensive approaches to particular problems of 
displacement, and identifies, as the principal elements of 
such approaches:[ ... ] 
(iii) respect for the institution of asylum, 
fundamental principle of non-refoulement, 
international protection to all those who need it 
including the 
and ensuring 
(iv) measures to reinforce international solidarity and burden-
sharing. 
The discussions on burden-sharing culminated at the 48th Session of the 
Executive Committee. Burden-sharing had been selected as the 'Annual 
Theme' of the session842, and the whole array of contentious issues 
resurfaced with unmitigated force. UNHCR's budget was exposed to 
massive cuts, hitting hardest in host countries of the South. While 
countries of the North signalled interest in regional solutions, countries of 
the South feared that the latter might be at the detriment of sharing at the 
global level. 843 Some Southern countries underscored that fiscal sharing 
841 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No. 80 (XLVII) 1996. 
842 See e.g. UNHCR, Annual theme: international solidarity and burden-sharing in all its 
aspects: national, regional and international responsibilities for refugees, 7 September 
1998, UN Doc. No. Al AC.96/904. 
843 To a degree, this concern was shared by a senior UNHCR official, underscoring that 
regional solutions must not be at the expense of international solutions. Interview with 
Erika Feller, Director, Division for International Protection, UNHCR, 98-10-05. 
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was not enough, as the actual reception of refugees created social, political 
and, not least, environmental consequences which could not be levelled 
out by sending money. Moreover, some countries voiced their discontent 
with the restrictive policies in the North, which were perceived as 
promoting concentration tendencies.844 In the light of these diverging 
interests, the Conclusions adopted could hardly achieve more than they 
had in earlier years. They contained a recognition that burden-sharing was 
indeed important, that heavily burdened countries should be assisted, and 
that the absence of burden-sharing must not be used as a pretext for 
refoulement: 
The Executive Conunittee, 
( ... ] 
(d) Reiterates that refugee protection is primarily the 
responsibility of States and that it is best achieved through effective 
cooperation between all States and UNHCR, as well as other 
international organizations and pertinent actors, in a spirit of 
international solidarity and burden-sharing;( ... ] 
(o) Reiterates its commitment to uphold the principles of 
international solidarity and burden-sharing, reaffirms the need for 
resources to be mobilized to assist countries receiving refugees, 
particularly developing countries who host the large majority of 
the world's refugees and bear a heavy burden in this regard, and 
calls upon Governments, UNHCR and the international 
co=unity to continue to respond to the asylum and assistance 
needs of refugees until durable solutions are found; 
(p) Recognizes that international solidarity and burden-sharing 
are of direct importance to the satisfactory implementation of 
refugee protection principles; stresses, however, in this regard, that 
844 'The bottom line is: should developing countries ever be seen to show reluctance to 
welcome asylum seekers, it would be more out compulsion than design. [ ... ] It would, 
therefore, be unfair to patronize the refugee hosting developing countries to carry on 
with the burden for the sake of human rights, while there are continuing incidences of 
refoulement, through summary expulsion of asylum seekers, occasionally en masse, and 
detention often under inhuman conditions in cenain countries. The situation becomes 
even more bleak when we perceive a steep decline in financial contributions to 
humanitarian bodies and agencies, leading to a large-scale downsizing of humanitarian 
operations.' Ms. Ismat Jehan, Counsellor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations 
Office of Geneva, Bangladesh, Statement at the 49th EXCOM 1998. On file with the 
author. 
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access to asylum and the meeting by States of their protection 
obligations should not be dependent on burden-sharing 
arrangements first being in place, particularly because respect for 
fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles is an 
obligation for all members of the international community;[ ... ). 
In practice, burden-sharing remains a challenge with regard to both 
reception in the region and resettlement. The critical assessment contained 
in the High Commissioner's 1995 Note on International Protection is still 
valid today: 
Over recent years, despite the broadening of State involvement 
with refugee issues, the lack of tangible international solidarity has 
remained an obstacle to the positive development of the 
international refugee protection regime. Successive Executive 
Committee Conclusions, endorsed by the General Assembly, have 
called for international solidarity and burden-sharing, enjoining all 
States to take an active part, in collaboration with UNHCR, in 
efforts to assist countries, in particular those with limited 
resources, that host large numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers. 
It remains the shared responsibility of the international 
community to support the capacity of host States to receive and 
protect refugees, including States lacking the necessary resources 
and those where domestic concerns, including anti-immigrant 
sentiment as well as social, economic, political and environmental 
concerns, militate against effective protection. Issues of national 
security are also increasingly relevant in this respect, particularly in 
regard to the political and related consequences of a prolonged stay 
of large groups of refugees. 845 
To sum up, it can be stated that an obligation to share the burden of 
reception has no ground in international treaty law. However, Fonteyne 
asserts that states are obligated to practice burden-sharing by international 
customary law.846 His argument is based on Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration, Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, observations on the 
845 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Forty-sixth session, 
Note on International Protection, International Protection in Mass Influx (submitted by 
the High Commissioner), UN Doc. No. Al AC.96/850, 1September1995, para. 14. 
846 J. L. Fonteyne, 'Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of Inter-
national Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees', 8 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 162 (1983), pp. 175 et seq. 
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opinio juris of states as expressed in UNHCR EXCOM and UN bodies, 
and deductions from state practice. Against his position, weighty counter-
arguments can be adduced. To start with, the UDHR is no binding 
instrument of international law, and neither is the content of its Article 
14.847 Therefore, it is fallacious to argue for the existence of a burden-
sharing obligation on its basis. Second, turning to state practice as part of a 
possible custom, case studies reveal that far from all refugee crises have 
been met with burden-sharing initiatives. In those cases where assistance 
indeed materialized, it was highly contingent on specific political 
constellations. 848 These academic findings are further backed up by the 
assessment of the High Commissioner quoted earlier. 849 Given these 
inconsistencies, the requirement of practice is hardly satisfied. With 
respect to opinio juris, we have noted earlier that the language of non-
binding EXCOM instruments fails to lend unambiguous support to a 
hortatory norm of burden-sharing. However, if states were indeed 
consenting on the existence of such a norm, the EXCOM Conclusion 
would be the ultimate forum for spelling out such an opinio juris. 
Fonteyne's assessment is, to say the least, open to doubt. Most 
certainly, it could be supported by other voices asserting that solidarity is 
a fundamental principle of international law. 850 But if one accepts this line 
of argument as valid, the resulting norm is a fairly abstract one. Keeping 
in mind the insurance function of burden-sharing, this inhibits its proper 
functioning as a stabilizing factor in a real-world refugee crisis. 
By contrast, Perluss and Hartman argue that the international 
community chose not to mould burden-sharing into an obligatory form, 
as this would risk weakening rather than strengthening protection. Had 
there been an obligation to share the burden, front-line states would abuse 
it as an excuse for refoulement if no assistance from less affected states 
847 See chapter 9.1.1 below. 
848 The successful case of burden-sharing following the Vietnamese refugees crisis is probably 
most indicative. Suhrke describes it as an essentially hegemonic scheme, resting on the 
pressure exerted on other countries by the United States. A. Suhrke, 'Burden-sharing 
during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action', 11 Journal 
of Refugee Studies 396 (1998), p. 413. 
849 Note 845 above. 
850 R. J. Macdonald, 'Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International Law', 8 
Pace lnt'l L.Rev. 259 (1996), p. 259, claiming that this principle is 'gaining both 
recognition and importance in the structure of the contemporary international legal 
order'. 
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materialized.851 Interestingly, both pos1t10ns trespass the legal-technical 
level and expand into their own theory on the international protection 
regime. Fonteyne claims that burden-sharing is obligatory, as the telos of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention cannot be secured otherwise. And Perluss 
and Hartman hold that the very same telos militates against the obligatory 
character of burden-sharing. 
To conclude this section, it can be established that burden-sharing has 
been understood as a functional prerequisite for the observation of the 
norm prohibiting refoulement852 , the preservation of protection capacities, 
and access to territory of potential host states. As this prerequisite has 
been identified in an early stage of the development of the current 
protection regime, states have had ample opportunity to develop a 
normative framework securing burden-sharing. Hitherto, this has been 
done in the African context, although this framework does not work well 
in practice. On a universal level, international law does not contain an 
obligation to share the burdens incurred by refugee protection. The 
following section will examine whether normative developments within 
the EU have filled this void at the European level. 
8.3 Burden-sharing and the EU acquis 
The dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the violent dissolution of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were two issues of utmost importance for 
the migrational agenda of Western European States. The Balkan crisis had 
set off the largest refugee flow in Europe since the end of the Cold War, 
and the number of asylum applications filed with European states peaked 
in 1992.853 European asylum infrastructures were allegedly not prepared to 
cope with the situation. The harmonization project pursued by Member 
States had not moved fast enough to provide infrastructures on the 
regional level that could cope with the situation. This is not surprising, as 
851 D. Perluss and J. F. Hartman, 'Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm', 
26 Virginia journal of International Law 572 (1986), p. 588. 
852 See Fonteyne, 1983, p. 175. Perluss and Hartman, 1986, p. 588. For affirmation of the 
necessity of burden-sharing without taking position on its normative quality see J. 
Thoburn, 'Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-sharing in 
Europe', 7 I]RL 459 (1995), p. 467 et seq. 
853 See chapter 4.1 above. 
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the goal of the Member States was to create an area without internal 
borders rather than to launch a regional protection regime. 
The largest populations of protection seekers from Bosnia were found 
in those countries of Western Europe which were either geographically 
proximate or already hosting immigrant communities from former 
Yugoslavia. In descending order per capita, Austria, Sweden, Germany 
and Switzerland854 received most of these persons. In total numbers, 
Germany alone accommodated 58 percent of all Bosnian refugees hosted 
by EU Member States.855 Together, Austria, Germany and Sweden, being 
the three largest receivers within the EU, hosted 84 percent of all Bosnian 
refugees who found shelter in the EU.856 This provides ample proof of the 
fact that no steering instruments existed to ensure equitable burden-
sharing in Western Europe. 
In terms of solidarity, the Bosnian refugee crisis represents an outright 
failure. The same must be said of the Kosovo crisis. 857 First, the 
distribution of so-called 'spontaneously arriving' protection seekers was 
highly unequal among European States. From the start of the military and 
police operations by Serbian authorities in early 1999 to the deployment 
of NA TO ground troops in Kosovo, more than 778 300 displaced persons 
from Kosovo were received in the region or within the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.858 This may be contrasted to 69 650 spontaneous protection 
854 At the time, Austria and Sweden had not acquired membership of the European Union. 
Switzerland was not and is not a member of the European Union. 
ss; Statistical source: UNHCR (1997), as reproduced in Black, Koser and Walsh, 1998, p. 7, 
table 1.1. By 1997 Germany had received 342 500 Bosnians out of an EU total of 584 017. 
856 Ibid. By 1997, Austria had received 88 609 Bosnians, while the corresponding number for 
Sweden was 60 671. 
857 For the· present purposes, the term 'Kosovo crisis' is meant to apply only to that period 
during which military and police activities took place in the province of Kosovo-i.e. the 
first and second quarter of 1999. For a comprehensive assessment of burden-sharing 
related to persecution and hostilities in Kosovo, one would need to look at the flow of 
protection seekers during the years preceding the crisis phase, as well as the post-crisis 
phase. 
858 778 300 displaced were hosted by Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the Republic of Montenegro {part of the FRY) and Bosnia-Hercegovina. An unknown 
number was received by the Republic of Serbia (part of the FRY). Statistics as of 15 June 
1999. Source: UNHCR, Update: Kosovo Emergency, 15 June 1999. KFOR troops were 
dispatched in Kosovo in mid-June, which demarcated the end of outflow. 
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seekers from Yugoslavia859 arnvmg in Western and Central European 
countries, excluding those in the immediate region, during the first and 
second quarter of 1999.860 Of these 69 650 persons, 41 820 sought 
protection in EU countries. This means that the region took the brunt of 
protection obligations, with some five percent of spontaneous arrivals 
being taken care of by EU Member States. 
Within Europe861 and the EU, spontaneous arrivals were distributed in 
a very asymmetrical manner. In the first and second quarter, Switzerland 
topped the list of European countries with 21 280 arrivals, while Germany 
took the lead among EU countries with a total of 17 840 cases. 862 We recall 
that both countries had been heavily burdened during the Bosnian crisis. 
By means of the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (HEP) and 
financial assistance, the receiving countries in the region were to a certain 
extent exonerated. Paradoxically, the HEP amplified the unequal 
distribution of spontaneous arrivals by increasing the load of those EU 
Member States whose burdens were already the most onerous. Some 90 
000 persons were evacuated to countries outside the immediate region 
within the framework of the HEP, designed to prevent the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro from being overburdened.863 Table 2 
shows that the reception of the evacuees was highly inequitable. Again, 
Germany stood out as the largest receptor.864 
During the handling of the Kosovo crisis, the interdependence between 
the number of protection seekers and the level of accorded rights emerged 
once more. In Germany, less than one percent of all Kosovar protection 
859 It should be noted that those statistics not only refer to citizens of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia originating from Kosovo. Statistics broken down to regional provenience 
are not available. 
860 Source: UNHCR, Asylum Application Statistics in Europe. Third Quarter 1999, 
available at < http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/9910euro/text.htm > (accessed 991105). 
861 Excluding the countries named in note 858 above. 
862 See note 860 above. 
863 As of 28 June 1999, 89 982 persons had been evacuated under this programme. UNHCR 
commenced return movements on 28 June 1999. 
864 As pointed out elsewhere, Germany contributed to a much lesser degree than the U.K. or 
France to military operations. The Economist, Guns or refagees-an unequal alliance?, 
8 May 1999, p. 28. However, as explained earlier, the two parameters are not necessarily 
commensurable. One reason is that states outside NATO contributed to HEP. Another 
is that far from all protection problems connected to the Kosovo crisis were solved by 




seekers were formally granted refugee status. Those who benefited from 
toleration were denied the right to work, and the return phase-including 
forcible removals-was introduced relatively early.865 By contrast, 
Denmark granted refugee status to the majority of spontaneous arrivals in 
the period between August 1998 and March 1999. Moreover, those 
accorded temporary protection were also given the right to family 
reunification. 866 
EU Member States European Non-EU Other States 
Member States 
Receiving HEP Receiving HEP Receiving HEP 
country Total country Total country Total 
Austria 5079 Croatia 370 Australia 3969 
Belgium 1223 C11;ch Rep;.iblic., 824 Canada 5350 
Denmark 2823 kc land 70 Israel 206 
Finland 958 rv1;"lltii 105 United States 8549 
France 6139 Norway 6072 
Germany 14689 Poland 1049 
Ireland 1033 RornarHd 41 
Italy 5829 Sfovakw 90 
Luxembourg 101 Sh.n1erHa 145 
Netherlands 4060 Swit1er!ant1 1.681 
Portugal 1271 Turkey 8340 
Spain 1426 
Sweden 3675 
United Kingdom 4209 
Total 52 515 1.9 393 :18074 
Grand Total 89982 
Table 2: UNHCR/IOM Humanitarian evacuations of Kosovar refugees from the 
FYR of Macedonia from 5 April through 25 June 19991167 
86; ECRE, ECRE Kosovo/Kosova Returns survey, February 2000, available at 
< http://www.ecre.org/archives/rpt/kreturn.doc > (accessed 22 March 2000). 
866 Ibid. 
867 Source: UNHCR, Update: Kosovo Emergency, 28 June 1999. 
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The Bosnian experience had already put burden-sharing on the Council's 
negotiation table, and the Kosovo crisis gave the issue a new momentum. 
In the Council, comprehensive and protracted deliberations have taken 
place on how to ensure a more equitable distribution in future cases. 
These deliberations shall be depicted in four steps, the first leading to the 
adoption of a resolution in 1995, the second exposing the role of burden-
sharing in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the third elaborating on the 
experimental instruments conceived in 1998, and the. fourth focusing on 
the negotiations following a specific burden-sharing proposal by the 
European Commission. Finally, in a fifth step, a recent initiative of the 
Commission on a limited form of burden-sharing shall be expounded. 
8.3.1 Negotiations Preceding the 1995 Resolution 
To understand the steps taken within the EU, it is indispensable to track 
the broader European discussion on solidarity triggered by the Balkan 
crisis. A first mention of burden-sharing was made during the 
International Meeting on Victims of the Humanitarian Crisis on 29 July 
1992. In a common position taken by the European Community and its 
Member States868, it was held that a just and lasting solution 'will not be 
assisted by movements of people outside the boundaries of the former 
Yugoslavia'. The strategy envisaged was to contain the conflict as well as 
flight from the conflict area. Furthermore, the position holds that 'the 
burden of financing relief activities should be shared more equitably by 
the international community'. No allusion was made to a more equitable 
sharing of the responsibility for arriving refugees. 
At the London meeting of the EU ministers responsible for 
immigration on 30 November and 1 December 1992, a Conclusion on 
People Displaced by the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was 
adopted. 869 In its paragraph 5, reference is made to certain categories of 
vulnerable persons, which the Ministers are 'in principle willing to admit 
temporarily on the basis of proposals made by UNHCR and the ICRC in 
accordance with national possibilities and in the context of co-ordinated 
action by all the Member States'. In the same paragraph, Ministers 'call 
868 Reiterated in Art. 1 of the Conclusion on People Displaced by the Conflict in the 




upon the Presidency, in cooperation with UNHCR, to negotiate with 
other States, to create the necessary conditions to enable these States also 
to be involved in the reception of nationals of the former Yugoslavia in 
the context of temporary admission arrangements'. 
Simulta..'1eously, Member States were eager to involve Non-Member 
States. At the time, Non-Member States such as Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland were already offering protection to a much greater extent 
than the majority of Member States. The willingness 'in principle' did not 
correspond to willingness in practice. Immediately before the London 
meeting, the UNHCR and the ICRC had appealed to the international 
community to receive camp prisoners from former Yugoslavia. In spite of 
earlier promises, the international community reportedly proved to be 
reluctant. 870 
As an attempt to break the stalemate of vagueness and non-compliance, 
Sweden launched a proposal on burden-sharing in the autumn of 1993. 
According to the Swedish under-secretary of State, the 'strategy of giving 
support near the conflict areas may well be completely inadequate when 
the winter sets in'.871 Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and 
Switzerland supported the Swedish effort. Together, the six countries 
presented a draft resolution at the Fifth Conference of Ministers 
responsible for immigration affairs in Athens on 18-19 November 1993.872 
It was stated in the draft that 'a more equal distribution of the outflow 
caused by the present situation in former Yugoslavia would facilitate 
protection to be given to all those forced to leave their homes'. 
Furthermore, the proposed text contained an appeal to all states of the 
world 'to offer shelter and to host, on a more equitable basis, in particular 
displaced persons and war refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina who 
cannot avail themselves of protection in the region'. As the draft was 
870 Migration News Sheet, European countries are reluctant to accept more refugees from the 
former Yugoslavia, November 1992, p. 5. 
871 Migration News Sheet, Sweden calls for burden-sharing of Bosnian refagees, November 
1993, p. 5. Sweden had earlier sought to raise support for a more equitable distribution of 
Bosnians in need of protection, inter alia by means of the 'Scandinavian Initiative' 
proposing a quota system for the reception of vulnerable persons and persons having 
certain links to the Scandinavian countries. The Scandinavian Initiative did not lead to a 
concerted reception mechanism. 
872 Migration News Sheet, Member States refuse a praposal to assist Bosnian refagees on a more 
equitable basis, December 1993, p. 4. This conference was arranged under the auspices of 
the Council of Europe. 
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resisted by a number of states, among others France, the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands, it was never put to a vote at the Athens meeting. 
However, the ministers agreed to ask the Vienna Group on East-West 
migration to study the draft 'as a matter of urgency'.873 
Accordingly, the draft was discussed again at the Vienna Group plenary 
meeting in Strasbourg on 27-28 January 1994. Even at this forum, the idea 
of burden-sharing met firm resistance. According to the Swedish 
Immigration Minister, the United Kingdom motivated its unwillingness 
to accommodate Bosnian refugees with the expenses deriving from its 
military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.874 
Earlier in the same month, the European Parliament had passed a 
Resolution on the General Principles of a European Refugee Policy875, 
which underscored that all Member States share responsibility for a 
common refugee policy. Accordingly, 'it should follow that the much 
heavier burden borne by some of them due to geographical or other 
reasons should be equally shared by all Member States'. 876 In its operative 
part, the European Commission is urged to elaborate an emergency plan 
for refugee reception on the basis of an equitable distribution among the 
Member States. 877 
The 1994 Communication from the Commission to the Council on 
Immigration and Asylum Policies878 attempted to offer a more specific 
solution by proposing the '[d]evelopment of a monitoring system for 
absorption capacities and creation of a mechanism which would make it 
possible to support Member States who are willing to assist other Member 
873 Ibid. 
874 Migration News Sheet, Idea of burden-sharing for Bosnian refugees is dead, February 1994, 
p.4. 
875 Resolution on the General Principles of a European Refugee Policy, adopted 19 January 
1994, Doc. No. A3-0402/93. OJ (1994) C 044/106. 
876 Ibid., preamble, Art. J. 
877 Ibid., Art. 16. Already in its 1992 Resolution on the Harmonization within the European 
Community of Asylum Law and Policies (adopted on 15 Nov. 1992, Doc. No. A3-
0337 /92), the European Parliament had urged 'that in the event of an influx of refugees, 
each Member State should take refugees in proportion to its capacity' (Art. 19) and 'that 
arrangements be made and formalized for Member States to come to the assistance of one 
Member State which is receiving a large number of refugees' (Art 21). 
878 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council on 
Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94) 23 final, 23 February 1994. 
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States faced with mass influx situations'. 879 According to the Communi-
cation, such a matching system would fall short of a formal burden-
sharing arrangement, but would increase the probability of support 
among Member States in situations of 'absorption problems'.880 
Among Member States, burden-sharing continued to be an issue 
causing dissent on the intergovernmental level. The informal meeting of 
Ministers responsible for immigration in Salonika on 6-7 May 1994 gave 
further proof of the divergent interests of more affected States, facing large 
inflows, and other States. The Priority Work Plan for 1994 declared 
burden-sharing to be one of the issues to be examined by the Council. 
Accordingly, the German presidency presented an ambitious 
o Draft Council Resolution on Burden-sharing with Regard to the 
Admission and Residence of Refugees881 
in July 1994. However, the German Draft had difficulties in attracting the 
necessary support. 
On 8 September 1994, the German Draft was discussed at an informal 
meeting in Berlin without signs of progress on the issue. Obviously, the 
detailed provisions setting out a distributive key were causing contro-
versy. Accordingly, the German Draft was replaced by a less detailed 
proposal launched by France, which was discussed at the Paris meeting on 
6 April 1995. A further draft initiative was launched by Austria, Germany 
and the Netherlands, followed by a simplified Spanish draft. 
During the Spanish presidency, a limited consensus on burden-sharing 
had finally begun to develop, as the adoption of a 
O Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on Burden-sharing with 
Regard to Admission and Residence of Displaced Persons on a 
Temporary Basis882 
indicated. Let us draw up a brief comparison between the German Draft 
of 1994 and the 1995 Resolution. 
879 Ibid., 42, para. 10. 
880 Ibid., 26, paras 98 and 99. 
881 Doc. No. 7773/94 ASIM 124 [hereinafter the Gennan Draft]. 
882 OJ (1995) C 262/1 [hereinafter the 1995 Resolution]. According to the Draft List, this 
instrument is part of the acquis. 
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8.3.2 Comparison of the German Draft and the 1995 
Resolution 
The most daring feature of the German Draft was the proposal of a 
specific distributive key which 'could be used by Member States'.883 This 
key was based on Member States' 
0 percentage of the total Union population; 
O percentage of Union territory; and 
O percentage of the Gross Domestic Product of the Union. 
Each of these criteria should be given equal weight. The German Draft 
contained a table of indicative figures884 for each Member State which 
were to be revised every five years by joint agreement. The possibility to 
depart from these figures by joint agreement was expressly provided for in 
Paragraph 8 of the German Draft. 
The centrepiece of the envisaged redistribution mechanism was 
contained in Paragraph 9: 
Where the numbers admitted by a Member State exceed its 
indicative figure under paragraph 8, other Member States which 
have not yet reached their indicative figure under paragraph 8 will 
accept persons from the first Member State. 
Accordingly, the German Draft intended to introduce compulsory 
resettlement relying on a distributive key. It envisaged, however, a 
reduction of reception obligations based on two factors: military 
883 Para. 7 of the German Draft. This solution was obviously inspired by the distributive 
order in domestic German legislation, which stipulates a distributive key for asylum 
seekers in federal legislation. This key may be modified by a unanimous decision of the 
Lander. See Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asylum Procedure Act], Section 45. 
884 Ibid. A look at these figures might help to understand both the German urge and the 
failing support of other large Member States. In descending percentage order, the figures 
read as follows: Germany (21.58), France (19.40), Italy (15.83), United Kingdom (14.28), 
Spain (13.63), Netherlands (3.55), Greece (3.20), Portugal (2.65), Belgium (2.42), Denmark 
(1.78), Ireland (1.54), Luxembourg (0.12). 
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expenditure triggered by intervention in the refugee-producing crisis885 
and the population of Convention refugees already present in a Member 
State.886 
In terms of realpolitik, resistance to the German Draft can be explained 
by the fact that Germany would have been its first beneficiary, with 
additional reception responsibilities falling upon all other Member States. 
Turning to the 1995 Resolution, it is striking that the indicative figures 
have vanished and the stipulated distributive key is devoid of any 
precision887: 
4. The Council agrees that the burden in connection with the 
admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis 
in a crisis could be shared on a balanced basis in a spirit of 
solidarity, taking into account the following criteria[ ... ]: 
- the contribution which each Member State is making to 
prevention or resolution of the crisis, in particular by the supply of 
military resources in operations and missions ordered by the 
United Nations Security Council or the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and by the measures taken by each 
Member State to afford local protection to people under threat or 
to provide humanitarian assistance, 
- all economic, social and political factors which may affect the 
capacity of a Member State to admit an increased number of 
displaced persons under satisfactory conditions. 
885 Paragraph 9 of the German Draft states: 'Member States which are helping, by means of 
particular foreign and security policy measures in the country of origin of the persons 
referred to in paragraph 1, to control the refugee situation in the State in question, need 
not admit the full figure assigned to them under paragraph 8. The resulting shortfall 
should be covered by the other States in proportion to their indicative figures. Measures 
of this nature include in particular peace-keeping or peace-making initiatives in the 
framework of the United Nations, NA TO or the Western European Union.' 
886 According to paragraph 11 of the German Draft, Convention refugees are set off against 
the indicative figure in paragraph 8. 
887 With regard to the vagueness of the given criteria, we omit a detailed discussion of their 
implications. For a critical analysis, see ECRE, Comments from the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles on the 1995 'Burden-Sharing' Resolution and Decision adopted by 
the Council of the European Union, March 1996. 
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A footnote linked to the first paragraph of this article, specifies that 
'[t]hese criteria are norms of reference that may be supplemented by 
further criteria in the light of specific situations'. 
To wit, this statement reveals the self-contradiction contained in the 
present instrument. In the preamble, it is correctly stated that 'situations 
of great urgency [ ... ] require prompt action and the development 
beforehand of principles governing the admission of displaced persons'. 
However, these principles are developed ex post facto by the Council. 
The 1995 Resolution has been followed by a 
O Decision on Alert and Emergency Procedure for Burden-Sharing 
with Regard to the Admission and Residence of Displaced Persons 
on a Temporary Basis888 
which lays down the procedural framework for Council decisions and 
monitoring in burden-sharing situations. 
In short, burden-sharing is initiated as follows. On the initiative of the 
Presidency, a Member State, or the Commission, an urgent meeting of the 
Coordinating Committee under Article K.4 of the Treaty on European 
Union is convened with the task of establishing whether or not a given 
situation necessitates burden-sharing as envisaged in the 1995 
Resolution.889 Given such a necessity, the Coordinating Committee 
prepares a proposal for submission to the Council for approval.890 If the 
Coordinating Committee fails to reach consensus within a month, the 
provisions laid down in the Council's Rules of Procedure for urgent cases 
may be applied, implying inter alia that the Council may adopt a relevant 
act by a written vote. 891 
888 OJ (1996) L 063/10. 
889 Ibid., para. 1. 
890 Ibid., para. 3. 
891 Ibid The relevant rules are contained in Council Decision of 6 December 1993 adopting 
the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ 93/662/EC. 
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This ex post facto-framework clearly fails to provide the predictability 
necessary for fair burden-sharing. Consequently, a cautious state would 
rather block access for refugees than trust in the outcome of this ad-hoc 
exercise in the Council. 892 
Who are the beneficiaries of a burden-sharing exercise under the 1995 
Resolution? Its personal scope comprises various categories of vulnerable 
persons 'whom Member States are prepared to admit on a temporary basis 
under appropriate conditions in the event of armed conflict or civil war, 
including where such persons have already left their region of origin to go 
to one of the Member States'.893 These categories were also contained in 
the German Draft, and comprise former camp internees, medical eva-
cuation cases, persons exposed to direct threat of loss of life or limb, cases 
of sexual violence, and war refugees having come directly from a combat 
zone to the territory of a Member State. In the 1995 Resolution, an 
exclusion clause similar to Article 1 F (a) and (b) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention has been inserted. It emerges clearly that no state obligation 
to admit is envisaged. Any decision on admission remains within the 
discretion of the relevant Member State. 
Furthermore, the 1995 Resolution does not apply retroactively, i.e. to 
persons admitted before its adoption. 894 The responsibility for persons 
applying for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention will be 
distributed according to the rules laid down in the Dublin Convention. 895 
Interestingly, and in contradistinction to the 1995 Resolution, the 
German Draft contained a provision allowing the reduction of a certain 
State's reception obligations with the number of persons residing there 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention or the ECHR.896 
892 The importance of a detailed and predictable burden-sharing framework seems to have 
been realized by the authors of the German Draft. See paragraph 5 of the German Draft: 
'The Council is convinced that if Member States are to be able to react promptly in 
emergencies, they must first devise an appropriate range of measures for the admission of 
refugees from war or civil war. Such measures must include prior agreement on 
principles for distributing refugees. Otherwise there is a risk that, in situations in which 
prompt action is necessary to avert serious danger to human life, decisions which need to 
be taken urgently will be delayed by the fact that complicated consultation procedures 
must first be initiated.' 
893 Art. l(a) of the 1995 Resolution. 
894 Art. 7 of the 1995 Resolution. 
895 Preamble of the 1995 Resolution 
896 Para. 11 of the German Draft. 
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As the remaining personal scope is imprecise and ultimately refers back to 
the assessment made by each Member State, it is not clear how Member 
States are to single out a group of persons which could be the subject of 
burden-sharing according to Article 4 of the 1995 Resolution. Finally, it 
must be recalled that a resolution is a so-called atypical instrument of 
Union law, which is not binding per se.897 This detracts further from the 
degree to which the 1995 Resolution may stabilize Member States' 
expectations in a crisis situation. 
A practical illustration of the persisting stalemate regarding solidarity 
arose at the same meeting at which the resolution was adopted. The 
Ministers discussed a UNHCR request for the long-term admission of 
50 000 internees from Kuplensko Camp in Croatia. Not a single State 
declared itself willing to admit persons from this group.898 
Both the German Draft Resolution and the 1995 Resolution relied 
heavily on what has been identified as a control strategy.899 In the 1995 
Resolution, however, the steering principles had been watered down to a 
degree at which the whole instrument became dysfunctional. 900 
8.3.3 The Impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
As expounded elsewhere in this work, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
represented a singular opportunity to restructure faltering co-operation in 
the area of asylum and migration. Yet ultimately, in these areas, 
Amsterdam was about form rather than substance. At large, Member 
States consented on procedures and competencies for future deliberations 
on visa, asylum, migration and other policies related to the free 
897 See chapter 1.4.2.6 above. 
898 Migration News Sheet, Most Member States Unwilling to Take in Ex-Yugoslav Refugees, 
October 1995, 4. 
899 See van der Klaauw, 1997a, p. 244, who criticises the EU approach to burden-sharing as 
too narrow-minded and focused on immigration control. 
900 But see J. Hathaway and A. Neve, 'Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection', 10 Harvard International 
law Journal 115 (1996), p. 143, who acknowledge the importance of the 1995 Resolution 
and the following Decision, as they provide for a consultative mechanism ('the meeting'), 
which is said to be crucial for burden-sharing processes. In the absence of a pre-
established distributive key, we would argue, negotiations will simply lead to a stalemate 
described below in chapter 8.5.2 on game theory. 
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movements of persons. Nevertheless, the agenda thus set is binding upon 
Member States as primary EC law and it certainly predetermines 
outcomes. The following shall analyze how the issue of burden-sharing is 
affected by Amsterdam. 
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Title IV of the 
TEC contains two articles on burden-sharing. First, Article 63 (2) TEC 
offers a broad entitlement to take action, subjugated to unanimity voting 
under the transitional period: 
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 67, shall, within a period of five years after the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, adopt: 
(2) measures on refugees and other displaced persons within the 
following areas: 
[ ... ] 
(b) promoting a balance of effort between Member States in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
other displaced persons 
[ ... ] 
Measures to be adopted pursuant to points 2(b) [ ... ] shall not be 
subject to the five year period referred to above. 
Which classes of beneficiaries are covered by the provision on burden-
sharing in Article 63 (2) (b) TEC? The drafters chose a comprehensive 
solution by including both 'refugees' and 'displaced persons'.901 The 
importance of that choice should not be underestimated. Let us imagine 
for a moment that burden-sharing had been limited to displaced persons, 
while refugees had been excluded from its ambit. That would have incited 
Member States to minimize the group of persons defined as refugees and 
to maximize the group of persons defined as displaced persons. As the 
precise scope of the refugee definition is a contested issue, this would be a 
rational and feasible strategy to avoid incalculable costs. 
From a protection perspective, the inclusive wording of Article 63 
TEC is a positive feature. It provides the Council with a basis for 
901 Chapter 7.1.3 elaborates on the precise content of these terms in the context of the 
present Treaty. 
298 
SHARING THE BURDEN? 
counteracting the concentration effects brought about by the Dublin 
Convention. 902 
In this context, it is worth noting that the introduction of qualified 
majority voting might have facilitated the adoption of an effective 
measure on burden-sharing. However, as expounded earlier903, there shall 
not be an automatic transition to qualified majority voting for the issues 
covered by Title IV. If Member States disagree on burden-sharing, they 
will, simply and logically, refrain from shifting this issue to a procedure of 
majority voting. 
Another negative aspect of Article 63 is the exemption of burden-
sharing from a temporally confined legislative agenda. It emanates from 
the very wording of Article 63 TEC that measures relating to burden-
sharing are not included among those which must be adopted within a 
five-year period. To be sure, this implies that the Council may take as 
much time as necessary for reaching consensus, at the risk that consensus 
might never be reached. Essentially, this makes the content of Article 63 
(2) (b) TEC a mere reminder that burden-sharing should be on the agenda, 
without imposing an obligation to adopt measures within a certain 
timeframe. 
The very disparity of the temporal limits set is a telling example of 
'/'integration a deux vitesses'. Recalling that openness towards persons in 
need of protection and cost distribution are interrelated904, this disparity 
may have detrimental consequences for the level of protection offered 
through EU measures.905 As for Article 63 TEC, the deliberations on cost 
distribution-i.e. the measure on burden-sharing-are open-ended, while 
openness-i.e. the measures relating to the granting of protection-is to be 
determined within five years. This keeps protection costs uncertain. As 
long as this uncertainty prevails, a rational state will opt for a minimum 
902 See chapter 5.2.1.1 above for a detailed account of the Dublin Convention and chapter 
8.3.6 below for a description of the concentration of protection seekers in a number of 
countries effectuated by it. 
903 See chapter 4.2.5.2 above. 
904 See chapter 3.1 above. 
905 Compare also Bank's assessment: 'However, it was exactly the prospect of burden-sharing 
which encouraged hopes that the Europeanisation of asylum policies in tum would 
provide for opportunities of having a keen eye on fair procedures and conditions granted 
to asylum seekers and recognised refugees. By disconnecting the harmonisation of laws 




level of protection. Translated back to practice, this promotes the spiral of 
restriction in EU asylum policies further. When adopting measures under 
Article 63 (1) and (2) (a) TEC, Member States will attempt to minimize 
the scope of protective burden-by reinforcing deflection and seeking to 
lower the level of rights enjoyed by protection seekers who manage to 
enter their territories. 
The temporal disparity has been affirmed by and fortified in the 1998 
Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam establishing an area 
of freedom, security and justice.906 The Action Plan makes up a more 
detailed schedule for the adoption of measures under Article 63. In spite of 
the fact that Article 63 TEC allows for five years, some measures are 
considered so important that they shall be adopted within two years.907 
Burden-sharing does not belong to these measures. It is listed among the 
measures 'to be taken as quickly as possible in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam'.908 
Apart from Article 63 TEC, another provision of Title IV also impacts 
on burden-sharing. Article 64 (2) TEC transgresses unanimity in decision 
making in a carefully delimited area: 
In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with 
an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of 
nationals of third countries and without prejudice to paragraph 1, 
the Council may, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission, adopt provisional measures of a duration not 
exceeding six months for the benefit of the Member States 
concemed.909 
This provision offers a facilitated procedure for deciding on provisional 
measures to be taken when one or more Member States are exposed to 'a 
906 Council of the European Union, Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how 
best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam establishing an area of 
freedom, security and justice, 7.12.1998, Doc. No. 13844/98, OJ (1999) C 19/1. The 
Action Plan is a non-binding instrument. 
907 Ibid, para. 36. 
908 Ibid, para. 37 b). 
909 Paragraph 1 of the same article reads: 'This Title shall not affect the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security.' 
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sudden inflow of nationals of third countries'. A vote by qualified 
majority is sufficient in such cases. However, the commitment of Member 
States under this norm is limited. Among other factors, the difficulty of 
predicting when refugees can return home constitutes a major obstacle to 
accurate quantification of the reception costs. Where measures are limited 
to a maximum of three months, the costs entailed are calculable. 
Therefore, majority voting was deemed acceptable to the drafters of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
It is reasonable to assume that measures of short duration are confined 
to fiscal burden-sharing. It is neither ethically nor economically defensible 
to move protection seekers among Member States to provide shelter for 
such a brief period. 
8.3.4 The Solidarity Drafts: Merging Admission and Burden-
sharing? 
The topic of burden-sharing in the EU is not exhausted with the 
dysfunctional 1995 Resolution and the framework provisions launched 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Initiated by the Commission, a proposal 
for a twin instrument regulating both admission to temporary protection 
and solidarity with regard to such protection was negotiated from 1997 
until early 1999. 
Different stages of the negotiation process illustrate in a very graphic 
fashion how decisions of access, level of accorded protection, fiscal 
burden-sharing and redistribution of physical protection responsibilities 
are intertwined. As this process may be of decisive value for tracking the 
intent of the Union as well as Community legislator, we shall deal with it 
at some length. 
In March 1997, the European Commission launched a proposal on a 
Joint Action concerning Temporary Protection of Displaced Persons.910 It 
was the first time the Commission had made use of its right to initiative in 
relation to asylum, pursuant to Article K.3 (2) (b) TEU/Maastricht. On a 
strategic level, this proposal signalled a certain caution with regard to the 
demanding paradigm of redistribution. Rather, its drafters returned to the 
910 European Commission, Proposal to the Council for a Joint Action based on Article K.3 
2 (b) of the Treaty of European Union concerning Temporary Protection of Displaced 
Persons, OJ (1997) C 106/13 [hereinafter the 1997 Proposal). 
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proven technique of harmonization, i.e., sharing norms. The 1997 
Proposal's main goal was to eliminate distortional effects911 flowing from 
differences among national regimes of Temporary Protection. 
With the proposal, the Commission sought to frame a Union-wide 
'Temporary Protection Regime', containing a number of minimum 
rights912 and a mechanism for the common opening up and phasing out of 
such a regime.913 Interestingly, the binding decisions on opening up and 
phasing out were proposed to be taken by qualified majority in the 
Council.914 
Article 5 of the 1997 Proposal addressed the question of assistance to 
particularly affected States: 
On the basis of the report of the Commission referred to in Article 
4 [on the Commission's reporting obligations, GN], the Council 
shall examine how best to support Member States which have been 
particularly affected by the mass influx of persons in need of 
international protection. 
The Explanatory Memorandum attached to the 1997 Proposal under-
scored that 
one of the very purposes of the joint action is precisely to 
create conditions for an effective sharing of the 
responsibility with regard to situations of mass influx of 
persons in need of international protection. Article 5 reflects 
the content of the Council resolution on burden-sharing 
which foresees the possibility of taking measures based on 
solidarity if one or more Member States are particularly 
affected by mass-influx situations. Such measures may for 
example take the form of financial compensation and/ or, if 
that is not sufficient, a fair allocation of the persons who are 
fleeing from the crisis region.915 
911 See paras 7 and 8 of the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the 1997 Proposal. 
912 Arts 6-9 of the 1997 Proposal. 
913 Arts 3 and 4 of the 1997 Proposal. 
914 Art. 12 of the 1997 Proposal. 
915 Para. 21 of the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the 1997 Proposal. 
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Under the consultation procedure, the European Parliament introduced a 
number of amendments to the 1997 Proposal.916 The readings in the 
Council focused inter alia on the issue of burden-sharing, where Article 5 
of the 1997 Proposal drew most of the fire, apparently being wholly 
unacceptable to certain Member States.917 
Therefore the Commission changed tactics. In June 1998, it presented 
two draft joint actions for adoption by the Council. One joint action 
would deal with a Union-wide 'Temporary Protection Regime', 
containing a number of minimum rights918 and a mechanism for the 
common opening up and phasing out of such a regime.919 Another joint 
action would be entirely devoted to burden-sharing, or rather, according 
to the terminology of the Commission, 'solidarity'.920 Primarily, Member 
States would share the burden through a system of financial compen-
sations. Firstly, a fixed emergency aid is proposed, limited to the first 
three months of a crisis and intended to cover accommodation, means of 
916 European Parliament, Legislative Resolution embodying Parliament's opinion on the 
proposal to the Council for a Joint Action based on Article K.3 (2) (b) of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning temporary protection of displaced persons (COM(97)0093 -
C4-0247/97 - 97/0081 (CNS}}, A4-0284/97, 23 October 1997. These amendments 
reinforce the language of the original Proposal, stress the exceptional nature of temporary 
protection, and underscore the importance of complying with international law and of 
consulting the UNHCR in the context of temporary protection. 
917 See the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the 1998 Temporary Protection Proposal, 
note 918 below, paras 1.1.3 and 2.12 and the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the 
1998 Solidarity Proposal, note 920 below, para. 1. 
918 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Joint Action concerning temporary 
protection of displaced persons (presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 
189a(2) of the EC Treaty), COM(1998) 372 final/2, OJ (1998) C 268 [hereinafter the 1998 
TP Proposal], Arts 6-9. H the goal of harmonization is to be taken seriously, a deviation 
from these minimum rights in favour of beneficiaries is rather improbable. 
919 Arts 3 and 4 of the 1998 TP Proposal. A provision on burden-sharing was retained in the 
1998 TP Proposal in a rephrased form (Art. 5). It prescribed that the future means of 
implementing solidarity were to be included in the reports on which a decision under 
Arts 3 and 4 would be based. Further, it stipulated that '[s]uch solidarity shall be 
implemented in accordance with the provisions of the 1998 Solidarity Proposal'. 
920 European Commission, Proposal for a Joint Action c.oncerning solidarity in admission 
and residence of beneficiaries of the temporary protection of displaced persons (presented 
by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2(b) of Article K3 of the EU Treaty), 




subsistence and emergency medical assistance.921 Secondly, reception 
projects could be financed by using an existing item in the EU budget.922 
This longer-term measure would cover accommodation, social assistance 
and education. 
Explicitly termed a secondary measure, a Council decision may also 
define the rules allowing the beneficiaries of temporary protection to be 
distributed among Member States, before or on arrival in their 
territory.923 This form of people sharing shall, however, not prejudice the 
rules laid down in the Dublin Convention, as long as Member States do 
not suspend the examination of asylum applications.924 To wit, in the 1998 
Solidarity Proposal, fiscal burden-sharing is endowed with a rather specific 
framework, while people sharing remains formally on the agenda, but 
lacks a specified normative framework. 
If the Solidarity Proposal had been adopted, its efficiency would have 
been hampered by important limitations. Clearly; it did not contain a 
general authorization to share costs. Firstly, sharing was confined to 
specified items, which only cover a fraction of total reception costs. 
Secondly, a precondition for sharing measures was that Member States 
take a unanimous decision under Article 2 of the instrument. One 
recalcitrant Member State would have been enough to block this limited 
form of burden-sharing. In fact, the joint action would have represented a 
framework mechanism, to be activated ad hoc by a consensus decision. As 
noted earlier, this makes burden-sharing highly contingent upon the 
political situation. 
The subordination of the sharing of people to the sharing of money 
was reversed in a revised draft presented in November 1998 by the 
921 Art. 4, 1998 Solidarity Proposal; Financial statement attached to the 1998 Solidarity 
Proposal. 
922 For 1998, the Proposal assumes a need for ECU 3 750 000 for these measures targeted at 
reception projects. Financial statement attached to ibid. As the reader will note, this part 
of the Proposal was consumed by the 1998 Joint Action on Improving Admission, note 
940below. 
923 Art. 4 (1), 1998 Solidarity Proposal. 
924 Art. 4 (2), 1998 Solidarity Proposal. However, it cannot be excluded that single Member 
States might prefer to process protection seekers in a Dublin procedure (in order to shift 
responsibility to another Member State) rather than accord temporary protection to 
them. 
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Austrian Presidency.925 This initiative represented a renewed approxi-
mation to a strict insurance model with highly predictable outcomest 
albeit moulded in a slightly softer form than the German Draft. It is no 
coincidence that one of the main recipient countries of Bosnian protection 
seekers signed as its drafter. Article 3 read: 
The decision [on implementing solidarity mechanisms, GN] shall 
provide for beneficiaries of temporary protection to be distributed 
between Member States in accordance with an allocation scale 
established in the decision on the basis of information provided by 
Member States. This allocation scale should be met as far as 
possible with the beneficiaries' consent, for example through 
resettlement projects or through direct admission from the crisis 
area. 
The observer will note that the 1994 German Draft was more radical in 
that it already featured a distribution key. According to the quoted Article 
3 of the Austrian Draft, such a key would be established ad hoc in each 
single reception case. It goes without saying that outcomes are less 
predictable under the Austrian Draft.926 A step forward taken by the latter 
was to imply that forcible reallocations are, in principle, undesirable. 
In Article 4, the Austrian Draft stipulates that the decision on 
implementing solidarity mechanisms 
shall also provide for financial assistance from the Community 
budget to cover certain costs generated by the admission of 
beneficiaries of temporary protection. The assistance shall include 
in particular contributions towards the cost of housing, welfare and 
education measures 
925 Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency, Draft Joint Action 
concerning temporary protection of displaced persons, Draft Joint Action concerning 
solidarity in the admission and residence of beneficiaries of the temporary protection of 
displaced persons, 9 November 1998, Doc. No. 12617/98 [hereinafter the Austrian 
Draft]. 
926 It must be recalled that a Joint Action of the proposed kind is not legally binding upon 
Member States. This should be kept in mind when judging its potential of stabilising 
Member States' expectations to be assisted in situations of crisis. That potential is wholly 
incumbent on whether or not Member States actually adopt a decision under Art. 2 of 
the 1998 Proposal or Art. 2 of the Austrian Proposal. Pursuant to Art. 249 TEC, 
decisions are binding instruments of Community law. 
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in accordance with the norms laid down in the 1998 TP Proposal as 
revised by the Council in 1998. 
Anoth"er decisive difference between the Austrian Draft and the 1998 
Solidarity Proposal was the latter's introduction of an obligatory linkage 
between temporary protection and burden-sharing. While the 1998 
Solidarity Proposal authorised the Council to take a decision on burden-
sharing when temporary protection was to be phased in, the Austrian 
Draft required the Council to decide on how to share the burden.927 The 
quorum for such a decision had not been fixed in the said proposal.928 
Actually, what the Austrian Presidency did was to make burden-sharing a 
precondition to admission.929 Without solidarity, there shall be no 
temporary protection regime. It is clear that those hurt most by such a 
blockage would be those persons in need of protection rather than other 
Member States. 
In spite of its compromise character, the Austrian Draft did not muster 
the necessary support among Member States. In early 1999, the whole 
stream of deliberations, negotiations and drafts set off with the 
Commission proposals had simply got stuck. Therefore, the German 
Presidency proposed a fresh start. The discussions of various drafts were 
discontinued and replaced by a principle debate, drawing on elements of 
consensus from the preceding discussions.930 
The core elements of the 1999 discussions were 
O a linkage between the admission decision and solidarity measures; 
O a pledging procedure, by which Member States would indicate 
their reception capacities in a given crisis situation; 
O fiscal burden-sharing as an incentive for reception; and 
927 Art. 2 of the Austrian Draft: 'When temporary protection regimes are adopted,[ ... ] the 
Council shall adopt decisions implementing solidarity mechanisms[ ... )'. 
928 The preference of the Austrian and German Presidencies had been a majority vote, 
lowering the threshold for a decision on burden-sharing. Obviously, other Member States 
bearing a lower protection burden will opt for a requirement of unanimity. 
929 The German Presidency taking over after the Austrian Presidency continued to uphold 
this linkage. See e.g. Note by the Presidency, Temporary Protection of displaced persons 
and solidarity in the admission and residence of such persons in the EU, 29 January 1999, 
Doc. No. 5645/99, para. 1.1.3. 
930 Table Document presented by the German Presidency at the JHA Council Meeting of 
11./12. February. On file with the author. 
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O the harmonization of residence rights and conditions of 
beneficiaries. 931 
In brief, burden-sharing would take place as follows. The Council would 
confirm the existence of a crisis and the need for joint action. Next, the 
Commission would draw up a report on the number of persons already 
protected in Member States and the number of persons still in the crisis 
area. Then, the Council would 'ascertain how many refugees [sic!] 
Member States were prepared to admit'. 932 It would decide to admit them 
only if enough places were made available by Member States to meet the 
known needs. 'Any possibility of taking the admission decision without 
coming close to covering the known admission needs would have to be 
ruled out, in order in particular to ensure that the number of places made 
available by the Member States was not restricted to the number of 
persons already residing in their territory.' 933 
After a Council decision, the persons already protected in a given 
Member State would be counted against the number of reception places 
that State had pledged. Spare places could be occupied by beneficiaries 
selected in admission procedures in the region of origin. Moreover, 
admission could also take place at the external borders of Member States. 
Where the Member State in question still had spare places, persons would 
be admitted to its territory under a temporary protection arrangement. If 
it had no more spare places, 'the person seeking admission would be 
asked' to proceed to a Member State willing to grant them admission.934 
Finally, financial support would depend on the number of persons 
admitted by a Member State. The level of social assistance guaranteed by a 
given State to its own nationals was proposed as a criterion for the cal-
culation of such support. However, the Note does not take a stand on 
whether the support percentage is to be fixed abstractly in the basic legal 
instrument, or contextually in the admission decision by the Council. To 
avoid secondary movements between Member States, the residence rights 
931 Council of the European Union, Note by the Presidency to the Asylum Working Party, 
Practical application of the principle of solidarity in burden-sharing with regard to the 
admission and residence of displaced persons, 31March1999, Doc. No. 7157/99. 
932 Ibid., II (A) 3. 
933 Ibid. 
934 Ibid. II (B) 1.c. 
307 
CHAPTER 8 
and conditions granted to beneficiaries must be harmonized throughout 
the Union. 
Quite obviously, the linkage of admission and burden-sharing is highly 
problematic. To make sense, it would require an almost perfect system of 
migration control. After all, the underlying idea is that Member States are 
free to choose whether to admit potential beneficiaries or not. This 
implies that the common external borders will simply be closed if 
Member States cannot agree on a sharing scheme in a specific crisis 
situation. 
This begs various questions. On the practical level, it is all too clear 
that borders cannot be sealed hermetically. Whatever Member States do to 
deflect flows, there will be ways and means to circumvent such measures. 
In the absence of a burden-sharing decision by the Council, the distri-
bution of protection seekers would continue to be determined by 
geographical proximity and the availability of efficient smuggling routes. 
On the legal level, the idea of voluntary admission is simply 
irreconcilable with the prohibition of refoulement. The Note by the 
German Presidency veils this ugly truth in a pretty formulation, when it 
ponders what to do when the reception system becomes numerically 
overstretched. 'If no Member State was willing to admit them [the persons 
seeking admission, GNJ, the Member State at whose external border the 
displaced persons were waiting would check whether it could admit them 
on the basis of national measures.'935 To wit, the Member State hosting 
the external border in question has no choice. It suffices that the persons 
'waiting at the border' invoke the prohibition of refoulement, and the 
Member State in question has to admit them for the duration of 
determination procedures. 936 
There is a moral-political dimension to the arrangement as well. 
Consider the following situation. The Council acknowledges the existence 
of a crisis, and the Commission has assessed the number of persons in 
need of protection. Now, the Member States cannot agree on a sharing 
scheme. In such a situation, it is politically troublesome to argue that the 
potential beneficiaries already counted by the Commission should not be 
admitted after all. If Member States go ahead and enforce non-admission, 
this is a slap in the face of a humanitarian interest formerly recognized by 
935 Ibid. 
936 This flows from the fact that Art. 33 GC is applicable already at the border. See chapter 
10.2.2.1 for a comprehensive argumentation. Compare also Art. 3 DC. 
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the Commission and the Council. If they do not, the linkage between 
admission and burden-sharing is dissolved. The Council might avoid this 
embarrassing dilemma by never acknowledging the existence of a crisis, 
which is the precondition for the whole exercise outlined in the Note. 
In its proposal, Germany had given up for lost the prospect of a 
predetermined insurance mechanism involving the sharing of people, 
which had been at the base of the 1994 German Draft. It is to be doubted 
whether it had won any gains in return, apart from keeping the issue of 
burden-sharing on the table. Presently, deliberations continue, and the 
fate of temporary protection and burden-sharing on the EU level remains 
undecided. 
8.3.5 The Experimental Instruments of 1997 to 1999 
Parallel to the deliberations on a comprehensive solution described in the 
preceding section, the Council, the Commission and the Member States 
gathered experience with small-scale burden-sharing by means of various 
pilot programmes on the reception and voluntary repatriation of specific 
categories of protection seekers. Typically, these programmes were 
endorsed for the duration of one year and operated with relatively 
moderate budgetary means. 937 Their importance lies not so much in the 
practical impact achieved with these limited resources, but rather with the 
testing of a new method of burden-sharing. In brief, the redistribution of 
means was channelled through the Community budget and subjected to a 
quite complex decision-making procedure, which makes the re-
distributionary effects rather difficult to predict and reconstruct. The 
project management was vertical and centralized, and the European 
Commission played the role of the administrator. 
The first couplet of instruments was launched in 1997, comprising the 
O Joint Action of 22 July 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the 
937 23.75 million Euro in 1997, 26.75 million Euro in 1998 and some 35 million Euro in 
1999. See Financial statement attached to EFR Proposal, para. 7.1. 
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financing of specific projects m favour of asylum-seekers and 
refugees938, and the 
O Joint Action of 22 July 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the 
financing of specific projects in favour of displaced persons who 
have found temporary protection in the Member States and 
asylum-seekers. 939 
In March 1998, the Council prolonged the experiment by adopting a 
corresponding couplet of Joint Actions. They were the 
0 Joint Action of 27 March 1998 adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning 
the financing of specific projects in favour of asylum-seekers and 
refugees940, and the 
0 Joint Action of 27 March 1998 adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning 
the financing of specific projects in favour of displaced persons 
who have found temporary protection in the Member States and 
asylum-seek~rs. 941 
The first instrument in each year's couplet was explicitly designated as 
implementing the 1995 Resolution942 and dealt with projects intended to 
improve admission facilities for asylum-seekers and refugees in the 
Member States. The second instrument in each couplet was seized with 
supporting projects intended to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of 
displaced persons as well as asylum-seekers. As spelt out in the preamble 
of the 1988 Joint Action on Improving Admission, 'taking action in 
favour of asylum-seekers and refugees in the Member States is likely to 
improve facilities for the admission of such persons and to encourage the 
sharing of responsibility between the Member States'. The nature of 
938 OJ (1997) L 205, pp. 5-6. The aggregate cost under this joint action was not to exceed 
ECU 3.75 million in 1997. 
939 OJ (1997) L 205, pp. 3-4. The aggregate cost under this joint action was not to exceed 
ECU 10 million in 1997. 
940 OJ (1998) L 138, pp. 8-9 [henceforth 1998 Joint Action on Improving Admission]. 
941 OJ (1998) L 138, pp. 6-7 [henceforth 1998 Joint Action on Facilitating Repatriation]. 
942 See Art. 1 (2) of the 1998 Joint Action on Improving Admission. 
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projects was not further specified. Under the 1998 Joint Action on 
Facilitating Return, where a corresponding objective of burden-sharing 
and facilitation is expressed in the preamble, the scope was set to cover 
education for minors, vocational training, information on the country of 
origin, twinning of local administrative areas and transport costs.943 
In 1999, and partly in reaction to the ongoing Kosovo crisis, the 
Council adopted the 
O Joint Action of 26 April 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing 
projects and measures to provide practical support in relation to 
the reception and voluntary repatriation of refugees, displaced 
persons and asylum seekers, including emergency assistance to 
persons who have fled as a result of recent events in Kosovo.944 
Compared to earlier instruments, the 1999 Joint Action is much more 
detailed and features some new approaches. In it, reception and voluntary 
repatriation are dealt with under one and the same instrument, and 
emergency assistance is added to its material scope. The 1999 Joint Action 
offers financial contributions from the Community budget to long-term 
structural improvements of Member States' ·protection systems as well as 
emergency measures in the context of the Kosovo crisis. The beneficiaries 
of programmes and actions financed under the 1999 Joint Action are 
defined945, and the three areas of assistance (improvement of reception 
conditions and the asylum procedure, voluntary repatriation, emergency 
assistance) are carefully circumscribed. 946 Projects to be financed under the 
1999 Joint Action are to be selected along a number of rather flexibly 
worded criteria947, while the eligibility decision is conferred upon a 
Committee composed of one representative of each Member State and 
chaired by the European Commission.948 
943 Art. 1 (2) of the 1998 Joint Action on Facilitating Repatriation. 
944 OJ (1999) L 114, pp. 2-5 [henceforth 1999 Joint Action]. 
945 See Art. 3 Kosovo Joint Action, offering definitions of the terms 'refugees', 'displaced 
persons' (interestingly, persons offered subsidiary protection are included under this 
category) and 'asylum seekers'. 
946 Arts 4-6 of the 1999 Joint Action. 
947 Art. 7 of the 1999 Joint Action. 
948 Art. 13 of the 1999 Joint Action. 
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As all five Joint Actions enumerated above are directed at the 
Communities rather than the Member States, they are binding. 
Irrespective of their very limited ambitions, at the time of writing the 
experimental instruments represent the only tangible expression of a 
concrete will to share burdens. 
8.3.6 The Proposal on a European Refugee Fund 
While the Council still quibbled about grand schemes, the European 
Commission prepared a new document, drawing on the experiences 
gathered with the experimental instruments in the period 1997-9. In 
December 1999, the Commission launched a 
O Proposal for a Council Decision creating a European Refugee 
Fund949, 
making use of its competencies under Article 63 (2) (b) TEC. At the time 
of writing, the Proposal was still being negotiated in the Council. 
However, given that it continues the innovative line of thought 
introduced by the aforementioned experimental instruments, there are 
good reasons to take a closer look at some of its features. 
To start with, the Proposal replicates the comprehensive approach of 
the 1999 Joint Action by merging the separate items of earlier 
experimental instruments into one single framework. Thus, the ERF 
Proposal spans from the reception of asylum seekers, to the integration of 
refugees, to measures promoting voluntary return. Second, it introduces 
pluriennial planning by shifting from the one-year time frame of the 
experimental instruments to a five-year period.950 Third, the Proposal 
seeks to inhibit that emergencies cannibalize on long-term development 
by separating structural measures intended for long-term improvements 
949 COM (1999) 686, 14 December 1999. 
950 This move was primarily motivated by the difficulties to run and evaluate integration 
projects within twelve months only. ERF Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum. 
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and capacity-building from emergency funds. 951 Moreover, as a novelty, a 
maximum of ten percent of the funds earmarked for structural measures 
may be used for evaluative studies on best practices. 952 The largest part of 
the total budget is dedicated to stuctural measures (26 million Euro in 
2000), while a substantial sum is reserved for emergency measures (10 
million Euro in 2000). 
Compared to the experimental instruments, the ERF Proposal 
distinguishes itself by introducing a decentralized management struc-
ture953, drawing on the model of EC Structural Funds.954 While the 
European Commission maintains a supervisory role, it is up to the 
Member States to draft, select and administer the funded programmes. 
These programmes are co-financed by the ERF and the Member State. 
Programme objectives are agreed upon by the Commission and the 
relevant Member State, while the latter is solely responsible for 
implementation. 
How, then, are the funds to be distributed among Member States? In 
contrast to the rather lofty criteria given in the 1999 Joint Action, the 
ERF Proposal seeks to operate with a predominantly mathematical 
approach. Resources for structural measures will be distributed in 
proportion to the number of applications for some form of international 
protection registered by each Member State and the number of people 
granted refugee status or temporary protection in the last three years. The 
number of applications for protection will be given a 65 percent weight-
ing, against 35 percent for the number of refugees accepted and displaced 
persons receiving temporary protection.955 'This is', says the Commission 
in its Explanatory Memorandum, 
951 Art. 5 ERF Proposal. The European Commission motivates this innovation as follows: 
'Experience in 1999 has also shown that the aim of financing "structural" measures in the 
area covered by Article 63 of the EC Treaty can be completely undermined by the sort of 
mass influx of refugees that occurs in the event of a crisis. In the absence of a specific 
budget heading to cater for emergencies, the entire financial allocation originally 
earmarked for heading BS-803 was spent on emergency measures for people who had fled 
from Kosovo.' ERF proposal, Financial statement, para. 7.1. 
952 Art. 4 ERF Proposal. 
953 Art. 6 ERF Proposal. 
954 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 
on the Structural Funds, OJ (1999) L 161/1. 
955 Art. 9 ERF Proposal. 
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because refugees start out by seeking protection before they are 
granted refugee status. Furthermore, most [of] them are entitled to 
support for the duration of the procedure, which, given the scope 
for appeal, can be very long. Lastly, integration measures concern 
only recognised refugees and displaced persons. These groups 
account for only a relatively small proportion of applicants and, as 
the integration measures take effect, they are expected to become 
gradually less dependent on benefits.956 
Different is the solution chosen for emergency measures, for which 80 
percent of the available resources shall be distributed on the basis of the 
number of persons having entered each Member State, and 20 percent on 
the basis of the quality of proposed projects. 957 
Interestingly, UNHCR958 and ECRE959 greeted these allocation criteria 
with scepticism. Both actors proposed that even Member States whose 
asylum systems need upgrading should benefit from reallocation under 
the ERF. It is noteworthy that this proposal reverses the order of 
gratification. From a protection perspective, burden-sharing should 
motivate the large receivers of protection seekers to keep their doors open 
and to refrain from introducing restrictive measures, since the latter 
would cause ripple effects all over Europe, enticing even minor receivers 
to close their doors. In such a context, it is questionable whether a 
redistribution of resources to minor receivers of protection seekers makes 
956 ERF Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum. Commentary on single articles, Article 9. 
957 Art. 20 (5) ERF Proposal. 
958 UNHCR, UNHCR Observations on the Commission Proposal for a Council Decision 
creating a European Refugee Fund (COM (1999) 686 final), 29 February 2000. In its 
observations, UNHCR proposes additional support for Member States with less 
developed asylum systems, suggests a clear inclusion of persons enjoying complimentary 
forms of protection among the group of beneficiaries and shows concern that funded 
tasks and activities are overtly focused on the avoidance of secondary movements rather 
than based on the need for measures to improve the fairness and efficiency of the asylum 
process. 
959 ECRE, Comments by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Commission 
Proposal for a Council Decision creating a European Refugee Fund, February 2000. 
ECRE is largely supportive of the ERF Proposal, but points out that a) persons granted 
complementary forms of protection seem .o be excluded from the scope of the proposal, 
b) individual legal counselling is not clearly covered, c) partnership arrangements with 
NGO's are neglected, and d) the proposal favours countries which already have received 
large numbers of refugees in the past, whereas stronger investments in such countries as 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain would be needed. 
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sense; it would not in any case keep the minor receivers from 
participating in the spiral of restriction, while carrying the additional risk 
of alienating larger receivers. From a political perspective, though, a 
redistribution to minor receivers might facilitate consensus on future, 
more comprehensive schemes, sweetening the pill of growing protection 
obligations. 
Thus, the ERF Proposal is all about fiscal burden-sharing, and its 
redistributionary effects are confined to a budget roughly equivalent to 
those of the experimental pilot programmes in the phase 1997-9. As an 
example, its total budget amounted to 26 million Euro for the year 2000. 
A look at the Financial Statement of the ERF Proposal confirms that this 
is but a drop in the ocean. The average annual amount disposed under the 
experimental instrument in 1997-9 
fell far short of what was needed on the ground. As regards aid 
measures for reception and voluntary repatriation in particular, the 
financial assistance requested in 1997 exceeded the allocation 
available by 30%. This rose to 45% in 1998 and 850% in 1999 (as a 
result of the Kosovo crisis}. The Commission estimates that more 
than half of the requests which could not be satisfied qualified for 
Community joint financing.960 
This alone makes clear that the ambitions of the ERF Proposal are 
limited, and that its impact on the problem of inequitable burdens is 
marginal.961 After all, a 1995 ICMPD study has indicated that care and 
maintenance costs in the Swedish protection system alone amounted to 1 
144 million US$ in 1994.962 
Why this modesty? From earlier discussions in the Council, the 
Commission had learnt the lesson that people sharing is difficult to 
achieve, and that Member States are not easily lured into comprehensive 
960 ERF Proposal, Financial statement, para. 7.1. 
961 ECRE qualifies this budget as 'inadequate to the daunting task of ensuring that all 
Member States achieve success in integration and a high standard of fairness and 
efficiency in reception of refugees'. ECRE, Comments by the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles on the Commission Proposal for a Council Decision creating a 
European Refugee Fund, February 2000, p. 1. 
962 M. Jandl, Structure and Costs of the Refugee and Asylum Systems in Seven European 
Countries (1995, ICMPD, Vienna), p. 138. In 1996, 64 300 persons were benefiting from 
the Swedish system. Ibid. p. 137. 
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schemes. Nonetheless, the ERF Proposal further develops the rather 
innovative approach of institutional burden-sharing adopted with the 
experimental instruments. Compared to an unregulated state of affairs or 
a mere pleading procedure, it offers the advantage of greater predictability. 
On the other hand, it is far from being as rigid as the mathematical 
approach of the 1994 German Draft. 
Exactly how it will strike fiscally is difficult to predict, because the 
redistributionary mechanism built into it is quite complex. To track 
whom is footing the bill in a particular refugee crisis many factors must be 
brought together. First, the various contributions of Member States to the 
community budget have to be taken into account. Second, recourse must 
be made to the rules of proportional redistribution in the ERF Proposal as 
well as to the actual numbers of protection seekers and refugees in a given 
year and the quality of the projects proposed. The aggregate redistribution 
is, accordingly, a function of the payments by a Member State into the 
community budget and the funding it receives from structural as well as 
emergency funds. 
This much is clear-the institutional detour taken by the ERF Proposal 
makes it more arduous to predict gains and losses for single Member 
States. The question is whether this insecurity actually furthers or hinders 
willingness to consent to the scheme. The rationale of the ERF Proposal is 
to test whether the model of the experimental instruments can be 
expanded to a larger time-frame without endangering the consensus 
among Member States. Against this background, it makes sense that its 
budget is still rather limited, inciting reluctant Member States to take on 
the gamble. 
8.4 Concentrating the Burden 
Elsewhere, we have outlined that burden-sharing and admission norms are 
interdependent. 963 We have also depicted the rather elaborate mechanism 
for deflecting movements to the Union's territories created by EU 
institutions and the Member States. Such mechanisms comprise pre-entry 
measures-carrier sanctions, pre-exit immigration controls, technical 
assistance to third countries' exit control, interdiction and containment of 
963 See chapter 3.1 above. 
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asylum seekers in third countries-as well as post-entry measures, such as 
norms of reallocation to safe third countries.964 
Here, we have a concrete example of interdependence: As we shall see 
in the following, reallocation along the concept of safe third countries 
aggravates the unequal distribution of protection seekers in Europe. Thus 
the mechanism of deflection impacts not only on single asylum-seekers, 
but also on the protection responsibilities in single Member States. The 
flagship of the acquis, namely the Dublin Convention, will be the first test 
case to prove our point, while the reallocation from Member States to safe 
third countries in Central Europe shall serve as the second. 
8.4.1 Concentration Effects of the Dublin Convention 
The rules laid down in the Dublin Convention serve_ inter alia to_ 
eliminate the processing of multiple applications filed in different Member 
States. A Member State responsible for a certain application will take over 
the task of processing the application together with the obligation to take 
charge of the applicant.965 With regard to allocation, two stages must be 
distinguished. After the responsibility of a given state has been established, 
an applicant is temporarily allocated to that state. After a positive status 
decision by that state, the latter will normally allow an applicant to 
remain on its territory subject to its national legislation. A positive status 
decision will turn the temporary allocation into a more permanent one. In 
a formal sense, the Dublin Convention only has a bearing on temporary 
allocation. But in cases falling under some of the protection categories of 
the responsible state, more permanent allocation measures may be 
indirectly triggered. 
At this stage, it could be objected that burden-sharing, as understood by 
the Member States of the European Union, mainly focuses on other 
categories of protection seekers than refugees, while the application of the 
Dublin Convention explicitly has been limited to applicants for asylum 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention.966 In other words, it would be 
unnecessary to deal with the Dublin Convention within the framework of 
this chapter. Such an objection would, however, disregard the fact that 
™ See chapter 5 above. 
% 5 Arts 10 and 11 DC. 
%6 Art. 1 DC. On the Resolution on Burden-Sharing, see chapter 8.3.2 above. 
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even protection seekers not falling under the 1951 Refugee Convention to 
a very large extent apply for asylum. Moreover, as shown above, the 
mandate of Article 63 (2) (b) TEC covers both refugees and other 
categories of protection seekers. In this respect, the Dublin Convention 
must be scrutinized even with a view to its effect on cases in need of 
protection, which do not necessarily fulfil the criteria of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention definition. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the categories of Convention 
refugees on one hand and other protection seekers on the other can be 
kept apart before an individual assessment is carried out. The 
development of temporary protection practices and the postponement of 
individual status assessment vis-a-vis protection seekers from former 
Yugoslavia illustrates the problem of mixed categories in a very graphic 
fashion. Affected states claimed that the process of breaking up that group 
along different categorizations in an individual procedure would have 
consumed too much time and too many resources. Suffice it to note that 
neither the 1995 Resolution nor the various Solidarity Proposals provide a 
solution to this problem. 
We cannot but conclude that an analysis of protection schemes for 
other categories than Convention refugees must include the factual 
allocation effected by the Dublin Convention, which is, in that respect, of 
importance for any burden-sharing mechanism to be developed. 
This is so because the allocation criteria contained in the Dublin 
Convention risk stabilizing an inequitable distribution of processing and 
reception burdens. An assessment of this risk motivates a closer look at 
the distributive key immanent in both instruments, namely the criteria 
along which the responsibility for examination is allocated. 
We recall that, in order of priority, the following criteria will steer the 
allocation of responsibility: 
1. family, 
2. residence and entry permits, 
3. entry, and 
4. state in which the application was first lodged. %l 
967 See chapter 5.2.1.1 above. 
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It has been stated earlier that geographical proximity to crisis regions and 
family ties were among the factors leading to the inequitable distribution 
of protection seekers fleeing the Balkan crisis.968 In this respect, it must be 
asked how the responsibility criteria relate to these factors. Do they 
counteract concentration tendencies, or do they reinforce them? 
The top priority of family ties is indispensable from a human rights 
perspective. From a distributive point of view, however, it must be 
acknowledged that it may lead to a further accumulation of refugees in 
major recipient countries. Inequitable sharing of protection seekers is 
aggravated by family reunion. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the 
group of persons falling under that norm is narrowly defined in two ways. 
Firstly, the concept of family is reduced to a core of spouse and children 
under 18; secondly, the family reunion criterion is only triggered by the 
presence of a family member who is recognized as a Convention refugee. 
Other protection categories fall outside the scope of this norm and, 
accordingly, under the discretion of the states involved.969 
The second criterion, concerning residence and entry permits, may not 
be as crucial for a fair distribution of protection seekers, as states can 
reduce the risk of attracting the responsibility for applications by simply 
being very restrictive in the issuing of such permits. 
The criterion on entry, however, is of utmost importance as it is 
intimately related to geographic proximity. To some extent, states can 
resort to more effective entry control through visa requirements linked to 
carrier sanctions and reinforced border surveillance. However, it is an 
empirically established fact970 that borders cannot be sealed hermetically. 
Accordingly, states whose borders are more exposed to illegal entry 
968 See text accompanying note 854 above. 
969 Art. 9 DC reads as follows: 'Any Member State, even when it is not responsible under 
the criteria laid out in this Convention, may for humanitarian reasons, based in particular 
on family or cultural grounds, examine an application for asylum at the request of 
another Member State, provided that the applicant so desires.' It must be observed, 
however, that the protection of family life under Art. 8 ECHR may force states to allow 
family reunion even for certain categories of protection seekers not falling under the 1951 
Refugee Convention. 
970 Official German statistics indicate that the majority of asylum seekers manage to 
circumvent border controls and to apply for asylum in-country. This sheds some light on 
the efficacy of one of the most developed border surveillance systems in Europe. For 
more on this topic, see Noll, 1997a, p. 415. 
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attempts will automatically be subject to larger numbers of asylum 
applications. 
All in all, the third and fourth criteria are prone to further reinforce 
concentration in States that already carry a considerable processing and 
reception burden. To a limited extent, the same goes for the criterion on 
family reunion. The present author published these findings in 1997; they 
were exclusively based on a legal analysis of the Dublin Convention.971 As 
will be shown in the following, the statistics that are currently available 
have confirmed the correctness of that analysis to its full extent.972 
Let us take Germany as an illustration of the accumulated effects of the 
Dublin criteria.973 Initially, the German government had set high hopes 
for the Dublin Convention, only to later discover that its application 
971 G. Noll, 'Prisoners' Dilemma in Fortress Europe. On the Prospects of Burden Sharing in 
the European Union', 40 GYIL 405 (1997), pp. 431-6. 
972 In its Dublin Working Paper, the European Commission has attempted to summarise the 
statistics as follows: ' Unfortunately, the statistics[ ... ] are incomplete, and this makes it 
very di~ult to draw up an overall analysis.[ ... ] In 1998, the incomplete figures record 
approximately 3 000 transfers out of Member States and around 4 500 transfers into 
Member States under the Dublin Convention (if the figures were complete, these figures 
should of course correspond). On this basis, it would appear that less than two percent of 
asylum applicants are transferred between the Member States under the Convention. On 
the basis of the figures available for 1998 and 1999, Germany and Austria are the main 
net recipients of asylum applicants under the Convention. For both of these Member 
States, applicants transferred in under the Convention account for about 4% of all asylum 
applicants. The main net "exporter" of asylum applicants under the Convention is 
Denmark, which succeeds in transferring about 18% of all asylum applicants. The next 
best performer in numerical terms, the United Kingdom, transfers only about 1% of 
asylum applicants. The performance of Denmark apparently reflects the successful 
operation of a bilateral agreement with Germany, and it will be instructive to examine 
and build upon the experience of bilateral agreements between the Member States to 
improve the application of the Dublin Convention.' Dublin Working Paper, para. 38. 
973 The following presentation with regard to Germany and the other Member States is 
based on official statistics as reproduced in: Committee set up by Article 18 of the Dublin 
Convention, Dublin Convention-Statistical data on the application of the Convention 
from 1 July to 30 September 1998, 6 January 1999, Doc. No. DUBLIN CONV 
2415/1/98. As noted below, two Member States did not make data available for that 
period. This is a common problem. However, comparisons with earlier statistics reveal 
that the basic pattern of distribution is not substantially different, and that Germany is 
one of the most heavily burdened Member States under the operation of the Dublin 
Convention. See also Letter of 18 August 1998 by the Federal Office for the Recognition 
of Refugees (Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung auslandischer Fliichtlinge) on the 
implementation of the Schengen and Dublin Conventions (on file with the author). 
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leaves Germany with a net increase of cases. This increase affects not only 
applications, but also decisions on accepted requests and actual transfers. 
Number of Rejected Accepted Transfer 
transfer requests requests of persons 
requests 
From other 
Member States 5390 771 3818 1199 
to Germany (14%) (71%) 
From Germany 
to other 1517 529 661 363 
Member States (35%) (43%) 
Table 3: Distribution of cases under the Dublin Convention between Germany 
and other Member States, 1 July-30 September 1998974 
The statistics for the period reproduced in Table 3 show that the number 
of applications received by Germany was more than three times the 
number of applications it submitted to other Member States. When 
looking at the outcome of applications, that is, actual transfers, the same 
proportions prevail. Germany received three times the number of cases it 
sent out to other Member States. Of the total 26 399 asylum applications 
during the period scrutinized, the number of transfer requests received by 
Germany represented 20.41 percent. Thus, in the same period, the Dublin 
Convention supplied one fifth of total asylum applications in the German 
protection bureaucracy. 
In total numbers, Germany topped the statistics with regard to both 
applications and actual transfers.975 The analysis can be carried further by 
974 The percentages in the second and third column do not add up to 100, as not all transfer 
requests were decided during the period in question. 
975 In second rank with regard to applications, we find Italy with 1 713 received applications, 
on the basis of which a mere 76 persons were transferred. In second rank with regard to 
transfer of persons, we find Austria with 127 transfers. 
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looking at each Member State separately. It is sufficient to establish which 
states are net senders and which net receivers under the Dublin 
Convention. The following overview is based on the first and third 
quarters of 1998, as compiled in Table 4.976 The second and third columns 
('Requests') establish the ratio of received to submitted transfer requests. 
This serves to deduce whether the country in question is a net receiver 
('R'), a net sender ('S') or neither ('P'). The first number relates to requests 
submitted to other Member States, while the second number relates to 
requests received from other Member States. The fourth and fifth columns 
('Transfers') establish the ratio of persons received from and persons sent 
to other Member States. The first number represents persons sent to other 
Member States, while the second number represents persons transferred 
from other Member States. The signals 'R', 'S' and 'P' are used 
correspondingly. For further clarification, Member States that are overall 
net receivers are highlighted with bold letters.977 
976 The available following official statistics have been used in the present analysis: 
Committee set up by Article 18 of the Dublin Convention, Dublin Convention-
Statistical data on the application of the Convention from 1 July to 30 September 1998, 6 
January 1999, Doc. No. DUBLIN CONV 2415/1/98. Committee set up by Article 18 of 
the Dublin Convention, Dublin Convention-Statistical data on the application of the 
Convention from 1 January to 31 March 1998, 25 September 1998, Doc. No. DUBLIN 
CONV 2407/1/98. 
977 For the purposes of the present analysis, an overall net receiver is a Member State rated 
with 'R' in at least one column and not rated with 'S' in any column. 
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Member Requests Requests Transfers Transfers 
State 1/1-31/3 1/1-30/9 1/1-31/3 1/1-30/9 
1998 1998 1998 1998 
Austria 62/77 (R) 66/436 (R) 2/5 (R) 8/127 (R) 
Belgium 422/180 (S) 339/272 (S) -/72 (?) (?) 
Denmark 531/24 (S) 381/101 (S) 137/19 (S) 259/14 (S) 
Finland 3/16 (R) 33/11 (S) -/7 (?) 0/0 (P) 
France 257/471 (R) (?) 86/91 (R) (?) 
Germany 865/2280 (R) 1517/5390(R) 90/420 (R) 363/1199 (R) 
Greece -/162 (?) 2/168 (R) -/1 (?) 1/13 (R) 
Ireland 43/10 (S) 46/20 (S) 0/8 (R) 20/20 (P) 
Italy 145/189 (R) 63/1713 (R) 1/5 (R) 2/76 (R) 
Luxembourg 15/5 (S) 21/1 (S) (?) 0/0 (P) 
Netherlands 1163/155 (S) (?) 71/57 (S} (?} 
Portugal 5/40 (R) 7/32 (R) -/11 (?) 0/0 (P) 
Spain 58/192 (R) 36/139 (R) 2/22 (R) 1/13 (R) 
Sweden 95/27 (S) 912/38 (S) 17/- (?) 0/0 (P) 
United Kingdom 535/35 (S) 604/30 (S) 120/24 (S) 181/15 (S) 
'R' implies net receiver 
'P' implies parity 
'S' implies net sender 
' - ' implies that no statistics were available for the period 
'?' implies that no deduction on status can be drawn from the statistics 
Table 4: Net Senders and Net Receivers under the Dublin Convention in the First 
and Third Quarter of 1998. 
Apart from Germany, the net receivers of applications and transfers are 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. With the exception of 
France, these countries have in common that they host an external border 
at the Eastern or Southern flank of the Union. 
Thus, the statistics collated by the Member States prove that the 
Dublin criteria provide for burden concentration instead of burden-
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sharing.978 What does this mean for future developments in the field of 
protection? 
On a national level, more affected states will be inclined to cut back 
protection and benefits for those groups not covered by international law. 
The rationale for doing so is, firstly, to create a disincentive for potential 
asylum seekers and, secondly, to stretch resources. In this context, it 
should be remembered that Germany received the vast majority of 
Bosnian protection seekers. However, most of these protection seekers 
were merely tolerated. This must be compared with other more affected 
countries like Sweden that accorded a comparably favourable humani-
tarian status to the majority of Bosnian protection seekers.979 
Translated into real terms, this means that a viable burden-sharing 
strategy first and foremost would need to break free from the 
conservation of inequality by the Dublin Convention. Considering the 
geographical and demographic differences among European States, the 
effect of this instrument and the quest for equitable burden-sharing are 
simply not compatible. It is somewhat ironic that the strategy of 
mitigating protection responsibilities by means of migration control not 
only strikes back at those in need of protection, but also at one of the 
major proponents of this strategy-Germany. But there are good reasons 
to suspect that other safe third country-mechanisms have the same 
detrimental effect. Inspired by the Western European pioneers, 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe, in Africa and in North 
America have started to copy the concept. The number of agreements on 
the readmission of third-country nationals is multiplying at an amazing 
pace.980 These developments ignore the forceful warning signal emanating 
from the experiences with the Dublin system. 
978 This is confirmed by the European Commission in its Dublin Working Paper, para. 35. 
However, the Commission simultaneously asserts that the Dublin 'system can not be said 
to be putting an excessive burden on any Member State'. Ibid. - It is ironic that the 
misgivings on burden-concentration raised during the deliberations of the 1989 Draft 
agreement on the responsibility for examining asylum requests were fully confirmed by 
the practice under the Dublin Convention. See note 331 above. 
979 Sweden linked the granting of humanitarian status largely to permanent residence 
permits. Beneficiaries were granted access to the labour market. By contrast, toleration 
implies that the person in question is still under an obligation to leave. However, this 
obligation is non-executable. A toleration permit is valid for a maximum of one year. 
980 See chapter 5.2.2.2 above. 
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Based on the logic of these developments, a burden-sharing mechanism 
stretching over both Convention refugees and other categories is indeed 
the key for safeguarding refugee protection on the territory of the 
Member States. Such a broad mechanism is mandated by Article 63 (2) (b) 
TEC. If combined with a material harmonization of protection categories 
and reception standards, it would mitigate competition for deflection as 
well as for the downgrading of territorial protection. Ideally, such a 
mechanism should have been launched concurrently with the mechanisms 
of migration control, so as to inhibit the latter setting the preconditions 
for the operation of the former.981 
8.4.2 Concentration Effects of Safe Third Country-
Arrangements 
At present, it is extremely difficult to analyze the redistributionary effects 
of safe third country mechanisms between the EU Member States and the 
applicant countries. In contrast to the information available on the 
operation of the Dublin Convention, comprehensive statistics reflecting 
country-to-country readmission of persons falling under safe-third-
country mechanisms simply do not exist.982 However, from the limited 
statistical material available983, a few trends worthy of reflection emerge. 
981 In this respect, it is of interest to compare development in the European Union with 
bilateral developments between Germany and Poland. The European Union's Member 
States put a readmission mechanism in place without any linkage to the question of 
burden-sharing. In contradistinction to this, the named bilateral arrangement seized the 
opportunity by linking readmission with rudimentary forms of burden-sharing. In both 
cases, the readmission agreements covering return of third country nationals a) contained 
a burden-sharing clause for cases of massive inflows and b) were coupled to an agreement 
on financial assistance. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und der Regierung der Republik Polen iiber die Zusammenarbeit 
hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen von Wanderungsbewegungen, 7 May 1993, BGBI. 1997 II, 
pp. 1734-6, Arts 6 and 2. 
982 The statistics available often refer to return measures at large, without breaking down 
numbers into cases with and without asylum dimensions. Regarding asylum returns, a 
distinction between pre- and post-procedure returns is frequently lacking. It is true that 
single countries produce such statistics, but these are collected according to quite different 
methodologies and, alas, often classified. 
983 UNHCR collects data on the processing of asylum applications worldwide, while ICMPD 
collects data on migration movements in the countries participating in the Central Euro-
pean Initiative. This author is indebted to both organisations for providing relevant data. 
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In the associated countries at large, the number of filed protection seekers 
has been on the rise throughout the last years, albeit from a very low 
base.984 From 1996 to 1997, the aggregate number of applications in the 
associated countries rose by 35 percent to some 10 000 cases, the number 
Germany could receive in a month.985 During more recent years, 
candidate countries have topped the application statistics. In 1998, 
Hungary came first with 7 100 applicants, the Czech Republic second 
with 4 080 applicants and Poland third with 3 370 applicants. At present, 
these three countries are rightly attracting a great deal of attention in the 
migrational context, due to their shared land borders with current EU 
Member States. For Slovenia and Estonia, the numbers are relatively low, 
and the statistical break-up incomplete. Therefore, the following analysis 
will focus solely on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (see Table 
5). 
In 1998 the recognition rates in all three countries were markedly 
lower than the average of all European States. Poland recognized a mere 
1.9 percent of all applicants as 1951 Convention refugees, which must be 
compared to the European average of 9.7 percent. The corresponding 
numbers were 2.8 percent for the Czech Republic and 7.8 percent for 
Hungary. The differential is even higher when comparing the total 
number of recognitions, accumulating 1951 Convention status and other 
protection-related statuses. Only Hungary offers an alternative status 
beyond the 1951 Convention, which boosts its total recognition rate to 
13.0 percent. The European average is still significantly higher at 23.7 
percent. Poland and the Czech Republic have no alternative status on 
offer, which explains their total recognition rates of an alarming 1.9 
percent and 2.8 percent respectively. From this perspective, both 
countries are among the most restrictive in Europe. This confirms the 
logic of evasion inherent in burden-shifting. When faced with large 
burdens-be they real or merely anticipated-states react by retaliating 
against protection seekers. 
Second, a marked feature of the three candidate countries is the high 
number of cases closed on either formal grounds or due to the 
disappearance of the claimant. While the European average is a rate of 
984 IOM/ICMPD, 1999, p. 28 
985 By way of example, 10 877 persons applied for asylum in Germany during January 1997. 
For the rest of the year, the monthly number varied between 7 750 and 9 760 applying 
persons. Source: German Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
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18.4 percent, Hungary closed 25.8 percent of all cases on which a decision 
was taken. The corresponding numbers for Poland (54.8 percent) and the 
Czech Republic (76.5 percent) are even more striking. Generally, there is 
no breakdown available as to how many cases are closed due to 
disappearance of the claimant, and how many are closed on other formal 
grounds. However, various indicators suggest that disappearance is the 
dominating reason. 986 By way of comparison, the rate for cases otherwise 
closed was 9.9 percent for Germany in 1998. Of the 5 760 pertinent cases, 
roughly 2 500 cases were closed due to withdrawal of the application, 
which can be formally presumed by the authorities when the applicant 
fails to maintain contact with them. This makes up approximately two 
percent of the total number of applications.987 
Disappearances under procedure are often interpreted as confirmation 
that the applicant is 'abusing' asylum procedures in the candidate country, 
considered a mere base camp while attempting onward migration to 
Western Europe. This interpretation reinforces the image of bogus 
refugees, whose motivations are in reality economic. Yet against the 
background of low recognition numbers and the limited availability of 
alternative statuses, a person with a genuine protection need may act 
wisely when attempting to migrate onwards. The conclusion that each 
disappearance represents an economic migrant is, therefore, simply 
unwarranted. 
It is quite another matter if persons attempt to migrate westwards after 
they have been recognized as refugees. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this happens, but it is naturally hard to substantiate this claim with any 
official statistics. If refugees indeed embark on such onward migration, 
they are surely not always taking a wise decision. Due to safe third 
country-mechanisms, protection may not be readily available for such 
persons. Moreover, practices can be harsher even for those protected. 
Germany started out with return of Bosnians comparatively early, while 
Hungary provided protection to the same group for a longer period. 
All aspects considered, the high number of disappearances in the three 
above-mentioned candidate countries does not alter the conclusion on 
986 For 1997, the Polish administration stated that 89 % of all applicants disappeared during 
procedures. Source ICMPD questionnaire (on file with the author). 
987 In another 1 440 cases of the pertinent 5 760 cases, the applicant was found to be from a 
safe third country, which inhibited her from invoking the asylum provision of the 
German basic law. 
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their restrictive practices. Obviously, the differentials for recognition rates 
between the three countries and the European average are much higher 
than those for rejection rates. 
In conclusion, safe third country mechanisms may produce effects 
similar to those under the Dublin Convention. For the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, the rising number of asylum applications was 
hardly unanticipated. Therefore, it is not surprising that these countries 
seek to limit their protection burden by avoiding the introduction of 
subsidiary protection categories and maintaining restrictive recognition 
practices. 
Member Convention Total Rejection Otherwise 
State recognition recognition rate closed rate 
rate rate (material (formal 
grounds) grounds) 
Czech Republic 2,8 2,8 20,6 76,5 
Hungary 7,9 13,0 61,1 25,8 
Poland 1,9 1,9 43,3 54,8 
European 9,7 23,7 57,9 18,4 
average 
Source: UNHCR, Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe in 1998: A Statistical Assessment 
with a Special Emphasis on Kosovo Albanians, Geneva, March 1999. 
Table 5: Outcomes of Asylum Applications in Three Candidate Countries in 1998 
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8.5 Two Interpretive Approaches 
Concluding on the preceding sections, it has emerged that Union law as 
well as Community law lack sufficiently broad and elaborate material 
norms on burden-sharing. Both legal systems feature procedural norms, 
which, taken by themselves, cannot secure the necessary predictability to 
produce openness in crisis situations. As shown earlier, international law 
does not contain an obligation to share the burdens of protection. 
Therefore, the absence of material burden-sharing norms in the law of the 
European Union does not violate international law. It remains to be seen 
whether this absence may violate norms of a higher dignity within the law 
of the European Union. 
The attempts to mould burden-sharing into a legal form within the EU 
could serve to support both an affirmative and a negative answer to this 
question. One could argue that the norms on burden-sharing stipulated in 
the EU context provide support for stating the existence of an obligation 
to share burdens in the law of the European Union. Alternatively, one 
could argue that these norms were adopted beyond legal obligations 
within the realm of discretion of the European Council and the Member 
States. Yet both interpretations are apparently beyond a mere legal-
technical understanding of the law, and they therefore actualize the sphere 
of qualitative arguments expounded earlier.988 To be specific, the question 
is what perspective is best equipped to explain burden-sharing in the law 
of the European Union-one that focuses on the needs of protection 
seekers, or one that focuses on the needs of states? 
In the following, two theoretical extrapolations of burden-sharing shall 
be presented. The first takes a protection-oriented perspective, and seeks 
to explain burden-sharing as a part of the subsidiarity principle in the law 
of European Union. By contrast, the second extrapolation, based on a 
game-theoretical analysis, seeks to find convincing logical reasons why 
burden-sharing cannot be a binding norm of law. These extrapolations 
conflict; indeed, they seek to disaffirrn each other: the first claims that 
there is an obligation to share protection burdens, while the second 
maintains that there is no such obligation. A caveat is in order: the 
following two sections are written in a partisan manner, and neither of 
988 See chapter 1.5.4 above, 
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them alone can be said to represent a complete picture of what burden-
sharing is-and is not. 
8.5.1 Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity is easily misconceived as a technical term governing the 
repartition of competencies within the Union. At first sight, this seems to 
be confirmed by the ERF Proposal. The last paragraph of its preamble 
reads: 
In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality as set out in Article 5 [TEC, GN], the objectives of 
the proposed action, namely to demonstrate solidarity between 
Member States by achieving a balance in the efforts made by those 
Member States in receiving refugees and displaced persons and 
bearing the consequences of so doing, cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or impact of the action, be better achieved by the 
Community. This Decision confines itself to the minimum 
required in order to achieve those objectives and does not go 
beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
This wording seems to serve an exculpatory function, giving reasons why 
it is legitimate that the Commission takes issue at all with the ERF. 
However, in this section, we shall attempt to demonstrate that there is not 
only a legal competence to arrange for burden-sharing within the 
framework of the TEC, but also a legal obligation to do so. 
Conceptually, sharing the burden of reception is but an 
implementation of the subsidiarity principle. At first sight, this might 
seem inconclusive, as subsidiarity is commonly identified with the 
exercise of competencies in the European Union. At the core of the term 
'subsidiarity', though, we find the simple concept of assistance-or, in 
Latin, subsidium. 
Who shall be assisted, by what means and through which procedure? 
The contemporary idea of subsidiarity owes much to Catholic social 
thought, authoritatively expressed in the encyclical letters 'Rerum 
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novarum' of 1891989 and 'Quadragesimo anno' of 1931.990 Due to its degree 
of elaboration, the latter is commonly considered the most important 
source on subsidiarity. It has also emerged, though, that the concept of 
subsidiarity is indebted to Johannes Althusius' reformatory theology and, 
ultimately, to Aristotelian philosophy.991 
The point of departure, and ultimate measure for the success of societal 
order, is the single human being, singularis homo. The single human being 
is not self-sufficient. This lack of autarky creates a need for collective 
structures to provide assistance: family, clan, local community, state, or 
even international community. But the individual shall not be absorbed in 
these structures, and her dignity prohibits that she be assisted, where she 
can assist herself.992 This reflection triggers a preference for the lowest 
organizational level that can provide the necessary assistance. The core 
sentence in 'Quadragesimo anno' is very clear in that respect: 
For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to 
the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb 
them.993 
A careful reading reveals that subsidiarity is indeed a double principle.994 
Firstly, it prescribes assistance where there is a need for it and, secondly, it 
989 Rerum Novarum. On the Condition of the Working Classes, Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo 
XIII, issued on May 15, 1891. 
990 Quadragesimo Anno (The Fortieth Year}, On Reconstruction of the Social Order, Encyclical 
Letter of Pope Pius XI, issued on May 15, 1931 [hereinafter Quadragesimo Anno], paras 79 
and 80. 
991 0. Hoffe, 'Subsidiaritat als staatsphilosophisches Prinzip', in K. W. Norr and T. 
Oppennann (eds), Suhsidiaritiit: !dee und Wirklichkeit. Zur Reichweite eines Prin:zips in 
Deutsch/and und Europa (1997, J.C.B. Mohr, Tiibingen), pp. 56-9. 
992 Referring to one of the authors of Quadragesimo anno, Oskar v. Nell-Breuning, 
Baumgartner warns of a liberal misreading of the reference to assistance in the encyclical 
letter, overtly focusing on individual autonomy. A. Baumgartner, '"Jede Gesell-
schaftstatigkeit ist ihrem Wesen nach subsidiar". Zur anthropologischen und 
theologischen Begriindung der Subsidiaritiit', in K. W. Norr and T. Oppermann (eds), 
Subsidiaritiit: !dee und Wirklichkeit. Zur Reichweite eines Prinzips in Deutschland und 
Europa (1997, J.C.B. Mohr, Tiibingen), p. 16. 
993 Para. 79, Quadragesimo anno. 
994 The term 'principle' is chosen deliberately, denoting a legal norm of a non-binary 
character, imposing a duty to optimise. R. Alexy, Theorieder Grundrechte, 1994 ed. (1985, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), p. 75 et seq .. Later, Alexy has elaborated this distinction 
further. Principles relate to an 'ideal ought' which does not presuppose a factual or legal 
331 
CHAPTER 8 
proscribes the usurpation of competence in assistance.995 'The prescription 
of assistance is addressed to communities at large: the body social as a 
whole is put at the service of the single human being.'996 Further, it is 
important to note that the duty to assist is not specified. This allows for 
the conclusion that the choice of means may differ from situation to 
situation, and from one societal extension to another. 
The proscription inherent in the principle of subsidiarity is a mere 
deduction from its prescriptive component. Assistance turns into a pretext 
for the agglomeration of power, where a higher-ranking societal extension 
performs tasks that could be performed by lower ranking societal 
extensions or the single human being herself. This proscription has 
become notorious by its-contextually adapted-insertion into the Treaty 
of European Union, which will be exposed in some detail below. A full 
understanding requires, though, that it be not severed from the 
prescription of assistance.997 
Who is to be assisted, by what means and through which procedure? 
The single human being is to be assisted by hierarchically ordered societal 
extensions, which give priority to the lowest level in the hierarchy, as 
long as higher levels are not better at providing the assistance needed. 
Next, how does the double principle of subsidiarity relate to the issue of 
burden-sharing? From the outset, it is quite dear that burden-sharing 
contains a dimension of assistance. Indeed, burden-sharing is about the 
relationship between the individual protection seeker, the country of first 
arrival and other potential host states. Where the country of first arrival 
cannot provide protection on its own, and delegation to an international 
realization, but demands an approximative fulfilment. In contradistinction, rules relate to 
a 'real ought' of a binary character. R. Alexy, Recht, Vemunft, Diskurs (1995, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main), p. 202. 
995 This specification finds support in Hiiffe, 1997, pp. 53-5 and P. Koslowski, 'Subsidiaritiit 
als Prinzip der Koordination der Gesellschaft', in K. W. Norr and T. Oppermann (eds), 
Subsidiaritat: !dee und Wirklichkeit. Zur Reichweite eines Prinzips in Deutsch/and und 
Europa {1997, J.C.B. Mohr, Tiibingen), pp. 40-1. 
996 Hiiffe, 1997, p. 54 
997 'Das Solidaritiitsprinzip griindet sich mithin auf die gemeinsame Aufgaben- und 
Zielbezogenheit (Gemeinwohl) der verschiedenen Handlungsebenen und wird auf diese 
Weise zur Voraussetzung des Subsidiaritatsprinzips.' C. Calliess, Subsidiaritiits· und 
Solidaritatsprinzip in der Europaischen Union (1996, Nomos, Baden-Baden), p. 168. 
However, the adequacy of referring to 'Gemeinwohl' (common good) can be questioned. 
When the preamble of the TEU speaks of 'citizens', it is at least open to debate whether 
those are related to as individuals or as a group. 
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level would better secure protection, subsidiarity suggests that other states 
share the responsibility for providing haven to the individual. However, 
where a country of first arrival is able to provide protection, subsidiarity 
would suggest that the case not be relegated to the international level. 
Subsidiarity is thus opposed to overtly centralized models of collective 
refugee protection and puts the definition of loss in burden-sharing 
schemes into a wider context. So far, so good. 
Still, the argument is incomplete as long as the role of the individual is 
omitted. In the light of subsidiarity, the ultima ratio of burden-sharing is 
to serve the individual. Where the country of first arrival is unable to 
provide assistance, or where assistance can be better provided in other 
states, the obligation to assist is transposed. While it originally rested with 
the country of first arrival, it is now shared by other potential host states. 
But is this indeed a reading that finds support in the primary law of the 
European Union? When answering this question, one needs to distinguish 
between the prescriptive and the proscriptive components of the principle 
of subsidiarity. Both are clearly catered for in Article 5 TEC, stating inter 
alia that 
[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Side by side with the proscriptive 'only if and insofar as', we find the 
prescriptive 'shall'. 
This provision is of relevance not only for the Community, but for the 
Union at large. Article 2 TEU stipulates that the European Union is 
bound to respect the principle of subsidiarity, as defined in Article 5 TEC, 
when achieving its objectives. Moreover, in the preamble of the TEU, the 
contracting parties express their resolution 'to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which 
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity'. The 'singularis homo' surfaces here as a 
citizen of the European Union; as we shall see, though, citizens are not 
the only beneficiaries of subsidiarity in the EU. 
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As it stands, the masters of this treaty clearly regarded the Member States, 
the Community and the Union as societal extensions, positioned at 
different levels within a hierarchical relationship. Taking account of their 
linkage to the free movement of persons, Articles 3 (1) (c), 61 (b) and 63 
(2) (b) TEC establish the competence of the Community with regard to 
burden-sharing. Article 3 (c) and (d) TEC includes the creation of an 
internal market and measures concerning the entry and movement of 
persons in the enumeration of the Community's activities. Title IV 
specifies those activities, which are ultimately motivated by the 
establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. The creation of 
this area is one of the overall objectives of the European Union according 
to Article 2 TEU. 
Moving to Title IV, we find that Article 63 (2) TEC finally accords a 
specific competence for burden-sharing to the Community, as earlier 
expounded. Further, the 1998 'Action plan of the Council and the 
Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam establishing an area of freedom, security and justice' points 
out a number of selection criteria for setting priorities in the future work 
of the Council. Paragraph 24 of the said instruments reads as follows: 
24. A number of pri...flciples have determined the way in which the 
Council and the Commission have identified -and intend to 
implement- the measures listed in this Part: 
[ ... ] 
(ii) The principle of subsidiarity, which applies to all aspects of 
the Union's action, is of particular relevance to the creation of an 
area of freedom, security and justice.998 
Up to now, it has been clarified that the Community is competent to 
tackle the issue of burden-sharing-a competency made use of by the 
Commission when launching the ERF Proposal-and that this 
competence shall be exercised with due regard to the principle of 
subsidiarity. The quest for a subject benefiting from this principle would 
998 Council of the European Union, Action plan of the Council and the Commission on 
how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam establishing an area of 
freedom, security and justice, 7 December 1998, OJ (1998) C 011, pp. 1--4. 
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merely lead to the preamble of the TEU and its reference to citizens, had 
it not been for the rather dramatic turn taken in Article 61 TEC: 
In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and 
justice, the Council shall adopt: 
[ ... ] 
(b) other measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and 
safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 63; 
Among the rights to be safeguarded are those enshrined in refugee law as 
well as in human rights law. Most recently by means of Article 6 TEU, 
Member States have obliged themselves to respect the latter. 
Burden-sharing is thus understood as a means of safeguarding the rights 
of third country nationals or, in the specific context, the rights of 
protection seekers. Article 61 (b) TEC provides nothing less than the 
prescriptive part of subsidiarity, characterizing burden-sharing as a 
measure on behalf of a specific class of benefiting 'singularis homines'. 
This makes a decisive difference. If the Union's citizens had been the sole 
beneficiaries of subsidiarity, burden-sharing would have taken on another 
tinge. In that case, the goal would have been to minimize costs without 
taking into account the interest of protection seekers. As will emerge in 
the following section, the quest for cost reduction at the expense of 
protection seekers leads to deflection and exclusion as the most rational 
choice. Thus, burden-sharing would have been an intermediate solution 
pending the materialization of perfect exclusion. Article 61 (b) TEC 
confirms forcefully that this was not the idea pursued by the Member 
States as masters of the treaties. 
Where burden-sharing is justified by the interest of protection seekers, 
its rationale is to make full use of existing protection capacities and 
maintain openness towards future beneficiaries. Among the 'rights' 
safeguarded by burden-sharing, the right to non-refoulement and the right 
not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment can be named.999 Needless to say, burden-sharing not only 
999 'It is necessary to support the efforts made by the Member States to grant appropriate 
reception conditions to refugees and displaced persons, including fair and effective asylum 
procedures, so as to protect the rights of persons requiring international protection', 
preamble, para. 3, ERF Proposal 
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contributes to averting extraterritorial risks, but also to securing the 
enjoyment of human rights on the soil of host states.1000 Thus, the 
international law of human rights represents the last missing component 
in the reconstruction of subsidiarity. 
At this stage, Quadragesimo anno and the law of the European Union 
become coextensive. The single protection seeker is to be assisted in a two-
tiered body social. First, the obligation to assist is incumbent on single 
Member States. On that level, its manifestation is to be found in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and a corpus of human rights instruments. Second, 
where inequalities in the distribution of protection seekers jeopardize 
their rights, the obligation to assist is extended to the level of the EC. 
Here, it takes the form of the duty to devise measures to level out 
inequalities in reception that may be detrimental to the rights of 
protection seekers. As stated earlier, the obligation to assist may take on 
different forms in different contexts. The interlinkage of human rights law 
and the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a telling example of this flexibility. 
Thus, the prescriptive component of the solidarity principle is covered. 
As for the proscriptive part, it follows that the measure adopted at EC 
level must not absorb the assistance which single Member States are 
capable of providing. Put differently, the Council is assigned to preserve 
the two-tier level as far as it can be reconciled with the best interests of the 
single protection seeker. 
Thus, we may conclude that there is not only a competency, but also 
an obligation to share receptive burdens among Member States, making 
use of the legal instruments and institutions offered by TEC. Where single 
protection seekers do not receive shelter due to the absence of practical 
100° Compare the preamble of the ERF Proposal: '(4) The integration of refugees into the 
society of the country in which they are established is one of the objectives of the 
Geneva Convention and, to this end, there should be support for actions by the Member 
States intended to promote their social and economic integration, in so far as it 
contributes to economic and social cohesion, the maintenance and strengthening of 
which is one of the Community's fundamental objectives referred to in Articles 2 and 
3(1)(k) of the Treaty. (5) It is in the interests of both the Member States and the persons 
concerned that refugees and displaced persons who are allowed to stay in the territory of 
the Member States are given the opportunity to provide for themselves by working. (6) 
Since measures supported by the Structural Funds and other Community measures in 
the field of education and vocational training are not in themselves sufficient to promote 
such integration, support should be given for special measures to enable refugees and 
displaced persons to benefit fully from the programmes which are organised.' 
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arrangements by the EC institutions, it could be argued that the latter are 
in breach of Community law. 
8.5.2 Game Theory 
Let us now approach the question on the existence of a burden-sharing 
obligation from a quite different tack. A look at the various solution 
attempts presented in earlier subsections leaves the observer wondering 
why it proves so difficult to reach a substantial consensus on matters of 
burden-sharing. Are viable normative-developments likely to take place in 
the near future? What factors will influence the outcome of such 
developments? And, finally, is it justifiable to construe the abstract 
concept of subsidiarity as an obligation of burden-sharing? 
Answers to these questions risk developing into long narratives. As a 
shortcut, we would propose the application of game theory1001, which 
might help to trace and systematize the recurring elements of a burden-
sharing conflict. Admittedly, in a human rights context, this choice of 
method might appear slightly bizarre. After all, game theory became 
widely known as a tool to frame nuclear conflict as a rational form of 
behaviour.1002 Like cybernetics, it drew on a positivistic paradigm. The 
development of both disciplines was fuelled by their instrumental value 
for military ends. In their quest for order, predictability and control, both 
approaches presupposed rationality in action. 1003 
1001 In addition to the contextual explanation given below, readers might be interested in a 
general definition of game theory: 'Game theory is a branch of mathematics which is 
frequently employed in a heuristic manner in order to draw attention to certain 
apparent paradoxes and dilemmas which emerge when interdependent decision-making 
is studied from a "rational choice" perspective-that is on the assumption that 
individuals choose courses of action that are believed to maximise their welfare, defined 
broadly.' C. Brown, Understanding International Relations (1997, Macmillan, Hounds-
mill and London), pp. 58-9. For an application of game theory in international law, see 
J. K. Setear, 'An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations 
Theory and International Law', 37 Harvard International Law journal 139 (1999). 
1002 K. van der Pijl, Vordenker der Weltpolitik. Einfiihrung in die internationale Politik aus 
ideengeschichtlicher Perspektive (1996, Leske + Budrich, Opladen), pp. 240 et seq .. M. De 
Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991, Swerve Editions, New York), pp. 
84-7, 97-100. 
1003 The initial problem of cybernetics was to calculate the flight of an enemy aircraft in 
order to guide anti-aircraft weaponry; it soon developed into a comprehensive 
behaviouristic theory conceiving of the human psyche as a self-regulating mechanism. 
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While both game theory and cybernetics shared common behaviourist 
roots, they focused on quite different questions. The development of game 
theory is inextricably linked to the name of John von Neumann, a U.S. 
mathematician who became deeply involved in nuclear missile defence 
planning after World War II. vori Neumann first presented his theory in 
an article featuring a logical analysis of chess strategies (Zur Theorie der 
Gesellschaftsspiele, published in 1928). Expanding into new disciplines, he 
carried out a study on the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior1004 
together with Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. Today, the interdisciplinary 
merger of Law and Economics is heavily indebted to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's pioneering work. 
Game theory provided the tools to translate complex real-world 
interactions into a limited number of abstract 'games'. Its ultimate 
promise was the identification of optimal moves and rational conflict 
resolution in spheres of reduced complexity. It did not come as a surprise 
that von Neumann moved on to yet another field of application. 
Eventually, he was appointed as an advisor to RAND Corporation, a 
think-tank originating in the U.S. defence industry. In the following, a 
considerable number of 'defence intellectuals' used a game theory 
paradigm when inquiring into the conflict arenas of the Cold War, 
notably nuclear deterrence and the arms race. This move secured a stable 
position for game theory in the study of International Relations. 1005 
Why should one resort to game theory when analyzing burden-
sharing? Just like nuclear deterrence or the arms race, burden-sharing is a 
problem of co-operation in an international environment without a 
central enforcement institution. As we will see, its main actors can be 
divided into two groups of 'players' who fit into the attractive simplicity 
of the game model. 
See P. Galison, 'Die Ontologie des Feindes. Norbert Wiener und die Kybernetik', in H. 
Rheinberger, M. Hagner, and B. Wahrig-Schmidt (eds), Rciume des Wissens. 
Reprasentation, Codierung, Spur (1997, Akademie Verlag, Berlin). 
1004 J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour 
(1944, Princeton University Press, Princeton). See van der Pijl, 1996, p. 241. 
1005 A. Kytt and D. Snidal, 'Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International 
Regimes', in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (1993, OUP, 
Oxford), p. 112. For a comprehensive application of game theory to various forms of 
conflicts from an international relations perspective, see M. Nicholson, Rationality and 
the Analysis of Conflict (1992, Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 63 et seq. 
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However, it must be underscored that our goal is not to point out the 
ultimate 'rational choice' in a given burden-sharing game. Rather, game 
theory is used as an interpretative device.1006 The actors in the burden-
sharing game pursue different goals, ranging from protection to cost-
reduction; the outcome of the game enables us to reconstruct the goals 
that have been dominating the actors as they 'play'. If there is a difference 
between state rhetoric and state action, it should emerge at this point. 
Thus, game theory offers a short cut for identifying what is usually 
termed 'the will of the legislator'. 
After this attempt to justify and delimit the use of game theory in this 
section, we would like to resort to a rather well known analytic device 
from its toolbox, which goes under the name of Prisoners' Dilemma.1007 
Let us briefly recall the choices facing the metaphorical prisoners. 
Two prisoners, against whom there is not enough incriminating 
evidence, are interrogated separately. Each faces two alternative ways of 
acting: to confess the crime or to keep silent. They both know that if 
neither confesses they will be convicted of some minor offence, 
concerning which there is sufficient evidence against them, and will be 
sentenced to a year in prison. However, if only one confesses, he thereby 
turns king's evidence and is thus set free, whereas the other receives a 
heavy term of ten years. 1008 
Co-operation among the prisoners, namely an agreement to the effect 
that both keep silent, will yield an outcome which is beneficial for both. If 
both confess, the outcome will be a long sentence for both. If the 
prisoners are able to communicate, they will eventually agree on keeping 
silent. However, there is a strong temptation for each prisoner to break 
such an agreement, if he wants to avoid punishment altogether. 
Furthermore, how can he be sure that his fellow prisoner will not break 
the agreement? The safest thing to do is to confess, if one wants to avoid 
the maximum penalty of ten years. Technically speaking, confession 
dominates non-confession, or defection dominates co-operation. 
1006 Kyn and Snidal, 1993, pp. 114, 131. 
1007 I am indebted to my colleague Fredrik Danelius for supplying the idea to describe 
dilemmas of refugee protection as a Prisoners' Dilemma. Large parts of the following 
presentation are founded on E. Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (1977, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford), dealing with Prisoners' Dilemma norms, co-
ordination norms, and norms of partiality from a philosophical perspective. 
1008 Ullmann-Margalit, 19n, p. 18. 
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Each single prisoner's preferences may be depicted as a linear chain of 
dominance. In this chain, D stands for defect, C for co-operate. The first 
letter indicates the behaviour of the actor whose perspective is taken. By 
way of example, DC stands for the following situation: the prisoner 
whose perspective is taken defects, while the other prisoner co-operates. 
Accordingly, the classical Prisoners' Dilemma described above would 
translate to the following chain: 
DC> CC> DD> CD 
To be sure, DC will result in freedom, CC in one year in prison and DD 
in five years. CD is the least desirable outcome and will yield 10 years of 
incarceration. 
Quite apparently, the Prisoners' Dilemma deviated in important 
respects from the scenario of nuclear conflict, and has been rightly 
criticized for introducing a pro-conflict bias into U.S. nuclear policies.1009 
Does burden-sharing resemble a Prisoners' Dilemma? Let us take a brief 
look at the characteristics of the latter: 
In Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations the state which is mutually 
desired by the participants is such that there is a strong temptation 
for each to deviate from it unilaterally. The state that results when 
they all deviate, however, is bad for all, jointly as well as severally. 
The problem, therefore, is to devise a method which will protect 
the "good" state and annihilate the temptation to deviate.1010 
Before addressing the temptation to deviate, let us point out some 
dissimilarities between the situation of the prisoners and the situation of 
EU Member States when faced with the problem of burden-sharing. To 
start with, the prisoners are confronted with a one-shot situation, where 
maximum gain must be secured in one single game in circumstances 
1009 'By framing [nuclear conflict] as a zero-sum game, where there is always a 
mathematically provable best strategy for an individual player, the scientists in search of 
the perfect "combat equation" artificially introduced a bias of conflict over co-operation. 
The preference for zero-sum games, where one player's gains are the other's losses, was 
also motivated by the fact that it could be used to eliminate the element of friction, 
ambiguity in this case, from the battle model.' De Landa, 1991, p. 97. [Emphasis in the 
original.] 
1010 Ullmann-Margalit, 1977, p. 9. 
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allowing no communication among the players. This may resemble the 
situation at the verge of nuclear conflict, but it differs somewhat from the 
burden-sharing-problem. Burden-sharing is a far more communicative 
process: in contrast to the two prisoners, Member States have all options 
to negotiate while making and reassessing their decisions on co-operation 
or defection. Additionally, burden-sharing is iterative by nature, as 
Member States are constantly confronted with new flight movements, 
thus allowing them to enter into a new 'game'. As we shall see later on, 
these differences are of some importance. 
Now, what is the 'good state' which Member States wish to achieve in 
the burden-sharing game? Partly drawing on the language of the 1995 
Resolution, one could compile the following non-hierarchical list: 
1. To ensure free movement of persons between Member States while 
controlling the inflow and movements of non-communitarians 
(migration contra~. 
2. To observe international law obligations, in particular those 
flowing from the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ECHR 
(international law compliance). 
3. To demonstrate 'solidarity between ~ember States' and to 'share 
the responsibility regarding admission' 1011 (equitable burdensharing). 
4. To 'reflect Europe's humanitarian tradition, thus ensuring to all 
persons in need of international protection within their juris-
diction a treatment in conformity with human dignity'1012 
(protection). 
5. To attain the aforementioned goals at a minimum of financial, 
social and political costs (cost reduction). 
In comparison to Prisoners' Dilemma, there is not merely a single goal 
(namely to minimize penalty), but an amalgam of goals. There are two 
possibilities. The group of Member States can choose a solution that 
accommodates all goals in the form of a certain compromise. Or the 
group of Member States can choose a solution that neglects one or more 




goals. 1013 Let us look into the options, contraposing any given Member 
State to the group of all other Member States. 
The cheapest option for a single Member State is to close its borders, 
thus minimizing its own reception costs, while other states keep their 
borders open, thus providing protection somewhere within the Union 
(DC). Mutual co-operation (CC) will also accommodate goals 1 through 4, 
but will induce higher expenses for a single Member State than the DC 
alternative. DD accommodates the con+rol and cost reduction goals, while 
it clearly sets aside the protection and possibly the legal compliance 
goal. 1014 The CD alternative may ensure protection and legal compliance, 
but it maximizes costs for the single Member State, allows only for a 
limited protection offer and fails to attain equitable burden-sharing, which 
makes it probably the least attractive of all options from a player's 
perspective. Accordingly, if all goals are to be accommodated, one could 
expect the situation to be structured as a classical Prisoners' Dilemma 
(DC>CC>DD>CD). 
As long as co-operation for the achievement of all goals is not stable 
and predictable, a single Member State faced with the probability of an 
influx of protection seekers will be tempted to resort to defection. In this 
context, defection may take the form of blocking access to state territory 
without regard for the interests of protection seekers or the ensuing 
'overburdening' of other Member States. On the other hand, mutual co-
operation yields optimal protection, as it ensures bigger capacities (more 
protection seekers can be protected) and greater choice (protection seekers 
can be 'matched' with an optimal host country with regard to such factors 
as personal preferences, social ties, labour skills, linguistic background and 
cultural characteristics). While bilateral defection renders protection 
impossible altogether, unilateral defection leaves protection seekers with 
the capacity of at least one Member State. 
At this stage, it emerges clearly that the simple game model sketched 
above needs to be expanded. To do full justice to the complexity of the 
situation, one would need to look at burden-sharing as a three level game 
1013 Clarifying goal preferences amounts to the revelation of actors' values. For a further 
exploration of the revelation of values by choices see I. Levi, Hard Choices: Decision 
Making under Unresolved Conflict (1986, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 
83 et seq. 
1014 See chapter 12.l below on the legality of visa requirements as a means to deflect 
protection seekers. 
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which states play with each other, with the protection seekers, and with 
their domestic electorates.1015 To complicate things further, burden-
sharing is not a one-shot exercise, but a game which must be played over 
and over again, in which earlier outcomes form the basis for the strategic 
decisions taken in each game.1016 However, as we merely wish to identify 
the dominance structure among the goals Member States pursue when 
playing the burden-sharing game, there is no immediate need to adopt a 
more complicated model for our purposes. 
Neither burden-sharing nor a Prisoners' Dilemma is, however, a self-
propelled machine. The outcome of either hinges on the values affixed to 
the various goals. Let us exemplify. Bilateral defection renders an 
undesirable outcome as to the goal of protection. Exactly how undesirable 
this outcome is depends on the importance of extraterritorial protection 
on each state's political agenda. If there is strong advocacy for protection 
seekers, the desirability of a complete denial of protection will be very 
low. In such a situation, bilateral co-operation is more desirable than 
bilateral defection. If, however, the electorate accepts the dismantling of 
extraterritorial protection for the sake. of reducing financial costs, the 
outcome will change. There are no political costs to be anticipated for the 
blocking of access. In such a situation, it is not likely that co-operation on 
extraterritorial protection and burden-sharing will take place. 
Apart from the impact of advocacy on cost assessment, other factors 
could influence the actors' choices. In context of free movement over 
internal borders of the EU, access of protection seekers to one single 
1015 Such an approach might help to answer interesting questions (e.g. why did certain goals 
dominate?), but reaches clearly beyond those asked in this section (namely which goals 
dominate in European burden-sharing and what structural impediments influence the 
outcome of burden-sharing games). For more on multi-level games see Kytt and Snidal, 
1993, pp. 130 et seq. 
1016 The standard narrative of an Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma is that of two salesmen 
exchanging goods in the following circumstances: they each must leave a package of 
merchandise at a predetermined spot; they never see one another but simply leave one 
package while picking up another. Now, they may choose between delivering the 
merchandise, or simply an empty package. Betrayal endangers future transactions, which 
is the main difference to one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma. This shift in the Dilemma's 
formulation turned the pro-conflict bias of the Neumann approach to a pro-co-operation 
one, driven by and associated with political scientist Robert Axelrod. Through a 
comprehensive series of tournaments, Axelrod was able to show that predominantly co-
operative strategies (not betraying first, retaliatory upon betrayal, but also forgiving 
after retaliation) were the most successful strategy. De Landa, 1991, pp. 85-6. 
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Member State might trigger problems for other Member States in the long 
run. As it becomes more difficult to control movement between 
Member States, secondary movements of protection seekers must also be 
considered. Against this background, DC might be perceived as less 
favourable and blocking access not only to a single Member State, but 
to the whole Union, thus yielding the preferred solution: 
DD>DC>CC>CD. 
To be sure, the focal point of analysis is the relationship between 
protection and the reduction of financial C?Sts. If protection is perceived 
as less important than the cutting of expenses, DD may dominate CC. If 
the opposite is true, CC will be preferred to DD. 
So much for our simplified model. Let us now get back to the reality of 
burden-sharing in the 1990s. In contradistinction to our model, states 
proved not to be equal. This emerged very clearly in the context of the 
Balkan refugee crisis. Among Western European states, two groups could 
be distinguished. States hosting a large population of Balkan crisis refugees 
had similar interests, while other states less affected in terms of refugee 
reception did not necessarily share those interests. 
The more affected states hosting large populations of protection seekers 
and refugees had become victims of a containment strategy that they 
themselves had masterminded-reception in the region.1017 According to 
this concept, protection seekers should be protected as near as possible to 
the region of crisis. In the case of the Balkan crisis, the notion of 'region' 
had to be successively expanded. Given the overburdening of states in the 
immediate vicinity of the conflict and the insecure conditions prevailing 
there, the region where protection would take place was extended to 
Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden. Geographic proximity was 
one determining factor in the choice of the protection seekers, historical 
ties another, and the existence of transnational networks established by 
preceding migratory flows a third. 1018 
1017 Allusions to this concept can be found inter alia in the preamble of the 1995 Resolution. 
1018 For further on networks as pull-factors see G. Brochmann, 'Migration Policies of 
Destination Countries', in Council of Europe (ed.), Political and demographic aspects of 
migration flows to Europe (1993, Council of Europe, Strasbourg), pp. 110 et seq; and 
Crisp, 1999. 
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In 1993, the more affected states had but one choice-to denounce 
reception in the region in favour of international burden-sharing. This 
was very clearly spelled out by the Swedish government.1019 
Let us have a look at the different choices at the outset of 1993, before a 
group of more affected states started pushing for burden-sharing and 
before containment measures such as visa requirements for Bosnian 
citizens came into being. More affected states had already received a 
considerable number of protection seekers and faced the probability of a 
continuing inflow. They had a strong interest in changing the CD 
situation and reducing their costs. While geographical, social and political 
factors made unilateral defection outright impossible for these states, the 
two options left were either to co-operate on reception (CC) or to block 
access for further refugees (DD). 
For less affected states, being in a DC situation, co-operation on 
burden-sharing would have led to augmented reception of refugees and 
increasing costs in a short-term perspective. Thus, cost-wise, mutual 
defection (DD) would have been as desirable as the status quo for less 
affected states; indeed, as more affected states were pushing for a change in 
the situation, mutual defection was the only alternative which could be 
reconciled with the self-interest of less affected states. 
A move to mutual defection was precisely what happened. By the end 
of 1993, most European states had introduced visa requirements, which 
made it hard for refugees from former Yugoslavia to seek protection 
outside the conflict zone. Western Europe had moved from a status quo of 
non-equitable reception and relatively open borders to a status of blocked 
access.1020 Thus, it can be inferred that, by the end of 1993, burden-sharing 
in Europe was structured as DC> DD> CC> CD. Contrary to state 
rhetoric, the goal of cost reduction dominated the goal of protection in 
the collective action (and inertia) of Western European states. 
Finally, it should be asked whether any structural changes have taken 
place since the end of 1993. Have Member States attempted to change, or 
perhaps even succeeded in changing, the dominance order depicted above? 
In 1993, more affected states had a short-term interest-to get other 
states to take a 'fair share' of Bosnian refugees. They had and still have a 
1019 See text accompanying note 871 above. 
1020 It is true that this decision was not taken in a co-ordinated fashion. This does not detract 
from the point made, as the first states introducing visa requirements must have been 
perfectly aware of the fact that other states were forced to follow. 
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long-term interest-to prevent the repetition of the inequitable sharing of 
refugees seen in the case of former Yugoslavia in a future crisis. 
States less affected by the Balkan crisis had a different short-term 
interest, namely to keep their level of involvement with refugee flows 
low. Their long-term interest depended on what scenario they deemed 
probable in the future: Would there be the possibility of a crisis producing 
an inflow into their own territor1? If so, would they need burden-sharing 
in such a situation? A state that answers both questions in the affirmative 
has a long-term interest in the establishment of a burden-sharing 
mechanism. 
A long-term perspective produces a classical Prisoners' Dilemma, with 
a dominance of mutual co-operation over mutual defection (CC> DD). 
The language of the 1995 Resolution and Article 63 TEC at least emulate 
such a perspective. If we take this perspective seriously, the stark 
differences between more affected states and less affected states begin to 
vanish. This is good in that it opens up for mutual co-operation as a 
rational choice; however, it leaves us with the question whether the 
better-yet-weak choice of co-operation actually has been strengthened. To 
be sure, unilateral defection dominates co-operation in a classical 
Prisoners' Dilemma. To change this, the choice of co-operation must be 
stabilized by reducing the pay-offs of defection. 
The first stabilizing factor that springs to mind is retaliation. In a 
situation where all states are potentially affected by flight movements, 
defection in one crisis brings about the risk of becoming the victim of 
other states' defections in the next. However, retaliation alone does not 
seem to be sufficiently stabilizing. If it were, one could argue that burden-
sharing was already tacitly practised, and the deliberations within the 
European Union since 1995 as well as any further debate on the topic 
would have to be regarded as quite superfluous. 
Next, do the normative content of the 1995 Council Resolution and 
Article 63 TEC represent a sufficient stabilizing device? The analysis 
carried out earlier indicates that these norms set a framework for further 
deliberations on burden-sharing rather than providing a fixed distributive 
key securing a predictable outcome. Accordingly, they cannot help to 
reduce the pay-off for defection. The dominance of mutual defection over 
mutual co-operation prevails. The experimental instruments of 1997-9 do 
not alter this assessment, as their redistributionary effect was negligible. 
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At this stage, it seems reasonable to conclude that co-operation on burden-
sharing is still a better-yet-weak choice. However, we need to go one step 
further. The Dublin Convention and other safe third country-
arrangements actually structure burden-sharing as a Prisoners' Dilemma 
with unequal participants. This brings us back to the situation prevailing 
at the end of 1993, where mutual defection was the only conceivable 
common choice (DC> DD> CC> CD). The£e are no prospects for co-
operation and mutual reception, as the only change acceptable for all 
participants is a complete blocking of access. As long as the Dublin 
Convention and other safe third country-arrangements preserve 
inequality, burden-sharing will be a systemic contradiction.1021 
Where does this leave the law? In a situation where defection dominates 
co-operation in burden-sharing, it is very hard to uphold that Article 2 
TEU and Articles 3, 5, 61 and 63 TEC are the cornerstone of an implicit 
obligation to share the burdens of reception in the law of the European 
Union. Actually, this would mean that all deliberations on burden-sharing 
were wholly unnecessary after the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, because the problem had been solved therein. This is 
obviously not the way the Member States perceived the matter. And game 
theory helps us understand why the subsidiarity argumentation 
expounded above simply cannot be taken as reflecting the will of the 
legislator-namely the Member States. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Let us briefly recall the main conclusions that have emerged in the course 
of this chapter. 
1. Equitable burden-sharing is inextricably linked to the maintenance 
of protection capacities globally as well as regionally. 
2. Three main approaches to achieving a more equitable sharing of 
the reception burden can be distinguished: harmonizing refugee 
and asylum legislation (sharing norms), reallocating funds (sharing 
money) and distributing protection seekers (sharing people). 
1021 In this context, it should be noted that the 1995 Council Resolution gives prevalence to 
the Dublin Convention in its preamble. 
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3. Member States have hitherto failed to develop a burden-sharing 
mechanism sufficiently comprehensive and predictable to inhibit 
the deflection of protection seekers or the downgrading of their 
rights. 
4. Article 63 TEC obliges Member States to adopt a number of 
measures impacting on extraterritorial protection within a five-
year period, while the issue of burden-sharing is exempted from 
these temporal constraints. As the outcome of future burden-
sharing deliberations remains that uncertain, a rational Member 
State will try to control future risks by minimizing the protection 
offer. By necessity, this systemically created unpredictability will 
make the instruments on protection adopted during the 
transitional period more restrictive. 
5. The Dublin Convention stabilizes an inequitable distribution of 
protection seekers between contracting States. 
6. In three associated countries, the number of protection seekers is 
on the rise, while recognition rates are extremely low. It is 
reasonable to conclude that such restrictiveness is causally linked to 
burden concentration under safe third country arrangements. 
7. As equitable burden-sharing is systemically blocked by the Dublin 
Convention and other safe third country-arrangements, there are 
only limited choices left for Member States and candidate countries 
that fear overburdening. The choices are either to block the access 
of protection seekers to their territory or to minimize protection 
obligations by curtailing the level of rights enjoyed during and 
after procedure, inter alia by adopting restrictive interpretations of 
existing protection categories and by avoiding the introduction of 
additional protection categories. 1022 
From the universalist perspective, a legal obligation of burden-sharing can 
be constructed, based on the concept of subsidiarity enshrined in the law 
1022 Compare chapter 3.1 above, suggesting that burden-sharing and state attempts to steer 
the number of beneficiaries and the level of rights enjoyed by them are interdependent. 
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of the European Union. From the perspective of the particularist, the 
existence of such an obligation can be denied. The particularist rejection is 
based, first, on the excessive abstraction inherent in the concept of 
subsidiarity and, second, on the structure of burden-sharing as a Prisoners' 
Dilemma, making co-operation on admission an irrational choice. 
This set-up of conclusions leaves us with further questions, revolving 
around both empirical and theoretical problems. First, we would need to 
verify whether the particularist dynamics flowing from the absence of 
burden-sharing really can be substantiated in the law of the European 
Union. The findings of the preceding chapter warrant an answer in the 
affirmative. Second, if that were to be the case, the question would remain 
where law sets out the limits of such particularism. Parts IV and V of this 
work shall deal with those limits. 
The question of the limits set by the law leads us to the third question, 
which is on the proper interpretation of the law. From a game theoretical 
approach, it is fully rational for states to opt for shared deflection instead 
of shared reception. By contrast, subsidiarity arguments cannot be used to 
argue in favour of deflective burden-sharing. This is so, because the latter 
focus on the conflict between individual and collective structures. 
Deflection cannot be justified, because it does not comply with the 
prescription of assistance vis-a-vis the group of protection seekers. No 
matter if this non-compliance is motivated by the protection of citizens' 
interest. As subsidiarity does not lend itself to the opposition of groups, it 
is unable to depict the tension between the group of citizens and the 
group of protection seekers. And precisely this tension between 
collectives is at the heart of game theoretical argumentation. This shows 
nicely that an argument of subsidiarity does not accommodate the formal 
arguments of particularists, which base differences in treatment on 
nationality or citizenship. Instead, it stresses the actual protection need, 
irrespective of formal requirements. Recalling the basic opposition 
between universalist and particularist argumentation expounded in 
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chapter 2, we behold the universalist, individual-based features of the 
doctrine of subsidiarity. The particularist potential of game-theoretical 
argumentation stands out in a marked contrast. 1023 
Beyond theory, how do both approaches relate to the law? Both the 
subsidiarity and the game-theoretical argument shuttle back and forth 
between the law and an extralegal meaning. While the former sets out 
with the letter of the law and changes it by means of theory, the latter 
starts out with theory, to prove the necessary absence of legal obligations 
on burden-sharing. 
The subsidiarity argument seeks to flesh out a number of vague 
provisions in the law of the European Union with a fairly specific 
meaning based on Catholic social thought. It can provide law's abstract 
formulations with a nexus to a comprehensive mesh of meaning. 
Contrasted with this theoretically supercharged letter of the law, the 
actual inability of states to devise a burden-sharing mechanism in the real 
world shrinks to an irregularity of minor significance. Following 
subsidiarity thinking, there must be a burden-sharing obligation, because 
its absence would defy the logic of the law. 
Game theory works quite the opposite way. It starts out with the 
actual behaviour of states and explains it rather well with a rationalistic 
theory. Indeed, hitherto, Member States have behaved like prisoners 
caught in the dilemma of burden-sharing. Now, as international law is 
made by the same rational actors whose behaviour game theory so aptly 
explains (namely states), it would be highly illogical if law already 
1023 It is of little surprise that game theory 'fits' so well into the panicularist discourse on the 
threat of massive undocumented migration. After all, this threat has succeeded the one 
underlying the cold war in a multitude of ways. Both threats rest on the image of a 
massive inflow into Western Europe from the East-be it by Red Army soldiers and 
tanks, or by undocumented migrants. Further, neither the Soviet Union nor the 
migrants would be accessible for negotiations. With regard to both threats, Western 
agencies have shown a strong tendency to exaggerate them numerically. The fictive 
bomber and missile gaps constructed by U.S. defense and intelligence agencies (De 
Landa, 1991, pp. 198-9) correspond to the opaque 'guesstimates' which EU governments 
and agencies funded by them present on the extent of undocumented migration. Finally, 
a key element in both discourses is the cult of secrecy. It must be underscored, though, 
that the analogy between them is a structural one, and does not imply that the migration 
discourse is endowed with comparable resources as was the military and intelligence 
establishment during the cold war. After all, while information depositories such as the 
IGCARMP and the ICMPD could be functionally likened to the RAND Corporation, 
there is a quite obvious resource gap between the former and the latter. 
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contained an obligation to share burdens. Any pretension that it does is 
mere wishful thinking of idealists. Following game theory, there cannot 
be a burden-sharing obligation, as this would defy the logic of the law-
maker. 
So, in the end, this is what the legal-theoretical conflict boils down to. 
The logic of the law is opposed to the logic of the lawmaker. With this, 
we seem to have reached the climax of argumentation. On the level of 
qualitative argumentation, it is rational behaviour to choose the 
subsidiarity argument for those seeking to promote the interest of 
protection seekers. But those seeking to promote the interest of the 
citizenry of potential host countries are well advised in choosing a game-
theoretical approach when extrapolating legal argumentation. The 
concluding chapter of this work will scrutinize whether this opposition of 
approaches can be overcome. 
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9 International Law and 
Extraterritoria I Protection 
IN THE SECOND PART of this work, we have sketched an overall 
image of the EU acquis related to extraterritorial protection and singled 
out a number of binding norms which seem to be on a collision course 
with universalist interests. Now we shall proceed to testing the viability of 
these norms under international law. To do so presupposes that we know 
which norms of international law have a bearing on access to territory, 
procedures and protection, and what their precise content is. To clarify 
these matters, and to establish benchmarks to test the acquis against, shall 
be the task of this chapter. 
But before embarking on the black letter of law, let us recapitulate the 
legal environment in which flight and refuge is posited. A person leaves 
her country of origin and attempts to reach another country in quest of 
protection. This is the basic scenario of refugee law, and it involves three 
main entities: an individual, the country of origin and the potential host 
country. To be sure, the relationship between the individual and both 
states is characterised alienage.1024 Firstly, staying in the country of origin 
is not an option, due to the threats faced there. Secondly, the potential 
host state is not her country of nationality, which makes her presence on 
1024 Hathaway has introduced this term when describing the relationship between a refugee 
and her country of origin, as expressed in the territorial requirement of Art. 1 A (2) of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. See J. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991, 
Butterworths, Toronto), p. 27. 
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its territory contestable. Given this situation, it is of crucial interest how 
the issue of transition between the territories as well as the communities 
of both states is managed. In that sense, refugee law is certainly about 
movement1025-both in a physical and a social sense. 
Possessing a defined territory and a permanent population are two pre-
conditions for the international personality of a state. 1026 These 
constitutive elements are simultaneously the objects of state power. As a 
corollary flowing from territorial and personal supremacy, states are 
entitled to control the composition of their population. The existence of 
this qualified1021 state right is unchallenged. Basically, this right is part of 
customary international law; it finds its expression in a large number of 
treaty instruments1028, in case law1029, and in doctrine1030• Within certain 
1025 P. Tuitt, False Images. The Law's Construction of the Refugee (1996, Pluto Press, London), 
p. 6. 
1026 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 26 December 1933, 165 
LNTS 19, [not in force], Art. 1. To be considered a person of international law, a state 
must also possess a permanent population, a government and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. The quoted provision is generally regarded as reflecting 
customary international law. 
1021 This right is qualified inter alia by the rules of asylum law and human rights law. By 
way of example, it is illegal to alter the composition of the state population by delivering 
refugees to their persecutors, by arbitrarily depriving persons of their nationality, or by 
committing genocide. Beyond such clear-cut cases, hard cases remain, where the precise 
delimitation of the state right to control the composition of its population has to be 
singled out. 
1028 A corollary of this state right to control immigration is the qualified right to return non-
nationals to their country of origins, which is regarded as part of customary law and has 
been codified as such in a large number of bi- and multilateral readmission agreements. 
See, e.g., the preamble of the 1992 German-Romanian readmission agreement, 
reaffirming the international obligation to readmit nationals. Vereinbarung zwischen 
dem Bundesminister des Innern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem 
Innenministerium von Rumanien iiber die Riickiibernahme von deutschen und 
rumanischen Staatsangehorigen, 1. November 1992, ILM vol. 31 (1992), pp. 1296-1300, 
BGBI. 1993 II, pp. 220-1. 
1029 As early as in 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that was 'an accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, 
and essential to its self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its 
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see 
fit to prescribe'. U.S. Supreme Court, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 US 651, 659 
(1892). In 1955, Judge Read formulated this right as follows in his dissenting opinion in 
Nottebohm: 'When an alien comes to the frontier, seeking admission, either as a settler 
or on a visit, the State has an unfettered right to refuse admission'. ICJ, Nottebohm Case, 
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 46. In the light of our discussion in this chapter, it is doubtful 
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limits, a state is thus entitled to remove a non-national from its territory. 
As mentioned earlier, 'boundedness' is regarded as a precondition for 
forming protective communities within political theory. 1031 Refugee law is 
a striking illustration of the mutual presupposition of protective 
community and boundary. For the ensuing analysis, it merits retaining 
that the boundary is twofold, featuring a geographical as well as a social 
dimension. The bounded community of a state is a function of territory 
and people. Both dimensions are legally controlled, and an analysis of 
refugee law will remain incomplete as long as one of them is omitted. 
In law, the significance of a state's territorial and personal extension 
translates into the regulation of migration, which means controlling the 
physical movement of persons across state borders. To transgress the 
geographical boundary severing communities, a protection seeker has to 
leave her home country and gain access to a host country.1032 In turn, the 
social boundary translates into the regulation of extraterritorial 
protection. For even where the individual protection seeker has managed 
to migrate, the question of social inclusion remains. Either the individual 
is allowed to stay or physically sent back. 
To do justice to the double boundary, our further inquiry into 
international law needs to be guided by two principal questions: 
whether this right indeed is an unfettered one. -In its judgements concerning Art. 3 
ECHR, the European Court of Hwnan Rights has repeatedly spelt out that states are 
entitled to control the entry of aliens on their territory. See e.g., Nsona v. the 
Netherlands, ECHR Reports 1996-V, No. 22, at para. 92. 
1030 R. Plender, International Migration Law (1988, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London), p. 1, with further references to earlier doctrinal texts; The 
movement of persons across borders, L B. Sohn and T. Buergenthal (eds), (1992, The 
American Society of International Law, Washington D.C.), p. 1; Verdross and Simma, 
1984, p. 799. 
1031 See text accompanying note 199 above. 
1032 Migration is also relevant in the context of return. Taking the case where a protection 
seeker has been denied extraterritorial protection by a potential host state, the individual 
right to return may facilitate the exercise of the host state's right to control the 
composition of its population. This is the case when the protection seeker wishes to 
return, confronting the country of origin not only with the inter-state claim to 




1. Are EU Member States under an obligation to grant extraterritorial 
protection? 
2. Are EU Member States under an obligation to let the individual 
migrate in order to seek such protection?1033 
The first question, relating to the social boundary, will be pursued under 
the heading 'Protection' in the present and the subsequent chapter. The 
second question, relating to the geographical boundary, shall be dealt with 
in a corresponding manner under the heading 'Access'. There is a reason 
for ordering both questions in this manner. As we shall see, not all 
beneficiaries of protection obligations are beneficiaries of obligations to 
allow access to state territory. Thus, it makes sense to delimit the broader 
class of beneficiaries first, before identifying their legal options to gain 
access to state territory. 
In a first step, we will identify such norms having a prima facie 
relevance for the issues raised in the two questions. The base thus 
established shall function as a common point of reference when answering 
the questions on the existence, coverage and nature of protective norms. 
Second, we shall identify the methodology of interpretation international 
law assigns us to use. The third step will be to apply this methodology of 
interpretation to the norms belonging to the normative base. Quite 
obviously, the goal shall be to determine the content of binding legal 
1033 The reader will note that the state is the subject of the two questions, and not the 
individual protection seeker. One might as well have asked 'Is there an individual 
entitlement to grant extraterritorial protection?' and 'Is there an individual entitlement 
to migrate in order to seek such protection?'. As formulating a question is to 
predetermine its answers, a certain bias could he suspected in that choice. Clearly, there 
is a bias attributable to international law. Even within the domain of human rights, the 
vast majority of norms in international law is of an inter-state character, and cannot be 
invoked directly by individuals. Therefore, an inquiry into state obligations will yield a 
larger number of norms than one seeking to identify corresponding individual 
entitlements. Conversely, an inquiry limited to individual entitlements will provide only 
a fragmentary picture of the array of norms impacting upon extraterritorial protection. 
Thus, it is reasonable to use the broader concept of state obligations as a point of 
departure. This choice is supported by the fact that the issue is of limited practical 
importance. First, even a universalist interpreter has a hard time arguing that the norms 
singled out in the normative base below are 'directly applicable' or 'self-executing'. 
Second, as relevant norms of international law are transformed into the domestic law of 
a number of Member States, there is little or no 'added value' in invoking them 
domestically. Third, the individual's access to monitoring bodies under the ECHR, 
ICCPR and CAT reduces the interest for direct applicability. 
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norms, drawing on the positions taken by various actors of international 
law, treaty monitoring bodies, courts and doctrinal writers. However, as 
we shall see, this monolithic reading shall collapse at certain points, and 
two separate streams of legal reasoning will emerge. Those are the hard 
cases. By the end of this chapter, we will know which they are, and in the 
subsequent chapter, we shall try to dissolve the ambiguities haunting 
them. 
9.1 Protection 
Which norms of international law may have a bearing on a state's 
obligation to grant extraterritorial protection? This section starts out with 
inquiring into the normative quality of the UDHR, and continues with a 
survey of express and implicit prohibitions of refoulement in both human 
rights law and humanitarian law. 
9.1.1 A Right to Seek and Enjoy Asylum? 
In the quest for a common normative base, it is reasonable to revert to 
norms of a foundational character. In a double sense, the norms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights fall within this category. 
Historically, they are foundational in that the UDHR was the first 
international human rights instrument of the post-war era. Considering 
their material content, they are foundational due to their level of 
abstraction. This allows an observer to regard the UDHR as an epicentre 
in the formation of the international system of human rights. Tracing 
these formative developments brings us to global and regional human 
rights treaties as well as to the 1951 Refugee Convention, all of which 
contain important extensions of the norms enshrined in the UDHR. 
Article 14 UDHR is of prima facie relevance for the first question 
asked in this chapter. It is about transgressing the social boundary 
between home community and host community: 
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution. 
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2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
It should be noted that Article 14 is subject to the limitations in Article 29 
and30UDHR. 
To wit, there is no identically or similarly worded successor to Article 
14 UDHR in treaty law with a universal scope. 1034 The prohibitions of 
refoulement to be presented later in this chapter are all less sweepingly 
worded, and none makes allusion to the right to seek and to enjoy asylum. 
If this provision turned out to be binding, it might, at best, provide 
universalists with raw material to argue for a broader scope of protection 
than that available under the prohibitions of refoulement dealt with 
below.1035 This would probably not only be of importance for protection 
obligations, but also for obligations to allow access to the territory of 
potential host states. By way of example, Article 14 UDHR could play a 
role in countering the indiscriminate exclusion effectuated by pre-entry 
measures such as visa requirements and carrier sanctions. Given the 
singularity of the norm enshrined in Article 14 UDHR on the universal 
level and its potential for the universalist cause, it is reasonable to inquire 
into its character as binding international law. 1036 
1034 On a regional level, a right similar to Art. 14 UDHR can be found in Art. 22.7 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights ('Every person has the right to seek and be 
granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and 
international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offences or 
related common crimes.') and Art. 12.3 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights ('Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain 
asylum in other countries in accordance with the law of those countries and 
international conventions.'). 
1035 However, such universalist arguments could be met with powerful particularist ones, 
claiming that the lJDHR laid down a state obligation to respect the grant of asylum by 
other states. See, e.g., A. Holmback, 'Forenta nationerna och asylratten', in 1949 :l.rs 
utlanningskommitte, SOU 1951:42. Betdnkande med forslag till Utlanningslag m.m. (1951, 
Stockholm), p. 292, arguing on the basis of the travaux. There would be no point in 
exploring the value of these arguments within the framework of our inquiry, if the 
UDHR turned out to be non-binding. Hence, the question of bindingness must be dealt 
with first. 
1036 For a detailed overview of the positions taken by different doctrinal writers, see P. R. 
Ghandhi, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years', 41 GYIL 206 
(1999), pp. 234-50. Ghandhi himself supports what we shall identify as the second 
position below, holding that certain provisions of the UDHR have acquired binding 
force as customary law. 
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As the UDHR was drafted and adopted as a non-binding declaration, it is 
clear that the Article 14 UDHR does not possess compulsory force per se. 
Therefore it must be asked whether Article 14 has acquired binding force 
by any other means than incorporation into universal treaty law. Three 
positions offer themselves. The first holds that the UDHR as a whole is to 
be regarded as binding. The second holds that single rights contained in it 
possess binding force, and that Article 14 UDHR is among them. If 
neither of these positions is tenable, we have to endorse a third one: the 
norms expressed in the named provisions do not oblige states in a legal 
sense. 
Setting out with the first position, it has been claimed that the UDHR 
as a whole has acquired the quality of customary law. A broad range of 
evidence has been adduced in support of this position, spanning from the 
incorporation of human rights provisions in national constitutions1037 to 
state practice in the General Assembly1038 and elsewhere, to the dicta of 
various international and domestic courts. 1039 
However, to allow for the construction of custom, state practice needs 
to satisfy a requirement of uniformity. 1040 The ways and means by which 
the rights of the UDHR are reflected in national constitutions vary to a 
considerable degree. By way of example, a right reminiscent of that 
enshrined in Article 14 UDHR can only be found in a handful of 
constitutions.1041 These rights usually turn on the right to obtain asylum, 
which is something quite different than the right to seek and to enjoy 
asylum. Furthermore, they are by no means sufficiently uniform in 
wording or in content. In addition, Schachter points out that actual state 
1037 For an enumeration with further references, see 0. Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice (1991, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht!Boston/London), p. 
336. Schachter himself doubts, however, that the whole content of the UDHR can be 
regarded as binding based on this evidence. He proposes a more selective approach, 
endowing single rights in the UDHR with the quality of customary international law. 
See Schachter, 1991, pp. 336-41. 
1038 J. Humphrey, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and 
Juridical Character', in B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), Human Rights Thirty Years After the 
Universal Declaration, Vol II (1979, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), p. 29. 
1039 See Schachter, 1991, p. 336 with further references. 
1040 'State practice [ ... ]should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of 
the provision invoked.' ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, p. 44, para. 74. 
1041 In the European context, Art. 16a (1) of the German Constitution and para. 4 of the 
Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 provide pertinent examples of the right to 
asylum in national constitutions. 
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practice is not necessarily respectful of such constitutional rights. 1042 
Transposing Schachter's inquiry onto the level of statutory rights, we find 
ourselves faced with largely similar problems. Again, a number of 
domestic legislations contain a right to obtain asylum at the statutory 
level, but the scope and content of this right is not necessarily identical. 1043 
Therefore, the required uniformity in practice is missing in a twofold 
manner. This shortcoming also works against the argument that the 
UDHR is reflective of general principles of law in the sense of Article 38 
(c) CICJ.1°44 With regard to state practice in the General Assembly, 
Partsch has observed that 'a verbal reference to a non-binding instrument 
in later such instruments has no more effect than its first adoption' .1045 
And the fact that courts have mentioned the UDHR in the same context 
as binding human rights instruments1046 does not reach much farther. 
Admittedly, one might apply the principle of ejusdem generis1047 when 
interpreting such quotes, and conclude that the court regards the UDHR 
to be normatively on an equal footing with the other instruments 
contained in the enumeration. However, it must be recalled that 
international law does not endow courts with the power to posit 
norms. 1048 Therefore, quoting passages from court decisions is of little 
1042 Schachter, 1991, p. 336. 
1043 The divergent interpretations of what constitutes 'persecution' in the sense of Art. 1 (A) 
(2) GC provide but one illustration of this fact. See text accompanying note 717 above. 
1044 Carillo Salcedo maintains that the norms of the UDHR reflect such principles and 
consequently must be regarded as binding. ]. Carrillo Salcedo, 'Human Rights, 
Universal Declaration of (1948)', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (1999, North Holland, Amsterdam), p. 303. 
1045 K. J. Partsch, 'Article 55 (c)', in B. Sirnma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A 
Commentary (1994, OUP, Oxford), p. 783. 
1046 See e.g. the following passage from the Tehran Hostage Case: 'Wrongfully to deprive 
human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions 
of hardship is manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights'. Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Rep., 1980, 3 at 42. 
1047 'In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, 
that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a 
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their 
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same 
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.' H. C. Black, Black's Law 
Dictionary (1979, West Publishing Company, St. Paul), p. 464. 
1048 This is clear from Art. 38 SICJ. 
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help, as long as they fail to produce convincing material arguments for the 
binding nature of the UDHR. 
Taking a different approach, the UDHR may be regarded as an 
authoritative specification of the obligation to respect and observe human 
rights contained in Article 55 (c) UNC.1049 As the Member States have 
pledged in Article 56 UNC to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the UN for the achievement of the purposes set out in 
Article 55, one might argue that this pledge would cover the catalogue of 
rights set out in the UDHR. The UDHR as such would remain non-
binding, but its content would be binding upon UN Member States 
according to the terms of the UNC. However, this position has been met 
with strong counter-arguments. The purpose of promoting universal 
respect for human rights enunciated in Article 55 (c) UNC is too 
unspecified to qualify as a legal norm and should rather be regarded as a 
programme for further action. The sole exception would be the 
prohibition of discrimination integrated in that provision, which is 
regarded as a binding legal norm. 1050 However, non-discrimination is not 
at stake here. Moreover, to be convincing, the linkage between the 
UDHR and Article 55 (c) must find support in state practice. On the level 
of single states, this brings us back to the problem of the lack of 
uniformity expounded in the preceding paragraph. On the level of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, such practice only covers 
gross and systematic violations of human rights. Therefore, the normative 
content of the UDHR as a whole boils down to a prohibition of gross and 
systematic violations of human rights in general international law.1051 
Given the high level of abstraction as well as the considerable threshold 
inherent in the terms 'gross' and 'systematic', this norm has no direct 
import on our questions. 
With regard to the second position, it would be necessary to embark on 
an assessment of the normative quality of Article 14 UDHR. On the 
1049 For a similar, albeit less specified approach, see L.B. Sohn, 'The New International Law: 
Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States', 32 Am. U.L.Rev 16 (1982), and 
Carrillo Salcedo, 1999, p. 303. 
105° K. J. Partsch, 'Human Rights in General', in R. Wolfrum (ed.), United Nations: Law, 
Policies and Practice (1995, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/London/Boston), p. 
606, mn 14, referring to Advisory Opinion on Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, 16 (57). 
1051 Partsch, 1995, p. 609, mn 30. For an account on the practice in ECOSOC, see K. J. 
Partsch, 'Article 68', in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary 
(1994, OUP, Oxford), pp. 890-2. 
361 
CHAPTER 9 
understanding that Article 14 UDHR is something else than just a positive 
formulation of Article 33 GC1052 and exceeds the normative content of the 
latter, there is no basis for such a finding. Neither a homogeneous state 
practice nor a corresponding opinio juris can be made out. This explains 
why the terms of Article 14 UDHR are missing in the list of customary 
human rights norms that doctrinal writers have compiled. 1053 
To conclude, it has become clear that neither the UDHR generally, nor 
the specific content of Article 14 UDHR possess the quality of binding 
international law.1054 In keeping with the methodology outlined in the 
first chapter of this work, we shall focus on binding norms. Therefore, 
Article 14 UDHR must be excluded from the normative base unc!erlying 
this work. 
9.1.2 Express Prohibitions of Refoulement in Human Rights 
Law 
9.1.2.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
Undisputedly, the prohibition of refoulement is the centrepiece of 
international refugee law. Its most important manifestation is the wording 
of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention1055, binding not only upon 
the State Parties to that instrument, but also to those who have ratified 
the 1967 New York Protocol. 1056 Article 33 GC is phrased as follows: 
1052 See chapter 9.1.2.1 below. 
1053 See inter alia American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, 1987, para 702. For a discussion of the 'listing' of customary human 
rights norms, see Schachter, 1991, pp. 338-42. 
1054 This does not deprive the UDHR of its possible relevance for the interpretation of 
binding norms. 
1055 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 
1056 See Art. 1 (1) of the New York Protocol: 'The States Parties to the present Protocol 
undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention [on the Status of 
Refugees, GN] to refugees as hereinafter defined'. A provision similar to Art. 33 GC is 
contained in Art. 10 of the Agreement on Refugee Seamen. 'No refugee seaman shall be 
forced, as far as it is in the power of the Contracting Parties, to stay on board a ship 
which is bound for a port, or is due to sail through waters, where he has well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.' The agreement does not contain an equivalent to 
Article 33 (2) GC. 
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1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, 
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country. 
It is dear, though, that the prohibition is not an absolute one. Paragraph 2 
of Article 33 GC singles out a group of persons to which the benefit of 
non-refoulement is denied, even though they live up to the requirements 
set out in the refugee definition in Article 1 (A) (2) GC and are not 
excluded under Article 1 (F) GC. The wording of this paragraph is vague 
in a threefold manner. It is by no means clear when a person is to be 
regarded as a 'danger to the security' or a 'danger to the community' of a 
potential host country. The phrases 'reasonable grounds' and 'particularly 
serious crimes' beg further questions. Moreover, it is not quite clear which 
cases Article 33 (2) GC covers beyond the scope of Article 1 (F) GC. 
It should be noted that the 1957 Agreement relating to Refugee 
Seamen1057 and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees1058 also 
feature a prohibition of refoulement. The pivotal importance of the prohi-
bition of refoulement has been regularly reaffirmed by the General 
Assembly and by the UNHCR Executive Committee. Claims have been 
made that the prohibition of refoulement is also a part of customary 
international law. 1059 Given the geographical scope of this work and that 
1057 Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen of 23 November 1957, 506 UNTS 125. 
1058 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 31January1967, 606 UNTS 267. 
1059 Affirming that the prohibition of refoulement is a norm of customary international law: 
Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p 167, Plender, 1988, p. 431, T. Meron, Human Rights and Humani· 
tarian Norms as Customary Law (1989, Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 22-3. Denying 
that the prohibition of refoulement is a norm of customary international law: A. Grahl 
Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. II ( 1972, A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden), 
p. 98, W. Kalin, Das Prinzip des Non·Refoulement. Das Verbot der Zuriickweisung, Asu· 
weisung und Auslieferung von Fluchtlingen in den Veifolgerstaat im VOlkerrecht und im 
scbweizerischen Landesrecht (1982, Peter Lang, Bern), p. 72, For further references, see H. 
MaaEen, Die R echtsstellung des Asylbewerbers im Volkerrecht (1997, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 
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all Member States of the EU are parties to the GC, there is no need to 
pursue this question further. In the present context, a reference to the 
prohibition of refoulement relates to its manifestation in treaty law. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol are 
binding upon all states of the European Union as well as upon all the first 
wave of candidate countries. They are regarded as part of the acquis 
communautaire. 1060 Article 63 (1) TEC expressly prescribes that measures 
on asylum adopted by the Council must be in accordance with these 
instruments. 
9.1.2.2 The 1984 CAT 
Until recently, the discussion on extraterritorial protection had focused to 
a very large degree on the 1951 Refugee Convention. Still, the protective 
capacities of international law are not exhausted with that instrument. 
Apart from the instruments dedicated to refugee law named in the 
preceding section, a prohibition of refoulement is also represented in a 
human rights treaty of a more general portee. The 1984 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment1061 limits the right of states to remove aliens in Article 31062: 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture. 
Generally, the CAT outlaws torture as well as cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The scope of the removal provision 
am Main), p. 192 note 622. 
1060 Draft List, para. I. A. b. 
1061 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
1062 For an excellent overview of the case law related to Art. 3 CAT, see B. Garlick, 'The 
Convention and the Committee against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime 
for Refugees', 11 IJRL 3 (1999). Generally on Article 3 CAT: D. Weissbrodt and I. 
Hortreiter, 'The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human 
Rights Treaties', 5 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review (1999). 
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in Article 3,. however, is limited to torture only. Given the fundamental 
character of the prohibition of torture, the CAT does not provide for 
derogation in states of exception. Therefore, the prohibition of removal to 
torture has been termed as absolute. 1063 Hence, the CAT is drafted in a 
more inclusive manner than the 1951 Refugee Convention.1064 
Through a declaration under Article 22 CAT, State Parties can choose 
to recognise the competence of the CAT Committee 'to receive and 
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the 
provisions of the Convention'. However, the decisions of the Committee 
merely possess the character of recommendations.1065 As it stands today, a 
significant portion of the cases considered by the Committee revolve 
around the issue of extraterritorial protection under Article 3 CAT. 
Considering the number of ratifications by EU Member States and first 
wave candidate countries, the CAT has been well received.1066 It is in force 
for all states of both groupings, save for Belgium and Ireland.1067 The 
competence of the CAT Committee to receive individual complaints has 
been recognised by 11 of the remaining 13 EU Member States (Germany 
and the U.K. have refrained from doing so). Among first wave candidate 
countries, only Estonia has chosen not to endow the CAT Committee 
with that competence. Finally, it should be noted that the CAT is not on 
the list of instruments considered to form part of the acquis. 
1063 See, e.g., Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, 1999, p. 16; J. Suntinger, 'The Principle of Non· 
Refoulement: Looking Rather to Geneva than to Strasbourg?', 49 Austrian journal of 
Public and International Law (1995), p. 208; and T. Har-1 Das volkerrechtliche 
Refoulementverbot abseits der Genfer Fluchtlingskonvention (1999, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 
am Main), p. 182, with further references in note 822. 
1064 As earlier noted, Art. 33 (2) GC excludes certain groups from the benefit of Art. 33 (1) 
GC. 
1065 Art. 22 CAT, para. 7. 
1066 Information on ratification and acceptance of monitoring competence has been gathered 
from the following document: Status of Ratification As of 12 April 1999, UN Doc. No. 
A/MISC/99 (Chairpersons Meeting), 12.04.1999. 
1067 Both countries have signed, but not yet ratified CAT. 
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9.1.2.3 Other Express Prohibitions of Refou/ement in Human 
Rights law? 
Article 5 of the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism 1068 has also been qualified as a prohibition of refoulement. 1069 
The article reads as follows: 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds 
for believing that the request for extradition for an offence 
mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may 
be prejudiced for any of these reasons. 
This clause represents a corollary of the prohibition of refoulement in 
Article 33 GC. 1070 It exempts a certain category of persons from any 
extradition obligation under the Convention. Article 5 does not entitle an 
individual, nor does it prohibit a state, to carry out extradition in the 
named cases. It simply obliges a state requesting extradition to accept a 
denial by the requested state, because the extradition request is made for 
persecution-related reasons. Therefore, the quoted provision is unrelated 
to the two basic questions this chapter deals with. 
9.1.3 Express Prohibitions of Refoulement in Humanitarian 
Law 
Humanitarian law has hitherto played a subordinate role in the analysis of 
state obligations towards protection seekers. 1071 An overtly rigid sepa-
ration of refugee law, human rights law and humanitarian law may 
1068 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 January 1977, ETS No. 90. 
1069 Hartl, 1999, p. 193. 
1070 However, it should be noted that the persecutory ground of 'membership of a particular 
social group' is absent in the quoted provision. 
1071 In this context, one should, however, take note of Melander's proposal to structure 
extraterritorial protection into two areas, one based on human rights law, and the other 
on humanitarian law. G. Melander, The Two Refugee Definitions (1987, Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute, Lund). 
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underlie such neglect. 1072 Given the existence of an explicit prohibition of 
refoulement in one of the basic instruments of contemporary humani-
tarian law, this attitude should be reconsidered. 
Article 45 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War1073 states inter alia that 
In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a 
country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for 
his or her political opinions or religious beliefs. 
The provisions of this Article do not constitute an obstacle to 
the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded 
before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected persons accused of 
offences against ordinary criminal law. 
However, this prohibition of refoulement is both narrower and wider 
than its successor in the 1951 Refugee Convention. It merely covers the 
grounds of political opinion and religious beliefs, which is less than the 
five grounds enumerated in Article 33 of the latter instrument. By 
contrast, the phrase 'may have reason to fear' seems to set a lower 
threshold than 'well founded fear' in the refugee definition. Notably, the 
prohibition of refoulement in the Fourth Convention does not introduce 
any exclusion or cessation clauses and has been termed as absolute. 1074 
It must be underscored, though, that the general provisions of the 
Fourth Convention set out a rather narrow framework for the application 
of its Article 45. According to Article 2 FC, this Convention is applicable 
in any armed conflict between two or more contracting parties. Article 4 
FC stipulates that 'Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at 
a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case 
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals'. However, the same 
provision introduces further limitations, inter alia to the effect that 
nationals of a state not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. 
As long as their state of nationality has ratified the Convention, 
protection seekers may benefit from the provisions of the Convention. A 
1072 For an analysis of the interrelationship between the three areas of law, see Melander, 
1997. 
1073 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287 [henceforth Fourth Convention, abbreviated FC]. 
1074 Pictet, 1958, p. 269. 
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temporal limitation is also to be taken into account: following Article 6 
FC, the Convention applies from the outset of conflict until the general 
close of military operations. However, the final sentence of this article 
provides that '[p ]rotected persons whose release, repatriation or re-
establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to 
benefit by the present Convention'. 
The Kosovo conflict provides an example of how such an instrument as 
this might become relevant. The NA TO intervention made a number of 
EU Member States and first wave candidate countries parties to an 
international armed conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All 
of the states were bound by the Fourth Convention.1075 A number of EU 
Member States and first wave candidate countries were confronted with 
protection claims from persons fleeing Kosovo. Apart from the explicit 
and implicit prohibitions of refoulement named elsewhere in this chapter, 
Article 45 FC may provide an additional safeguard against return. Given 
the very low recognition rate for Convention refugees from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in Germany1076, clarifying the impact of such an 
obligation would be a worthy task. The general interest of this question is 
not diminished by the fact that return to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was practically impossible during the conflict, as flights were 
banned by the UN embargo. This example goes to show that the 
applicability of the Fourth Convention presupposes that the Member 
State in which protection is sought is concurrently a party to an armed 
conflict falling under the Fourth Convention. 
The Fourth Convention has been ratified by all Member States as well 
as all first wave candidate countries.1077 Given that its thematic centre of 
gravity is not Justice and Home Affairs, this instrument is not part of the 
acqms. 
1075 Source: IHL Database, available at < http://www.icrc.org/ihl > (accessed on 24 April 
00). 
1076 In 1998, the Convention Recognition Rate for Germany amounted to a mere 4.2 
percent. Source: UNHCR, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe in 1998: A Statistical 
Assessment With A Special Emphasis on Kosovo Albanians (March 1999, UNHCR, 
Geneva), p. 15. 




9.1.4 Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement in Treaty Law 
Apart from the comparatively straightforward prohibitions of 
refoulement spelt out word for word in treaty provisions, the observer is 
confronted with a number of norms that have been construed to imply a 
prohibition of refoulement. The basic assumption underlying such 
implied prohibitions of refoulement is that states are responsible for 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law by other actors to the 
extent their own action or omissions contribute to such violations. What 
constitutes a violation must be assessed against the background of 
international law obligations of the returning state. 
9.1.4.1 Human Rights Law 
With Article 33 GC and Article 3 CAT, international law possesses two 
treaty provisions prohibiting the refoulement of different groups of 
beneficiaries. Differently from the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
CAT, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 19661078 
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 19501079 do not contain explicit prohibitions of 
refoulement. However, some of the rights guaranteed by them have been 
construed by their treaty-monitoring bodies to protect from removal to a 
state where a claimant would be exposed to certain violations. In 
particular, norms prohibiting torture and other forms of ill-treatment 
have provided the base for barring removal. 1080 · In other words, such 
norms may contain an implicit prohibition of refoulement. This prohi-
bition could, in turn, constitute a state obligation to grant extraterritorial 
protection. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to scrutinise such an 
interpretation is tenable. As practice is most developed with regard to the 
prohibition of torture and other forms· of ill-treatment, we shall limit our 
scrutiny to these norms. In cases brought before treaty monitoring bodies, 
1078 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171. 
1079 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4November1950, ETSNo. 5~ 
1080 With regard to the ECHR; even other human rights guaranteed by it have been invoked 
in a manner reminiscent of non-refoulement arguments. See chapter 11.1 below. 
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torture and other forms of ill-treatment have been most frequently 
invoked as a basis for obtaining such protection. This in no way 
prejudices that other human rights imply entitlement to extraterritorial 
protection as well. What is at stake here, however, is whether extra-
territorial protection can be justified under any of the rights guaranteed in 
the ECHR and the ICCPR. If such a justification is within reach, it may 
be asked exactly where the limits of extraterritorial protection under these 
instruments are. We shall revert to that question in a later chapter. 1081 
The prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment has been 
codified on an universal level in Article 7 ICCPR, stating that 
[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.1082 
This provision leaves no room for exceptions or limitations. Even in 
states of emergency, no derogation may be made from Article 7 ICCPR 
according to Article 4 (2) ICCPR. 
All EU Member States and first wave candidate countries are bound by 
the ICCPR. 1083 By ratifying the First Optional Protocol1°84, State Parties 
to the ICCPR recognise the competence of the Human Rights Committee 
to receive and process individual complaints regarding the rights set out in 
the ICCPR. 1085 In contradistinction to the judgements of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the decisions of the Human Rights Committee 
are not binding upon states.1086 The First Optional Protocol has been 
ratified by all states within the two groups save for the United 
Kingdom. 1087 The ICCPR has not been included in the list of conventions 
forming part of the acquis. 
1081 See chapter 11 below. 
1082 Art. 5 UDHR is the identically worded historical predecessor of this norm. 
1083 Information on ratification and acceptance of monitoring competence has been gathered 
from the following document: Status of Ratification As of 12 April 1999, UN Doc. No. 
A/MISC/99 (Chairpersons Meeting), 12.04.1999. 
1084 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 302 [henceforth First Optional Protocol], Art. 1. 
1085 Art. 1 First Optional Protocol. 
1086 Art. 5 (4) First Optional Protocol. 
1087 Information on ratification and acceptance of monitoring competence has been gathered 
from the following document: Status of Ratification As of 12 April 1999, UN Doc. No. 
A/MISC/99 (Chairpersons Meeting), 12.04.1999. 
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Omitting the word 'cruel' contained in Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 ECHR 
states that 
[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
Article 3 ECHR makes no provision for exceptions. Furthermore, Article 
15 (2) ECHR states that no derogation from this norm in time of war or 
other public emergency is permitted, which has brought some 
commentators to qualify the protection under Article 3 ECHR as 
absolute. 1088 Accordingly, it would be misplaced to weigh the interest of 
an applicant against the public interest in removal cases under Article 3 
ECHR.1os9 
All Member States of the European Union and all Candidate Countries 
are bound by the ECHR. This instrument forms part of the acquis 
communautaire1090, and Article 6 (2) TEU provides that 'the Union shall 
1088 A comprehensive discussion on the absolute character of Art. 3 and the inherent 
prohibition of refoulement can be found with Hartl, 1999, pp. 96-103; and R. Alleweldt, 
Schutz vor Abschiebung bei drohender Polter oder unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender 
Behandlung oder Strafe: Refoulement· Verbote im Volkerrecht und im deutschen Recht unter 
besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Artikel 3 der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention und 
Artikel 1 des Grundgesetzes (1996, Springer, Berlin), p. 56 ff. Doubts on the adequacy of 
terming protection as 'absolute' have been raised by M. K. Addo and N. Grief, 'Does 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?', 9 
EJIL 3 (1998). See also the ambitious argumentation in S. Ziihlke and J-C Pastille, 
'Extradition and the European Convention-Soering Revisited', 59 ZaoR V 3 (1999), pp. 
759-66, questioning to what extent 'absoluteness' is a helpful·'concept when scrutinising 
the effects of rights enshrined in Section I ECHR and denying that the absolute nature 
of a right is an indicator of superiority. ' 
108• Accord: N. Mole, 'Problems Raised by Certain Aspects of the Present Situation of 
Refugees from the Standpoint of the European Conventidn on Human Rights', in 
UNHCR, The Eurapean Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees, 
Asylum-Seekers and Displaced Persons (1996, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 40, analysing inter alia 
the Commission Report in the Chahal case. However, a weighing of public interests 
against the applicant's interests is precisely what a number of dissenting opinions in 
ECtHR cases propose: ECtHR, Vilvarajah and Others vs. the U.K, 30 November 1991, 
Series A 215 [henceforth Vilvarajah], Dissenting opinion of Judge Russo; and ECtHR, 
Chahal vs. the U.K, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V [henceforth Chahal], Joint 
Partly Dissenting Opinon of Judges Golciiklii, Matscher, Freeland, Baka, Totchev, 
Bonnici and Levits. See also Hartl, 1999, p. 102, suggesting that there should be no 
weighing of interests, while pointing out that the public interest may impact the 
interpretation of the concept 'inhuman and degrading treatment'. 
1090 Draft List, para. XII. A. b. 
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respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law'. 
A special feature of the ECHR is its powerful monitoring mechanism. 
Earlier, State Parties to the ECHR could choose to endow the Court with 
the competence to receive individual applications by making a declaration 
to that effect. After the restructuring of the Convention's control 
machinery through Protocol No. 111091, acceptance of that competence 
has become an integral and mandatory part of the Convention.1092 Finally, 
State Parties have taken upon themselves an obligation to follow the 
judgements issued by the European Court of Human Rights. 1093 As we 
shall see, the European monitoring bodies have played a critical role in 
developing the inherent prohibition of refoulement in human rights 
norms. 
9.1.4.2 .Humanitarian Law 
Are there any implicit prohibitions of refoulement in humanitarian law? 
Marx has suggested that Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions creates 'an immediate prohibition of refoulement for victims 
of civil war'1094 over and above its obligations to the parties to the conflict. 
His argument draws on the 1986 ICJ Decision in the Nicaragua case, 
where the Court had to pronounce itself on the question whether the 
1091 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, 11 
May 1994, ETS No. 155. 
1092 See Art. 34 of the ll'h Protocol: 'The Court may receive applications from any person, 
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a 
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties set forth in the Convention or in the 
protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the 
effective exercise of this right'. 
1093 Art. 46 of the 11th Protocol. 
10• 4 R. Marx, 'Volkervertragsrechtliche Abschiebungshindernisse fiir Fliichtlinge', in K. 
Barwig (ed.), Ausweisung im demokratischen Rechtsstaat (1996, Nomos, Baden-Baden), at 
299. Accord: M. Kja:rum, 'Article 14', in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. A Common Standard of Achievement (1999, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague), p. 285. 
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United States had violated humanitarian law by publishing a manual on 
guerrilla warfare and spreading it to the insurgent 'Contras' forces. 1095 
The cornerstone of this argumentation is the content of a provision 
included in each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions1096, identically 
worded, allotted the same article number and therefore known as 
Common Article 3. This norm spells out basic protective obligations of 
State Parties bound by any of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in 
situations of non-international armed conflicts: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
1095 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
1096 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 75 UNTS 135; Convention 
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287 [henceforth the 1949 Geneva Conventions]. 
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{2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to 
the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to 
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the 
other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the 
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties 
to the conflict. 
Due to a reservation by the United States that excluded multilateral 
treaties from the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court was prevented from 
considering the responsibility of the United States under the-
multilateral-1949 Geneva Conventions. Instead, it had to resort to a 
general principle of humanitarian law, consuming the content of 
Common Article 3, to pronounce itself on this matter. In the next step, it 
considered Common Article 3 to be an 'elementary standard of humanity' 
and, due to its minimum character, applicable in non-international and 
international conflicts alike. Further, the Court considered the United 
States to be party to an international conflict with Nicaragua, which 
would make the general principle of humanitarian law related to earlier 
applicable. 1097 
Subsequently, the Court found by fourteen votes to one that, under 
general principles of humanitarian law, the United States was bound to 
refrain from encouragement of persons or groups engaged in the conflict 
in Nicaragua to commit violations of common Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. The manual on 'Psychological 
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare', whose publication and dissemination 
was the responsibility of the United States, advises certain acts which are 
to be regarded as contrary to that artide. 1098 
Liberating himself from the actual reach of the judgement, Marx claims 
that Common Article 3 not only obliges parties to the conflict, but also 
'any conceivable bearer of responsibility under international law' to 
refrain from immediate and mediated violations of its basic rights.1099 If 
1097 Nicaragua Case, para. 219. 
1098 Nicaragua Case, paras 219 and 292. 
1099 'Diese Schutznorm kommt aber nicht erst bei der Unterstiitzung eines Konflikt· 
beteiligten zur Anwendung. Vielmehr will sie die unbeteiligte Zivilbevolkerung vor 
jeder unmittelbaren und mittelbaren Verletzung ihrer grundlegenden Rechte durch je· 
den denkbaren Triiger volkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen schiitzen.' Marx, 1996, p. 300. 
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this were the case, Common Article 3 would possess a given place in the 
emerging refugee law of the EU. All Member States and first wave 
candidate countries have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are 
bound by Common Article 31100; besides, its content would also be 
binding on them as part of the general principles of humanitarian law.1101 
However, taking account of its greater transparency, the treaty obligation 
shall be looked into in the subsequent discussion. 
Marx's line of argument is not convincing, as it runs counter to the 
very terms of Common Article 3. It emanates from the first sentence of 
Common Article 3 that this provision merely obliges states party to the 
conflict, and so do the general principles of humanitarian law alluded to 
by the Court.1102 To be sure, reading a prohibition of refoulement by 
states not parties to the conflict into Common Article 3 would amount to 
an interpretation contra legem. 1103 The methodology of interpretation 
enshrined in the Vienna Convention and expounded at some length 
below1104 does not permit us to pursue an interpretative operation further 
when clarity has been attained by studying the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the provision in question. 1105 And the ordinary meaning of the 
terms used in Common Article 3 entail its non-applicability to others than 
parties to the conflict. 
The Nicaragua Case does not support Marx's argument either. The 
Court's conclusion was explicitly reached on the premise that the United 
States was party to an international armed conflict. 1106 Thus, the Court did 
not expand the personal scope of Common Article 3 or its counterpart 
among the general principles of humanitarian law. Neither is it 
1100 Source: IHL Database, available at < http://www.icrc.org/ihl > (accessed on 24 April 
00). 
1101 In some domestic legal orders, this offers the advantage of direct applicability. 
1102 In the Nicaragua Case, there is no indication whatsoever that the Court considers the 
general principles of humanitarian law consuming the content of Common Article 3 to 
apply to non-parties to the conflict as well. 
1103 This argument also strikes against Kja:rum's support for a prohibition of refoulement 
implied in Common Article 3, which he bases partly on the provisions on the 
prosecution of war criminals, partly on an analogy to the case law under Article 3 
ECHR. Kja:rum, 1999, p. 285. These analogies can hardly alter the wording of Common 
Article 3. Therefore, together with the one taken by Marx, his position is untenable. 
1104 See chapter 9.3 below. 
1105 See Article 31 (4) VTC and text accompanying note 1121 below. 
1106 Nicaragua Case, para. 219. 
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conceivable that a prohibition of refoulement would flow from other 
general principles of humanitarian law, as the personal scope of those is 
restricted to parties to the conflict.1107 
Contrary to Marx's claim, the personal scope of Common Article 3 
does not comprise all conceivable subjects of international law. The 
implicit prohibition of refoulement inherent in Common Article 3 would 
only oblige a host state which is party to the conflict. 
This reduces the practical relevance of such a prohibition to a great 
extent. Properly speaking, it would offer protection to internally 
displaced persons. However, given that internally displaced persons per 
definition fail to have crossed an international boundary, this category 
falls outside the scope of the present work. Therefore, Common Article 3 
shall not be included in the normative base. Nonetheless, the idea behind 
Marx's approach remains useful and merits further scrutiny. 
We would propose another approach that offers the advantage of 
greater applicability in practice. We shall seek to expound whether norms 
of humanitarian treaty law applicable in international conflicts contain 
implicit prohibitions of refoulement. 
The Fourth Convention contains a catalogue of rights in Part ill, 
Section I, which protected persons are entitled to in the territories of the 
parties to the conflict as well as in occupied territories. This catalogue 
hosts inter alia the explicit prohibition of refoulement in Article 45 FC, 
already dealt with above. Here, we shall scrutinise Article 32 FC, obliging 
the parties to respect the life and physical integrity of protected persons: 
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is 
prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause 
the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in 
their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, 
corporal punishments, mutilation and medical or scientific 
experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a 
protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilian or military agents. 
1107 Compare the allusion to 'obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound 
to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized people, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public 
conscience' in Convention I, Art. 63, Convention II, Art. 62, Convention ill, Art. 142, 
Convention IV, Art. 158 (emphasis added). 
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Precisely as in Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR, this article might 
host an implicit prohibition of refoulement. With due regard to Article 4 
FC, a protection seeker is a protected person in the hand of a contracting 
party. Her return by the latter to a conflict zone could very well 
constitute a 'measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering 
or extermination' of the said person. Considering the threat facing the 
returnee, the forcible implementation of return by civilian or military 
agents of the returning state could constitute a 'measure of brutality' in 
the sense of the second sentence. 
If Article 32 FC indeed hosts an implicit prohibition of refoulement, its 
scope of application is comparably narrow. Due to political reasons, a 
party to the conflict might not even wish to return persons potentially 
coming under its protection. Moreover, it would overlap to a certain 
extent with other explicit and implicit prohibitions of refoulement. 
Nonetheless, there is a theoretical interest in clarifying the matter, and it 
cannot be excluded that a protection seeker would find herself outside all 
conceivable protection categories, were it not for Article 32 FC. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to include this provision in the normative base 
underlying the ensuing inquiry. 
9.2 Access to Territory 
Which norms are prima facie relevant for answering the second question 
regarding access to protection? First, it must be recalled that the explicit 
and implicit prohibitions of refoulement dealt with above need to be re-
examined in the light of the second question. After all, a state obligation 
to protect could embrace an obligation to allow access as well. Second, 
those norms of international human rights law which deal specifically 
with migration also need to be included in the normative base. Both the 
ICCPR and a Protocol to the ECHR contain pertinent articles that shall 
be presented in detail below. 
9.2.1 The ICCPR 
Article 12 (2), (3) and (4) ICCPR deals with the transgression of state 
borders. More specifically, it enshrines a carefully delimited right to 
international freedom of movement: 
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2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any 
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary 
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are 
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present 
Covenant. 
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country. 
To be precise, this prov1s10n contains two rights: entitlement to 
emigration from any country, including one's own, and entitlement to 
entry into one's own country. On a matter-of-fact basis, it can be stated 
that Article 12 is asymmetrical in that the right to emigrate is wider than 
the right to immigrate. Neither this provision, nor any other contained in 
the ICCPR, makes mention of a right to immigrate into states which are 
not one's 'own country'. Compared to its predecessors in the UDHR1108, 
Article 12 ICCPR specifies the conditions for restricting the right to leave, 
and qualifies the right to enter one's own country by prohibiting arbitrary 
deprivation. 
9.2.2 The Fourth Protocol to the ECHR 
Moving from the ICCPR to the regional system of human rights 
protection in Europe, we find that the right to leave and the right to entry 
are similarly framed. The 1963 Fourth Protocol to the ECHR1109 provides 
for both rights under the European system. While Article 2 (2) lays down 
a right to leave which is identically worded to the corresponding right in 
Article 12 (2) ICCPR, the clause on restrictions in Article 2 (3) of the 
Fourth Protocol is worded in a slightly different manner: 
1108 Article 13 (2) UDHR is worded as follows: 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country'. This provision is subject to the 
limitations in Arts 29 and 30 UDHR. 
1109 Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain Rights and Freedoms other than those already 
included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto, Strasbourg, 16 September 
1963, ETS No. 46 [hereinafter the Fourth Protocol]. 
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2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the maintenance of "ordre public", for the prevention of 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Compared to Article 12 (4) ICCPR, the right to entry is moulded into 
more specific terms in the Fourth Protocol. Its Article 3 (4) explicitly 
limits this right to nationals: 
No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the 
State of which he is a national. 
However, its protective ambit is not limited to the arbitrary deprivation 
of the right to entry, but to any such deprivation. In this regard, the 
Fourth Protocol is more favourable than the ICCPR. 
With the exception of Spain and the United Kingdom, all EU Member 
States have ratified the Fourth Protocol. It is regarded as part of the 
acquis, and the Council has classified it as an instrument which 'States 
applying to join the European Union should endeavour to become party 
of' .1110 Already now, all first wave candidate countries are bound by the 
Fourth Protocol. Individuals can seize the European Court of Human 
Rights with complaints against those states that are parties to it.1m 
9.3 Methodology of Interpretation 
In the next move, it has to be clarified which norms of interpretation shall 
be used in establishing the precise content of the provisions singled out 
above. Articles 31-3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties1112 provide for the interpretation of treaties, which is at stake 
here. There is no doubt that the Vienna Convention, according to its 
Article 4, is not to be applied retroactively. This bars direct recourse to its 
1110 Draft List, para. XII. D. 
1111 See Art. 34 of the 11th Protocol to the ECHR. 
1112 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 24 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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interpretative norms when grappling with the 1949 Fourth Convention, 
the 1950 ECHR, its 1963 Fourth Protocol, the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
the 1966 ICCPR and the 1966 First Protocol. However, it is widely agreed 
that Articles 31-3 VTC are reflective of customary international law on 
the interpretation of treaties, valid at least throughout the post-war period 
at stake here. 1113 As an example, the Human Rights Committee has 
explicitly referred to the Vienna Convention when interpreting the 
ICCPR1114, and so did the ECtHR when construing the ECHR1115• Even 
the ICJ has confirmed that the principles in Articles 31 and 32 VTC 
reflect customary international law.1116 For practical reasons, we shall refer 
to Articles 31-3 VTC even when interpreting instruments concluded 
before its entry into force. Such references shall be understood as alluding 
to the corresponding norms in customary international law. 
It should be underscored that the rules on interpretation contained in 
Articles 31-3 VTC are binding treaty law for the parties.1117 The vast 
majority of Member States and first wave candidate countries have ratified 
this instrument. 1118 Those who have not are bound to apply identical rules 
of customary international law.1119 Accordingly, neither Member States 
nor first wave candidate countries can choose freely which standards to 
apply to the interpretation of their international treaty obligations; rather, 
they are duty-bound to revert to the content of Articles 31-3 VTC. 
Article 31 VTC provides for a 'General Rule of Interpretation'. Its first 
paragraph merits quoting in full: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
1113 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1984, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester), pp. 19 and 153. 
1114 Human Rights Committee, Alberta Union v. Canada, B118/1982, para. 6.3. 
1115 ECtHR, Golder Case, 21February1975, Vol. A 18, p. 14. 
1116 ICJ, Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of July 21, 1989, Judgment of 12 November 
1991, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 53, at pp. 69-72. 
1117 For an exploration on the bindingness of rules of interpretation, see Bernhardt, 1992, p. 
1418. 
1118 Save for France, Ireland and Portugal, all Member States are bound by the VTC. Among 
first wave candidate countries, only Malta is not bound by the VTC. Ratification data as 
of 28 June 1999, contained in UNHCR Refworld database, July 1999 edition. 
1119 Bernhardt, 1992, p. 1418. 
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Article 32 VTC deals with supplementary means of interpretation and 
their use, while Article 33 VTC spells out rules for the interpretation of 
treaties authenticated in two or more languages. 
But Articles 31 and 32 VTC are not merely instructing international 
lawyers where to look for raw material informing their interpretation, but 
also in what order and under which conditions to use such material. Based 
on a systematic analysis of both provisions, Linderfalk has identified a 
hierarchical methodology of interpretative operations.1120 The metho-
dology inherent in the named standards stretches over a maximum of 
three stages. In the first stage, the interpreter shall establish the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty. Where this operation leads to 
a clear result, interpretation has come to an end, and no further action is 
necessary. 1121 If and only if such clarity is not attained, the interpreter shall 
proceed to the second stage, drawing on the context as well as the object 
and purpose of the treaty to dissolve the ambiguity resting in the 
'ordinary meaning'. mi Where the content of a provision is clarified in the 
second stage, interpretation has come to an end. If and only if such clarity 
is not attained, the interpreter shall proceed to a third stage, taking 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation along the provisions of 
Article 32 VTC. 1123 Among other data, the third stage makes the travaux 
available to the interpreter. 
It is quite obvious that the notion of clarity plays a prominent role in 
the correct application of Articles 31 and 32 VTC. Stating that the matter 
is clear may stop interpretation from proceeding to a subsequent stage, 
and thus bar additional data from being admitted to the interpretative 
process. Stating that the outcome of interpretation is still ambiguous 
1120 U. Linderfalk, Om tolkning av traktater (2000, unpublished dissertation manuscript, on 
file with the author). 
1121 Compare Art. 31 (4) VTC, shifting the burden of proof to those who argue for an 
interpretation beyond 'the ordinary meaning' of the terms of the treaty. M. K. Y asseen, 
'L'interpretation des traites d'apres la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traites', 
Receuil des Cours 151[IIIJ (1976), p. 28. This is precisely where the border between the 
first and the second step is located. 
1122 For an express confirmation of this step-by-step method, see ICJ, Case Concerning the 
Arbitral Award of July 21, 1989, Judgment of 12 November 1991, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 
53, at pp. 69-72, summarising some of its earlier dicta on interpretation. 
1123 Yasseen, 1976, pp. 78-82, underscoring that recourse to the supplementary means of 
interpretation is to be considered as a distinct step in the interpretative operation. See 
also YILC 1966, II, p. 219. However, it should be noted that Art. 32 VTC may also be 
used to confirm the result of an interpretative operation under the first two stages. 
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opens the gates to further evidence of meaning and intent, evidence that 
may give interpretation a wholly new direction. The Vienna Convention 
does not define clarity, which leaves the international lawyer with a 
subjective margin. 
Mindful of the order prescribed by the VTC, we shall now identify 
norms for which the 'ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty' is not enough to establish the content of state obligations vis-a-vis 
protection seekers. Going through those parts of the normative base 
singled out as binding above, we shall identify a group of hard cases, 
which will be taken to the second and, where necessary, even the third 
stage in chapter 10. 
9.4 Identifying Hard Cases 
In the following, it shall ' be established whether the questions on 
protection and access can be answered by interpreting the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty norms in question. 
9.4.1 Protection: Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement 
The first question was whether EU Member States are under an obligation 
to grant extraterritorial protection. 
All of the express prohibitions of refoulement scrutinised above are 
unproblematic. The wording of Article 33 GC, of Article 3 CAT and of 
Article 45 FC, respectively, establish that EU Member States are under an 
obligation to refrain from refoulement. While the precise scope of these 
obligations is in need of further clarification1124, their content is 
sufficiently clear to answer the question quoted above: Member States are 
under a legal obligation to grant extraterritorial protection. In this respect, 
there is no need to proceed to further stages in the interpretative 
operation. 
Different is the case of implicit prohibitions of refoulement in human 
rights law and humanitarian law. The question whether and to what 
1124 Among other things, the precise personal scope of these prohibitions is not clear (see 
inter alia chapter 12.2.2 below). 
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extent these norms entail an obligation to grant extraterritorial protection 
has yet to be answered. 
9.4.1.1 Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR 
The wording of Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR is not of much 
help when it comes to the issue of extraterritorial protection. The sole 
insight to be derived from it is the fact that no one shall be subjected to 
certain forms of ill-treatment. 
The ambiguity of interpretation emerged clearly in Soering, the first 
landmark case on Article 3 ECHR before the European Court of Human 
Rights. 1125 Although Soering concerned extradition, it unlocked the 
protective potential of Article 3 ECHR for asylum as well. 1126 The issue to 
be decided was whether it was permissible for the U.K. to extradite a 
suspected murderer to the United States of America, where he faced the 
risk of capital punishment and placement in a specific prison wing, 
commonly known as 'death row'. The responding U.K. government 
claimed that 'it would be straining the language of Article 3 [ ... ] 
intolerably to hold that by surrendering a fugitive criminal the extraditing 
State has "subjected" him to any treatment or punishment that he will 
receive following conviction and sentence in the receiving State' .1127 This 
view was not shared by the Court, which apparently regarded the 
language of Article 3 as ambiguous. Rather, it based the applicability of 
that provision in extradition cases on contextual and teleological 
arguments. 1128 Accepting the counsel's claim that the conditions in death 
row indeed were inhuman, the Court concluded that extradition by the 
U.K. would violate Article 3 ECHR. 1129 The U.K. government, however, 
remained unconvinced. When the Chahal case1130 came before the 
Commission, the Government underscored 'that, contrary to the view of 
1125 ECtHR, Soering vs. the U.K, Series A, No. 161 [henceforth Soering]. 
1126 In Cruz Varas, the Court held that Art. 3 was applicable not only to extradition cases, 
but a fortiori also to expulsion cases. ECtHR, Cruz Varas vs. Sweden, Series A, No. 201 
[henceforth Cruz Varas], para. 69. 
1127 Soering, para 83. 
1128 See chapter 10.1.1.1 below on the second stage of interpretation. 
1119 Thus, in the Court's opinion, it was neither the risk of capital punishment nor that of 
execution, which would have made extradition a violation of the ECHR. 
1130 See text accompanying note 180 above. 
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the Court in the Soering and Vilvarajah cases, Article 3 [ ... ] of the 
Convention has no extra-territorial effect, but should be construed as a 
prohibition on a Member State exposing persons within its own 
jurisdiction to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment' .1131 
Tracking down the ordinary meaning of 'to subject' and 'a soumettre' 
respectively1132 does not solve the problem. The former means 'to cause to 
undergo or experience some action or treatment'1133, while the latter 
signifies 'exposer a un effet qu'on fait subir'1134• The precise nature of the 
causality alluded to in these explanations can hardly be established by 
resorting to a semantic, grammatical and pragmatic analysis, however. 
To wit, the terms of Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR fail to 
answer in a sufficieI?-tlY clear manner whether removal to ill-treatment in a 
third country is covered or not. A line of reasoning built on the 
assumption that the removal from one country and the anticipated human 
rights violation in the destination country are to be seen as non-divisible 
will lead to an affirmative position. On the other hand, perceiving the act 
of removal and the act of violating human rights as two separate 
phenomena typically supports a denial of non-refoulement obligations 
inherent in both provisions. True enough, Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 
ICCPR enshrine certain rights to the benefit of individuals, but it is 
unclear whether these entail state obligations to grant extraterritorial 
protection. Only by moving on to the second stage of the interpretative 
operation can clarity be attained. 
9.4.:1..2 Article 32 FC 
Precisely as in the case of Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR, the issue 
of causality is critical for a proper interpretation of Article 32 FC. The 
ordinary meaning of the phrase 'taking any measure of such a character as 
to cause' is open to conflicting interpretations on whether such causation 
1131 European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 22414/93, The Chahal Family 
against the United Kingdom, Report of the Commission (adopted on 27 June 1995), para. 
92. 
1132 The English and French texts of the ECHR are equally authentic. 
1133 Webst= New World Dictionary of the American Language (1970, The World Publishing 
Company, New York and Cleveland), p. 1418. 
1134 Le Mirco-Robert (1988, Dictionnaires le Robert, Paris}. 
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must be direct or may also be indirect. A proper reading of the terms of 
Article 32 FC reveals that it only covers direct causation. 
The nexus between the first and the second sentence of Article 32 FC is 
of particular relevance in this context. Let us have a second look at the 
wording of the provision: 
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is 
prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause 
the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in 
their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, 
corporal punishments, mutilation and medical or scientific 
experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a 
protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilian or military agents. 
In the first sentence, measures causing the physical suffering or 
extermination of persons in the hands of a Contracting Party are 
prohibited. In the second sentence, the prohibited measures are 
exemplified. Murder, torture and the other measures explicitly named 
have in common that they constitute violations of the physical integrity 
of the protected person. In line with the interpretative principle of 
ejusdem generis1135, the phrase 'any other measure of brutality' must be 
understood to share this characteristic. This suggests that the drafters did 
not wish to include the indirect causation of physical suffering or 
extermination in the protective scope of this provision. Otherwise, they 
could have easily omitted the words 'of brutality' or extended the list of 
examples with an explicit reference to removal situations. Therefore, 
Article 32 FC does not contain an implicit prohibition of refoulement. By 
consequence, this provision can also be discarded from our scrutiny of the 
question of access to territory. 
1135 See note 1047 above. The first stage of interpretation-i.e. the identification of the 
'ordinary meaning' of the terms of a treaty-covers not only a lexical, but also a 




9.4.2 Access to Territory 
The second question was whether an individual entitlement to migrate in 
order to seek such protection exists. Migration is a composite of leaving 
one country and entering another. Therefore, the right to leave as well as 
the right to entry has to be scrutinised. Given the ever more widespread 
usage of control mechanisms outside state territory (e.g. pre-entry 
measures such as carrier sanctions combined with visa requirements), our 
examination of the right to entry can be further differentiated. The 
regulation of entry at the border of a potential host state should be dealt 
with separately from the regulation of entry by means of externalised 
control mechanisms. In the former case, it can be argued that the claimant 
has made contact with state territory, which usually results in a more 
advantageous legal position. The same is not true for a claimant visiting 
the embassy of a potential host country in her home country, asking for 
an entry visa. 1136 Here, the absence of territorial contact might impact 
negatively on the claimant's legal position. In the following, we shall deal 
with both access situations, looking into the impact of relevant provisions 
on access at the border and access from outside the potential host state. 
9.4.2.1 The Right to Leave and the Right to Entry 
With regard to emigration, the matter is clear. It emanates from the 
wording of Article 12 (2) and (3) ICCPR and from Article 2 (2) and (3) of 
the Fourth Protocol that everyone has a right to leave any country, 
including his own, albeit this right is subject to certain limitations. As 
clarity has been attained in the first stage, recourse to contextual or 
teleological interpretation is unnecessary. 
The other side of the coin, that is, immigration, entails greater 
difficulties. As earlier noted, neither of the provisions in the normative 
base contains a reference to immigration, be it in the permissive or in the 
!imitative sense. A universalist would conclude that a right to immigrate is 
a necessary corollary of the right to emigrate. Admitting the right to 
emigration while denying a right to immigration would be a contradiction 
in terms. A particularist would disagree with this notion and underscore 
1136 It should be underscored that, legally and practically, this case is different from one 
where diplomatic asylum is sought. 
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that the ICCPR represents an enumeration of rights: the wording of its 
provisions demarcates the reach of the entitlements contained in them. A 
right can not simply be deduced from the silence of the text. If the texts 
are silent with regard to the right to immigration it is because their 
drafters did not want such a right to exist. Both positions exceed the 
wording of the said norms and draw on a deeper conflict: whether, in case 
of conflict, to give prevalence to the logic of the law or the will of its 
drafters. 
To conclude, clarity cannot be attained on the right to entry by 
recourse to the terms of the said treaty provisions. It is thus indispensable 
to involve their context and telos. 
9.4.2.2 Explicit Prohibitions of Refoulement 
A prohibition of refoulement may be merely taken as a state obligation 
not to remove a certain group of persons present on its territory to the 
country of persecution. However, the question is whether such 
prohibitions shall be interpreted as implying an additional obligation. The 
question is whether states are bound to admit persons applying for 
protection at the state border or from outside state territory. While non-
removal entails a right to transgress an administrative border (namely to 
be admitted to the state community, although in a minimalist sense), non-
rejection would entail a right to transgress a physical border as well. If 
non-rejection is a legal corollary of the prohibition of refoulement, Article 
33 GC, Article 3 CAT and Article 45 FC would contain an implicit right 
to entry for their beneficiaries. 
It is clear, though, that the wording of all three provisions does not 
allow for deducing a right to entry in the absence of territorial contact 
with the potential host state. In other words, a person demanding an 
entry visa at the embassy of a Contracting Party cannot invoke the said 
norms. In such cases, one cannot speak of expulsion, return, refoulement 
or transfer 'to the frontier of territories' 1137 or 'to another State'1138 or 'to a 
country'1139 from which the specified threats originate. 
1137 Art. 33 GC. 
ms Art. 3 CAT. 
1139 Art. 45 FC. 
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The ambiguity of all the above provisions is limited to cases where a 
person presents herself at the border of the territory of a Contracting 
Party. An inclusive reading would be based on the understanding that 
such a person has already left the territory from which a pertinent threat 
emanates. Therefore, denying entry to the territory of the Contracting 
Party would constitute return 'to the frontiers of' such territories or 'to 
another State' or transfer 'to a country' hosting the specific threat. An 
exclusive reading would propose that a person who is present at the 
border has neither left nor entered a territory. Therefore, it would be 
wrong to call the denial of entry a form of return. Since Article 33 GC, 
Article 3 CAT and Article 45 FC only have a bearing on return, such a 
person would fall outside their protective scope. 
With regard to rejection at the border, we note that the terminological 
couplet 'return ("refouler")' is used in both Article 33 GC and Article 3 
CAT. This exposes a literal interpretation to a problematic tension. The 
ordinary meaning of the English term 'return' normally excludes rejection 
at the border1140, while the French term 'refouler' precisely includes such 
rejection. 1141 In short, this is not a case where the interpretative rule of 
Article 33 (4) VTC-dealing with divergences of meaning between the 
authentic language versions of one and the same treaty text-applies. 1142 In 
the present case, the divergence of meaning stems from one and the same 
language version, namely the English one, which happens to feature a 
French term. 
The linkage between the English and the French term is not easily 
understood. If the drafters had perceived both terms as congruent, why 
was it necessary to add the French term to the English version of the text? 
If the drafters were conscious of the difference in meaning, why did they 
1140 Following Webster's, the most appropriate connotation in the present context would be 
'to bring, send, or put back to a former or proper place'. Webster's New World 
Dictionary of the American Language, 1970. 
1141 Davy refers to the following explanation given in the Grand dictionnaire Larousse VIII: 
'Refouler qqn, un groupe [ ... ] les repousser, les faire reculer par la force ou les emp~cher de 
passer qqpart, de penetrer dans un lieu et notamment dans un pays; chasser [ ... ] Re/ouler 
des immigrants a la frontiere'. U. Davy, Asyl und internationales Fluchtlingrecht, Band I: 
Volkerrechtlicher Rahmen (1996, Verlag Osterreich, Wien), p. 104, note 55. 
1142 Art. 33 (4) VTC reads: 'Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with 
paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning 
which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 




refrain from clarifying matters in the English language, e.g. by expressly 
including rejection at the border among the listing of prohibited acts? 
Instead of 'return' or 'refouler', the Fourth Convention uses the verb 
'to transfer'. This term denotes 'to convey from one person, place, or 
situation to another' .1143 A person rejected at the border of a certain state 
is actually moved over from the jurisdiction of this state to that of another 
one. Therefore, it could be argued that the prohibition of transfer includes 
rejection at the border. On the other hand, the term is less precise than 
refoulement, and the practice of rejection lies at the fringes of its ordinary 
meanmg. 
Regarding all of the three named instruments, the mere wording of the 
provisions does not allow for a clear-cut interpretation. Therefore, it is 
indispensable to move to the second stage. 
9.4.2.3 Implicit Right to Access 
In addition to the scrutiny of explicit prohibitions of refoulement, it may 
be asked whether Article 3 ECHR, Article 7 ICCPR and Article 32 FC 
protect a claimant not only inside the territory, but also at the borders of 
a Contracting State. Apart from border situations, it needs to be assessed 
whether both provisions apply to persons neither within the territory nor 
at the border of a potential host state. In contrast to both Article 3 CAT 
and Article 33 GC, nothing in the wording of Article 3 ECHR, Article 7 
ICCPR and Article 32 FC precludes that they protect persons attempting 
to avert the risk of ill-treatment by demanding admission at the border, or 
an entry visa at the embassy of a Contracting Party. If one concedes that 
the latter provisions indeed represent an individual entitlement to 
extraterritorial protection, it is fully arguable that they imply a right to 
entry as well. The very fact that such a right needs to be derived from the 
wording of the said provisions makes it contestable, however. A 
particularist interpreter would claim that the silence of the ECHR, the 
ICCPR and the FC with regard to refoulement is proof enough that their 
provisions were never intended to give rise to extraterritorial effects. The 
universalist interpreter would argue the opposite, pointing to the fact that 
a broad interpretation maximises the protection with which both 
instruments are tasked. Both a universalist and a particularist 
1143 Websters New World Dictionary of the American Language, 1970. 
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interpretation go beyond the terms of Article 3 ECHR, Article 7 ICCPR 
and Article 32 FC. Therefore, the double ambiguity of these provisions 
with regard to the right to entry cannot be solved in the first stage of the 
interpretative operation. 
9.4.3 Interim Conclusion on the First Stage 
In all, focusing on the 'ordinary meaning of the terms' of relevant 
provisions contained in the normative base did not yield full clarity. 
Regarding the issue of protection, it could be clarified that Article 33 GC, 
Article 3 CAT and Article 45 FC oblige states to refrain from 
refoulement. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether Article 3 ECHR, 
Article 7 ICCPR and Article 32 FC cover situations where the threat of 
violation is situated outside the territory of a potential host state. 
Regarding the issue of access, it could be clarified that international law 
endows the individual with a right to leave. It could not be established 
whether the silence on a corresponding right to entry shall be construed 
in a permissive or a prohibitive manner. This ambiguity is reflected in the 
interpretation of Article 33 GC, Article 3 CAT, Article 3 ECHR, Article 
7 ICCPR and Articles 32 and 45 FC. It is fully possible to argue-and to 
contest-that the wording of these provisions allows for deriving punctual 
rights to access. However, an analysis of the terms of Article 33 GC, 
Article 3 CAT and Article 45 FC could exclude their applicability outside 
the territory and beyond the border area of a potential host state. 
For ease of understanding, the effect of the claimant's location on the 
applicability of these norms is displayed in Table 6 below. Evidently, the 
entry 'arguable' dominates at this stage of reasoning; this illustrates the 




Claimant is Claimant is Claimant is 
situated within situated at the situated 
the territory of border of a elsewhere 
a potential host potential host 
state state 
Art. 33 GC Yes Arguable No 
Art. 3CAT Yes Arguable No 
Art. 45 FC Yes Arguable No 
Art. 3 ECHR Arguable Arguable Arguable 
Art. 7 ICCPR Arguable Arguable Arguable 
Art. 32 FC No No No 
Table 6: Applicability ratione loci of Selected Norms in Relation to a Potential 
Host State. Results of the First Stage. 
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10 Interpreting Hard cases 
THE LAST CHAPTER HAS LEFT US with a series of interpretative 
questions related to extraterritorial protection. The present chapter has 
the task of reducing the number of ambiguous outcomes as far as possible 
with the assistance of the interpretative norms in the Vienna Convention. 
In the first stage, the methodology inherent in Articles 31-2 VTC 
compelled us to regard the terms of each provision separately, admitting 
only a limited set of data. The second stage, with which this chapter 
begins, extends the scope of the interpretative operation, and 
complements the analysis of the ordinary meaning with an examination 
of, first, the context and, second, the object and purpose. Article 31 (2) 
VTC delimits what shall be regarded as the context of a treaty, and Article 
31 (3) VTC enumerates what shall be taken into account 'together with 
the context'. What is to be understood by the 'object and purpose' is not 
developed further in the Vienna Convention, however. With the second 
stage, it is clear that we are beginning to shift from the sphere of legal-
technical arguments to that of qualitative argumentation. 
Provided that the second stage fails to produce clear outcomes, the 
interpreter may resort to a third stage. A non-exhaustive enumeration of 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _011
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the data which may be used in the third stage is contained in Article 32 
VTC. Among them, we find the travaux preparatoires. 
The rationale of the second and third stages is to resolve the conflict in 
interpretation persisting after the first stage. However, as pointed out 
earlier, the possibility remains that the interpretative divide will become 
more profound instead. This is where a conflict is transposed from a 
qualitative to a meta-legal level. 
1.0.1. Protection: Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement 
Recalling our earlier reflections on the terms of Article 3 ECHR and 
Article 7 ICCPR, the question of how the term 'subjected' in each of 
these prohibitions of ill-treatment should be interpreted became 
unavoidable. The term could be understood to denote either 'subjected on 
the territory of the Contracting Party' or 'subjected on the territory of 
the Contracting Party or elsewhere'. 
10.1.1 Article 3 ECHR 
10.1.1.1 The Reasoning of the European Organs 
As clarified earlier, the European organs have chosen the latter option. In 
constant case-law, the Court has stated that Article 3 ECHR is applicable 
in the context of removal.1144 More specifically, this provision is violated 
1144 For a recent and carefully argued analysis of the case law of the European organs, see S. 
Karagiannis, 'Expulsion des etrangers et mauvais traitements imputables a l'etat de 
destination OU a des particuliers', 10 Rev.trim.dr.h. 37 (1999). For general overviews of 
non-refoulement provisions in human rights law, including the case law under the 
ECHR, see R. Plender and N. Mole, 'Beyond the Geneva Convention: constructing a de 
facto right of asylum from international human rights instruments', in F. Nicholson and 
P. Twomey (eds}, Refugee Rights and realities: evolving international ccmcepts and regimes 
(1999, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge}, pp. 81-91; T. Hartl, Das 
volkerrechtliche Refoulementverbot abseits der Genfer Fliichtlingskonvention (1999, Peter 
Lang, Frankfurt am Main), pp. 39-135. See also H. Fourteau, L 'apjJlication de /article 3 de 
la Convention europeenne des droits de l'homme dans le droit interne des Etats members 
(1996, L.G.D.J., Paris), pp. 211-65. For a comparison between the case law of the ECHR 
and of the CAT Committee, see J. Suntinger, 'Article 3 ECHR', Austrian Yearbook of 
International Law (1996). 
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where 'substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he or she was 
returned'. 1145 
The present argumentation, elaborated by the European organs 
throughout decades, assumes that the decision of removal and the 
expected violation of human rights in a third state are indivisible. 
Although this assumption is universalist, we shall see that the Court was 
careful enough to prepare for future limitations of its stance by 
incorporating particularist retreat positions. In the following, we shall 
track the pattern of argumentation as it emanates from the reasoning of 
the Court. 
In Soering, already identified as the landmark case in which 
extraterritorial protection under Article 3 ECHR was introduced1146, the 
Court found it necessary to argue for the applicability of this provision in 
greater detail. We shall follow this trail of argumentation, keeping in mind 
that its references to extradition apply mutatis mutandis to all other forms 
of remova11147 and complementing it, where necessary, with the dicta from 
later judgements. 
Typically, the Court proceeds in eight steps, weaving together its 
conclusion by alternating between the affirmation of rules and the 
reduction of their scope. First, it acknowledges the sovereign right of 
states to control immigration. 1148 Second, it states that the ECHR contains 
no right to immigration or to asylum. 1149 These are two major 
affirmations, seemingly conceding to the particularist interests of the state. 
We may conclude that, taken in an isolated fashion, a decision to remove 
an alien does not contravene the Convention. However, in a third step, 
the Court reduces the reach of both affirmations by underscoring that the 
state right to control is not an absolute one. It has to be exercised with 
1145 Nsona v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 28 November 1996, Reports 1996 V, para. 92, 
with further references. 
1146 See text accompanying note 1125 above. 
1147 A parallel reasoning was first applied in the Cruz Varas case, turning on the removal of 
an asylum seeker. Cruz Varas, paras 69 and 70. Compare also the principles spelt out in 
Nsona, para. 92 (b). 
1148 Vilvarajah, para. 102; Nsona, para. 92. 
1149 Ibid. For an enumeration of cases, see Council of Europe, 1984, pp. 23-4. It should be 
borne in mind that the same is true for the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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due regard to those human rights obligations flowing from Section 1 of 
the ECHR. Although it represents a necessary part of the Court's 
argumentation, this step is not documented in Soering or any other case 
before the Court. Here, we may rely on the expressions it has found with 
the Commission on a large number of occasions: 
Whereas under general international law a State has the right, in 
vinue of its sovereignty, to control the entry and exit of foreigners 
into and out of its territory; and whereas it is true that a right or 
freedom to enter the territory of States, members of the Council of 
Europe, is not, as such, included among the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in Section I of the Convention; whereas, however, a 
State which signs and ratifies the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must be understood as agreeing 
to restrict the free exercise of its rights under general international 
law, including its right to control the entry and exit of foreigners, 
to the extent and within the limit of the obligations which it has 
accepted under that Convention.1150 
That is, the implementation of a decision to remove a foreigner can 
conflict with obligations in Section I ECHR in certain cases.1151 
Next, the Court prepares the ground for the ensuing interpretation by 
adducing, fourth, a contextual and, fifth, a teleological argument. 
In developing the contextual argument, the Court reverses the order of 
things reigning in the earlier steps: now, affirmation works for the 
universalist claimant, and reduction for the particularist responding state. 
As part of the context, the Court introduces Article 1 ECHR, which 
provides that 'the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
1150 The Commission has made use of this paragraph in more than a dozen cases between the 
fifties and eighties. It was first used in Dec. Adm. Com Ap. 434/58, 30 June 1959, YB II, 
p. 354 at 372; Coll. 1. For an overview of other cases where it has been used, see Council 
of Europe, 1984, p. 118. 
1151 Two types of cases can lead to such a conflict. Firstly, removal may directly affect a 
person's human rights as enshrined in the ECHR. This could be the case if the action of 
removal separates him from family members in the removing country. It can also be 
referred to cases where a gravely ill person is exposed to transport in spite of negative 
consequences for her health. Such conflicts relate to circumstances within the 
jurisdiction and, as a rule, on the territory of the removing state. They are not relevant 
for the purpose of this chapter. Instead, we shall focus on the second type of case, where 
a violation of a right enshrined in the ECHR is anticipated to take place in the country 
to which a person is removed. 
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within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I' .1152 
Now, the Court shifts the focus of argumentation: suddenly, the negative 
obligation of not 'subjecting' is traded off for the positive obligation of 
'securing'. The importance of this exchange for the outcome of the 
Court's reasoning can hardly be overestimated. As if it has been 
frightened by its own radical universalism, the Court rushes from an 
affirmation of the relevance of this positive obligation to its immediate 
limitation: 
In particular, the engagement undertaken by a Contracting State is 
confined to "securing" ("reconnahre" in the French text) the listed 
rights and freedoms to persons within its own "jurisdiction". 
Further, the Convention does not govern the actions of States not 
Parties to it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the 
Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other 
States. Article 1 (art. 1) cannot be read as justifying a general 
principle to the effect that, notwithstanding its extradition 
obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender an individual 
unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of 
destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the 
Convention.1153 
Although the judges denied the existence of an obligation embracing the 
individual's future treatment in another state, they underscored again that 
the liberty of states was not unfettered. In the end, Contracting Parties 
were not absolved 'from responsibility under Article 3 [ ... ] for all and any 
foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside their juris-
diction'. 1154 No further motivation is given, and the exact delimitation of 
state obligation and state freedom of action under Article 1 ECHR 
remains obscure. At most, the quoted passage would suggest that the level 
of protection is lower in a context involving extraterritorial threats than 
in a context involving domestic threats. 1155 
1152 Soering, para. 86. See also European Commission of Human Rights, Decision of 12 
March 1984, Appl. 10479/83, Kirkwood v the United Kingdom, D & R 37 (1984) p. 158, 
at p. 183. 
1153 Soering, para. 86. 
1154 Soering, para. 86. 
1155 This implies that the Court introduces a two-level hierarchy of rights under the 
Convention, which is not provided for by its wording. Needless to say, the erection of 
such a hierarchy begs theoretical as well as practical questions. 
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Still, the contextual argument had increased rather than resolved 
ambiguity: apart from the question what 'subjecting' in Article 3 ECHR 
means, the Court also had to take a stand on the interpretation of 
'securing' in Article 1 ECHR. At this stage, the Court switched over to 
the teleological level. It took recourse to the special character of the 
ECHR as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and 
reminded observers of the interpretative principles developed in the 
Court's earlier case law. 
Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument 
for the protection of individual human beings require that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective [ ... ] In addition, any interpretation of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be consistent with "the 
general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to 
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic 
society" .1156 
The level of abstraction is rather high in these lines, striking a single chord 
of affirmation. The absence of clear delimitations ratione loci should not 
keep the Court from meting out effective protection to claimants. And 
the promotional dynamics inherent in the Convention would seem to 
motivate an extension rather than a restriction of protection accorded 
under it. The ambiguity harvested in the contextual argument is converted 
into freedom, and the telos of the Convention suggests that this freedom 
should be used for the sake of universalism. 
In the sixth step, the Court turns more technical again, still 
maintaining the theme of universalist affirmation. Article 3 ECHR is 
identified as absolute and, given the wording of Article 15 ECHR, non-
derogable.1157 Thus, it is identified as enshrining 'one of the fundamental 
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe' .1158 
Although the Court does not spell it out, this provision would seem to be 
one of the best candidates for the promotional agenda of the Convention. 
In the same step, the Court tackles the issue whether the prohibition of 
refoulement under Article 3 CAT should be seen as lex specialis, 
1156 Soering, para. 87. 
1157 Soering, para. 88. 
1158 Soe1ing, para. 88. 
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possessing some form of regulatory monopoly for cases of removal. This 
is denied by the Court: 'The fact that a specialised treaty should spell out 
in detail a specific obligation attaching to the prohibition of torture does 
not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not already inherent in 
the general terms of Article 3 [ ... ) of the European Convention'.1159 To 
underpin that conclusion, the Court refers to the telos of the Convention, 
as expressed in the preamble, and the telos of Article 3 ECHR itself. 
In the seventh step, the Court formulates the problem of a traditional 
limitation of the Convention's protective scope. It acknowledges that it 
usually does not pronounce itself on potential violations of the ECHR. 
Reducing the scope of this reduction, it introduces an exception for cases 
where the suffering risked would be 'serious and irreparable' .1160 
Finally, in the eighth and last step, the Court claims to infer the 
responsibility of the removing state directly from the act of the third 
state: 
The establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an 
assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the 
standards of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention. Nonetheless, 
there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the 
responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general 
international law, under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as 
any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is 
liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of 
its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the 
exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.1161 
With this final affirmation of the non-divisibility of acts leading to 
violations of human rights, the Court has taken a clear stand for the 
universalist cause. However, the universalist result is derived from 
walking a path of particularist 'principles'. In the first and second steps, 
particularism is made the starting point of the whole argumentation. By 
denying the existence of a universalist 'principle' in the fourth step, it 
relegates universalism to a status of exception and keeps the particularist 
door open for future corrections. The same is true for the seventh step, 
where a particularist rule is generally upheld, but complemented once 
1159 Ibid. 
1160 Soering, para. 90. 
1161 Soering, para. 91. 
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more with a universalist exception. By doing so, the Court avoided tying 
itself to a paradigm, which would reduce its options in future cases. For 
the Court, straddling divergent paradigms is a rational strategy. True 
enough, it strikes against the predictability of outc'omes. However, this 
cost is borne by the Contracting Parties to the ECHR and the individuals 
under their jurisdiction rather than the Court itself. 
10.1.1.2 Two Critics of the European Organs 
In the foregoing, it could be shown that the reasoning developed by the 
European organs fails to deliver a stringent theory on the territorial reach 
of the human rights enshrined in Section I of the ECHR. The path chosen 
by the organs to affirm the existence of state responsibility for 
extraterritorial violations entailed new ambiguities. Moreover, the organs 
limit themselves to stating the choices they made instead of giving reasons 
for doing so. Probably, this was a wise thing for a monitoring body to do, 
but it does not relieve the doctrinal writer from an obligation to search 
for a more conclusive and forceful interpretation. 
Making recourse to the methodology of interpretation expounded 
above, we note that other contextual and teleological arguments can be 
adduced, and that the ones invoked by the European organs can be used 
differently. As it pleased the organs to reach a universalist outcome, and as 
this outcome has been praised, condoned or tacitly accepted by numerous 
doctrinal writers1162, it seems appropriate to let its critics come forward. 1163 
Reichel is one of them. 1164 Proceeding in two steps, he concludes that 
Article 3 ECHR possesses no extraterritorial reach. First, he reformulates 
the problem, asking whether the legal character of action taken by one 
state (expulsion) can be determined by those acts of another state 
(torture), for which they are a causal precondition.1165 If this is the case, 
international law would contain a state duty to react on other states' 
1162 For a comprehensive overview, see MaaBen, 1997, pp. 117-20. 
1163 Apart from the criticism voiced by Reichel and MaaBen, dealt with extensively below, a 
less elaborate critique can be found with G. H. Gomig, Das Rejoulement-Verbot im 
VOlkerrecht (1987, Braumiiller, Wien), p. 34. 
1164 E. Reichel, Das staatliche Asylrecht 'im Rahmen des VOlkerrechts'. Zur Bedeutung des 
VOikerrechts for die Interpretation des deutschen Asylrer:hts (1987, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin), pp. 171-80. 
1165 Reichel, 1987, pp. 173-7. 
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wrongful acts by refraining from any action objectively promoting such 
acts. This duty, professes Reichel, is not generally incorporated into 
international law and cannot said to be 'the rule'. Therefore, at the time of 
its drafting, one could not assume that Article 3 ECHR would include 
protection from extraterritorial threats. However, he continues, inter-
national law has developed. As evidence, he cites Article 27 of the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, outlawing aid or assistance by a 
state to another state for the commission of an international wrongful 
act. 1166 Based on the Barcelona Traction and Teheran Hostages Cases, 
Reichel finds that the observance of fundamental legal obligations is in the 
interest of all states and that all states are called upon to avert the damages 
emanating from their violation. Given that the prohibition of torture 
forms part of these fundamental legal obligations, Reichel comes to the 
intermediary conclusion that an extensive interpretation of Article 3 
ECHR would correspond to the recent developments sketched by him. 
In the second step, however, Reichel approaches the problem from a 
different tack. 1167 As Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR allows detention for the 
purposes of expulsion, Reichel deduces the general permissibility of 
removing aliens. A reference to the prohibition of collective expulsion in 
Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol is taken as a sign that other forms of 
expulsion are allowed under the Convention. These two deductions e 
contrario are complemented by a historical argument. Attempts to 
include a right to asylum in the rights catalogue of the ECHR and its 
protocols failed repetitiously. Reichel names specific attempts to include a 
right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution as well as a prohibition 
of refoulement to persecution into the second Additional Protocol to the 
ECHR, which failed to muster the necessary support from governments 
in 1961.1168 Reichel suggests that the absence of regulation proves that the 
state right to expel aliens is principally unfettered. This issue is simply not 
regulated in the Convention, and any attempts to compensate this lacuna 
by analogy would raise substantial doubts. 
The pattern pursued by Reichel can be described as an initial 
affirmation of a universalist reading followed by an affirmation of the 
particularist perspective through contextual and historical arguments. The 
latter are alfowed to dominate, being considered as closer to the actual will 
1166 YILC 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 30. 
1167 Reichel, 1987, pp. 177-9. 
1168 R'eichel, 1987, p. 178. 
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of the contracting parties. However, as deductions e contrario lack 
precision, and the second step relies on such deductions, his conclusion 
suffers from a lack of compelling force. As indicated earlier, this 
deficiency is shared by the argumentation advanced by the Court. 
Eleven years after Reichels contribution to the debate, an outright 
rejection of the European organ's case law under Article 3 ECHR was 
attempted by MaaBen, who was able to integrate the Courts judgements 
since the 1989 Soering case into his analysis. MaaBen advances three lines 
of argument. The first deals extensively with the issue of state 
responsibility. 
From the outset, MaaBen makes himself a partisan of particularism by 
explicitly describing removal to a country where the individual is faced 
with a human rights violation as an act consisting of two parts. The first 
part consists of removal proper, which he is endowing with a 'legality as 
such'1169, and the second of the violation to which the individual is 
exposed in the receiving country. In a footnote, he motivates this strict 
distinction by pointing out that both parts presuppose their own 
voluntary decision and, as a rule, strive separately for different goals.1170 
We shall have reason to return to this issue in some detail below.1171 
MaaBen states that the delict of aiding another state in the assistance of 
an internationally wrongful act lacks a basis in treaty law or custom. 
Moreover, even if it existed, it would fail to apply in the case in point: 
drawing a parallel from German criminal law, MaaBen states that the 
wrongful act must have been accomplished to trigger responsibility for 
aiding and abetting. As the human rights violation has not taken place at 
the time of removal, there cannot be any state responsibility for aiding 
and abetting.1172 Next, MaaBen considers whether the notion of state 
responsibility for dangerous activities could apply to removal cases. 
Claiming that removal is a neutral act per se, he excludes this notion as a 
basis for an extensive interpretation of Article 3 ECHR.1173 In the final 
1169 Maa&n, 1997, p. 121 and p. 131. 
1170 'DaB es sich hier um verschiedene Vorgiinge handelt, kann man schon daraus 
entnehmen, daB beide Vorgiinge einen eigenen Willensentschluss benotigen und in aller 
Regel getrennt zu einem unterschiedlichen Ziel hinstreben.' Maa&n, 1997, p. 126, note 
376. 
1171 See chapters 10.1.1.2 and 10.1.1.3 below. 
1172 MaaBen, 1997, p. 124. 
1173 Ibid. 
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analysis, Maaflen ties state responsibility to territorial sovereignty rather 
than jurisdiction, which implies another reaffirmation of the particularist 
perspective. 1174 
The second line of argument largely reiterates the contextual and 
historical arguments already expounded by Reichel, complemented by a 
reference to Article 1 of the Seventh Protocol. 1175 Here, Maaflen follows 
Reichel's model by concluding e contrario a) that the state right to expel 
aliens is only limited by provisions expressly dealing with that matter and 
b) that the absence of a right to asylum in the ECHR and its protocol 
implies that a right of extraterritorial protection must not be interpreted 
into Article 3 ECHR. 
The third line of reasoning points at a number of consequences which 
an extensive interpretation of Article 3 ECHR would trigger. 
1. Contracting States would also be obliged to admit persons claiming a 
risk of human rights violation in their country of origin. 
2. Apart from Art. 3 ECHR, even other articles will trigger protection 
from refoulement. 
3. Protection from refoulement cannot be limited to violations by 
agents of the third state, but would also cover violations by non-state 
agents. 
4. Apart from removal, even other forms of state action entailing 
human rights violation by third states would lead to liability. 
1174 Maaf!en, 1997, p. 126. 
1175 Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Strasbourg, 22November1984, E.T.S. No. 117. Art. 1 reads as 
follows: 
'1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom 
except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed: 
a) to submit reasons against his expulsion, 
b) to have his case reviewed, and 
c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or 
persons designated by that authority. 
2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1 (a), (b) and 
(c) of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is 
grounded on reasons of national security.' 
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5. State liability would not be restricted to violations abroad, but also 
cover violations by private agents within the territory of the 
Contracting State.1176 
According to his estimation, these consequences are devastating in the 
sense that they lead to an overburdening of reception states. He concludes 
that the Court has exceeded its competencies by endowing Article 3 
ECHR with a content which the legislator-i.e. state parties to the 
ECHR-did not want it to have. 1177 
By comparison, Ma.a.Ben's argumentation is far less dialectical than the 
one pursued by Reichel, which weakens its capacities to integrate and 
consume opposed arguments. With Ma.a.Ben, everything flows from the 
initial affirmation of separated state responsibilities, enticing him to take a 
conservative approach to the evolving law of state responsibility. 
However, his insistence on the issue of state responsibility points to an 
interesting facet that merits further discussion. 
10.1.1.3 Methodological Appraisal 
At this point of the discussion, we have achieved an overview of the main 
arguments used by the European organs and two of its critics in what 
could be regarded as a debate on the proper interpretation of Article 3 
ECHR. To what extent do they fit into the framework of the general rule 
of interpretation in the Vienna Convention? To be sure, neither the 
European organs nor its critics appear to be overtly concerned with 
following the interpretative norms of the Vienna Convention. There 
seems to be a consensus that the mere wording of Article 3 ECHR is 
insufficient to produce clarity, as all of the named discussants proceed to 
other means of interpretation. As shown above, this is perfectly in line 
with the methodology derived from the Vienna Convention.1178 With 
regard to the context, all discussants refer to further articles in the ECHR, 
which is fully in line with Article 31 (2) VTC. 
Additionally, both critics invoke rights enshrined in 'Protocols to the 
ECHR (Reichel refers to Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol; MaaBen refers 
1176 MaaBen, 1997, pp. 129-34. 
1177 MaaBen, 1997, p. 128. 
1178 See chapter 9 .3 above. 
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additionally to Article 1 of the Seventh Protocol). However, not all 
parties to the ECHR are parties to the named protocols.1179 Therefore, the 
Fourth and the Seventh Protocol do not represent 'rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties' in the sense of Article 31 
(3) (c) VTC.118° Furthermore, it would be hard to qualify the Protocols as 
'subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation' in the sense of 
Article 31 (3) (b) VTC. Even if the Protocols had qualified under the latter 
norm, it merits recalling that they only replicate the ambiguity of the 
ECHR. This runs counter to the requirement that practice establish 'the 
agreement of the parties regarding' the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. 
Thus, the Protocols do not form part of the context of Article 3 ECHR. 
By contrast, the rules of state responsibility referred to by the two 
critics and the state right to control the entry of aliens referred to by all 
discussants are part of the context as defined in Article 31 (3) (c) VTC. As 
customary international law, they are applicable in the relations between 
all State Parties to the ECHR. 
Generally, the references to the object and purpose of the ECHR or its 
Article 3 fit into the framework of Article 31 (1) VTC, although an 
observer will note that the Court adduces its own principles of 
interpretation without making the nexus to the telos of the ECHR 
clear.1181 
The decisive argument in both critiques is the intentional abstention by 
the Contracting Parties to stipulate a right to asylum (taking the place of 
the second argument in each argumentation). However, in the manner of 
presenting it, both critics commit a serious methodological mistake. Both 
Reichel and MaaBen fail to separate the context from the legislative 
history of the Convention and its Protocols. When arguing for an 
1179 A list of state parties to the Fourth and Seventh Protocols is available at the website of 
the Council of Europe: < http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/ 46t.htm > and <http:// 
www.coe.fr/tablconv/117t.htm > (accessed on 26 April 00). 
1180 Emphasis added. Accord: Yasseen, 1976, p. 63. But see: Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Fitzmaurice in the Guzzardi Case, where he interpreted Art. 5 ECHR in the context of 
Art. 2 (1) of the Fourth Protocol (which the responding state had not ratified). ECtHR, 
Guzzardi vs. Italy, Series A, No. 39, p. 51. With all due respect for the pragmatic 
position taken by Judge Fitzmaurice, one must recall that it is not supported by the text 
of Art. 31 VTC. See Fastenrath, 1991, p. 183 note 728 for further examples where the 
limits of Art. 31 (3) (c) VTC were trespassed in case law or rejected by doctrinal writers. 
1181 See text accompanying note 1156 above. 
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intentional om1ss1on of a right to asylum, they not only rely on the 
existing articles of the Convention, which are part of the context 
according to Article 31 (2) VTC, but also on the defeated attempts to 
include an asylum provision into the Convention framework. To be sure, 
the latter data are not part of the context under Article 31 (3) (c) VTC.1182 
Neither can they be subsumed under Article 31 (3) (b) VTC as a 
'subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation'. The abstention of 
pursuing a legislative project further does not amount to a practice in the 
sense of that provision. Moreover, numerous indications contradict the 
establishment of an unambiguous practice in the sense of Article 31 (3) (b) 
VTC.1183 Falling outside the notion of context, these data must be 
considered as part of the legislative history. As such, they may be used 
exclusively for the confirmation of an interpretation derived from the 
second stage or for further clarification, if the second stage fails to render 
the necessary clarity.1184 Both critics disregard this rule. 1185 Neither of 
them is able to show that the second stage has produced a result a) 
sufficiently clear to be the subject of confirmation in the third stage or b) 
which leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Therefore, it is simply not warranted 
to proceed to the third stage. 
Further, they fail to pursue the third stage to its end: there is no 
indication that the authors looked into those parts of the travaux 
specifically dealing with Articles 1 and 3 ECHR. This would have 
1182 'The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: [ ... ] any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.' 
1183 E.g. Resolution 14/67 of 29 June 1967, cited in Reichel, 1987, p. 178 note 49. One 
should also consider that some Contracting Parties to the ECHR have introduced 
domestic protection categories that correspond to the case law of the European organs 
under Art. 3 ECHR. In the Swedish Aliens Act, a protection category drawing on the 
protective ambit of the ECHR is contained in Chapter 3 Section 3, para. 1, and a 
corresponding prohibition of refoulement can be found in Chapter 8 Section 1. 
According to Section 53 (4) of the German Aliens Act, an alien may not be removed, if 
removal contravenes the ECHR. The current deliberations on subsidiary protection in 
the EU Council should also be recalled (see note 1203 below). 
1184 Art. 32 VTC. 
1185 MaaBen develops the historical argument under the heading 'Context of significance'. 
(Bedeutungszusammenhani,), which is at odds with the structure flowing from Arts 31 
and 32 VTC. MaaBen, 1997, p. 127. 
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revealed inter alia that earlier drafts of Article 1 ECHR contained a 
limitation to persons 'residing within' Contracting Parties, which was 
dropped in favour of the present wording, with the express intent of 
widening the scope of application of the Convention.1186 Accordingly, the 
critics' approach to the supplementary means of interpretation was a 
selective one. 
In addition, MaaBen's third argument relating to the consequences of 
an extensive interpretation has no place in the methodological framework 
of Articles 31 and 32 VTC. Leaving aside the question whether his 
description of consequences is correct1187, it remains unclear whether he 
adduces those within the framework of the second stage or as a 
supplementary means of interpretation. 
10.1..1.4 Reinterpreting Article 3 ECHR 
The reasoning of the European organs, the alternative interpretations 
offered by two of its critics and our own methodological appraisal of both 
have endowed us with a tool box of rather diverse arguments. We have 
criticised the critics, and to some extent even the European organs, for 
deviating from the framework set by th~ Vienna Convention. The 
question is whether following this framework would have produced a 
determinate outcome and, if so, what its content would be. What we shall 
attempt in the following is a reinterpretation of Article 3 ECHR, avoiding 
the errors committed by both the Court and its critics. As the outcome 
will be decisive for the protection issue as well as the issue of access, the 
following argument indeed represents the essence of this chapter. 
1186 See e.g. Report of the Sub-Committee instructed to make a preliminary study of the 
amendments proposed by the members of the Committee of Experts (5 February 1950): 
'Since the aim of this amendment is to widen as far as possible the categories of persons 
who are to benefit by the guarantee contained in the Convention, and since the words 
"living in" might give rise to a certain ambiguity, the Sub-Committee proposes that the 
Committee should adopt the text contained in the draft Covenant of the United Nations 
Commission: that is, to replace the words "residing in" by "within its jurisdiction"'. As 
quoted in Council of Europe, Preparatory work on Article 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 31March1977, Court (77) 9. 
1187 In a number of respects, his analysis of consequences is seriously flawed. For a critique, 
see G. Noll, 'Book review. Hans-Georg MaaBen, Die Rechtsstellung des Asylbewerbers 
im Volkerrecht', 67 NJIL 371 (1998), pp. 374-8. 
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Starting out with the context of Article 3 ECHR, we note that five sets of 
data have been tenably invoked hitherto: 
1. Article 1 ECHR, obliging Contracting Parties to 'secure' inter alia the 
right enshrined in Article 3 ECHR to persons within its 'jurisdiction'; 
2. Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR, regulating the legality of detention in the 
context of expulsion; 
3. the state right to control the entry of non-citizens; 
4. the absence of an explicit right to asylum in the Convention; and 
5. the law of state responsibility. 
In consecutive order, the amount of data contained in each set increases, 
and so does the distance to the provision to be interpreted. Simul-
taneously, the precision in argumentation decreases in a corresponding 
fashion. 
Ad 1): Article 1 ECHR is a single norm sentence, connected explicitly 
to Article 3 ECHR by a reference to 'the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section 1 ', of which Article 3 ECHR forms part. The amount of 
additional data provided by this provision is limited but as earlier noted, it 
forces the interpreter to take a stand on the extension of the term 'to 
secure'. 
Ad 2): The nexus between Articles 5 (1) (f) and 3 ECHR is much more 
remote: the former provision enounces conditions under which detention 
may be used to deny entry to or to remove aliens. There is no explicit 
linkage between the provisions, and their thematic relationship is of a 
rather limited character. Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR would only be con-
textually useful if it had stated that, save for detention explicitly 
prohibited by it, all other forms of immigration control are permissible 
under the ECHR. Quite understandably, this is not the case. The fact that 
Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR names denial of entry and removal among the 
criteria for permissible forms of detention cannot be extrapolated to the 
conclusion that denial of entry and removal are per se unaffected by the 
rights and freedoms stated in Section I. 1188 If immigration control had been 
offered the carte blanche of absolute permissibility under the ECHR, 
inhuman treatment during expulsion would also be beyond the reach of 
1188 Had An. 4 of the Fourth Protocol and An. 1 of the Seventh Protocol been pan of the 
context, the same argumentation would have applied to them. 
408 
INTERPRETINC HARD CASES 
the Convention. This is clearly fallacious, and none of the critics takes 
that position.1189 By conclusion, an e contrario deduction based on Article 
5 (1) (f) ECHR is too imprecise and cannot help to determine the proper 
meaning of Article 3 ECHR. It entices the interpreter to reasoning out of 
the negative, wich entails a very large amount of additional data to be 
handled. 
Ad 3): The state right to control the entry of non-citizens is 
thematically close to the interpretative issue at stake here. This right 
forms part of customary international law, and is therefore part of the 
context of Article 3 ECHR.1190 It is a positive right and, at first sight, this 
makes it easier to handle than the sets of data introduced under 2) and 4). 
However, the control right is not an absolute one; it has to be exercised 
with due regard to the stipulations of human rights law.1191 Therefore, it 
would be tautological to determine the impact of human rights law by 
recurring to the state right to control. Where it is invoked by proponents 
of a particularist interpretation, it is-consciously or not-endowed with 
the character of a residual trump: everything not explicitly regulated by 
human rights law is regulated by the state right to immigration control. 
International law features neither a demand for explicitness on the 
limitations through human rights, nor does it offer a hierarchical order 
putting state rights on a higher echelon than human rights.1192 Where the 
1189 See MaaBen, 1997, p. 220, explicitly stating that the conditions of removal must not 
contravene Art. 3 ECHR. 
1190 See Art. 31 (3) (c) VTC. 
1191 'A State has the competence to control and to regulate the movement of persons across 
its borders. This competence is not absolute. It is limited by the right of individuals to 
move across borders and by the obligations of the State that arise from generally 
accepted principles of international law and applicable international agreements.' Sohn 
and Buergenthal, 1992, p. 1. 
1192 Bernhardt states explicitly that 'the often-invoked rule that treaties should be interpreted 
restrictively and in favour of State sovereignty can no longer be considered valid'. R. 
Bernhardt, 'Interpretation in International Law', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law (1992), Volume I (1992), pp. 1416-26, at p. 1421. Elsewhere, he 
notes that 'the in dubio mitius rule is not even mentioned in the Vienna Convention'. 
Ibid. at p. 1419. Given the post-war proliferation of human rights norms, the 
disappearance of this interpretative rule makes sense. Where treaties aim at stipulating 
benefits for third parties not represented under treaty negotiations, the duty-minimising 
presumption of bilateral international law is no longer appropriate. Moreover, inquiring 
into the precise content of 'mitius' brings us back to the conflict between universalism 
and particularism: does it serve the long-term interests of state to deflect victims of 
human rights violations, or is the opposite true? 
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argument of the state right to immigration control is endowed with such a 
trump function, it is merely the outflow of a political choice made by the 
interpreter. To conclude, the amount of data introduced by this argument 
is very large, and so is the risk of tautological reasoning. 
Ad 4): The absence of a right to asylum in the ECHR also entails a 
reasoning out of the negative and shares the problems explained under ad 
2). This absence forms the base of Reichel's and of MaaBen's second 
argument, providing another example of fallacious reasoning e contrario. 




An implied right to extraterritorial protection under Article 
3 ECHR is identical with the stipulation of a right to 
asylum, as suggested in the 1961 Proposal.1193 
The right to asylum, as suggested in the 1961 Proposal, has 
not been laid down in the ECHR. 
Conclusion: There is no implied right to extraterritorial protection under 
Article 3 ECHR. 
Quite obviously, the first premise is flawed. The right to asylum as 
specified in the 1961 Proposal is far from being congruent with the 
potential scope of extraterritorial protection under Article 3 ECHR. The 
former contains exceptions, while the latter does not. The former is 
characterised by the notion of persecution, while the latter hinges on the 
threat of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These 
forms of mistreatment are only a fraction of all conceivable practices 
amounting to persecution. Finally, the rejection of the 1961 Proposal may 
have taken place for many reasons. It is not warranted to conclude that 
the non-adoption of the right to asylum implies that the Contracting 
Parties simultaneously intended to limit the extraterritorial reach of the 
rights enshrined in the ECHR. Had this been their intention, the rejection 
of the 1961 Proposal would not have constituted adequate means to 
1193 In strict pursuance of Reichel's version of this argument, such a right would be identical 
with the non-adopted 1961 Proposal, containing a right to seek and enjoy asylum from 
persecution as well as a prohibition of refoulement to persecution. See text 
accompanying note 1168 above. 
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express it. 1194 Given its flawed premise and, additionally, the 
methodological inappropriateness of the historical data used to underpin 
this argument, Reichel's and MaaBen's critique loses its decisive trump. 
Ad 5): As we have seen, both critics have involved the customary law 
of state responsibility in their reasoning. They state no reason for doing 
so, and such a reason is not immediately evident. State responsibility does 
not offer norms of a higher dignity impeding an extensive interpretation 
of Article 3 ECHR. In fact, state responsibility may be considered 
relevant in an indirect manner. The critics may intend to show that a 
certain interpretation 'fits well' or 'does not fit' with the grid or norms in 
the area of state responsibility. In short, they want to prove that their 
interpretation is more consistent with that grid: it reduces complexity 
without producing additional complexity elsewhere in the system. What 
they suggest is the construction of an analogy between human rights law 
and the law of state responsibility. 
The problem is twofold. First, the allocation of responsibility in the 
tripartite conflict with different classes of participants at stake under 
Article 3 ECHR (the bearers of interest being the returning state, the 
receiving state and the individual, the latter not possessing the same legal 
personality as the two former) is qualitatively different from the existing 
rules on state responsibility. The latter are seized with inter-state relations 
and deal with human rights violations only in an indirect manner. 1195 In 
this regard, human rights law and the law of state responsibility are 
simply not sufficiently comparable to allow for ex analogia reasoning. 
Second, the law of state responsibility is sufficiently open to allow for a 
universalist as well as a particularist analogy. We recall that both critics 
come to diametrically opposed conclusions: while Reichel finds that an 
extensive interpretation of Article 3 ECHR is consistent with the rules on 
state responsibility, MaaBen suggests the opposite. Obviously, this field of 
international law only reproduces the choice encountered when 
interpreting Article 3 ECHR. 
1194 In line with Art. 31 (3) (a) VTC, one may think of an 'agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions' as an 
adequate means. 
1195 Compare Art. 19 (3) (c) ILC Draft declaring certain violations of human rights to be 
international crimes. It is quite indicative that this draft provision has attracted a fair 
amount of criticism so far. 
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The causal linkage between the anticipated human rights violation by a 
third state and the responsibility of the removing state can be elucidated 
further by making recourse to the ILC Draft Articles on International 
Responsibility of States, to some extent reflective of customary 
international law. According to the Draft Articles, state responsibility 
flows from an internationally wrongful act. 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when: 
(a) Conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to 
the State under international law; and 
(b) That conduct constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.1196 
The action of removal is decided on and executed by agents of the 
removing state and consequently attributable to it. 1197 While removal of an 
alien as such is clearly permitted by international law, removal in a 
manner or under circumstances violating the ECHR is not. A state not 
taking the latter restrictions into account will attract responsibility under 
international law for such a removal. 
Determining the content of 'to subject' and determining the limits of 
attribution offer identical interpretative dilemmata. Drawing analogies 
between human rights law and the law of state responsibility amounts to a 
mere replication of the problem. 
Concluding on the context of Article 3 ECHR, we may state that the 
reference to Article 1 ECHR remains the only constructive contribution 
to the interpretative problem discussed here. All the other sets of data 
provide for circular arguments or suffer from logical flaws. As remarked 
earlier, the predominantly negative obligation in Article 3 ECHR is now 
complemented with a predominantly positive obligation in Article 1 
ECHR. This suggests that a contextual interpretation supports the 
outcome arrived at by the Court. 
Moving on to a teleological interpretation, we find ourselves 
confronted with the very abstract goal of promoting human rights. In 
their most pertinent and still rather hazy recital of the preamble, the 
Contracting Parties express their resolve 'to take the first steps for the 
1196 ILC Draft Articles on International Responsibility of States, YILC 1980 Vol. II (Part 2), 
pp. 30-4, Art. 2. 
1197 Ibid, Art. 5. 
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collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration'. 1198 This aim propels us back to the very conflict between 
universalists and particularists on how to best promote human rights, 
expounded at some length above. It largely restores the complexity of the 
original political conflict and leaves the interpreter with the stalemate of 
an indeterminate outcome. The Court drew once more on an oft-invoked 
interpretative rule, stipulating that the Convention rights must be 
interpreted in such a way as to make them practical and effective.1199 At 
first glance, this would suggest working in favour of the individual and 
advancing the universalist position. However, a second look reveals that 
the principle of effectiveness cannot shift the indeterminate setting. What 
is to be regarded as effective is equally vague and ambiguous as how to 
best promote a telos. After all, invoking this principle cannot alter the 
indeterminate outcome of a teleological interpretation. 
Now, at the end of the second stage, we must combine the results of 
the contextual and the teleological interpretation. True enough, the 
former favours a universalist interpretation. Nonetheless, the inde-
terminacy of the latter begs questions. Admittedly, this indeterminacy is 
most useful for the partisan practitioner. The protection seeker's counsel 
may argue for a universalist reading of the telos, thus being able to 
produce a determinate outcome in the second stage. This allows the 
counsel to bar recourse to the third stage1200 and declare the process of 
interpretation to be finished. The government would typically do the 
opposite, arguing that results yielded by the contextual and the 
teleological interpretation contradict each other and lead to an ambiguous 
outcome in the sense of Article 32 VTC. Theoretically, it is not 
immediately evident how the indeterminacy of the teleological 
interpretation should be handled. Two options are conceivable. Either 
teleological indeterminacy is a neutral factor when combining results of 
the contextual and teleological interpretations-suggesting that the 
universalist result of contextual interpretation shall prevail-or the stated 
teleological indeterminacy alone is sufficient to make the result of the 
second stage ambiguous, regardless of the clarity attained by the 
contextual interpretation. The question would not arise, if the contextual 
and teleological interpretations were found in separate, hierarchically 
119& Fifth recital of the preamble of the ECHR. 
1199 See Soering, para. 87 with further references to earlier case law. 
1200 Save for the purpose of confirming the universalist result, in line with Art. 32 VTC. 
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ordered stages. Had this been the case, the clarity attained in the 
contextual interpretation would make any dealings with the telos 
superfluous. 
However, we maintain that the first option must be chosen. To opt for 
the second would endow an indeterminate outcome in one of the two 
interpretations with the same weight as a clear-cut contradictory outcome, 
where both interpretations would lead to diametrically opposed results. It 
would imply a procedural advantage to the particularist position. When 
combining the two interpretations under the second stage, indeterminate 
outcomes must be treated as neutral entities, having a zero value in the 
final count of universalist and particularist arguments. This is in line with 
the rationale of the rule of interpretation enshrined in Article 31 VTC: to 
provide for a hierarchically structured increase of complexity, precisely to 
the extent needed for reduction. The second option defies the logic of 
executing interpretation in three distinct stages. In that sense, 
interpretation is not about the eradication of reasonable doubts, but 
rather about the establishment of justificatory dominance. As shown 
above, Article 1 ECHR provides for an abundance of data justifying a 
universalist outcome. 
With this conclusion, there is no need to move on to the third stage. At 
any rate, this stage would have largely reproduced the universalist-
particularist divide. A consultation of the travaux leads to ambiguous 
results, as indicated in the discussion of the doctrinal critique above. The 
abortive 1961 Proposal on the inclusion of a right to asylum would stand 
against the omission of the territorial limitation of the Convention's 
scope.1201 
Apart from the travaux, other data could be adduced. Most important 
is probably the emerging consensus on a universalist reading of Article 3 
ECHR, as it manifests itself in the discussions in the Council of the 
European Union. 1202 Based on a Danish initiative, various documents on 
subsidiary protection have been circulated since 1997, and the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights on cases involving extraterritorial 
threats holds a prominent place in them. In 1999, the Austrian Presidency 
1201 See chapter 10.1.1.3 above. 
1202 As for now, the domestic laws of some Contracting Parties feature protection categories 
that are inspired by a universalist interpretation of Art. 3 ECHR. Suffice it here to name 
Section 53 (4) of the German Aliens Act and Chapter 3 Section 3 (1) of the Swedish 
Aliens Act. 
414 
INTERPRETING HARD CASES 
summarised the state of discussions as follows: 'Of the subsidiary 
protection instruments existing in the European Union, Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is particularly important'.1203 
The note by the presidency goes on to discuss the impact of the Court's 
case law, of which 'use should be[ ... ) made[ ... ) in formulating policy for 
common legislation, although this involves judgements in individual cases, 
which may differ according to circumstances'. 1204 If these discussions will 
indeed produce a legislative measure transforming the case law of the 
Court into community law, a universalist reading would have won 
express support by a large part of the Contracting Parties to the 
ECHR.12os 
Assuming for a moment that it would be warranted to move on to the 
third stage under Article 32 VTC, this would add no further determinacy. 
To conclude, the universalist conclusion derived in the second stage still 
stands: Article 3 ECHR must be construed as embracing extraterritorial 
protection. 
10.1.2 Article 7 ICCPR 
In principle, the reasoning developed above is applicable to Article 7 
ICCPR as well. 1206 Above, we had identified five sets of data as relevant 
for the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. Mutatis mutandis, four of them 
are relevant for the interpretation of the ICCPR: 
1. Article 2 (1) ICCPR, obliging Contracting Parties to 'respect and to 
ensure to all persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' 
the rights recognized in the Covenant, inter alia Article 7 ICCPR; 
2. the state right to control the entry of non-citizens; 
1203 Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Asylum Working 
Party, Subsidiary Protection, 23 February 1999, Doc. No. 6246/99 ASILE 7, para. 4. 
1204 Ibid., para. 6 (a). 
1205 However, as the Union is not congruent with the group of State Parties to the ECHR, 
such an instrument would not constitute part of the context as alluded to in Art. 32 (3) 
VTC. 
1206 The Human Rights Committee opines that Art. 7 ICCPR prohibits extradition, 
expulsion and refoulement to a country disregarding the content of this provision. See 
General Comment 20/44, 3 April 1993, para. 9. 
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3. the absence of an explicit right to asylum in the Convention; and 
4. the law of state responsibility. 
There is no provision corresponding to Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR in the 
ICCPR. The pivotal factor is Article 2 (1) ICCPR, which provides the 
contextual element tilting interpretation in favour of a universalist 
reading. Therefore, even Article 7 ICCPR must be read to imply a right to 
extraterritorial protection. This reading has been endorsed by the Human 
Rights Committee in a number of cases related to Article 7 ICCPR.1207 
10.2 Access to Territory 
The second question was whether an individual entitlement to migrate in 
order to seek extraterritorial protection exists. An interpretation based on 
the terms of Article 12 (2) ICCPR and Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol 
could not clarify this issue. 
Drawing on contextual and teleological interpretations, two lines of 
argument shall be pursued. First, Article 12 ICCPR shall be put in the 
context of inter-state norms regulating migration. This approach is in line 
with Article 31 (3) (c) VTC, stating that any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into 
account together with the context. Second, Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 
ICCPR shall be interpreted in the context of other provisions in each of 
the respective treaties. The latter provisions form part of the context 
according to Article 31 (2) VTC. Moreover, both provisions shall be 
interpreted teleologically as well. 
10.2.1 The Right to Leave and the Right to Entry 
We had been seized with the question whether or not Article 12 ICCPR 
implies a correlative right to enter another country. Hitherto, this 
question has not been dealt with in the case law of the Human Rights 
1207 Human Rights Committee, Kindler vs. Canada, No. 470/1991, UN Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991; Human Rights Committee, Ng vs. Canada, No. 469/1991, 
UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991; Human Rights Committee, Cox vs. Canada, 
No. 486/1991, UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/45/D/468/1991. 
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Committee, and doctrinal discussion of the issue remains rather limited. 
In the following, we shall first present a universalist reading affirming 
such a correlative right and, second, complement it with a particularist 
reading, denying its existence. 
10.2.1.1 A Universalist Reading 
It should be noted that the right to leave can be interpreted in two ways. 
It can be read as solely enshrining an entitlement vis.ti-vis the country of 
origin. Or it can be read to contain an additional entitlement vis-a-vis all 
states. In this section, we shall argue for the existence of the latter 
entitlement from a particularist perspective. 
Indeed, the right to leave one's country would be nullified in a 
situation where no other state was prepared to receive the individual 
making use of this right. The ideal to be realised by the right to leave and 
the right to return is the free movement of persons. Since these rights 
were conceived, the actual problem has shifted. The number of states 
preventing their citizens from leaving or prohibiting their return is clearly 
decreasing. 1208 Instead, free movement is hampered by a parallel emergence 
of immigration restrictions. 1209 
The wording of Article 12 ICCPR does not restrict it being a claim 
only vis-a-vis the country of origin. We shall now introduce a contextual 
argument, which rests upon an analogy between the inter-state right to 
return aliens to their country of origin and the human right to leave any 
country, including one's own. 
How is the inter-state right structured? As a corollary flowing from 
their territorial and personal supremacy, States have a qualified right to 
expel aliens from their territory. In order for this right to become 
effective, another State has to receive the person expelled. It is largely 
uncontested that this obligation to receive rests upon the State of which 
1208 K. Hailbronner, Ritckiibernabme eigener und fremder Staatsangeboriger. Volkerrechtliche 
Verpfiichtungen der Staaten (1996, C. F. Muller Verlag, Heidelberg), p. 6. 
1209 See note 226 above. 
417 
CHAPTER 10 
the expelled person is a citizen. 1210 Thus, the right of a State to remove 
non-citizens from its territory has been extrapolated to produce a duty to 
receive by the country of origin. This correlate is regarded as a norm of 
customary international law1211 although single countries of origin deny 
readmission to citizens not returning voluntarily. Recurring to the 
standards of interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention, it can be 
stated that the customary law norms governing inter-state relations are 
applicable in the relations between all State Parties to the ICCPR. 
Following Article 31 (3) (c) VTC, they form part of the context of Article 
12 ICCPR. As such, they must be taken into account when interpreting 
this right. 
Let us grant for a moment that the requirements of a sufficiently 
consistent practice1212 and the requirement of opinio juris1213 are fulfilled. 
This would prove that inter-State international law accepts the deduction 
of a correlative duty from a right. It follows that opinio juris embraces the 
logic of correlates. If the same argumentative technique of constructing a 
duty as a correlate to a right is applied in the field of human rights, the 
right to leave produces a duty to admit. In order for the former to be 
effective, one has to construct the latter. This line of argument entails an 
all-or-nothing outcome. Either it is accepted that the logic of correlates is 
part of customary international law, thus validating both an inter-state 
duty to readmit nationals and a human right to immigration, or it is 
1210 The non-binding Cairo Programme of Action described this obligation as follows: 
'Governments of countries of origin of undocumented migrants and persons whose 
asylum claims have been rejected have the responsibility to accept the return and 
reintegration of those persons, and should not penalize such persons on their return'. 
Programme of Action, International Conference on Population and Development, 
Cairo, 5-13 September 1994, UN Doc No. A/CONF.171/13, 18 October 1994, para. 
10.20. Further on the obligation to receive, Hailbronner, 1996, p. 36; and Plender, 1988, 
p.460. 
1211 It is hard, if not impossible, to assess the efficiency of return in practice. Comprehensive 
statistics are lacking. 
1212 Apart from those states outrightly denying readmission to non-voluntary returnees, 
others obstruct return by administrative measures. By way of example, the returnee is 
declared not to be a citizen of the requested state, or return is denied due to lacking 
travel or identity documents. See G. Noll, 'Unsucessful Asylum Seekers-The Problem 
of Return', 37 International Migration 267 (1999), pp. 274-5. 
1213 See the Cairo Programme of Action, note 1210 above. In a number of bilateral 
readmission agreements regulating the return of nationals to their country of origin, the 
right to return is merely reaffirmed. See note 1028 above. 
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denied that customary international law embraces the logic of correlates. 
In that case, a human right to immigration would fall, bringing with itself 
in the inter-state duty to readmit nationals. 
It is quite clear from the analysis of the travaux preparatoires to the 
ICCPR that states intended to preserve their control over the composition 
of their populations. 1214 Now, accepting the logic of correlates as part of 
international law seems to produce a puzzling result. How can a state 
right to control the composition of its population coexist with an 
individual right to entry? If the right to entry is understood as a long-term 
or even permanent change of settlement, those rights indeed conflict. 
However, if one frames the concept of entry as a temporary one, they go 
along very well with each other. Drawing on the latter understanding, the 
individual's right to entry is merely a right to make contact with the 
territory of a state, pending a decision of the entered state whether to 
accept or to reject the entrant. This understanding would limit the right 
to entry to the transgression of physical borders, while admitting that the 
transgression of administrative borders remains a state prerogative. It also 
endows the inter-state duty to readmit nationals with additional 
functionality. After all, the temporary nature of a stay can only be 
enforced by efficient return, which is preconditioned on a duty to 
readmit. Thus, the logic of correlates augments coherence within the 
corpus of norms related to migration. 
Marginally, one might wish to note that such a reading shows a striking 
correspondence to the Kantian 'right ~o visit'. 1215 It must be underscored, 
however, that the legal right to entry is deduced not from philosophical 
premises, but from legal ones.1216 This interpretation manages to reconcile 
both individual and state rights without postulating artificial normative 
hierarchies. 
1214 Hailbronner, 1996, p. 11. 
1215 See chapter 22 above. 
1216 Therefore, Grahl-Madsen, Melander and Ring miss the point when they conclude that 
'[l]ogic does not entitle us to infer a right of entry in countries other than one's own, 
since the right of States to control entry into their respective territories is a jealously 
guarded privilege'. Indeed, the philosopher's logic may not, but the lawmaker's does. 
Moreover, as indicated above, the lawmaker's logic is careful enough to leave right to 
control entry untouched in the long term. A. Grahl Madsen, G. Melander, and R. Ring, 
'Article 13', in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. A Common Standard of Achievement (1999, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague), p. 276. 
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The contextual interpretation expounded above must be complemented 
by a teleological interpretation. This poses problems very similar to those 
encountered when interpreting Article 3 ECHR. The telos of human 
rights protection is broad and abstract; this brings us back to the original 
conflict between universalists and particularists. The ideal of free 
movement is subject to the same divide: who is to tell whether an all-out 
slashing of limitations or a gradual process of controlled deregulation is 
the best device to achieve it? 
Let us sum up on the universalist line of reasoning. The second stage 
affirmed the existence of a right to temporary immigration under the 
contextual interpretation and yielded a neutral, i.e. indeterminate, 
outcome under the teleological interpretation. Cumulating both sets of 
data produces the following result: Article 12 ICCPR must be read to 
imply a temporary right to make contact with the territory of states other 
than one's home country. Interpretatio cessat in claris-there is no need to 
proceed to the third stage. 
10.2.1.2 A Particularist Reading 
10.2.1.2.1 Complementing the Second Stage 
From the preceding section, it emerges that the universalist position is 
based on a contextual argument, allowing it to produce a determinate 
conclusion in the second stage. However, there is another contextual 
argument, suggesting a different outcome. 
Earlier, it has been acknowledged that states possess a right to control 
the composition of their population. A widespread tool to exercise this 
right to control is the imposition of visa requirements. The number of 
states using this tool and the number of nationalities subjected to such 
requirements is on the rise. In the EU, all Member States are duty-bound 
to impose visa requirements along the Visa Regulation. 1217 In the U.S., visa 
requirements have been used throughout the whole century, and enforced 
extraterritorially by placing U.S. immigration agents at points of 
embarkation in third countries.1218 Although visa requirements represent a 
barrier to free movement and can be perceived as politically undesirable, it 
1217 See chapter 5.1.1.1 above. 
1218 See generally Christian, 1999. 
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has not been claimed that they are illegal under international law. There is 
a widespread practice of states in all parts of the world, and there is also an 
opinio juris accepting their general conformity with international law.1219 
Thus, we may state that a customary law norm exists allowing states to 
use visa requirements as a tool of migration control. Following Article 31 
(3) (c) VTC, this norm forms part of the context of Article 12 ICCPR. 
The rationale of visa requirements is to inhibit a would-be emigrant 
from setting out on a journey to a country unwilling to receive her. If visa 
requirements are legal, it must also be considered legal to inhibit non-
nationals from having territorial contact with a potential destination 
country. The state right to deny entry would not only relate to the 
administrative boundary, but the territorial boundary as well. This state 
right cannot be reconciled with a temporary right to entry held by the 
individual, as developed earlier. Its existence confirms that the ICCPR 
simply does not guarantee a general right to entry into the territory of the 
Contracting Parties.1220 
With two powerful contextual arguments standing against each other, 
contextual interpretation cannot deliver a determinate outcome. Recalling 
the indeterminacy produced by the teleological interpretation, the second 
stage must be said to produce an ambiguous result. Therefore, it is 
mandatory to proceed to the third stage. 
10.2.1.2.2 The Third Stage 
The particularist position is further reinforced by arguments becoming 
accessible in the third stage. The travaux of the ICCPR offer ample proof 
that many of the Contracting Parties had an attitude favourable to 
limiting freedom of movement. In a 1950 meeting of the Human Rights 
Committee, the British delegation had requested the outright deletion of 
the relevant draft article. This proposal was rejected by nine votes to 
three, with two delegations abstaining from the vote. 1221 The travaux also 
show that the wording of Article 13 UDHR was perceived as too liberal 
1219 For an overview of prnctices, see e.g. Commissioner of the CBSS, Conditions for Trnvel 
Across the National Borders of the CBSS Member States, 10 May 1999, pp. 20-36. 
1220 M. Nowak, UNO-Pakt uber biirgerliche und politische Rechte und Fakultativprotokoll. 
CCPR-Kommentar (1989, N.P. Engel Verlag, Kehl am Rhein), p. 229. 
1221 Nowak, 1989, p. 209, quoting E/CN.4/SR.151, para. 44. 
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in some respects.1222 By consequence, the Human Rights Committee 
agreed on the deletion of a general prohibition of exile as well as a number 
of qualifications of the freedom of movement.1223 Finally, the Human 
Rights Committee dropped the introduction of a right to asylum as early 
as 1950.1224 
In the third part, focus has shifted from the letter of the law to the 
intention of the legislator. This intention is clearly not in favour of an 
extensive interpretation of Article 12 ICCPR. Therefore, the particularist 
has improved her position, arguing that the aggregate conclusion must be 
that this provision does not contain an implied right to entry, be it 
temporary or not. 
10.2.1.3 Conclusion 
The discussion on Article 12 ICCPR provided a telling illustration of the 
interplay between material content and interpretative rules. In the second 
stage, the universalist argument appears to be more precisely formulated 
than the particularist counter-argument. As the gap between the two 
arguments is too wide to be bridged, there are faint chances for the 
construction of further universalist arguments consuming the visa 
argument. Therefore, the universalist can hardly argue that the 
interpretative conflict can be solved in an unambiguous or non-obscure 
manner in the second stage. Thus, what the particularist needs in the 
second stage is not an objectively better argument, capable of defeating the 
universalist stance, but one strong enough to produce indeterminacy. The 
visa argument is sufficiently strong in this regard, and the third stage is 
activated, allowing the particularist to access further arguments for her 
cause. 
Does this mean that the aggregate outcome of the interpretative 
operation is in favour of the particularist? Having gone through all three 
stages according to the prescriptions of the Vienna Convention, we are 
1222 Nowak, 1989, p. 210. 
1223 Firstly, internal freedom of movement was limited to those lawfully present in the 
territory of a Contracting Party. Secondly, a derogation option was introduced, 
covering internal freedom of movement as well as the right to leave. Thirdly, the 
ICCPR provision merely prohibits only those deprivations of the right to return which 
are arbitrary. 
1224 Nowak, 1989, p. 210. 
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left with an array of contradicting arguments. The Vienna Convention 
does not provide any help for the process of weighing these arguments 
against each other. Thus, the interpretation of Article 12 ICCPR ends 
with an indeterminate result and is ultimately open to the decision-makers 
preferences. 
10.2.2 Explicit Prohibitions of Refoulement 
1..0.2.2.1.. Article 33 GC 
1..0.2.2.1...1.. The Second and Third Stage in the Light of Doctrinal 
Debate 
Determining whether Article 33 GC applies to rejection at the border has 
been a standard topic for doctrinal writers ever since the inception of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Naturally, it does not evade the dichotomy 
between universalism and particularism. Inclusive readings affirm the 
applicability of Article 33 GC to border claims by referring to the logic of 
the law, usually drawing on its object and purpose, or pointing to 'absurd 
results' flowing from non-applicability.1225 On the other hand, ex-
clusionary readings largely rely on a reconstruction of the legislator's will, 
which is said to underpin the non-applicability of Article 33 to border 
claims. These reconstructions draw on the travaux and on the absence of a 
Convention provision regulating the admission of refugees. 1226 Given the 
richness of doctrinal thought, there is no need to craft further substantial 
arguments. However, not all of the arguments advanced in doctrine are 
constructed in a manner compatible with the Vienna Convention. In the 
following discussion of selected arguments, we shall use the Vienna 
Convention as a watershed for distinguishing arguable approaches from 
non-arguable ones. 
In older literature, we find rather clear-cut statements with cursory 
motivations. The first exclusionary reading was advanced by Robinson in 
1225 See, e.g. M. Pellonpaa, Expulsion in International Law. A Study in International Aliens 
Law and Human Rights with Special Reference to Finland (1984, Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki), p. 313. For an overview of inclusionary positions in doctrinal 
thought, see Davy, 1996, p. 94, footnote 8. 
1226 For an overview of exclusionary positions in doctrinal thought, see Davy, 1996, p. 93, 
footnote 3, and p. 94, footnote 7. 
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1953. He denies that Article 33 GC applies to refugees seeking entrance 
into the territory of a potential host state: '[I]f a refugee has succeeded in 
eluding the frontier guards, he is safe; if he has not, it is his hard luck' .1227 
In a footnote, Robinson claims that the drafters did not intend to regulate 
admission by Article 33.1228 Later on, a number of authors have based 
their exclusionary reading on this argument. 1229 
Recurring to the Vienna Convention, we have to state that Robinson 
leaps to the travaux without devoting any interest to the wording, context 
or telos of Article 33 GC. Quite clearly, this negligence strikes back at the 
viability of his results. We would like to add another reflection. 
Interestingly, Robinson deplores that his interpretation of Article 33 GC 
falls short of the protection provided in Article 3 (3) of the 1933 
Convention, which provided that Contracting States undertake 'in any 
case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their country of 
origin'.1230 Nonetheless, he fails to see an interpretative idiosyncrasy 
flowing from this observation. After all, the High Contracting Parties to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention considered 
that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international 
agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the 
scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of 
a new agreement1231 
1227 N. Robinson, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Its History, Contents and 
Interpretation, 1997 ed. (1953, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 138. 
1228 Ibid., at 139, footnote 275. 
1229 A. Zimmermann, Das neue Grundrecbt auf Asyl (1994, Springer, Berlin), p. 74; MaaBen, 
1997, p. 78. 
123° Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, 28 October 1933, 159 LNTS 
199. See also Robinson, 1953, p. 139. In his literal interpretation of the term 'refouler', 
MaaBen also takes note of this provision (MaaBen, 1997, p. 62). By pointing to the fact 
that only eight states had ratified the 1933 Convention, he attempts to disqualify its 
importance. In the light of the teleological interpretation presented here, his counter-
argument is irrelevant. What counts is the fact that the Contracting Parties to the 1951 
Refugee Convention explicitly named the 1933 Convention in Art. 1 A. (1) GC and that 
they expressed their wish to 'extend the scope of and protection accorded by' the 1933 
Convention in the preamble. 
1231 2"d recital, preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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An exclusionary reading is at odds with this telos, as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention would offer a territorially more restricted scope of protection 
than the 1933 Convention. 
Goodwin-Gill takes a moderate position, granting that Article 33 GC 
may not have been applicable to non-rejection at the border from the 
outset. However, following his argument, an extension of the provision's 
scope had taken place through later state practice. 1232 Goodwin-Gill does 
not refer to the Vienna Convention. His argument of extension through 
state practice may be subsumed under Article 31 (3) (b) VTC, but his 
sparse examples fail to show the existence of 'any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation'. 
While the earlier discussions went directly for what was considered a 
relevant argument, more recent contributions explicitly relate to the 
Vienna Convention. An elaborate inclusionary reading has been proposed 
by Kalin, who operates both substantial and methodological 
arguments. 1233 Countering other authors' exclusive readings based on the 
travaux, Kalin rightly asserts that the Vienna Convention inhibits 
recourse to the latter, where a clear result has been derived from the 
norm's context and telos. 1234 While the travaux may very well reveal the 
drafters' unwillingness to regulate admission, this is irrelevant for the 
purpose of interpretation. Kalin himself states rightly that the wording of 
Article 33 GC is open to an inclusionary reading. 1235 In his view, a clear 
result can be derived from a teleological interpretation. Following his 
view, it is the aim of Article 33 GC to inhibit that a refugee, who has 
managed to evade a country of persecution, is returned to it. 1236 
His reading is opposed by Reichel, who manages to transform the 
travaux argument on the non-regulation of admission into a contextual 
argument, thereby evading Kalin's methodological critique. 1237 Reichel 
1232 Goodwin-Gill, 1996, pp. 121-4, at 123. 
1233 Kalin, 1982, pp. 105-10. 
1234 'Wahrend eine an der Entstehungsgeschichte orientierte Auslegungsmethode zu einem 
negativem Ergebnis kommt, fiihrt eine grammatikalische und teleologische 
Interpretation zu einem positiven Ergebnis. Welcher Auslegungsmethode in einem 
solchen Fall der Vorzug zu geben ist, !asst sich der Wiener Vertragsrechtkonvention 
(VK) entnehmen [footnote omitted, GN]'. Kalin, 1982, pp. 108, 109. 
1235 Kalin, 1982, p. 105. 
1236 Kalin, 1982, p. 107. 
1237 Reichel, 1987, pp. 39-42. 
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refers to the following passage m the Final Act of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention: 
The Conference 
[ ... ] 
recommends that Governments continue to receive refugees in 
their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of 
international co-operation in order that these refugees may find 
asylum and the possibility of resettlement.1238 
How does this passage affect the interpretation of Article 33 GC? Reichel 
is correct in qualifying this dictum as a part of the norTI'.'s context.1239 
Subsequently, he argues that it would lack meaning to recommend 
continued reception of refugees to governments, if Article 33 GC obliged 
them not to reject refugees at the border.1240 However, this argument e 
contrario is unconvincing, as 'reception' remains a wider concept than 
non-rejection at the frontier. The meaning of 'reception' ranges from non-
obstruction of physical entry to the meting out of a specific personal 
status. Given this incongruity, it is logically untenable to take the quoted 
passage as an indicative for the interpretation of Article 33 GC by the 
Contracting Parties. Compared to earlier proponents of an exclusive 
reading, Reichel barters a methodological error for a logical one. 
An ambitious, but methodologically flawed, attempt to clear our 
thoughts on Article 33 GC has been put forward by MaaBen. Drawing 
mainly on the by now well-known argument of a missing intent to 
regulate admission, he concludes that this provision does not encompass 
rejection at the border.1241 The Vienna Convention is invoked in support 
of Ma:illen's assertion. But his understanding of the General rule of 
interpretation in Article 31 of the latter instrument builds entirely on the 
subjective approach focusing on state intent. Obviously, in the present 
case, such an understanding promotes an exclusionary reading of Article 
33 GC. Had MaaBen followed Articles 31 and 32 VTC strictly, he would 
have started with a literal interpretation, concluded that the wording was 
1238 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 189 UNTS 37, 28July 1951, IV, D. 
1239 Art. 31 (2) (a) VTC. 
12«i Reichel, 1987, pp. 40 and 41. 
1241 MaaBen, 1997, pp. 55-80. 
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not sufficiently clear, and directly proceeded to a contextual and 
teleological interpretation. Instead, he attempts to identify the historical 
and present intent of the Contracting States as part and parcel of a literal 
interpretation. To this end, he dra,-;s on the travaux. There is no support 
whatsoever in the Vienna Convention to supercharge the ordinary 
meaning of a term with contents derived from the drafting process. 
Maafiens' method turns a blind eye to the subsidiary character of the 
travaux, which are to be consulted if and only if the 'single combined 
operation'1242 of literal, contextual and teleological interpretation has not 
produced a sufficiently clear or reasonable result.1243 Even if one accepts 
the contested state intent approach1244, the latter must not serve as an 
excuse to circumvent Article 32 VTC. While MaaBen observes the risk of 
contradiction between the subjective approach and the Vienna 
Convention1245, he disregards that very risk in his actual interpretation.1246 
Although Maafien fails to realise it, his contribution demarcates a 
change in the discussion's focus. Given the richness of accumulated 
arguments, the battle on the proper interpretation of Article 33 GC can 
no longer be won on a substantial level. The decisive arguments are those 
relating to the interpretation of interpretative rules. Here, we experience a 
shift from the legal-technical to the qualitative level. The Vienna 
Convention is not a monolith, but-like any other body of norms-is 
open to interpretation. Although it pre-establishes the precarious balance 
between the letter of the law and the intent of the legislator, there is 
enough room for a versed interpreter to promote one of these parameters 
at the cost of the other. 1247 Both Reichel and Maafien have realised that 
substantial arguments may be precluded by the Vienna Convention if 
they are not cloaked in proper form. Maafien goes a step further and 
attempts to secure a better substantial outcome by reinterpreting the 
interpretative rules contained in the Vienna Convention. In short, this 
method is about producing substance through form. Although he fails in 
this effort, it is not inconceivable that future discussants manage to 
1242 YILC 1966 II, p. 219. 
1243 Compare the wording of Art. 32 VTC. 
1244 For a discussion, see K. Ipsen, Volkerrecht (1990, C.H. Beck, Miinchen), pp. 7-14 and 
121-2. 
1245 Maall.en, 1997, p. 61. 
1246 MaaBen, 1997, p. 64. 
1247 Bernhardt, 1992, p. 1418. 
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construct a tenable exclusionary reading by exploiting the idiosyncrasies 
of the Vienna Convention. Maa.Ben's attempt is, however, doomed 
because it lacks the necessary sophistication. 
Recently, Davy has made what could be termed the most carefully 
argued and exhaustive contribution to this debate hitherto.1248 
Simultaneously, she is most orthodox in her handling of the Vienna 
Convention, which ultimately secures her success. Davy rejects an 
exclusionary reading for three reasons. 1249 First, the drafting history of the 
Convention does not offer unambiguous support for the contention that 
rejection at the border is outside the scope of Article 33 GC. The oft-
quoted statements by delegates in support of an exclusionary reading have 
been superseded later in the drafting process. To wit, the exceptions in 
Article 33 (2) GC were included, meeting the demands for a limitation of 
the prohibition of refoulement. Moreover, the expression 'in any manner 
whatsoever' was included in the wording of Article 33 (1) GC, supporting 
an inclusionary interpretation of this norm. Finally, delegations also 
complemented the English term 'return' with the French term 'refouler'. 
Davy presents an interesting analysis of the latter amendment. She holds 
that the drafters intended to exclude measures taken at the border by 
inserting the term 'refouler' into the norm. However, this term relates 
also-and, in some cases, primarily-to measures taken at the border. In 
francophone asylum law and practice, 'refouler' covered non-admittance 
at the border. 1250 The same applies for the international refugee law of the 
1930s, which was another point of reference for the drafters. 1251 And, most 
importantly, the ordinary meaning of 'refouler' also includes rejection at 
the frontier. 1252 According to Davy, the conclusion is inevitable that a 
linguistic mistake has been committed in the drafting of Article 33 (1) 
Gc.12s3 
1248 Davy, 1996, pp. 93-123. 
1249 Davy, 1996, p. 95. 
1250 Davy, 1996, pp. 101-3. 
1251 Davy, 1996, p. 104. 
1252 Davy, 1996, pp. 104-5. 
1253 'Das Wort "refouler" verweist jedoch auch (und manchmal sogar vorrangig) auf 
Massnahmen an der Grenze. Bei der Abfassung des Art 33 Z 1 ist also-diese 
Schlussfolgerung scheint unausweichlich-ein sprachlicher Fehler unterlaufen.' Davy, 
1996, p. 105. 
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Thus having defeated exclusionary readings based on the legislative 
history, Davy proceeds to a reinterpretation of Article 33 (1) GC along 
the lines of the Vienna Convention. She reverts to the ordinary meaning 
of 'refouler', which includes rejection at the frontier, and complements 
the linguistic interpretation by a contextual one. Among the contextual 
data, she identifies Article 33 (2) GC and Article 31 (1) GC as particularly 
important. 
Article 33 (2) enshrines exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement 
and is worded as follows: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
The expression 'as a danger to the security of the country in which he is' 
may be taken to support an exclusionary reading, ruling out the 
applicability of the whole provision, including its first paragraph, to 
rejection at the border. However, as Davy argues, two reasons militate 
against such a conclusion. Firstly, Article 33 (2) GC specifies a sub-group, 
which fulfils the prerequisites of Article 33 (1) GC, but which shall be 
excluded from its benefits. Thus, the group of persons alluded to in 
Article 33 (2) GC is not identical with the one alluded to in Article 33 (1) 
GC. Therefore, the qualifications of the former cannot be analogously 
transferred to the latter. Secondly, Davy points out that border controls 
usually take place on state territory, which means that a person waiting at 
the border is within the scope of Article 33 (2) GC. Summing up, Davy 




She proceeds to Article 31 (1) GC, which exempts refugees from penalties 
on account of illegal entry or presence1254, and tracks the legislative history 
of this provision. She lays bare the hierarchy of interests inherent in this 
provision, which accords the interests of the refugee a position prior to 
those of the state. In the next step, she concludes that it would be an 
evaluative contradiction to exempt refugees entering illegally from 
penalties, while insisting on an unconditional state right to reject refugees 
at the border. On the contrary: if the Convention compels Contracting 
States to refrain from penalising the violation of entry regulations by 
refugees, it must be concluded a fortiori that the Convention does not 
allow that the observance of the same regulations is enforced ex ante by 
the means of refoulement.1255 
Davy's contextual argument is much more focused and precise than 
earlier advanced arguments on the contradiction between the telos of the 
Convention and the non-applicability of Article 33 (1) GC to rejection at 
the border.1256 As her inclusionary reading is derived from a rigorous 
application of the Vienna Convention, it has to be unreservedly endorsed. 
Her interpretation produces a clear and unambigucus result already in the 
second stage. She never resorts to a teleological interpretation in the 
narrow sense, but draws on expressiop.s of the telos in the norm context 
instead. Summing up, we may state that Davy fully exploits the strategic 
advantage offered by the Vienna Convention, allowing the letter and logic 
of the law to overrule other manifestations of the legislator's will. She 
arrives at a determinate result compatible with the canc11 of interpretation 
prescribed by the Vienna Convention. 
1254 Art. 31 (2) GC is worded as follows: 
'(1) The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
(2) The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees r:!strictions 
other than those which are necessary and such restrirtions shall only be applied until 
their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admi,sion into anotbr country. 
The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the 
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.' 
1255 Davy, 1996, p. 120. 
1256 For an example of such an argument, see MaaEen, 1997, pp. 55-79. 
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Davy's argumentation can be further reinforced by the contextual 
argument drawing on the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
Article 3 (3) of the 1933 Convention developed earlier in this sub-section. 
Pulling together the various threads, we find that the second stage renders 
an unambiguous outcome: the question whether non-rejection at the 
border is embraced by Article 33 GC must be answered in the affirmative. 
10.2.2.1.2 Article 33 GC in the Light of the Dublin Convention 
The inclusionary reading arrived at above can be consolidated by drawing 
on the acquis. On a sub-regional level, the most important factor in the 
contemporary intP.rpretation of the territorial applicability of Article 33 
GC is probably the 1990 Dublin Convention. Its Article 3 (1) reads as 
follows: 
Member States undertake to examine the application of any alien 
who applies at the border or in their territory to any one of them 
for asylum. 
This convention has been concluded by the Member States of the 
European Union as an instrument of international law. The group of its 
Contracting Parties is thus smaller than the group of Contracting Parties 
to the GC. If both groups had been identical, the norms in the Dublin 
Convention would have formed part of the context of Article 33 GC 
under Article 31 (3) VTC. 1257 Now, with a strict application of the Vienna 
Convention, these norms would merely represent a supplementary means 
of interpretation, although one of a very high relevance. 
However, if one narrows the scope of scrutiny to the obligations 
incumbent on Member States of the EU-which is precisely the 
delimitation chosen for this work-another approach comes into reach. 
Instead of asking what constitutes the proper interpretation of Article 33 
GC, to be adhered to by all its contracting parties, one may ask what 
constitutes the proper interpretation of Article 33 GC, to be adhered to 
by the Member States of the European Union. Opting for the latter 
query, we find that the interpretation of Article 33 GC transmutes into 
1257 In this hypothetical case, it would have been most appropriate to term the norms 
enshrined in the Dublin Convention as 'relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations.between the parties' as related to in Art. 31 (3) (c) VTC. 
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the question of interpreting the Dublin Convention. All parties to the 
Dublin Convention are also parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Therefore, the norms of the 1951 Refugee Convention form part of the 
context of Article 3 (1) DC. 
Under this approach, the matter is clear. Member States of the 
European Union have taken upon themselves the obligation to process 
asylum claims filed both at their borders and in-country. 1258 The rationale 
of asylum procedures is to single out beneficiaries of the norms in the 
1951 Refugee Convention, of which Article 33 GC is one. Thus, the 
rejection of a protection seeker at the border of a Member State amounts 
to a violation of the Dublin Convention. 
10.2.2.1.3 Conclusion 
On a universal level, convincing contextual arguments have been 
advanced that Article 33 GC covers non-rejection at the frontier as well. 
On the sub-regional level, it merits mention that Member States of the EU 
have acknowledged the applicability of Article 33 GC at the border. In a 
treaty provision, they have undertaken to examine asylum applications 
filed at their borders. 
10.2.2.2 Article 3 CAT 
10.2.2.2.1 The Second Stage 
As stated earlier, the wording of Article 3 CAT does not make it entirely 
clear whether or not this provision also prescribes non-rejection at the 
frontier. Doctrinal writing on this issue is still rather sparse, mainly due to 
the fact that the CAT has been adopted only in 1984.1259 From the outset, 
it must be recalled that one cannot solve the question by a simple analogy 
1258 For a confirmation from a governmental perspective, see F. Loper, 'Pre-Procedural 
Aspects', in UNHCR, 4th International Symposium on the Protection of Refugees in the 
Central European and Baltic States, 27-29 September 1998, Bled/Slovenia. Report and 
Proceedings (1999, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 55. 
1259 For an extensive reading, see Hartl, 1999, p. 181, with further references to other 
extensive interpretations. 
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to Article 33 GC. 1260 Apart from the very wording of both provisions, 
their context and telos is obviously not identical, which prohibits an:» 
interpretative short cuts. 
It has been argued by MaaBen that the drafters of CAT must have been 
well aware of the terminological dispute embroiling Article 33 GC and 
that they consciously refrained from choosing an unambiguous wording, 
also prohibiting rejection at the frontier. 1261 First, one might wish to recall 
that this would make the interpretation of Article 3 CAT contingent 
upon the interpretation of Article 33 GC. As we saw above, the in-
clusionary reading of the latter provision prevails, which would bring 
about an inclusionary reading of Article 3 CAT. This is quite the opposite 
of what Maafien has intended. Second, it has to be asked what relevance 
this argument possesses under the Vienna Convention. To be sure, the 
1951 Refugee Convention is not part of the context of Article 3 CAT. By 
way of example, Afghanistan is party to CAT, but not to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. It follows that the provisions of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention do not represent 'relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties' to CAT .1262 Thus, 
arguments relating to the 1951 Refugee Convention are irrelevant for the 
purposes of the second stage. 
Is there any contextual data that must be taken into account when 
interpreting Article 3 CAT? It must be underscored that this provision is 
embedded in a normative environment mainly dealing with the 
punishment of perpetrators as well as the prevention of torture and other 
forms of ill-treatment within Contracting States. Article 3 CAT is 
therefore somewhat atypical, and the possibility of drawing upon other 
provisions as contextual elements is clearly limited. 
However, one might wish to note a reference to Article 7 ICCPR in 
the preamble of CAT: 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
[ ... ] 
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
1260 Weissbrodt attempts to solve the matter by a simple analogy to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Weissbrodt and Hortreiter, 1999, p. 57. 
1261 Maa£en, 1997, p. 183. 
1262 Art. 31 (3) (c) VTC. 
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and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, [ ... ]1263 
Could this imply that Artide 3 CAT is presumed to have at least the same 
protective scope as Article 7 ICCPR? If the latter covered non-rejection at 
the border, the former would do so too. This would make the precise 
content of Article 3 CAT contingent upon the interpretation of Article 7 
ICCPR. Nonetheless, the protection from extraterritorial threats inherent 
in Article 7 ICCPR covers not only torture, but also cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. This is obviously not the case with 
Article 3 CAT, which has been explicitly limited to cover torture only. 
Therefore, Article 3 CAT cannot be said to replicate the extraterritorial 
protection afforded under Article 7 ICCPR. Moreover, the language of 
the quoted preambular recital is rather weak: the phrase 'having regard to' 
merely denotes that the Contracting Parties had the named provisions in 
mind, without necessarily reaffirming and drawing upon each and every 
aspect inherent in them. 
However, one might wish to inquire whether Article 3 CAT.is part of 
a seamless system of preventing torture and other specified forms of ill-
treatment. If that were the case, it would seem logical not to disrupt-by 
allowing rejection of potential torture victims at the border of host 
states-the universal coverage provided by such a system. But a seamless 
system would already be disrupted by the limitation of Article 3 CAT to 
torture only. Possibly, one could inquire whether the CAT provides 
seamless protection at least from toi;;ture. To be sure, the CAT provides 
for preventive, punitive and '"eparative measures with regard to torture. 
Nonetheless, an argument solely crafted on this basis will not be a very 
strong one-after all, the very purpose of the present argumentation is to 
single out the precise limitations of torture protection. 
In addition, teleological interpretation is also hampered by the same 
lack of specific evidence. The preamble does not give further clues, and an 
inquiry into the object and purpose of Article 3 CAT quickly propels 
interpretation to very abstract levels. In all, the second stage yields 
singularly weak arguments, and does not allow for a stable and 
determinate outcome. Recourse to the third stage is necessary. 
1263 Preamble to CAT, founh recital. 
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10.2.2.2.2 The Third Stage 
The travaux provide some evidence supporting an inclusionary reading of 
Article 3 CAT. The original Swedish draft for that provision was worded 
quite differently: 
No State Party may expel or extradite a person to a State where 
there are reascnable grounds to believe that he may be in danger of 
being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.1264 
In the deliberations of the 1979 Working Group, no conclusion could be 
reached on this proposal.1265 Therefore, Sweden presented a revised draft 
of this provision, which was subsequently adopted and became Article 3 
(1) CAT: 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refoulerj or extradite a person 
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.1266 
Notably, the words 'return ("refouler")' had been added to the prohibited 
measures, while the danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment other than torture was eliminated from the protective scope 
of the provision. Thus, the revised draft provision simultaneously 
extended and limited the reach of what would become Article 3 CAT. 
The ensuing discussion of the extended wording in the 1979 Working 
Group is quite remarkable. It was said that there were strong 
humanitarian reasons to include the English and the French terms. 
Further, mention was made of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which 
contained the very same words. On the other hand, it was pointed out 
that the 1951 Refugee Convention 'concerned a different subject and was 
not broadly accepted'.1267 Finally, and probably most revealingly, it was 
1264 J. H. Burgers and H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against torture: a 
handbook on the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (1988, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht), p. 49. 
1265 Burgers and Danelius, 1988, p. 49. 
1266 Ibid. The Swedish proposal was intI .iduced in UN Doc. No. E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1. 
1267 Burgers and Danelius, 1988, p. 50. At the time, the 1951 Refugee Convention did not 




suggested 'that the inclusion of the concept of "return" might require a 
State to accept a mass influx of persons when it was not in a position to do 
so'_ 126s 
In spite of these misgivings, the revised draft provision was adopted in 
the 1980 Working Group.1269 Contrary to what Maa8en has assumed1270 , 
delegations took the term 'return' to imply non-rejection at the border. 
Otherwise, it would hardly make sense to allude to the risk of an influx. 
Furthermore, as the Working Group and, later on, the Signatories 
accepted the inclusion of the terms 'return ("refouler")', it can be validly 
assumed that this acceptance also stretched over an obligation of 
admission at the border, irrespective of number of beneficiaries. 
Given the fact that the CAT was endowed with a facultative 
monitoring mechanism allowing for individual complaints, this argument 
gains additional weight. To wit, Contracting Parties may recognise 'the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications 
from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the 
Convention' .1271 As rejection at the frontier is a jurisdictional act, the path 
would be open for a rejected person to complain to the CAT Cemmittee. 
At least those Contracting Parties opting for the mechanism must have 
been conscious of the fact that any ambiguity in the wording of Article 3 
CAT might be construed extensively by the future CAT Committee. 1272 
Although the authoritative power of interpretation would still remain 
with states, the observations by the CAT Committee would de facto have 
a considerable impact on the understanding of CAT. This constituted a 
stark difference to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which could not be 
invoked by individuals before a specific monitoring body. Therefore, the 
fact that the drafting delegations chose to retain the terms 'return 
1268 Burgers and Danelius, 1988, p. 50. 
1269 Burgers and Danelius, 1988, p. 54. 
1270 See text accompanying note 1268 above. 
1271 Art. 22 (1) CAT. 
1272 At the time, the method of dynamic interpretation pursued by the European organs 
endowed with monitoring the ECHR was well known. 
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("refouler")' evidences that they were aware of and accepted a possible 
inclusionary reading of Article 3 CAT by the CAT Committee.1273 
The assumption of admission obligations was, however, clearly limited 
in scope. First, as already remarked, Article 3 CAT did not protect from 
the extraterritorial threat of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Compared to the implied prohibitions of refoulement in 
Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR, this reduces the protective 
obligations of Contracting Parties to a great extent. Second, the definition 
of torture contained in Article 1 CAT is rather demanding, as it contains a 
specific criterion of intent. Taken together, the number of persons coming 
under the scope of Article 3 CAT is significantly reduced. This must have 
dissolved the fears voiced in the 1979 Working Group.1274 
Although it is not possible to establish a consistent state practice in the 
sense of Article 31 (3) (b) VTC, the actual comport of states may prove 
relevant in the third stage. By way of example, in the German Aliens Act, 
the general prohibition of expulsion to a state where a torture risk exists 
in Section 53 (1) is explicitly extended to situations arising at the 
border. 1275 Chapter 8 Section 1 of the Swedish Aliens Act puts the refusal 
of entry and expulsion on the same footing: 
An alien refused entry or expelled may never be conveyed to a 
country where there are reasonable grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of suffering capital or corporal punishment or 
of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, nor to a country where he is not 
protected from being sent on to a country where he would be in 
such danger. 
These examples from domestic law may further support the contention 
that states support an inclusionary reading of Article 3 CAT at present. 
Let us sum up. In the third stage, and drawing mainly on the travaux, it 
has been possible to establish strong arguments militating for an 
inclusionary reading. Against this background, Article 3 CAT must be 
1273 The question of rejection at the border in the light of Art. 3 CAT has not yet been 
brought before the CAT Committee. This is mainly due to the fact that states de facto 
observe the prohibition of refoulement when confronted with claims at their borders. 
1274 See text accompanying note 1261 above. 
1275 Section 60 (5) of the Aliens Act makes Section 53 (1) applicable mutatis mutandis to the 
refusal of entry. 
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understood to comprise non-rejection at the border of Contracting 
Parties. 
10.2.2.3 Article 45 FC 
In the second stage, we were tasked with clarifying the meaning of the 
verb 'to transfer' as it is used in Article 45 FC. 
Are there any contextual elements which may elucidate the proper 
reading of Article 45 FC? 
Article 1 FC states that '[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances'. The phrase 'in all circumstances' may be taken to suggest 
that it is improper to infer limitations from the Convention text, which 
are not explicitly stated in it. This is reinforced by the language of Article 
45 FC, which states that transfer may take place 'in no circumstances'. 
Further, the heading of Section II, of which Article 45 FC forms part, 
reads 'Aliens on the territory of a party to the conflict'. As earlier 
mentioned, rejection at the border usually takes place on the territory of 
the State where entry was requested. Therefore, the phrase 'in no 
circumstances' must be understood to include rejection at the border. 
At first sight, the widely respected Commentary to the Fourth 
Convention seems to confirm this reading: 'Any movement of protected 
persons to another State, carried out by the Detaining Power on an 
individual or collective basis, is considered as a transfer for the purposes of 
Article 45'. 1276 Obviously, this statement is the product of a contextual 
interpretation. The Commentary continues: 
The term "transfer", for example, may mean internment in the 
territory of another Power, repatriation, the returning of protected 
persons to their country of residence or their extradition. The 
Convention makes provision for all these possibilities. 
Suddenly, this exemplification turns into an exhaustive listing, when the 
Commentary states: 
1276 Pictet, 1958, p. 266. 
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On the other hand there is no provision concerning deportation (in 
French "expulsion"), the measure taken by a State to remove an 
undesirable foreigner from its territory. In the absence of any 
clause stating that deportation is to be regarded as a form of 
transfer, this Article would not appear to raise any obstacle to the 
right of Parties to the conflict to deport aliens in individual cases 
when State security demands such action. However, practice and 
theory both make this right a limited one: the mass deportation, at 
the beginning of a war, of all the foreigners in the territory of a 
belligerent cannot, for instance, be permitted.1277 
The method used herein begs questions. The exclusion of expulsions from 
the scope of the provision relies on an argument e contrario: as expulsion 
is not explicitly mentioned, it must be assumed that Article 45 FC applies 
to it. Neither the wording nor the structure of the provision suggests that 
the prohibition of refoulement is limited to those practices mentioned in 
other paragraphs of the Article. In other words, these practices do not 
form an exhaustive list. Had that been the case, it would have been quite 
meaningless to introduce the prohibition of refoulement with the phrase 
'in no circumstances', added to the prohibition of refoulement. The 
quoted argumentation is simply unconvincing. 
Moving on to a purely teleological interpretation, we face the same 
difficulties as already encountered with human rights instruments. It is 
quite clear that the Geneva Conventions are inspired by the wish to 
maximise the protection of the individual. At the same time, it is clear 
that states wished to draw the line with regard to their responsibilities. 
Thus, the telos alone does not help to establish an interpretative 
presumption-be it in favour of individual beneficiary or protection-
burdened states. 
The contextual elements adduced earlier, however, are sufficient to 
establish clarity in the second ~tage: Article 45 FC must be understood to 




10.2.3 Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement 
We have earlier concluded that a specific risk of human rights violations 
in third countries blocks the removal of a claimant, present on the 
territory of a host state, to such a third country. However, this does not 
necessarily answer the question whether Contracting Parties to the 
ECHR and ICCPR have to admit persons threatened with pertinent 
human rights violations elsewhere to their territories. The important 
difference consists of the fact that the latter group of persons is still 
outside the territory of Contracting Party. 
10.2.3.1 Article 7 ICCPR 
Regarding protection claims made from outside the territory of a 
Contracting Party, the parallels between the ECHR and the ICCPR cease 
to exist. To be sure, the ICCPR does not provide for such claims. This 
flows from a contextual argumentation. Article 2 (1) ICCPR expressly 
requires that the individual claimant be 'within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction'.1278 This contextual argument clarifies the matter: Article 7 
ICCPR cannot be invoked if the claimant lacks territorial contact with 
the potential host state. 
With regard to protection claims made at the border of a Contracting 
Party to the ICCPR, the wording of Article 2 (1) ICCPR is unambiguous. 
As long as the claimant is physically in touch with the territory of that 
Contracting Party, she falls under the protective ambit of Article 7 
ICCPR. 
1278 Nowak first affirms that presence on state territory and subjugation to state jurisdiction 
is crucial for individual protection under the ICCPR. However, Nowak also points at 
the contradictions inherent in this cumulative requirement (e.g. that a state would not be 
responsible for denying the right to entry to a citizen outside its territory) and suggests a 
teleological interpretation to resolve them. Moreover, he suggests that recourse should 
be taken to the extent of state responsibility when determining the precise meaning of 
Art. 2 (1) ICCPR. Nowak, 1989, p. 45. At first sight, his argumentation could be taken 
to support a state responsibility to allow access to protection seekers outside its 
territory. In the opinion of this author, Art. 31 (4) VTC must be taken into account, 
which would provide a powerful counter-argument to such an extensive reading. See 
also Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p. 142, invoking dicta of the Human Rights Committee in 
support of an extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. 
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In both cases, contextual arguments could bring about a determinate 
outcome. The ICCPR provides no right to access for persons not in touch 
with the territory of the Contracting Party. 
10.2.3.2 Article 3 ECHR 
When delimiting the scope of the ECHR, its drafters discarded the 
criterion of territorial presence and resorted only to the criterion of 
jurisdiction. Article 1 ECHR is worded as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this 
Convention. 
For reasons of argumentative economy, we shall first scrutinise the impact 
of that solution on protection claims made outside the territory of 
Contracting Parties. If they fall within the ambit of the ECHR, an 
argument a fortiori would imply that protection claims made at the 
border do so as well. If not, we would be compelled to look into the issue 
of claims at the border separately. 
In 1981, the European Commission delimited the scope of Article 1 
ECHR in some detail. Its pertinent reasoning, drawing on the case law of 
the Court as well as its own earlier decisions, merits quoting at some 
length. 
The Commission recalls that, in this prov1Slon, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to secure the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I to everyone "within their jurisdiction" (in the 
French text: "relevant de leur juridiction"). This term is not 
equivalent to or limited to the national territory of the High 
Contracting Party concerned. It emerges from the language, in 
particular of the French text, and the object of this Article, and 
from the purpose of the Convention as a whole, that the High 
Contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights and 
freedoms to all persons under their actual authority and 
responsibility, not only when the authority is exercised within 
their own territory, but also when it is exercised abroad. [ ... ] As 
stated by the Commission in Application Nos. 6780/74 and 
6950175, the authorised agents of the State, including diplomatic or 
consular agents and armed forces, not only remain under its 
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jurisdiction when abroad but bring any other persons or property 
"within the jurisdiction" of that State, to the extent that they 
exercise authority- over such persons or property. In so far as, by 
their acts or omissions, they affect such line with persons or 
property, the responsibility of the State is engaged.1279 
Thus, in our terminology, the term 'within the jurisdiction' does not refer 
to a geographical, but to an administrative boundary, and the ad-
ministrative reach of a state exceeds its territorial borders. Be it within or 
outside state territory-wherever the state or its agents act or omit to act-
its responsibility under the ECHR can be engaged. 
Let us now merge these two lines of argument. First, we have 
concluded that State Parties to the ECHR must accord extraterritorial 
protection to persons present on its territory by not removing them to 
countries where protection-relevant threats are situated. 1280 Removal is an 
act of state authority, affecting a person under the jurisdiction of the 
removing state. It is covered by Article 1 ECHR, as expounded earlier. 
This conclusion could be reached in the second stage of interpretation, 
relying mainly on a contextual argumentation. 
Second, following the argumentation of the Commission, Article 1 
ECHR also obliges states to protect the rights guaranteed in Section 1 in 
the exercise of their authority outside state territory. A person in need of 
extraterritorial protection requesting entry into a state is under the 
authority of that state as far as the demand of entry is concerned. Those 
rights that may trigger extraterritorial protection are all rights guaranteed 
in Section I. Any act or omission by the demanded state relating to the 
entry demand affect that person. Thus, such acts or omissions may engage 
the responsibility of the requested state under the ECHR. Accordingly, 
there is no difference between removal and denial of entry with regard to 
state responsibility under Section I. Paraphrasing the words of the Court 
in Cruz Varas, one may state the following. In so far as any liability under 
the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the 
Contracting State denying entry by reason of its having taken action which 
has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-
1279 Dec. Adm. Com. Ap. 9360/81, 28 February 1983, D&R 32 p. 211 (214-6), para. 14. To 
support its reasoning in this passage, the Commission refers back to a number of earlier 
decisions. 
1280 See chapter 10.1.1.4 above. 
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treatment. 1281 To be sure, such an obligation is a negative one: the 
Contracting State may not hinder entry by jurisdictional acts or 
omissions. If that state routinely blocks access to its territory by imposing 
visa requirements for certain nationalities, it has to waive that re-
quirement in relevant cases. 
For protection claims filed at the border of Contracting Parties, a 
corresponding argumentation implies that a duty not to inhibit access to 
the said Party's territory flows from Article 3 ECHR. 
Otherwise put, Article 1 ECHR entails a privilege of entry for aliens 
threatened by torture or other forms of ill-treatment covered by the ambit 
of Article 3 ECHR. The term 'privilege' is used in the Hohfeldian sense 
here-it implies that a State Party to the ECHR has no right to impose 
visa requirements on such an alien. Let us exemplify. A person risking 
torture in her home country approaches the Swedish Embassy in its 
capital, asking for an entry visa. Provided that the denial of an entry visa 
has the direct colnsequence of exposing that person to torture, the Swedish 
consular officer must issue it, if Sweden is not to violate Article 3 ECHR. 
Technically speaking, the present conclusion is a mere consequence of the 
prevailing universalist reading of Article 3 ECHR in the sub-sections on 
protection. It draws on the determinacy won in that argumentation. 
It cannot be denied that this conclusion unfolds the most radical 
consequences for European migration policies. Together with comple-
mentary measures (carrier sanctions and pre-frontier training and 
assistance), visa requirements remain the most powerful device of 
migration control. Their track record of deflecting would-be refugees is 
considerable, reaching back to the German refugee crisis of the 1930s. On 
a political level, it has been constantly argued by UNHCR and non-
governmental organisations that such requirements are an indiscriminate 
means of control, blocking access even for those persons in need of 
protection. Drawing on the argumentation developed in this chapter, it is 
now possible to argue that an indiscriminate application of visa 
requirements is illegal under the ECHR. 
This conclusion is radically at odds with the current practices of many 
Contracting Parties to the ECHR. In the EU, far from all Member States 
operate a regime allowing protection seekers to file claims under Article 3 
1281 See text accompanying note 1161 above. 
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ECHR with diplomatic representations abroad. 1282 This endangers their 
compliance with their human rights obligations flowing from the ECHR. 
10.3 Interim Conclusion on Hard Cases 
In order to facilitate further discussion, we shall finish by pulling together 
the main results of the second and third stages. Finally, it shall also be 
asked how the material outcome affects our further inquiry. 
Setting out with the first question on protection, we can state that 
almost all of the ambiguities persisting at the first stage could be clarified 
at the second stage. Proceeding to the third stage was necessary only in 
two cases (the applicability of Article 3 CAT to non-rejection at the 
border and immigration under Article 12 ICCPR), of which the latter 
resulted in an indeterminate outcome. An overview of the results derived 
from the second and third stages is given in Table 7 below. 
Moving on to the second question of access to territory, it was 
determined that all explicit prohibitions of refoulement (Article 33 GC, 
Article 3 CAT and Article 45 FC) contain an obligation of non-rejection 
at the border. Contrary to various particularist arguments, these 
provisions feature a punctual right to access. However, this right is only 
applicable on the territory of a Contracting Party, and cannot be invoked 
by a person present in another state. Thus, the named provisions cannot 
be used to obtain a waiver from visa requirements in order to evade the 
situations of threat specified in the three provisions. 
Moving on to the remaining provisions, the second stage produced 
remarkable results with regard to Article 3 ECHR. This provision indeed 
implies a prohibition of removal, thus confirming the reasoning of the 
European Court of Human Rights, as well as a punctual right to access at 
the border and from elsewhere (issues hitherto not deliberated by the 
Court). The importance of this outcome can hardly be underestimated. 
Mainly due to its monitoring mechanism and the respect it enjoys, the 
ECHR remains the most powerful human rights instrument available in 
the region. Provided the preconditions for the applicability of Article 3 
ECHR are fulfilled, a Contracting Party to the ECHR is not only legally 
required to mete out protection. Over and above that, it is also obliged 
not to obstruct access to its territory, e.g. by demanding an entry visa. 
1282 See notes 522 and 523 above. 
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Given that visa requirements are the prime tool of regulating access to 
extraterritorial protection in contemporary Europe, this outcome should 
have considerable practical repercussions on regional asylum and 
migration policies. Although this interpretation is a stable product of the 
interpretative rules contained in the Vienna Convention, it opens a 
justificatory question: where are the limits of the protective obligations 
relating to extraterritorial threats under the ECHR? This issue shall be 
pursued in detail in the ensuing chapter. 
The ECHR remains, however, the only instrument covering pro-
tection as well as both modes of access. While Article 7 ICCPR allows for 
protection on the territory as well as non-rejection at the border, its scope 
does not include persons situated elsewhere. 
It is also worth noting, however, that some interpretations at the 
second stage entailed voluminous and complex arguments, as was the case 
with the protection and access dimensions of Article 3 ECHR as well as 
the access dimension of Article 33 GC. Materially speaking, though, it is 
hardly surprising that the issue of access raises profound conflicts, which 
can be tidied up only with great effort-or not at all. The only issue 
remaining indeterminate after the second and the third stage was whether 
Article 12 ICCPR provides for a temporary right to immigration. Both 
the universalist and the particularist position could be fortified with 
complex argumentations, and a weighing operation turned out to be 
inevitable. This is the second theme for further inquiry: can this 
indeterminacy be solved beyond interpretation, e.g. by introducing some 
form of presumption? If not, what does it do to law as a whole, given that 
the issue at stake is far from being trivial? 
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Claimant is Claimant is Claimant is 
situated within situated at the situated 
the territory of border of a elsewhere 
a potential host potential host 
state state 
Art. 33 GC Yes (1•t stage) Yes (2nd stage) No (1st stage) 
Art. 3 CAT Yes (i•t stage) Yes (3'° stage) No (i•t stage) 
Art. 45 FC Yes (1•t stage) Yes (2nd stage) No (1•t stage) 
Art. 3 ECHR Yes (2nd stage) Yes (2nd stage) Yes (2nd stage) 
Art. 7 ICCPR Yes (2nd stage) Yes (2nd stage) No {2nd stage) 
Art. 32 FC No (1•t stage) No {1•t stage) No {1•t stage) 
Table 7: Applicability ratione loci of Selected Norms in Relation to a Potential 
Host State. Results of the First, Second and Third Stage. 
10.4 Substance by Method? 
10.4.1 What Does the Vienna Convention Do To the Law? 
In the preceding interim conclusions, we have pulled together the material 
outcome of a number of interpretations. However, reaching this outcome 
raised a new question. To wit, what did the strict pursuit of Articles 31-2 
VTC do to our material or, put generally, what do these articles do to any 
legal material? 
The interpretative provisions of the Vienna Convention structure 
interpretative data by assigning them specific places in a hierarchy. This is 
helpful in two ways. First, irrelevant, i.e. non-legal, arguments are 
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eliminated.1283 Second, procedural rules for the controlled escalation of 
complexity in interpretation are provided. To overcome ambiguity, the 
amount of data accessible to the interpreter is increased step by step. It is 
reasonable to assume that the conflicts identified and persistent in the first 
stage will come into full bloom in the remaining stages of the 
interpretative operation. Yet, with an increasing total amount of data, 
chances augment that data critical for the elimination of competing 
positions come within reach. Ultimately, the goal of interpretation is to 
use the increased amount of data for the purpose of reduction. The 
underlying logic is to expand complexity for the purpose of reducing it. 
This would only work if there were no 'residual data' which would not be 
consumed by reduction. The ideal would be to expand the data amount 
exactly so much as to induce one single outcome, consuming all data made 
available. However, the requirement of neutrality inherent in a legally 
framed procedure prohibits that only such data is made available that 
would resolve ambiguity in a determinate manner. Neutrality dictates that 
not single data, but rather classes of data (as the 'context' or the 'telos') are 
gradually made available to the interpreter. In these classes of data, 
irreducible elements may be contained. These would then augment 
complexity instead of reducing it, resulting in ever more profound 
ambiguity. 
To conclude, a materially neutral methodology of interpretation 
cannot guarantee determinate outcomes. This does not imply that it is 
useless, however. What it can do, and should do, is to structure legal 
argumentation, to do away with simple ambiguities, to diminish the 
necessity of weighing conflicting principles and, finally, to single out the 
point in argumentation at which political decisions are cloaked in the 
attire of formal implementation of interpretative rules. 
However, the rules of the Vienna Convention are not necessarily 
neutral when it comes to balancing the letter of the law and the will of the 
legislator. The procedure of interpretation outlined above gives the letter 
of the law a strategic advantage over the context, telos and other 
manifestations of the will of the legislator. This advantage can be 
compared to that enjoyed by the chess player making the first move. It 
also offers such an advantage to the context and telos in their relation to 
1283 Properly, one might wish to speak of arguments that are not legally coded. However, 




other manifestations of the legislator's will, as, for example, the travaux. 
This hierarchy may impact most decisively on the outcome of a specific 
interpretation, and, as we have seen earlier, a versed interpreter usually 
takes it into account when crafting arguments. 
The methodology offered by the Vienna Convention is no self-
propelling machinery, however. It remains dependent on decisions taken 
by the interpreter. To wit, the assessment of clarity after the first and 
second stage respectively is a critical area. 1284 As clarity is a vague concept, 
here is the possibility of manipulating the outcome of interpretative 
operations. Above, we have opted for a formal concept of clarity, 
implying the absence of arguable counter-arguments admissible in a given 
stage of interpretation.1285 Yet, while this concept is logically derived from 
the Vienna Convention, it is not prescribed by it. We have to 
acknowledge that other concepts of clarity can be devised and defended, 
and may eventually lead to different outcomes. 
10.4.2 What Do Lawyers Do With the Vienna Convention? 
As a by-product of our own interpretation, we were forced to conclude 
that the majority of interpretative efforts by doctrinal writers as well as 
within monitoring bodies partly or fully neglect the methodological 
framework prescribed by the Vienna Convention. On a formal level, this 
is serious, as the Vienna Convention is a binding instrument, and the 
international lawyer has no choice but to follow its rules of 
interpretation. But what are the reasons for this neglect? Why is the 
positivist potential of international law not fully exploited when it comes 
to the cutting-edge exercise of interpretation? 
It is conceivable that some lawyers perceive the material and structural 
limitations flowing from the Vienna Convention as simply impeding their 
argumentative project. Such lawyers may believe that an unrestrained 
presentation of interpretative arguments is the better success strategy. Or 
they believe that following a different canon of interpretation (e.g. one 
1184 There are others: as an example, what exactly is to be considered as the 'text of the 
treaty' or what is to be counted as 'subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreemem of the panies regarding its interpretation'? 
1285 See text accompanying note 1200 above on the combination of a determinate context 
and an indeterminate telos in the second stage. 
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putting more emphasis on the intent of the legislator) secures an outcome 
more favourable to their needs. Obviously, such wholesale circumvention 
of the Vienna Convention makes an interpretation derived on its basis 
extremely weak and contestable. Put succinctly, it reveals a lawyer 
disregarding the law. In the present context, this approach is without 
theoretical interest and merits no further discussion. 
More interesting is the class of lawyers who use the Vienna Convention 
as a strategic tool in their material argumentation. Above, we saw how 
doctrinal writers became ever more aware of the trump role played by the 
Vienna Convention. They reformulated older arguments, thus moving 
them up to a better position in the three stages of interpretation. 1286 Or 
they sought to transform teleological arguments into contextual ones1287, 
thus making them more concrete and protecting them from being 
consumed in the opposition of a universalist and a particularist telos. Used 
likewise, the Vienna Convention becomes a tool in a partisan struggle. 
This is wholly acceptable-legal argumentation does not take place in a 
political void, but is part and parcel of a greater context. As long as 
arguments can be cloaked in the language of law, they enjoy a privileged 
position in discourse. But beyond partisan conflict, the question remains 
whether the law favours, or indeed implies, a certain outcome. 
10.4.3 Three \NHdcaids: Presumptions, Telos and 
Indeterminacy 
Some doctrinal writers had a ready-made answer in store. They operated 
openly with presumptions on an implicit burden of proof, a method 
highly reminiscent of a standard framework in civil procedure law: if the 
universalist claimant does not succeed in the creation of determinacy, she 
shall lose the case. Otherwise put, if interpretation does not produce a 
clear and unambiguous outcome, a certain paradigm shall prevail, and the 
opposite paradigm shall lose the case. One author operated with the 
maxim in dubio mitius to support state interests: where an obligation 
cannot be unambiguously shown to exist, it shall be assumed that states 
1286 Consider e.g. the reformulation of a travaux-based argument on the applicability of Art. 
33 GC to rejection at the border into a contextual argument grounded in the Final Act. 
See text accompanying note 1237 above. 
1287 See text accompanying note 1254 above. 
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are not obliged. 1288 But in dubio mitius can also be turned around and put 
to work for the universalist. This would imply the opposite presumption: 
any doubt would support the deduction of a state obligation. Clearly, if 
such presumptions had had a basis in international law, they would open 
good chances to secure an outcome that is determinate. Presumptions are 
thus serving two groups: those favouring their underlying paradigm, but 
also those cherishing determinacy. However, none of the authors using 
such presumptions bother to clarify their validity and justification under 
international law. While the operation of presumptions based on some 
sort of intuition must be rejected, the question remains: does international 
law contain an inherent presumption apt to endow interpretative 
stalemates with determinacy? And, if this is the case, does it work for 
universalism or particularism? 
The use of presumptions can take on a more subtle form. We have 
noted above that some authors convert the telos into a Trojan horse, 
bringing their own preferences into the second stage of interpretation.1289 
As shown earlier, there is no simple answer to the question how the goal 
of promoting human rights is best served. Therefore, teleological 
interpretation easily leads back to the original conflict between 
universalism and particularism. If any hierarchy between the two 
paradigms could be established, this would impact on the second stage of 
interpretation, either tilting outcomes in its favour, or, where 
counteracting contextual arguments exist, producing an indeterminate 
outcome. Basically, teleological reasoning raises the same questions as the 
issue of presumptions. 
There is a third manifestation of the very same question. In the present 
chapter, the Vienna Convention was perceived as a tool producing 
determinate outcomes-no matter whether these work for the 
particularist or the universalist. The underlying assumption was the 
desirability of determinacy at the earliest possible stage in interpretation. 
This determinacy was to be produced without resort to presumptions. By 
consequence, if the Vienna Convention failed to produce a determinate 
outcome, there would simply be no determinate outcome, and one of the 
two promises of law-justice and predictability-would remain unfulfilled. 
1288 See text accompanying note 1192 above. 
1289 See text accompanying note 1236 above. 
450 
INTERPRETING HARD CASES 
As we have seen, this worst case scenario materialised with regard to the 
contested right to immigration under Article 12 ICCPR. 
Now, what are the consequences of an indeterminate interpretation? 
The issue of determinacy is one of partisanship as well. Are not 
indeterminate outcomes simply supportive of existing power structures? 
Would not an indeterminate outcome support that paradigm which 
happens to dominate political discourse for the moment? Regarded as 
such, is indeterminacy nothing more than a nicely camouflaged way of 
taking sides? 
This chapter set out to scrutinise how the conflict between 
universalism and particularism manifests itself in the interpretation of the 
law regulating protection and access. Faced with these man.ifestations, we 
were compelled to realise that we cannot do without an answer to this 
conflict. In reality, the three issues beyond the reach of the Vienna 
Convention-the existence of a presumption, the handling of the telos and 
the consequences of indeterminacy-boil down to one. Directly or 
indirectly-does international law favour universalism or particularism? 
Without an answer, the meaning of law remains obscure. 
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11 Delimiting and Justifying 
Protection under the ECHR 
WHILE THE PRECEDING CHAPTER answered some questions on the 
protective capacities of international law, it at the same time raised new 
and ever more complex ones. We came to the conclusion that the CAT, 
the ICCPR and the ECHR all contained norms prohibiting refoulement. 
While the protective a.'1lbit of CAT was rather clear cut-Article 3 was the 
sole provision impacting removal of aliens, and it covered removal to 
torture only-both the ICCPR and the ECHR proved trickier to delimit. 
As a comprehensive interpretation based on the Vienna Convention has 
shown, we must endorse that Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 ECHR 
protect from removal and entitle to access at the border. Most 
intriguingly, it emerged that Article 3 ECHR also contained an implicit 
right to access from other territories. 
At this juncture, then, the question imposes itself whether other 
provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR unfold corresponding effects. 
Does the right to a fair trial contain an implicit prohibition of 
refoulement? If one accepts the implications of the prohibition of ill-
treatment upon removal, must one not also endorse parallel implications 
of the right to life? In the case of the ECHR, the consequences would 
attain a revolutionary tinge. If there is a right to access for persons 
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threatened with torture in a third country, there might also be a right to 
access for persons whose right to free speech is impaired. Affirming that 
all rights in the ECHR and its Protocols can be transformed into ancillary 
rights to non-refoulement would potentially undermine large parts of 
current migration control policies in Europe. 
This suggests that future battles on the extent of extraterritorial 
protection are to be fought in the arena provided by the ECHR and that 
their intensity will exceed those on the 1951 Refugee Convention. After 
all, a potentially much broader protection package is at stake, coupled 
with a rather impressive inherent right to access. The deliberations on 
subsidiary protection within the Council represent only feeble 
preliminaries for things to come.1290 Let us anticipate this discussion in the 
present chapter, which is fuelled by two questions. Where exactly are the 
boundaries of extraterritorial protection under the ECHR? How are these 
boundaries justified? We shall look into responses developed in the case 
law of the European organs and by doctrinal writers. Given that the 
ECHR possesses a more powerful monitoring mechanism than the 
ICCPR and comprises an implied right to access as well, we shall limit our 
scrutiny to the former. Suffice it to note that the delimitation of 
extraterritorial protection and its justification under both instruments is 
largely parallel. 
1.1..1. The Case Law of the European Organs 
Do all human rights listed in Section I of the ECHR contain an implicit 
prohibition of refoulement? In Soering, the European Court has made 
clear that extraterritorial protection need not be confined to Article 3 
ECHR when stating that 'in so far as a measure of extradition has 
1290 The Council seems to be at pains to realise the impact of the ECHR on extraterritorial 
protection. While it is laudable that a structured discussion on subsidiary protection has 
started, and that the Amsterdam Treaty has created legal competencies for an EC 
measure on the topic, the Council's General Secretariat appears to have difficulty 
realising the full impact of the ECHR on extraterritorial protection. In the Council's 
study on subsidiary protection, the issue of non·refoulement under other provisions 
than Art. 3 ECHR is not even named. Furthermore, the study suggests 'it would[ ... ] be 
wrong to assume that Article 3 would require Contracting States to adjust their 
admission policies'. For the reasons outlined in the preceding chapter, this suggestion is 
untenable. Council of the European Union, Study on international instruments relevant 
to subsidiary protection, 13 July 1998, Doc. No. 10175/98 ASIM 178, p. 8. 
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consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a Convention right, it 
may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract the 
obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant Convention 
guarantee'. 1291 The case law of the European organs provides a few 
indications on the potential of other provisions than Article 3 ECHR 
with regard to extraterritorial protection. The right to life, the 
prohibition of the death penalty, the right to a fair trial and the right to 
family life have been expressly addressed by the European organs in a 
context of non-refoulement. In the past, the latter have not had the 
opportunity to pronounce themselves on the inherence of non-
refoulement in other rights than those named. Let us embark on a brief 
overview. 
Concerning the right to life, the Commission has explicitly stated that 
removal of a person to a state where his or her life is endangered may 
engage responsibility under Article 2 ECHR, prohibiting the intentional 
deprivation of life.1292 Precisely as is the case with Article 3 ECHR, Article 
2 ECHR does not allow for exceptions and cannot be derogated from in 
time of war or other public emergency. However, the provisions differ in 
that Article 2 ECHR contains a requirement of intent, while Article 3 
ECHR does not. Accordingly, when seized with an issue under Article 2 
ECHR, the Commission applied a far more exigent standard of proof 
than under cases related to Article 3 ECHR: 
As to the prohibition of intentional deprivation of life, the 
Commission does not exclude that an issue might be raised under 
Article 2 in circumstances in which the expelling State knowingly 
puts the person concerned at such high risk of losing his life as for 
the outcome to be a near-certainty. The Commission considers, 
however, that a ureal risk" -within the meaning of the case-law 
concerning Article 3 [ ... ) -of loss of life would not as such 
1291 Somng, para. 85. 
1292 Application No. 25894/94, Bahaddar vs. the Netherlands, Report by the Commission of 
13 September 1996, para. 78. Application No. 14912/89, X vs Switzerland (unpublished), 
quoted in W. Kalin, Die Bedeutung der EMRK for Asylsuchende und Fluchtlinge. 
Materialien und Hinweise (1997, ZDWF, Bonn), p. 19. 
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necessarily suffice to make expulsion an "intentional deprivation of 
life" prohibited by Article 2, although it would amount to 
inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3.1293 
In practice, though, this need not diminish the protective scope of the 
ECHR. As the Commission suggests in the last words of the quoted 
passage, a threat not satisfying the requirements of Article 2 ECHR may 
very well fall under the protective ambit of Article 3 ECHR.1294 
The prohibition of condemning a person to the death penalty or 
executing her contained in Article 1 of the Sixth Additional Protocol of 
the ECHR 1295 could also contain an inherent prohibition of non-
refoulement. In Soering, the ECtHR was inhibited to pursue this question 
further, as the respondent state was not bound by the Protocol. 1296 The 
European Commission has considered extraterritorial protection under 
Article 1 of the Protocol as arguable in Y vs. the Netherlands without 
however providing further details.1297 
Concerning the right to fair trial, the European Court 'does not 
exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an 
1293 Application No. 25894/94, Bahaddar vs. the Netherlands, Report by the Commission of 
13 September 1996, para. 78. 
1294 We note, however, that the requirement of proof under Article 2 ECHR, as expressed in 
the previously quoted case of the European Commission, is higher than the 
corresponding demands in Art. 5 of the Principles on the effective prevention and 
investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions. The latter provision 
reads: 'No one shall be involuntarily returned or extradited to a country where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he or she may become a victim of extra-legal, 
arbitrary or summary execution in that country'. To be sure, the word 'may' sets a 
lower threshold of proof than the term 'real risk', which is used by the European 
Commission. It is most unfortu.-iate that a regional hu.-nan rights mechanism features a 
lower degree of protection than what has been politically consented upon at the 
universal level. Fully conscious of the non-binding character of the Principles as such, 
the observer wonders why the European Commission has felt the need to amplify this 
difference by introducing the very demanding concept of 'near-certainty'. Principles on 
the effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary 
executions, recommended by Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/65, 24 May 
1989. 
1295 Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of Death Penalty, Strasbourg, 28 
April 1983, E.T.S. 114. 
1296 Soering, paras 102 and 103. 
1297 Yvs the Netherlands, Decision of 16 January 1991, Appl. No. 16531/1990, Decisions and 
Reports 68 (1991), para. 304. 
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extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or 
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country' .1298 
This position was reiterated by the Commission in the Kozlov case.1299 
Parenthetically, it might be of some interest to note that the right to fair 
trial figures also amongst the mandatory grounds for refusal of extradition 
named in Article 3 of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition.1300 
With regard to the right to family life, we must distinguish those cases 
where family life on the territory of the removing party is disrupted from 
those where a disruption takes place extraterritorially. True to the 
delimitation of this work to extraterritorial protection, only the latter 
cases are of interest. 1301 In Cruz Varas, the European Court has shown 
itself prepared to scrutinise whether a disruption of family life due to 
removal and outside the territory of the respondent state violates Article 8 
ECHR. 1302 This implies that, in the Court's view, Article 8 ECHR also 
features an inherent prohibition of refoulement. 
Although it has proved willing to embrace other provisions than 
Article 3 ECHR, the Court has been far from making itself a harbinger of 
universalism. As earlier noted, it has stressed the exceptional character of 
extraterritorial protection under the Convention. It has underscored that 
1298 Soering, para. 113. 
1299 Kozlov vs Finland, Decision of 28 May 1991, Appl. No. 16832/1990, Decisions and 
Reports 69 (1991), para. 332. 
1300 This provision reads as follows: 
'Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances: 
[ ... ] 
(f) [ ... ) if that person has not received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in 
criminal proceedings, as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 14; 
(g) If the judgement of the requesting State has been rendered in absentia, the convicted 
person has not had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his or 
her defence and he has not had or will not have the opportunity to have the case retried 
in his or her presence.' 
G.A. Res. 45/116, Model Treaty on Extradition, 14 Dec. 1990, UN Doc. No. 
A/RES/45/116. While not binding as such, this instrument might be of some use when 
analysing the opinio juris with regard to the permissibility of extradition under 
customary international law. As stated earlier, an analogy can be drawn to removal 
other than extradition. 
not For a general overview on the case law related to removal and Article 8 ECHR, see A. 
Sherlock, 'Deportation of Aliens and Article 8 ECHR', 23 European Law Review (1998). 
1302 Cruz Varas, para. 88. 
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its Article 1 'cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect 
that, notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may 
not surrender an individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting 
him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of the 
safeguards of the Convention'. 1303 At face value, this allows for three 
possible readings. First, there are some Convention rights which do not 
unfold extraterritorial protection. Or, second, in an extraterritorial 
context, the protection through each Convention right is not as far 
reaching as in the domestic context. Or, thirdly, both limitations could 
apply. Seemingly, the Court discards the fourth option, and therewith the 
congruency of extraterritorial and domestic protection under the ECHR. 
Anything else than the fourth option requires that a line be drawn. 
This line is differently located in the first and the second reading. While 
the first reading implies a hierarchy among the rights in Section I of the 
ECHR, the second implies a hierarchy within these rights. According to 
the first reading, some rights are 'superior' to others, motivating and 
justifying their potential for extraterritorial protection.1304 Following the 
second reading, some violations of a right are superior to others, which 
motivates an.cl justifies that extraterritorial protection be granted for the 
former. When browsing through relevant doctrinal text in the following, 
we shall see how the argumentative patterns of both readings resurface-
tracking either which rights apply, or to what extent they apply to 
extraterritorial protection. 
11.2 A Hierarchy among Rights? 
Let us start out with the first reading and, hence, with which rights apply. 
Close to the particularist end of the spectrum, we find a position that 
argues that extraterritorial protection under the ECHR is exclusi·vely 
confined to Article 3 ECHR. 1305 Another, less rigidly formulated, but 
materially identical, approach accords Article 3 ECHR the function of a 
passerelle to extraterritorial protection. The latter position can be 
1303 Soering, para. 86. 
1304 Z iihlke and Pastille, 1999 have provided an excellent overview of a broad variety of 
superiority arguments, discarding them in a systematic fashion. 
1305 See A. H. Robenson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe (1993, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester), p. 44. 
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exemplified with the case of a person threatened with an unfair trial in her 
home country. Removal to that country would be considered inhuman 
treatment and would thus violate Article 3 ECHR, rather than Article 6 
ECHR. The bottom line is that the feared treatment must qualify as 
inhuman in the sense of Article 3 ECHR. Proponents of the latter 
position1306 appear to have been inspired by the earlier case law of the 
European Commission 1307 -case law that is obsolete after Soering and the 
cases referred to earlier in this sub-section. 1308 
Taking any of these !imitative positions inevitably leads one to ask why 
the prohibition of ill-treatment in Article 3 ECHR should enjoy special 
status among the rights enshrined in the ECHR and its Protocols. As 
noted in doctrine, '[i]t remains unclear where the superiority of Article 3 
is located'.13°9 Arguing for a special character of torture-related norms, 
motivating their exclusive possession of extraterritorial range, is indeed a 
demanding task. It is by no means evident why protection from torture is 
tantamount to protection from other 'irremediable damages' such as, for 
example, the intentional deprivation of life. Neither the wording, nor the 
context, nor the telos of Article 3 ECHR accommodate an exclusive 
possession of non-refoulement capacities. Nor can the absence of 
permissible limitations in Article 3 ECHR and its non-derogable character 
support hierarchical superiority within Section I-after all, both 
characteristics are shared by other provisions of the ECHR. As a result, 
we must reject the two }imitative approaches. 
What then is the criterion singling out a special class of rights endowed 
with an inherent prohibition of refoulement? This criterion can be sought 
either within the text of the ECHR or outside it. 
Taking the latter approach, a distinct effort to argue for the special 
status of Article 3 ECHR was made in 1988 by Vogler, who advances a jus 
cogens-criterion. He contends that Article 3 ECHR inhibits extradition, 
1306 Accounting for arguments in favour of such an exclusive possession, MaaBen, 1997, 
p. 136, states that the European organs ultimately focus on the legality of removal from 
the sending state and not the legality of the presumed treatment in the receiving state. 
But see Zimmermann, 1994, p. 90 f, Suntinger, 1996, p. 214, affirming an independent 
prohibition of refoulement under Art. 2 ECHR. 
1307 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, pp. 756-7. 
1308 The reader will note that both !imitative positions are at odds with the Court's own 
position, as stated earlier. See text accompanying note 1291 above. 
1309 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 757. 
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while Article 6 ECHR does not. 1310 He bases this contention on the 
observation that only Article 3 ECHR represents a 'general rule of 
international law recognised by civilised nations' in its totality, while, for 
example, the principles of legality of procedure enshrined in Article 6 
ECHR 'belong to them only in their intrinsic components' .1311 He 
elevates this conclusion to a general theory: '[ w ]hether a State is allowed 
to extradite [ ... ] ultimately depends on the classification of rules as 
belonging to the international ius cogens' .1312 
Van Dijk refutes this argumentation with a reference to the compe-
tence of the Strasbourg organs, which 'is limited to the "engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Con-
vention"'1313. This misses the point, as Vogler uses the criterion of jus 
cogens only to single out those norms in the ECHR endowed with an 
inherent non-refoulement capacity. The responsibiiity of State Parties to 
the ECHR is still based directly on the ECHR, which is merely 
interpreted in the light of international law. 
Other reasons militate against Vogler's explanation, which is ultimately 
an attempt to craft an argument capable of superseding contractual 
obligations under bi- or multilateral extradition agreements. 1314 Vogler 
1310 This was roughly a year before the ECtHR spelt out in Soering that Art. 6 ECHR could 
very well provide a basis for extraterritorial protection. See text accompanying note 
1298 above. 
1311 T. Vogler, 'The scope of extradition in the light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights', in F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Dimension (EssfZYS in Honour of G.]. Wiarda) (1988, Heymann. Koln), p. 669. 
1312 Ibid., p. 670. 
1313 P. van Dijk, Asylum Law and Policy in the Netherlands. The Dynamic of the Protection of 
Human Rights in Europe. EssfZYs in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. Ill (1994, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht), p. 139. 
1314 Such agreements usually do not exempt persons risking torture or other forms of ill-
treatment in the requesting country from extradition obligations. It would follow e 
contrario from Vogler's approach that a State Party to the ECHR could liberate itself 
from its obligations vis-a-vis an individual under its jurisdiction by entering into a 
bilateral agreement to that effect with another state. This is clearly not the case, and one 
need not resort to jus cogens or, for that matter, obligations erga omnes to explain why. 
The answer lies in the fact that human rights are not a bilateral business with states as 
reciprocal beneficiaries. By agreeing to Article 1 ECHR, states have simply bound 
themselves not to enter such rights-impairing agreements. Otherwise put, Section 1 of 
the ECHR would constitute lex specialis in relation to extradition agreements. An 
interesting parallel is the explicit exemption of treaty provisions relating to the 
'protection of the human person' from the party's disposal in Art. 60 (5) VTC. The 
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meets this challenge by declaring Article 3 ECHR to reflect a norm of 
higher dignity. 1315 In the absence of rudimentary forms of support from 
the actors of international law, the qualification of norms as peremptory 
is still a disturbingly controversial affair. 1316 Zuhlke and Pastille have aptly 
demonstrated the practical fallacy of reasoning based on jus cogens by 
comparing two cases involving the death row phenomenon. In Soering, 
the ECtHR considered the death row phenomenon to constitute inhuman 
treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR. In Kindler, however, the 
Human Rights Committee did precisely the opposite.1317 It is little helpful 
to declare a norm to be jus cogens, when there is such disagreement on its 
content by highly qualified actors as the ECtHR and the HRC. Similar 
reflections apply to an approach based on obligations erga omnes1318 or on 
attempts to identify a group of basic protection norms in international 
treaty law1319• Therefore, we are compelled to conclude that these 
concepts are of no help when identifying the rights in Section I ECHR or 
in the Protocols that may entail extraterritorial protection. 
Let us now turn to the search for a criterion distinguishing such rights 
within the text of the ECHR. In 1982, Kalin proposed that non-
refoulement under the ECHR is reserved for violations of non-derogable 
rights as defined by Article 15 ECHR and for the 'core content' 
(' Kerngehahj of other rights enshrined in the ECHR.1320 Regarding non-
derogable rights, Ermacora agrees with Kalin: 'The most legal approach to 
the problem may be to state wherever rights might be involved which are 
even guaranteed in the case of public emergency (Articles 2, 3, 4 § 1 and 7 
of the Convention) a member State may be considered responsible under 
the Convention for actions taken with a view to deportation or 
problem is that Article 1 ECHR stretches over the whole rights catalogue contained in 
Section 1 of the ECHR. The contractual approach leads either to disturbing 
consequences for the international law of human rights or back to the original question. 
1315 See Art. 59 VTC. 
1316 A topical discussion with further references can be found with Higgins, 1993, pp. 20-2. 
1317 Kindler revolved around whether the removal of the applicant to the U.S. would 
constitute a violation of Article 7 ICCPR. The HRC denied that a placement in death 
row would constitute inhuman treatment in the sense of Article 7 ICCPR. Kindler vs. 
Canada, para. 6.4. See Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 765. 
1318 For a good argmTientation, see Zli.hlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 763. 
1319 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 763. 
132° Kalin, 1982, pp. 181-2. 
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extradition'.1321 A delimitation turning on derogability appears to be 
plausible, as it follows a structure erected within the ECHR by the 
Contracting Parties themselves. The same would go for a delimitation 
based on which rights are formulated as 'absolute', that is, making no 
room for limitations. Such 'absolute' rights would offer protection from 
refoulement, while the 'relative' rights in Articles 8 to 11 would not. In its 
case law, the Court has repeatedly stressed the absolute nature of Article 3 
ECHR as well as its non-derogability. 
But this plausibility is deceptive. As Zuhlke and Pastille have 
convincingly argued, it rests on a tautology: '[t]racing superiority with the 
help of non-derogable rights dwells on the assumption that those rights 
are non-derogable because they are superior-a classic circular 
argument' .1322 This works against all attempts to deduce a hierarchical 
structure from the textual manifestations and delimitations of rights, 
whether they be drawn from express limitations (as in Article 5 ECHR), 
justifiable interferences (Articles 8 to 11 ECHR) or derogability in case of 
public emergency (all rights other than those enshrined in Articles 2, 3, 4 
(1) and 7 ECHR). Basically, the Convention text is no more than a 
structure of technical solutions to the problem of formulating rights with 
sufficient precision. There is no indication whatsoever that the chosen 
technical solutions are signs of superiority.1323 
Further, the adequacy of terming rights as 'absolute' can be drawn into 
question. Along the terms suggested by Alan Gewirth, the absoluteness of 
a right implies that it survives a conflict with another right. 1324 It is 
questionable, though, whether Article 3 ECHR, or, for that matter, 
similarly formulated rights in Section I, are absolute. As Ziihlke and 
Pastille have argued, the precise extent of Article 3 ECHR cannot be 
established but on a case-by-case basis, necessitating subjective assessments 
1321 F. Ermacora, 'The Application of the ECHR in Asylum Cases', in R. Lawson and M. de 
Blois (eds), The Dynamic of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe. Essays in Honour of 
Henry G. Schermers. Vol. Ill (1994, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht), p. 162. 
1322 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 761. 
1323 'The different mechanics of protecting rights follow substantial differences in the history 
and practical nature of those rights. The different forms that rights take in the 
Convention cannot serve as an indicator of superiority [footnote omitted, GN].' Zuhlke 
and Pastille, 1999, p. 760. 
1324 Addo and Grief, 1998, p. 514, quoting A. Gewirth, Human Rights. Essays on justification 
and Applications (1982, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London), p. 219. 
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by means of a weighing process.1325 Consider two police officers marching 
a handcuffed and sparsely clad person over a public square. Whether or 
not this is degrading treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR depends on 
the circumstances. Provided that person is a suicide assassin, such conduct 
is likely to be justified. Where the same person has merely committed a 
minor traffic offence, this public display would most certainly be 
considered degrading by the European Court. 1326 Thus, Addo and Grief 
are certainly right when stating that the case law 'gives an impression of 
shifting boundaries as regards the character and scope of the absolute 
nature of the prohibitions in Article 3'.1327 Where the fringes of a right are 
dynamic to this degree, what sense does it make to suggest that it survives 
a conflict with any other right? The example has shown that the rights of 
others-e.g. the potential victims of a suicide assassin-impact on the 
extent of the right enjoyed by the person marched over the public square. 
What one could validly claim is that a core content of Article 3 ECHR 
(e.g. the more specific concept of torture) will always survive and is thus 
absolute. 1328 But this is true for any of the rights in Section I-beyond 
justified interference and the margin of appreciation. So, in the end, there 
is no difference between Article 3 ECHR, and, say, Article 8 ECHR. At 
the fringes of Article 3 ECHR, the concept of absoluteness turns out to be 
materially empty .1329 Thus, it is useless for discerning hierarchical 
structures among the single rights enshrined in Section I ECHR.1330 
Hence, we can discard the first reading of the European Court's dictum 
quoted earlier. 
1325 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, pp. 770-2. 
1326 The example is taken from Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 771. 
1327 Addo and Grief, 1998, p. 514. 
1328 However, while the torture concept may represent a 'core content' for Art. 3 ECHR, 
the same is not true for Art. 3 CAT, where the fringes of the concept are highly 
contested grounds. This is so because the buffer zone of other forms of ill-treatment is 
unavailable under the latter provision. 
rn9 It is no coincidence that Gewirth, while affirming the existence of absolute moral rights, 
chooses to formulate them in very abstract terms. Gewirth illustrates rule absolutism by 
the right not to be made the intended victim of a homicidal project, and principle 
absolutism by the principle that agents and institutions are absolutely prohibited from 
degrading persons, treating them as if they had no rights or dignity. Gewirth, 1982, p. 
233. 
rno By stating this, we have taken no position on the existence of absolute rights. 
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This brings us back the second part of Kalin's proposal, turning on the 
notion of a 'core content' inherent in each right. Kalin himself defines the 
concept of core content as the realm of a right, which cannot be infringed 
upon without eradicating the right as such.1331 Indeed, it is not simple to 
make Kal.in's formula operational right away. Two alternative under-
standings are conceivable. Either Kalin wishes to separate violations of the 
core content from less severe violations, with only the former entailing 
extraterritorial protection, or any infringement into a derogable right 
beyond what has been termed the margin of appreciation would be 
regarded as touching upon the core content. This reading would make 
Kalin's proposal congruent with the fourth reading, affirming the 
congruence of extraterritorial and domestic protection under the ECHR. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Kalin indeed had the first 
alternative in mind when formulating himself. 
Using the notion 6f a 'core content' implies erecting a hierarchy within 
a right. It is of little surprise that Kalin's usage of the notion has been met 
with criticism for its ambiguity. 1332 Thus, the search must go on. Exactly 
how shall the line be drawn between the core content and the fringes of 
the rights enshrined in Section I? In the following, we shall test a 
delimitative criterion inferred from the case-law of the European organs. 
1:L3 lrreparability as a Water-Shed? 
The European Court has stressed that it was only willing to rule on a 
potential violation of the ECHR due to the irreparable nature of damages 
flowing from removal to a country where there is a risk of treatment 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR. 1333 Could the notion of irreparability be a 
water-shed, separating those violations triggering refoulement from those 
which do not? It is worth recalling that the instruments themselves do not 
spell out which violations are to be regarded as causing irreparable 
damages. Neither did the European organs give further guidance on the 
1331 The doctrine of core content is highly relevant in a constitutional context. As an 
example, the German legislator may very well change single provisions in the rights 
catalogue of the German Constitution, as long as the core content of the right to human 
dignity remains unaltered. Art. 79 (3) of the German Basic Law (Gnmdgesetz). 
1332 Gornig, 1987, pp. 33-4, MaaiSen, 1997, pp. 130-1. 
1333 Soering, para. 90. 
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issue of reparability. Nonetheless, the concept of irreparability fits well 
together with the subsidiary character of extraterritorial human rights 
protection. 
Which human rights violation could qualify as irreparable? Tentatively, 
one could to distinguish three main categories of violations. The first 
category comprises violations leading to a direct or indirect termination of 
life. Starting with a truism, one can state that the intentional deprivation 
of life is an irreparable violation.1334 From this, it can be inferred that 
violations of due process1335 and the maxim of nullum crimen sine lege1336 
fall into the same category, if conviction would result in capital 
punishment. 
The second and third categories encompass violations that are not 
irreparable per se, as a violation would not lead to a termination of the 
victim's life. However, amongst those rights, two additional factors might 
endow a violation with irreversibility: therapy-resistant traumatisation 
and lack of legal remedies. This category is made up of right violations 
other than those falling under the first category. 
In certain cases, violations of human rights falling short of a direct or 
indirect deprivation of life can nevertheless lead to a trauma for the 
victim, which is resistant to therapy. Such a trauma becomes irreversible 
in the sense that the violation continues to affect the mental or physical 
health of the victim. Thus, the violation is perpetuated. Clearly, violations 
of Article 3 ECHR are cases in point. Torture is highly traumatising and 
affects the victim over a long period, if not the rest of his or her life. 1337 In 
specific cases, the same might be true for violations of other human rights, 
depending on the gravity of the violation and its effects for the individual 
victim. In other words, the risk assessment carried out before a removal 
decision must comprise an individual evaluation of possible traumati-
sation by the violation of any human right, which the sending state is 
obliged to observe. 
1334 Art. 2 ECHR and Art. 1 of the Sixth Protocol respectively. 
1335 Art. 6 ECHR. 
1336 Art. 7 ECHR. 
1337 In a lucid essay recounting his repeated interrogation by SS agents in 1943, Jean Amery 
has condensed the impact of torture when stating 'Wer gefoltert wurde, bleibt gefoltert' 
(He, who has been tortured, remains tortured). J. Amery, Jenseits van Schuld und Suhne. 
Bewiiltigungsversuche eines Oberwiiltigten, July 1988 ed. (1988, Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag/Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart), p. 51. 
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Apart from cases falling under the second category, violations can also be 
perpetuated by the absence of a legal remedy ending rights-violating 
practices. This constitutes the third category of violations. Let us assume 
that a person is arbitrarily detained. In the absence of legal remedies, such 
detention cannot be subjected to legal scrutiny. There are no means of 
putting a stop to the denial of human rights in such cases, which 
constitutes a violation of its own right according to Article 13 ECHR. 
Accordingly, the absence of legal remedies makes a violation practically 
irreversible and, consequently, irreparable. 
The criterion of irreparability would thus establish a hierarchy both 
among and between rights. Along the lines suggested above, the concept 
of irreparability could be made the cornerstone of a doctrine of 
extraterritorial protection under the ECHR. Its central proposition might 
be formulated as follows: All human rights enshrined in the ECHR and 
its Protocols contain an inherent prohibition of refoulement to a country 
where there is a risk of an irreparable human rights violation. A violation 
is irreparable inter alia when it directly or indirectly terminates the life of 
the victim, when it produces a trauma resistant to therapy or when there 
are no legal remedies available to redress the violation. 
But the concept of irreparability is burdened with problems. Precisely 
like the notion of a 'core content' of human rights, it is ambiguous and 
difficult to pin down: we may all agree that torture is irreparable, but we 
are not so sure when it comes to degrading treatment. Thus, the concept 
of irreparability opens up a new arena for indeterminacy, turning on the 
question of exactly what is reparable and what is not. Furthermore, the 
distance of this notion to the letter of the ECHR is considerable: we have 
inferred this rule from the case law of the European organs, which, in 
turn, is based on th.e letter of the law. That adds up to three steps, and a 
considerable degree of abstraction. This inherent abstraction produces 
unrestrained conflicts on a meta-legal level: instead of being based on the 
law, the decisive arguments will be medical, psychological, or otherwise 
technical. In addition, it is hard to justify the water-shed of irreparability 
within the normative edifice of the ECHR itself. There are no indications 
that its drafters intended to create a hierarchy of violations according to 
reparability. Dogmatically, the determination of non-refoulement 
obligations by a criterion of irreparability would simply not fit into the 
framework of the ECHR. Although the question of reparability remains 
an important factor when assessing the severity of a certain treatment 
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alleged to violate the ECHR, it alone cannot serve as the water-shed we 
are tasked with identifying here. 
11.4 A Hierarchy within Rights: The Concept of Positive 
Obligations 
At this stage, it appears that no simple and objective criterion can be 
found which would determine non-refoulement obligations under the 
ECHR and its Protocols. We seem to be stuck with a case-by-case 
approach, necessitating subjective evaluations by the decision-maker. 
Indeed, Zuhlke and Pastille have suggested that, in the absence of a 
predetermined superiority of certain rights, all rights are principally 
capable of possessing non-refoulement properties.1338 However, the extent 
to which they do so is to be determined by a 'direct balancing' of the 
interests of the persons to be removed against those of the removing 
state. 1339 In justifying this approach, the authors draw a parallel to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 ECHR-
the existence of which is, in their view, established by balancing state 
interests against those of the individual. 
Seconding Zuhlke a..11d Pastille, we would like to underscore that this 
balancing is not the same as the one proposed by the Chahal dissenters. 
While the latter wished to balance an established violation of an ECHR 
right against state interests, Zuhlke and Pastille resort to balancing only to 
establish whether an ECHR right would be violated at all. It is quite 
obvious that the option proposed by the Chahal dissenters doubles the 
degree of discretion-balancing is applied both to establish the existence of 
a violation, and its permissibility. This is at odds with Article 15 ECHR, 
which is exhaustive with regard to additional powers of limitation.1340 
By and large, to describe the establishment of non-refoulement rights as 
a balancing process has a great deal of merit. Indeed, when confronted 
with the fringe areas of rights, we agree that there is a predominantly 
subjective and case-oriented element in singling out the extent of 
protection by them. However, while the 'direct balancing approach' is 
reflective of the European organs' practice, it is incapable of justifying it. 
133z Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 766. 
1339 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 769. 
1340 Zuhlke and Pastille, 1999, p. 769. 
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Below, we shall attempt to develop a dogmatically more coherent 
approach, drawing on the concept of positive obligations. 1341 
We shall suggest a two-pronged procedure for identifying whether a 
specific threat in the country to which the claimant shall be removed 
entails extraterritorial protection under the ECHR or its Protocols. In the 
first step, one would ask 
O Would one or more of the rights protected in Section I of the 
ECHR and the Protocols to the ECHR be violated upon removal? 
In the first step, any violation of any right is of interest. To be sure, a 
discriminatory or non-emergency derogation of a derogable right would 
also be considered a violation. 1342 In principle, the assessment of when a 
right is violated would not differ from that made in a purely domestic 
context. That is, the threat of ill-treatment by police officers in the home 
country of the claimant would be assessed in exactly the same manner as if 
that threat emanated in the host country where protection is sought. This 
is valid for all rights, regardless of whether or not they are derogable or 
may or may not be restricted under the ECHR. Thus, an alleged. violation 
of a right which may be subject to restrictions (Articles 8-11 ECHR) will 
also need to be assessed against the benchmarks provided in the second 
paragraph of each of these articles. To identify whether a restriction is 
acceptable under the named provisions, it must be lawful, serve a specified 
interest and be 'necessary in a democratic society'. To assess the latter 
benchmark, the alleged violation is subjected to the proportionality test 
developed by the European organs. 
The qualification of the threat as. a violation is a necessary criterion for 
triggering extra-territorial protection under the ECHR. However, it is not 
sufficient that this criterion is satisfied. If and only if a potential violation 
has been established in the first step, we shall proceed to the second. The 
second step turns on the following question: 
O Do the positive obligations flowing from that right impede 
removal? 
1341 On the logical structure of positive obligations, see R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte 
(1985, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), pp. 179-94. 
1342 Compare Arts 14 and 15 (1) ECHR. 
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Why is such a step necessary? We recall that the European organs had 
focused on the obligations of the host state, and not of the country of 
origin, when justifying the implicit prohibition of refoulement under 
Article 3 ECHR. Undoubtedly, removal would be perfectly legal under 
the ECHR in situations where a person is removed from the territory of a 
host state and subsequently becomes the victim of unforeseeable 
violations; the responsibility of the removing state under the ECHR is not 
engaged in such cases. Obviously, we need to involve the issues of risk and 
predictability to clear our minds on the scope of extraterritorial 
protection under the ECHR. 
To understand the necessity of risk assessments, we should revert to a 
purely domestic level for a moment. The positive obligations enshrined in 
Section 1 of the ECHR and its Protocols make such assessments by State 
Parties necessary on a regular basis. The right to life, for example, cannot 
be actively protected without clarifying which kinds of risks it is exposed 
to and what measures of protection are proportional to the probability 
linked to such risks. In a case turning on the legality of a vaccination 
scheme under Article 2 ECHR, the Commission reasoned as follows. 
The concept that everyone's life shall be protected by law "enjoins 
the State not only to refrain from taking life intentionally" but, 
further, to take appropriate steps to safeguard life. However in the 
present case the Commission is satisfied that, where a small 
number of fatalities occur in the context of a vaccination scheme, 
whose sole purpose is to protect the health of society by 
eliminating infectious diseases, it cannot be said that there has been 
an intentional deprivation of life within the meaning of Article 2 
(1) or that the State has not taken adequate and appropriate steps to 
protect life. 1343 
Risk assessments are, however, not limited to those rights which are 
perceived as containing predominantly negative obligations, that is, the 
obligation to abstain from a certain conduct. The prohibition of inhuman 
treatment implies, for example, that a State Party analyses a certain 
planned action vis-a-vis an individual under its jurisdiction with a view to 
the severity of suffering it produces. In the absence of such a positive 
obligation to assess the conformity of future conduct under the ECHR, 
1343 Dec. Adm. Com. Ap. 7154/75, 12 July 1978, D & R 14 p. 31, (32-3). 
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the system for the 'collective enforcement of human rights'1344 laid down 
in that instrument would mainly rest on a 'trial and error' process. 
A positive obligation-that is, in the case of Article 3 ECHR, an 
obligation to prevent ill-treatment-does have its reasonable limits. Such 
an obligation does not imply that a state has to take any conceivable 
measure to prevent ill-treatment. The process of choice involves with 
necessity considerations of risk, if the state's scarce protective resources 
should be used in an efficient manner. To illustrate this relationship, one 
might look at ill-treatment in the domestic sphere of a State Party to the 
ECHR. It is clearly a violation of Article 3 ECHR when state agents 
actively ill-treat a person. When state agents acquiesce to ill-treatment 
carried out by a third ~erson, this is also regarded as a violation. However, 
the concept of acquiescence easily slips away into obscurity. Would it be 
acquiescence, and thus k violation of the ECHR, if the head of a municipal 
police department ordered downsizing of a district's resources, thereby 
accepting a higher rate of violent crime? It would not, if she could justify 
her decision with regard to crime rates in other, more violent districts and 
the scarcity of resources. Thus, in an effort to comply with the positive 
obligations flowing from the ECHR, she made a risk assessment to 
identify a measure providing an optimum of protection from violence. 
Moving to an extraterritorial application of Article 3 ECHR, we find 
structural similarities. In both cases, violence would ultimately be 
exercised by non-state agents. In the preceding example, the agents would 
be criminals, and, in the case of refoulement, the agents would 
presumably be officials of another state. There is, however, state action 
that might aggravate or alleviate the risk of a violent incident. In the first 
example, such action would consist of the decision to downsize personnel 
in the police district. In the case of refoulement, it would be a decision of 
removal. To put it simply, a risk assessment translates the positive 
obligations abstractly inherent in a norm into concrete guidelines of 
action. Protection and predictability are interrelated: the more predictable 
a violation, the stronger becomes the protection claim of the presumptive 
victim. 
A quite different question is the nature of such a risk assessment. In 
constant case-law, the European organs have stated that a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR in a refoulement context presupposes that 'substantial 
1344 Soering, para. 87 with further references. 
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grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a 
real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in the country to which he or she was 
returned' .1345 The reader will note a triple threshold in this wording, the 
first regarding the probability of the risk, the second regarding the burden 
of proof and the third regarding the standard of proof. In the following, 
we shall focus on the dimension of risk. 
First of all, the risk must be a real one, which indicates certain 
exigencies on the probability of its realisation. In the Soering case, the 
European Court has indicated that this probability need not be high. One 
commentator holds that any risk but a negligible one will do in cases 
related to Article 3 ECHR1346; another has pointed to the proportionality 
between the risk requirements and the gravity of the anticipated 
violation.1347 We saw earlier that the requirement of intent in Article 2 
ECHR entailed a risk approximating 'near-certainty'. As the requirement 
of risk varies between different provisions of the ECHR, it is important 
to analyse their wording before setting the yardstick for a risk assessment. 
But when is the requirement of risk satisfied and the prohibition of 
refoulement triggered? This question can only be answered in a relative 
manner. Our reply draws on Alexy's principle theory, which understands 
human rights as 'commands of optimisation'.1348 In contradistinction to 
rules, principles command that something must be realised to a maximum 
extent in relation to legal and factual possibilities. In our context, the 
limitations lie first and foremost in factual possibilities. A host state is 
limited, first, in its capacity to foresee risks. To a certain degree, accuracy 
in prediction is a matter of invested resources. Beyond this degree, reality 
simply defies the most well funded auguries. Second, it cannot accept any 
risk whatsoever as a basis for non-refoulement, without undermining its 
resource base for human rights protection. Thus, in the assessment of the 
magnitude of the risk and the degree of predictability, the divide between 
1345 Nsona v. the Netherlands, para. 92, with further references. 
1346 S. Egelund, 'The Potential of the European Convention on Human Rights in Securing 
International Protection to Forcibly Displaced Persons', in UNHCR, The European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Displaced 
Persons (1996, UNHCR, Geneva), p. 17. 
1347 T. Einarsen, 'The European Convention of Human Rights and the Notion of an 
Implied Right to de facto Asylum' 2 I/RL 361 (1990), p. 371. 
1348 Alexy, 1985, pp. 75 et seq. 
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universalism and particularism rears its head again. Although the 
subjectivity of weighing can be limited by the proper delimitation of 
discretion1349, a considerable degree of indeterminacy remains. 
Let us revert to the possible readings of the European Court's dictum 
set out in the first section. We recall that the Court underlined that 
Article 1 ECHR 'cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the 
effect that, notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State 
may not surrender an individual unless satisfied that the conditions 
awaiting him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of 
the safeguards of the Convention' .1350 In the course of our analysis, we had 
to discard the first reading, which assumed that there are some 
Convention rights which do not unfold extraterritorial protection.1351 
What, then, about the second reading, professing that, in an 
extraterritorial context, the protection through each Convention right is 
not as far reaching as in the domestic context? Moreover, we have to ask 
whether the Court actually rules out the fourth option, and therewith the 
congruency of extraterritorial and domestic protection under the ECHR. 
By now, we have to answer both questions in the negative. The extent 
of Convention protection is exactly as far reaching domestically as in an 
extraterritorial context, and, accordingly, both domains of protection are 
congruent. As the perpetrator of an act potentially violating the rights 
enjoyed under the ECHR is always a third party, and not the state from 
which protection is sought, extraterritorial protection is a matter of 
positive obligations only. By contrast, protection from violations within 
the territory of a State Party to the ECHR relates to both negative and 
positive obligations. 
The notion of positive obligations facilitates our understanding of what 
the European Court actually meant in its dictum quoted above. As 
positive obligations have their limits, there cannot be a general principle 
to the effect that 'a Contracting State may not surrender an individual 
unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of 
destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the 
Convention'. Clearly, there is no such principle in the domestic arena 
1349 For a model of weighing see, D. Herling, 'Weight in Discretionary Decision-Making', 19 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1999), drawing on the background of U.K. case law. 
mo Soering, para. 86. 
1351 This invalidates automatically the third reading, professing that there is a hierarchy both 
among and within the rights enshrined in the ECHR and its Protocols. 
472 
PROTECTION UNDER THE ECHR 
either-no State Party to the ECHR possesses the capacity to ensure 
conditions in its territory that are in full accord with each of the safeguards 
of the Convention. The term 'conditions' embraces not only conditions 
created by the state, which are fully subjected to the prescriptions of the 
ECHR, but also conditions that are not under the control of the state, 
which are therefore subject to the prescriptions of the ECHR only to the 
extent of the state's positive obligations. 
11.5 Conclusion 
Let us conclude. The European organs have opened up the ECHR for 
extraterritorial application without spelling out the theoretical founda-
tions of their intei pretation. This foundation can be reconstructed by 
focusing on the positive obligations flowing from the threatened right. 
Our model avoids imposing artificial hierarchies on the rights catalogue of 
the ECHR and is better apt to explain the language used in the decisions 
by the European organs. As we shall see in the following, the notion of 
positive obligations facilitates the analysis of extraterritorial protection by 
non-state agents of persecution as well. 1352 
However, to make this reconstruction operational for assessing future 
cases, we must accept a substantial amount of qualitative reasoning-and 
indeterminacy. In principle, any violation could entail eligibility for 
extraterritorial protection. Whether it actually will, depends on an in casu 
assessment, leaving much power to the decision-maker. 
But this power is not unconstrained. The model expounded here offers 
the decision-maker a structure to follow. First, the extent of positive 
obligations under the invoked right has to be identified. As we saw earlier, 
not all provisions operate with the same threshold of risk exigencies. 
Second, it has to be determined whether the facts of the case fall within 
the extent of positive obligations. The facts of the case are a composite of 
two elements. The first relates to the degree to which the invoked right is 
violated upon return, while the second consists of the degree of 
predictability that this intrusion will materialise. 
Opening up the ECHR for extraterritorial protection must certainly be 
regarded as a victory for universalism. However, as our model shows, it 
was a victory of the judge over the parliamentary legislator as well. 
1352 See chapter 12.2.2.3 below. 
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Making the concept of positive obligations operational invests the 
decision-maker with considerable power; in this case, the decision-maker 
is, ultimately, the ECtHR. From now on, Strasbourg will hold the key to 
exclusion. This is not unproblematic for the universalist. After all, court 
majorities can change. What seems to be a victory for universalism in the 
ivory tower, can very well turn out to be its defeat in the courtroom one 
day. With a particularist majority amongst the judges, this concept may 
very well lead to regression in the scope of protection. 
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12 Three conflict zones 
WE RECALL THAT PART Ill seeks to identify whether the EU acquis 
on immigration and asylum is in conformity with relevant norms of 
international law. The analysis of the EU acquis in chapters 5 to 8 allowed 
us to conclude that integration in the field of migration and asylum only 
brought about four major binding instruments-the Schengen and Dublin 
Conventions, the Visa Regulation and the Spanish Protocol. In chapters 8 
to 10, we sought to identify the precise content of international law 
norms relevant for assessing the legality of the acquis. Our scrutiny in 
chapters 10 and 11 was structured along two issues-the existence of state 
obligations to grant protection and to allow migration to benefit from 
such protective obligations. In the present chapter, the insights gained 
during that inquiry shall be confronted with selected parts of the acquis. It 
is self-evident that such a confrontation must be limited and that not 
every conceivable normative clash between international law and the EU 
acquis can be addressed. We have chosen to select three normative conflict 
zones, involving the core content of all four binding instruments. 
First, the legality of visa requirements is scrutinised with regard to the 
ECHR, thus covering the most significant pre-entry-measure used by EU 
Member States today. This section puts both the Schengen visa acquis and 
the EU Visa Regulation to the test. The issue at stake is the legality of 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _013
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individual as well as collective deflection. To tackle the latter, various 
concepts of discrimination shall be drawn on. 
Second, the potential for conflict between the Dublin Convention and 
the prohibitions of refoulement in international law is expounded, thus 
covering the prime deflection measure adopted by Member States for the 
post-entry stage. Can a claimant be allocated from a Member State that 
upholds an inclusive interpretation of non-refoulement norms to a 
Member State that embraces an exclusionary interpretation? As a 
representative test case, we have chosen to epitomise allocation under the 
Dublin Convention in cases where the claimant is threatened by non-state 
agents in the country of origin. For the personal scope of extraterritorial 
protection, this issue is of utmost importance, and Member States have 
taken widely diverging approaches to it. Thus the second section covers 
not only the access filter, but also the filter of protection categories. 
Third, we look into the conformity of the Spanish Protocol with the 
prohibitions of discrimination in international law, thus covering the 
regulation of access to full-fledged procedures. Although the Spanish 
Protocol does not affect a large number of protection seekers for the time 
being, it remains the only binding instrument in the field of procedures. 
In addition, its symbolic value should not be underestimated, as it is the 
first and hitherto only instrument by which a regional group of states 
agrees to downgrade protection for each other's citizens. 
A scrutiny of these three areas of conflict covers each of the filter 
devices identified in Chapter Three. Each area hosts a possible conflict 
between the acquis and international law. Our task shall be to establish 
whether and how emerging conflicts can be resolved. 
12.1 Access to Territory: Visa Requirements and the ECHR 
In the preceding chapter, the ECHR and its Protocols emerged as the sole 
instrument containing an implied right to access to territory for persons 
seeking entry from abroad. Contracting States to the ECHR may incur 
liability under this instrument when denying entry to their territories, 
when this has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to a 
violation of her rights under the ECHR.1353 The following case served as 
an example. A person risking torture in her home country approaches the 
1353 See chapters 10.2.3.2 and 11.4 above. 
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Swedish Embassy, asking for an entry visa. Provided that the denial of an 
entry visa has the direct consequence of exposing that person to torture, 
the Swedish consular officer must issue it, if Sweden is not to violate 
Article 3 ECHR. 
Now, as the EC Visa Regulation and the visa list attached to the 
Schengen CCI oblige states to introduce visa requirements vis-a-vis certain 
third states, it seems that we are facing a compliance conflict between the 
ECHR and both instruments.1354 Recalling our explorations in Chapter 
one, we may state that this conflict manifests itself in four distinct 
constellations: 
1. Secondary international law (the Schengen CCI) versus pnmary 
international law (the ECHR); 
2. secondary EC law (the Visa Regulation) versus primary international 
law (the ECHR); 
3. secondary EC law (the Visa Regulation) versus primary EC law 
(Article 6 TEU)1355; and 
4. secondary EC law (the Visa Regulation) versus the General Principles 
of EC law (of which the rights enshrined in the ECHR form part). 
Generally, all of these constellations would fall under the competence of 
the ECtHR, but the second, third and fourth could also be brought before 
the ECJ under the preconditions outlined in Article 68 TEC. 
However, a closer look reveals that a compliance conflict can be 
avoided, if the Schengen CCI and the Visa Regulation are applied in line 
with the obligations flowing from the ECHR. It has been shown earlier 
that the EU acquis on visa requirements accommodates an obligation to 
grant a visa for protection-related grounds. Both the Visa Regulation and 
the Schengen CCI contain exemption clauses, allowing states to deviate 
from common visa requirements. 1356 Therefore, we may conclude that 
international law and the acquis do not conflict in this respect. The crucial 
1354 To be sure, both norms have a mandatory character and cannot be realised jointly. See 
text accompanying note 54 above. 
1355 Art. 6 TEU is relevant for EC law as well, and thus concurrently forms part of EC 
primary law. See text accompanying note 105 above. 




issue is whether Member States make full use of their competence to 
exempt protection-related cases from visa requirements. As earlier noted, 
not all Member States have instructed their consular posts accordingly.1357 
Therefore, in practice, it is very probable that single Member States violate 
the ECHR by not issuing visas in protection-related cases or by not exempting 
such cases from visa requirements. This is, however, a matter involving the 
domestic law and practices of Member States, and, therefore, outside the 
scope of this work. 
Nonetheless, even if used with consideration by states, visa 
requirements still entail significant practical problems for protection 
seekers. To start with, consular posts are a rare resource in refugee-
producing countries. From the outset, it is by no means clear that a 
protection seeker will find a diplomatic representation of a potential host 
state. Without such a representation, seeking a visa is practically 
impossible or entails considerable hardships. 1358 Even where a diplomatic 
post is available in the country of origin, not all problems are solved. 
Applying for a visa or for the exemption from a visa requirement and 
waiting for a response from the diplomatic representation takes time. 
During this time, the person in need of protection is exposed to the risk of 
human rights violations. Furthermore, the task of the persecutor is 
facilitated. An easy method of tracking down political enemies is to check 
those persons turning to diplomatic representations of other states. Thus, 
channelling flight through diplomatic representations aggravates the risks 
to which the potential protection seeker is exposed. 
Let us look at a specific example. There is a difference in treatment 
between, say, a Czech national and a Yugoslav national when it comes to 
visa requirements. Prima facie, this distinction is based on nationality. 
While a Czech national may enter the European Union freely1359, this is 
not the case for a national of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the 
latter country is on the common visa list annexed to the Visa regulation. 
1357 See text accompanying note 522 and 523 above. 
1358 The possibility of seeking a visa per mail would be obviated by the malfunction of postal 
services in crisis situations. Leaving for a neighbouring country to seek a visa is not a 
reliable option, as neighbouring countries may be inclined to bar access in situations of 
large-scale outflows. 
1359 The Czech Republic is not on the Common List. Presently, no Member State maintains 
visa requirements vis-a-vis the Czech Republic. See Inventory of visa regimes applied to 
countries not featured on the common list annexed to Council Regulation (EC) No. 
547 /1999, reproduced in MNS June 1999, p. 3. 
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In 1999, cases of alleged persecutions of Romany citizens were reported 
from both countries. 1360 This example indicates that persons of the same 
ethnic origin and with a roughly equivalent protection request under 
Article 3 ECHR may be subjected to different treatment by virtue of the 
negative list. Taken together, a protection seeker who is a national of a 
country on the negative list is worse off than a protection seeker from a 
country whose nationals are not subject to a common visa requirement. 
The question, therefore, would be whether this difference in treatment 
is in line with international law. To be sure, we are not dealing with 
access to territory for individual protection seekers any more, but for 
whole groups. Put otherwise, is there an obligation not only to grant visas 
in individual cases, but to exempt nationalities from visa requirements 
altogether? If there is a duty to exempt, this would not only impact on the 
individual Member State, which would be obliged to make use of the 
exemption clauses in the Visa regulation and the Schengen Convention. It 
would also raise the question whether the EC institutions are under an 
obligation to remove a country generating refugees from the negative list, 
so as not to inhibit flight movements. This is the question we shall pursue 
in the following, and discrimination reasoning is at its core. 
Below, we shall introduce the determinants of discrimination concepts 
in international law. This analysis provides a base not only for the present 
section, but also for the assessment of the Spanish Protocol in a later 
section. Then, we shall proceed to analyse whether Member State 
compliance with the Visa regulation indeed constitutes discrimination 
under the ECHR, making it illegal under international law. If visa 
requirements flowing from the Visa regulation can be shown to be 
discriminatory, we would encounter a compliance conflict between the 
EU acquis and international law, with two mandatory norms standing 
against each other. The four constellations of conflict outlined earlier 
would then become relevant again. Precisely as shown above, such a 
conflict would be justiciable in Strasbourg as well as in Luxembourg. 
1360 On the situation of Roma in the Czech Republic, see H. O'Nions, 'Bonafide or Bogus?: 
Roma Asylum Seekers from the Czech Republic', 1999 Web Journal of Current Legal 
Issues (1999), available at < http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issue3/ onions3.html >. 
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12.1.1 Determinants of Discrimination Arguments 
To argue equality is to re-politicise legal norms within the limits of legal 
argumentation. If the legislative process can be conceived of as a gradual 
structuring and freezing of a political conflict, an equality argument 
works in the opposite direction, constituting a gradual thawing of the 
political conflict feeding the norm. However, most intriguingly, this 
thawing process does not restore the original conflict. Instead, it 
restructures the conflict, regulating the gradual admissibility of arguments, 
forcing them into predetermined sequences and creating distinct 
hierarchies between different lines of argument. Quite obviously, this 
affects the outcome. Arguing equality is reminiscent of the ethical-
political discourse antecedent to the stipulation of the norm, but it is not 
identical with that discourse. Discourses antecedent to the stipulation of a 
norm are discourses on validity. Legal discourses on equality and non-
discrimination are discourses on application. 1361 While the former deal with 
the legitimacy of abstract norms, the latter look into the legitimacy of 
concrete outcomes. Validity is uhimately created by potential norm 
addressees; application is determined by judges. Equality arguments must 
also be distinguished from arguments on interpretation, although both 
pertain to discourses on application. The latter balances divergent norms 
against each other; the former balances divergent outcomes against each 
other. 
Earlier in the discussion, it emerged that arguing equality means 
reconciling both a limited universal validity of human rights and the 
boundedness of communities. Very roughly, this tension sets out the 
poles within which equality arguments are to be framed. One pole is 
survival of the individual; the other is system survival. Assessing 
proportionality means identifying a segment, hosting several legitimate 
norm applications, on the scale between the poles. Indeed, the term 
'segment' suggests that a variety of proportional outcomes is conceivable. 
This variety is necessary: if the judge pointed out only one optimum 
application, she would usurp the role of a legislator.1362 
1361 The terminological distinction used here has been introduced by Klaus Gunther, who 
separates BegrUndungsdiskurse (discourses of justification) from Anwendungsdiskurse 
(discourses of application). K. Gunther, Der Sinn for Angemessenheit (1988, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main), p. 25. 
1302 See note 1373 below. 
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Yet equality is not a unitary concept in law.1363 On the contrary, different 
human rights instruments offer different delimitations of it. What 
distinguishes them is the degree to which an equality right allows a re-
politisation of a legal norm. Suffice it here to structure the various 
dimensions or equality arguments as to whom they typically support-the 
individual claiming to be the victim of discrimination, or the state 
defending itself against such a claim. A limitation of the concept to formal 
and negative equality, prohibition of arbitrariness and a requirement of 
proving discriminatory intent will typically facilitate the position of a 
state defending itself against discrimination claims. Conversely, an 
expansion of the concept to embrace material and positive equality, 
equality of opportunity and the admissibility of proving discriminatory 
effect, will typically support claimant interests. Ancillary prohibitions of 
discrimination narrow the scope of action that the individual can 
challenge. Hence, they work for the s~ate, while stand-alone equality 
rights are more advantageous for the individual. 
Another aspect to be taken into consideration is the empirical 
environment in which proportionality tests take place. Balancing is rather 
simple where a single person may be compared to another single person, 
and the point of reference is quantifiable; it becomes more complicated 
when groups are compared to each other, and the point of reference is 
non-quantifiable. Therefore, substantiating claims of discrimination in 
open and complex environments is more demanding for the claimant. 
Without a certain cognitive determinacy, any proportionality argument 
will simply fail. Conversely, closed and simple environments work for the 
claimant. 
At this point, we possess a backdrop for assessing the potential and 
limitations of equality arguments in the law relating to extraterritorial 
protection. We shall inquire whether visa requirements constitute direct 
discrimination based on nationality. As we shall see, this question is 
situated in an extremely open empirical environment, which hampers the 
prospects for a determinate outcome. The aim is a) to present the frame-
work of equality reasoning derived from the case-law of the European 
Court on Human Rights, b) to complement this framework with a 
differentiated model of proportionality reasoning developed in doctrine 
1363 For a clear-cut exploration of equality reasoning, see P. Kirchhoff, Die Verschiedenheit 




and c) to conclude on whether visa requirements under the Visa 
Regulation constitute discrimination under the ECHR. 
12.1.2 Discrimination under the ECHR? 
What concept of discrimination was envisaged by the drafters of the 
ECHR, and how has it been used in the case law of the Strasbourg organs? 
Article 14 ECHR provides for prohibition of discrimination, which is 
ancillary to the other rights enshrined in Section I ECHR: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
To wit, where a violation of e.g. Article 3 ECHR is found, the Strasbourg 
organs do not proceed to the question whether the same facts would serve 
for concluding that discrimination under Article 14 ECHR has taken 
place.1364 The reasons may seem obvious: to stipulate specific human rights 
is to cast the comparability and proportionality reasoning, at the heart of 
any equality argument, into a fixed form. In that sense, the stipulation of 
human rights drains the right to non-discrimination of material content. 
Where the right is violated, equality before the law is violated 
concurrently. 1365 
However, the material drainage is not a total one, as the European 
Court of Human Rights reminds us: 
Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the 
convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence, 
since it has effect solely in relation to the enjoyment of the rights 
1364 'Once it has been held that the restriction on the applicant's right to respect for his 
private sexual life gives rise to a breach of Article 8 by reason of its breadth and absolute 
character [ ... ], there is no useful legal purpose to be served in determining whether he 
has in addition suffered discrimination as compared with other persons who are subject 
to lesser limitations on the same right.' ECtHR, Dudgeon Case, Judgment of 22 October 
1981, Series A no. 45, para. 69. 
1365 Equality before the law is tautological: as legal norms are universal, such equality merely 
demands that norms be complied with. See Alexy, 1985, p. 358, with further references. 
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and freedoms safeguarded by those provlSlons. Although the 
application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose a breach 
of those provisions-and to this extent it is autonomous-there can 
be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within 
the ambit of one or more of the latter [ ... ].1366 
This means that an alleged violation of Article 14 ECHR is only meaning-
ful to consider under the following circumstances: 
1. There is no violation of a substantive provision in the ECHR or its 
protocols. 
2. The facts fall within the ambit of one or more of the substantive 
provisions in the ECHR or its protocols. 
Quite logically, Article 14 ECHR demands non-discrimination even 
beyond the command of equality already inherent in the substantive 
norms of Section I. The Court has formulated this obligation as follows: 
The notion of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 [ ... ] 
includes in general cases where a person or group is treated, 
without proper justification, less favourably than another, even 
though the more favourable treatment is not called for by the 
Convention.1367 
Therefore, a claimant who cannot substantiate a violation of Article 3 
ECHR may very well be able to substantiate a claim of discrimination 
under Article 14, based on unequal protection from ill-treatment. 
Let us recur to our example. Provided the Swedish representation 
denies a potential torture victim a visa, the obligations of Sweden under 
Article 3 ECHR can be engaged. Assuming for a moment that the facts 
support the contention that Article 3 ECHR indeed were violated, there 
would be no necessity to proceed to a discrimination reasoning under 
Article 14 ECHR. 
Now, let us consider the opposite. In the individual case, the facts do 
not allow to conclude on a violation. Could the claimant successfully 
1366 ECtli"""R, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Baikandali Case, Judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A 94 
[henceforth Abdulaziz], para. 71. 
1367 Abdulaziz, para. 82. 
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argue that the very fact that she possesses a nationality for which an entry 
visa is required puts her into an inferior position compared to aliens 
possessing a nationality which allows them to enter the territory of the 
respondent state without a visa? 
To assess an alleged violation of Article 14 ECHR, the reasoning of the 
Court passes a number of discernible stages. The Court sets out with a 
comparability test, deliberating whether the person claiming to be 
discriminated actually finds herself in a situation similar to that of the 
person she compares herself with. 1368 If this is the case, the Court proceeds 
to a justification test. The justification test, in turn, consists of two 
consecutive operations. 1369 First, the Court scrutinises whether the aim 
pursued by the difference in treatment is a legitimate one. If and only if 
this is the case, the Court ponders whether there is a 'reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised' .1370 This second step represents the inner core of 
equality reasoning, its rationale being to assess the 'legitimacy of 
difference'. 1371 It should be noted that the Contracting States enjoy a 
certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent 
differences in othenvise similar situations justify a different treatment in 
law. 1372 By respecting this margin, the Court avoids a quasi-legislative role: 
had it spawned precise norms by way of proportionality reasoning, it 
would have colonised the role of domestic parliaments. The Court is only 
competent to set limits for the legislator, and not to devise optimum 
solutions in lieu of the legislator. 1373 
Let us recur to our example and apply this methodology to it. As 
expounded above, there is a difference in treatment between a Czech 
national and a Yugoslav national when it comes to visa requirements. 
Prima facie, this difference is based on national origin, which is one of the 
1368 See, inter alia, ECtHR, Case of Moustaquim vs. Belgium, Judgment of 18 February 1991, 
Series A 193, para. 49, where the ECtHR denied that Article 14 ECHR was violated on 
grounds of lacking comparability. 
1369 This two-step methodology was first expounded in the Belgian Linguistic Case, Judgment 
of 23 July 1968, Series A 3. 
1370 Abdulaziz, para. 72. 
1371 Abdulaziz, para. 78. 
1372 Abdulaziz, para. 73. 
1373 The rationale behind this restraint is to preserve the repartition of competencies in the 
trias politikas. For a comprehensive argumentation, see Alexy, 1985, pp. 373-7. 
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grounds enumerated in Article 14 ECHR. Otherwise, both nationalities 
hold persons of the same ethnic origin and with a roughly equivalent 
protection request under Article 3 ECHR. The comparability criterion is 
thus fulfilled, and one may proceed to the stage of justifying the stated 
difference in treatment. 
The aim of visa requirements is to counter clandestine immigration. 1374 
There is no doubt that this aim is legitimate1375, given that the right to 
control the composition of its population is internationally recognised as 
being inherent in state sovereignty. 1376 This opens up the last stage of 
equality reasoning, drawing on the issue of proportionality. 
12.1.3 Refining Proportionality Reasoning 
Essentially, the proportionality test consists of a weighing operation. An 
initial difficulty is that 'means' and 'goals' are incommensurable. To 
overcome this difficulty, we suggest adopting the concept of intrusion. 
More specifically, to what degree does the difference in treatment intrude 
upon the human rights of the individuals affected? And to what degree 
does the non-implementation of the goal intrude into the human rights of 
others? 
This approach draws first on a perception of human rights as 
'commands of optimisation', as developed in Alexy's principle theory1377, 
and, second, on the strong linkage between principle theory and the 
proportionality test. In contradistinction to rules, principles command 
1374 See the fourth recital of the Common Visa List: 'Whereas risks relating to security and 
illegal immigration should be given priority consideration when the said common list 
annexed hereto is drawn up;[ ... ]'. 
1375 In Abdulaziz, the Government contended 'that the measures in question were justified 
by the need to maintain effective immigration control, which benefited settled 
immigrants as well as the indigenous population. Immigration caused strains on society; 
the Government's aim was to advance public tranquillity, and a firm and fair control 
secured good relations between the different communities living in the United 
Kingdom'. (Abdulaziz, para 76). Responding to this argument, the ECtHR seems to 
accept the amalgam of migration control and public tranquility by stating that it 'accepts 
that the 1980 Rules also had, as the Government stated, the aim of advancing public 
tranquillity'. (Abdulaziz, para. 81). 
1370 This state right has been recognised in the constant case law of the Court. See, e.g. Nsona 
vs the Netherlands, para. 92. 
1377 Alexy, 1985, pp. 75 et seq. 
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that something must be realised to a maximum extent in relation to legal 
and factual possibilities. The degree of realisation depends on factual as 
well as legal circumstances. A legal circumstance could be a countervailing 
principle. In the area of constitutional law as well as of human rights law, 
such conflicts are quite commonplace.1378 The attempts to solve such 
conflicts can be further structured by Alexy's balancing rule: 
The higher the degree of non-fulfilment or restriction of one 
principle, the higher the importance of fulfilment of the other 
principle has to be.1379 
This trade-off rule implies that the resistance offered by a right increases 
with the degree of intrusion. 1380 Reverting to our earlier exploration of 
proportionality reasoning, this is strikingly familiar. The formulations of 
the European Court of Human Rights reverberate with this relationship 
between colliding interests: 
As to the present matter, it can be said that the advancement of the 
equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of 
the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons 
would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the 
ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the 
Convention.1381 
1378 Alexy himself has exemplified them by referring to a case before the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, where the freedom of expression clashed with the right to 
personal integrity, both guaranteed by the German constitution. Alexy, 1985, pp. 84 et 
seq. For the manifestation of principle conflicts in human rights law, see our 
1379 
1380 
reconstruction of the proportionality test below. 
Alexy, 1985, p. 146. 
Lindahl describes trade-offs as models in which 'it is assumed that when an amalgamated 
preference ordering over different states of a society is constructed, values can be 
"traded" against each other, in the sense that a loss on one value-attribute can always be 
compensated or "outweighed" by a suitably great gain on another value-attribute'. 
[Emphasis in the original, footnote omitted]. Lindahl, 1992, p. 56. Trade-off models 
compete with lexicographic models, in which values are ordered by their importance. 
See Lindahl, 1992, pp. 57-8. 
1381 Ahdulaziz, para. 78. 
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The existence of a margin of appreciation does not alter the situation, as 
the European Court affirmed in a case on discrimination on grounds of 
nationality: 
Moreover the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in 
otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment. However, 
very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the 
Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on 
the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention.1382 
Given this apparent kinship, it comes as no surprise that Alexy holds that 
the rule of proportionality1383 and principle theory imply each other. 1384 
Understanding his motivation necessitates a further refinement of the 
proportionality test. 
Following an established doctrine, the proportionality test in the broad 
sense can be broken down into three subordinate rules. 1385 The rule of 
appropriateness excludes means that are not suitable for the pursuit of a 
given goal. The rule of necessity lays down the precedence of less intrusive 
over more intrusive means in pursuit of a given goal. 1386 Finally, the third 
rule consists of the proportionality test in the narrow sense, excluding 
such means as are excessive for the pursuit of a given goal. 
While the rule of appropriateness and the rule of necessity delimit the 
factual possibilities of optimisation, the proportionality test in the narrow 
sense delimits the legal possibilities of optimisation. 1387 The reader will 
note that this refined model does not provide a solution to the conflict 
inherent in discrimination reasoning. Even in this form, the 
proportionality test is beyond a simple, mathematical quantification. The 
intrusion by differential treatment cannot be unambiguously and 
1382 ECtHR, Gaygusuz vs. Austria, Judgment of 16.9.1996, Reports 19%-IV, para. 42. 
1383 Alexy rightly underscores that the norm of proportionality is not a principle, as it does 
not require optimisation of a certain value. Alexy, 1985, p. 100, note 84. Due to its 
binary character, it is to be termed a rule. 
1384 Alexy, 1985, p. 100. 
1385 Alexy, 1985, p. 100, with further references in note 82. 
1386 The test of necessity is structured as a test of pareto-optimality: state A is to be preferred 
to state B, if a shift from B to A will not leave any of the actors involved worse off than 
before, but at least one of them better off. Alexy, 1985, p. 149 note 222. 
1387 Alexy, 1985, p. 101. 
487 
CHAPTER 12 
objectively measured, and the same is true for the intrusion caused by the 
non-implementation of goals pursued by such treatment. 1388 However, it 
delivers a procedure to be followed, thereby limiting the degree to which 
the personal preferences of the decision-maker may influence the 
outcome. It remains to be seen whether this model produces sufficiently 
determinate outcomes when applied to the present case of visa 
requirements. 
12.1.4 Applying the Refined Proportionality Test to Visa 
Requirements 
Following the model derived from the Court's case law, we have already 
stated that the goal pursued by visa requirements-namely migration 
control-was a legitimate one. Now, complementing the rudimentary 
proportionality test of the Court with the more complex model exposed 
in the preceding section, we shall tackle the question to what extent the 
means used is appropriate and necessary. 
There can be no doubt that the means of visa requirements is 
appropriate for the goal of immigration control. Together with other pre-
en try measures, it diminishes the probability of unauthorised entry by 
erecting a first administrative boundary abroad.1389 Thus, the first 
subordinate rule does not provide any further help. At first sight, the 
second subordinate rule seems to be more relevant. It is all the more likely 
that states could have chosen alternative means with a less intrusive effect 
on protection seekers. One of these means is the issuance of specific visas 
for protection seekers, as practised by Denmark and Sweden during 
certain periods of the Bosnian refugee crisis. Basically, this option (i.e. 
protection visas) would imply a modification of the rules and procedures 
for issuing visas, while visa requirements as such would be retained. 
Another would be the slashing of visa requirements combined with a 
simultaneous strengthening of in-country immigration controls and of 
determination procedures. Further arrangements-such as the establish-
1388 At large, trade-off models share this problem with lexicographic models. In the latter, a 
decision on the ranking of values must be made, which is perforce a subjective one. See 
note 1380 above. 
1389 See chapter 5.1 above. 
488 
THREE CONFLICT ZONES 
ment of complex systems for reception in the region of origin with 
following resettlement-could be imagined. 
Looking into the relatively straightforward alternative of protection 
visas, we find that it reduces the degree of intrusion for protection seekers 
compared to comprehensive visa regimes. For host communities, it 
reduces the degree of intrusion compared to the total abolishment of visa 
regimes. However, the risk of abuse by persons not in need of protection 
remains, and, with it, the risks entailed by the straining of domestic 
resources by undeserving cases. But even the inflow of deserving cases 
would augment, which would draw state resources by its own right. The 
same applies to more complex solutions involving reception in the region 
and resettlement. Thus, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to argue 
that two different means are identical when it comes to the promotion of 
a certain goal. Establishing or denying this identity is quite apparently a 
step charged with value judgements and thus open to meta-legal reasoning. 
Thus, the problem cannot be solved with the rule of necessity. 
Introducing protection visas or alternative protection regimes merely 
shifts the conflict of intrusions. Now, lesser risks for the individual 
protection seekers are bought at the price of higher risks for the potential 
host state. It still remains to be determined whether this balance of 
intrusions is a proportional one. 
Therefore, we shall proceed to the proportionality test in the narrow 
sense, attempting to apply the balancing rule expounded above. We chose 
to leave the issue of protection visas for the time being, and to pursue our 
original task, which was to assess the distinction in treatment inherent in 
visa requirements. 
What are the rights involved, and what are the possible intrusions that 
a balan.cing operation must take into account? Following our example, the 
right guaranteed in Article 3 ECHR is at stake for the individual 
protection seeker. On behalf of the host community, it is normally 
referred to the state right to immigration control. However, this right 
must not be taken as an autocratic means in itself. The effectiveness of the 
state as a guarantor of rights and freedoms presupposes the idea of a 
bounded community. Thus, immigration control is a means to secure not 
only the interests, but also the human rights of citizens and denizens. 
Therefore, the term 'immigration control' contains a cluster of individual 
rights, which would run the risk of being inf ringed if the state entrusted 
489 
CHAPTER 12 
with ensuring them were weakened.1390 As we shall see below, this issue is 
a complex one; further differentiation is necessary. To conclude, an 
approach based on the concept of intrusion allows for a translation of the 
present proportionality issue to one of conflicting human rights. Thus, we 
are left with an opposition of one right-Article 3 ECHR-with a 
plurality of rights, some of them contained in the ECHR, some of them 
_not.1391 Next, then, we must ask whether the intrusions risked by either 
party are quantifiable. 
Starting out with the interest of the individual protection seeker, it is 
clear that the difference in treatment affects de facto access to 
extraterritorial protection. First, a Czech citizen could leave her home 
country right away. By contrast, a Yugoslav citizen would be subject to a 
visa requirement. This would compel her to apply for a visa with a 
diplomatic representation of an EU Member State, which could entail 
considerable practical problems, as many countries had limited their 
diplomatic presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1999. 
Where these problems could be overcome, the claimant would have to 
wait for a decision. During this time, she would continue to be exposed to 
a persecutory risk, while a Czech citizen would not. 
Second, provided that she indicated the true purpose of her journey-
namely to seek extraterritorial protection-she would, as a rule, not be 
granted a visa. Resorting to the services of human smugglers would 
remain the only option for her. Ultimately, this option is only open for 
those who can cope with the substantial financial costs, physical hardships 
and considerable risks linked to being smuggled. 
In a worst case scenario, the drawbacks caused by the visa requirement 
could result in the individual being exposed to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Given that Article 3 ECHR is non-
derogable, there is no doubt that State Parties to the ECHR accord a high 
value to the protection from such forms of ill-treatment. Thus, the 
intrusion into the individual's integrity has a considerable weight in the 
present proportionality test. 1392 
1390 A weakening would not occur by admitting single cases, but it might be conceivable if 
large numbers were to enter. 
1391 The weakening of economic, social and cultural rights falls outside the framework of the 
ECHR. 
1392 See text accompanying notes 1381 and 1382 above. 
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The collective interests involved, however, are not trivial either. 
Abolishing visa requirements at large would deny a powerful tool of 
migration control to potential destination countries. Very likely, the 
consequences would be a marked increase in immigration. Given the 
dismantling of emigration restrictions during the last two decades and the 
facilitation of travel, this increase might reach a historically unprecedented 
level. Even were immigration restrictions to be maintained, the channel of 
seeking extraterritorial protection would remain open, de facto allowing 
for a temporary stay on the territory of the destination state until the 
claim was determined. In egalitarian welfare societies, this temporary stay 
draws considerable resources; and so does the maintenance of proper 
determination procedures, compulsory for any Rechtsstaat worthy of the 
name. 
Thus there are two options-either the system of extraterritorial 
protection is further restricted, or even dismantled, or the destination 
state reallocates resources from other areas to that system. 
To wit, the obligations owed to protection seekers under the 1951 
Refugee Convention and other instruments of international law have 
become so entangled with the concept of liberal democracies, that a 
renunciation of these instruments would be perceived as a foundational 
change.1393 It would undermine the self-perception as well as the self-
organisation of such societies, creating considerable costs. Although this 
option is hypothetical at present, it should be kept in mind. It illustrates 
that an excessive demand for protection might call the survival of treaty-
based protection obligations into question. The consequence would be 
inequality over time: in the first phase of the abolishment of visa 
requirement, a larger number of persons would enjoy extraterritorial 
protection. However, in the second phase, states would withdraw from 
relevant conventions and dismantle the increasingly resource-demanding 
system of extraterritorial protection altogether. Clearly, a late-born 
1393 It must be recalled that a renunc1at1on of human rights instruments implies a 
dismantling of protection for citizens as well. It would be impossible to maintain the 
status as a liberal democracy and to dismantle human rights protection simultaneously. 
The following episode might be indicative in this regard. In 1998, the Austrian 
presidency drafted a strategy paper for the EU Council, in which it questioned whether 
the 1951 Refugee Convention still represented an adequate response to contemporary 
challenges of migration and asylum. After the paper was leaked, the public reaction was 
markedly negative, and other Member States hurried to dissociate themselves from this 
part of the paper. 
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protection seeker would be worse off in the second phase, if she were to 
be compared to her predecessors under the first phase. Legally, identical 
human rights and a very similar degree of intrusion would stand against 
each other, the only difference being that they related to different right-
holders over time. Thus, the first option is intrusive to a considerable 
degree-for future protection seekers as well as for the ideological 
foundation of liberal democracies. 
The second option would oppose protection seekers with the citizens 
and denizens of the potential destination country. Legally, it opposition is 
structured as follows. On one side, there is the protection seeker's right 
under Article 3 ECHR. On the other, there is the enjoyment of human 
rights at large by the community of citizens and denizens. This opposition 
is profound and complex. It involves a heterogeneous set-up of persons 
involved, and juxtaposes the absolute denial of a right held by the 
protection seeker to the gradual erosion of rights for a whole community. 
Under the first option (abolition of extraterritorial protection) as well 
as the second option (protection at the cost of host states' population), an 
exact quantification of intrusion is impossible, as many factors remain the 
subject of speculation. How many persons will seek protection in the 
future? How are they going to be distributed between potential host 
countries? How many resources will a given host country have available 
in the future? What would be the consequences of a denial of 
extraterritorial protection? What would be the consequences of large-scale 
immigration? Nonetheless, it is possible to state that the aggregate 
intrusion might have a considerable weight in the present proportionality 
test. 
Let us conclude. We have combined the proportionality test used by 
the Court with a sophisticated procedural model for balancing intrusions. 
We have been careful to limit the extent of meta-legal reasoning. In doing 
so, we have accorded both the intrusion caused by the use of visa 
requirements and the intrusion caused by their non-use considerable 
weight. We have also been forced to state that a more precise 
quantification is impossible. This stalemate of intrusions produced by the 
proportionality test cannot be resolved on a formal level. The outcome is 
indeterminate: any judgement will be an ideological one, mirroring the 
universalist or particularist interests of the decision-maker. 
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12.1.5 Appraisal 
We seem to have come full circle. The stalemate of proportionality 
reasoning is reminiscent of the stalemate we encountered earlier when 
interpreting single human rights by virtue of Articles 31-3 VTC. Both 
forms of reasoning break up the reduction of complexity attained by the 
moulding of political conflicts into legal norms. 1394 Proportionality 
reasoning and interpretation both feature a gradually increasing 
consumption of data, augmenting complexity and indeterminacy in a 
structured escalation. In interpretation, the steps in escalation are the 
various methods of interpretation, ordered by Articles 31-2 VTC in a 
consecutive manner. In proportionality reasoning, a corresponding ladder 
of escalation exists, gradually augmenting complexity by admitting new 
data to the process of reasoning. None of these steps is purely legal-
technical, so as to allow a solution on formal grounds. Instead, each 
contains a sufficient margin of subjectivity to allow for indeterminate 
outcomes. This, in turn, opens the path to the next step, escalating 
complexity further. In the first step, comparability is assessed; in the 
second step, the legitimacy of the goal pursued is at stake. In the third 
step, the appropriateness of the means is assessed, while in the fourth, the 
determination of the means' necessity is questioned. Finally, in the fifth 
step, the quantification and balancing of opposed intrusions is undertaken. 
Without doubt, the case of visa requirements is one of the most 
extreme examples of the reproduction of complexity by proportionality 
reasoning. What is at stake is not the distribution of rights within a given 
society, but, rather, the admission into a society where rights are 
distributed. We have made frequent use of the Abdulaziz case, which is a 
rich source for tracking the Court's reasoning on discrimination. 
However, Abdulaziz is still about the right of the included-namely the 
1394 See also Habermas' general observations on the augmentation of complexity in 
application discourses: 'Wir haben gesehen, wie sich in der Rechtssprechung unter 
Anwendungsaspekten das Bi.indel jener verschiedenartigen Argumente wieder offnet, die 
in den Rechtsetzungsprozess eingegangen sind und den Legitimitiitsanspriichen des 
geltenden Rechts eine rationale Grundlage verschafft haben'. Habermas, 1992, p. 345. 
['We have already seen how legal adjudication unwraps, for the purposes of application, 
these variegated arguments that have already entered into the lawmaking process and 
provided a rational basis for the legitimacy claims of established law.' J. Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(1996a, Polity Press, Cambridge), p. 283]. 
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right to family life enjoyed by persons legally present in the respondent 
state-and not about the right to be included. Due to the absence of a 
territoriality requirement in its scope of application, the ECHR offers a 
unique possibility under international law to reopen the discourse on the 
exclusion of aliens in need of protection. 
Claims of inclusion are probably among the most complex issues to be 
dealt with in law, as they host fundamental contradictions inherent in a 
system of universal human rights protection entrusted to particularist 
actors, i.e. nation states. The assessment of visa requirements under 
Article 14 ECHR and the inquiry into a possible right to access under 
Article 12 ICCPR reveals striking similarities. Both cases suggest a linkage 
between the unpredictability of the number and magnitude of inclusion 
claims and the indeterminacy produced on the legal-technical level. 
As the restraints of legal reasoning result in an indeterminate outcome, 
we are left with the production of determinacy by the ECtHR or the 
ECJ. In the legal-theoretical stalemate explicated above, their judgement 
will inevitably be a purely decisionist one. 
i2.2 Access to Territory and Protection: Choosing between 
Dublin and Geneva? 
Consider the following dilemma. In '1998-9, Swedish policy was not to 
remove those Bosnian citizens originating from an area in Bosnia where 
they would be in minority upon return. Therefore, Muslims or Croats of 
Bosnian nationality originating from places now situated in the 
'Republika Srpska' continued to enjoy protection in Sweden. Germany 
took a different position. Since the conclusion of the Dayton agreement, 
Germany has been removing Bosnians of the said groups. The German 
perception is that such return poses no risk, as returnees are free to 
relocate internally within the Bosnian Federation to avoid threats from 
other groups. 
To avoid return by the German authorities, a number of Bosnian 
protection seekers left Germany for Sweden. Under the terms of the 
Dublin Convention, Germany would be required to take them back. 
However, for the Swedish authorities, requesting such return would mean 
accepting a considerable risk of removal from Germany to Bosnia, fully in 
line with the relevant German practice. Granting for a moment that the 
Swedish stance is based on a correct interpretation of the 1951 Refugee 
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Convention, return to Germany would amount to indirect refoulement. 
But if Sweden allowed these groups to stay, this would stimulate 
secondary movements to Sweden and undercut the deflection mechanism 
introduced by the Dublin Convention. The described case is a real one.1395 
The Aliens Appeals Board, to which the case was appealed after a removal 
decision in first instance, referred it for decision to the Swedish 
government. One year and eleven months after referral, the government 
still had not decided the case.1396 What shall prevail: Dublin or Geneva-
control or protection? 
The example of Bosnians cited earlier makes abundantly dear that the 
reallocation to safe third countries does not go together with a polycentric 
proliferation of interpretations. Somewhere, a line has to be drawn, 
separating permissible from impermissible reallocations. Earlier, we noted 
that prohibitions of refoulement also encompass indirect removal to a 
state from which pertinent threats emerge. This suggests that Dublin and 
Geneva disaffirm each other-it is not possible to realise both jointly. 
However, we also recall that the Dublin Convention does not force 
Contracting Parties to effectuate removal under its allocation rules. 
Article 3 (4) DC enshrined an opt-out clause, allowing a Contracting 
Party to bypass allocation criteria and to assume responsibility for a 
consenting applicant present on its territory. In legal terms, the question 
would be the following: exactly at what point do prohibitions of 
1395 The Bosnian nationals X, Y and their three children applied for asylum in Sweden. They 
originate from a Bosnian town situated in the 'Republika Srpska', now dominated by 
Serb inhabitants. The applicants are Muslims. The family had earlier found refuge in 
Germany, but moved on to Sweden when the German authorities requested them to 
leave the country by 6 November 1997. The Swedish Immigration Board (SIB) requested 
its German counterpart to assume responsibility for the asylum application of the 
Bosnian family under the Dublin Convention. On 27 November 1997, the German 
authorities declared their willingness to do so, based on Art. 5 (1) and (4) of the Dublin 
Convention. Upon this decision, the SIB ordered the family to leave Sweden. This 
decision was appealed to the Alien Appeals Board (AAB). On 2 June 1998, the AAB 
decided to refer the case to the Government, recommending it to dismiss the appeal. See 
also text accompanying note 1402 below. 
l3% The political dimension of such cases is aptly condensed in the following quote: 'In 
short, the "safe country" principle injects an unnecessary and totally unhelpful political 
element into the refugee determination process. Either we risk offending other nations 
by declaring them to be unsafe, or we play politics and turn a blind eye to the real risks 
faced by refugee claimants in the interests of diplomatic harmony'. J. Hathaway, 'The· 
Humane and Just Alternative for Canada', 7 Refuge (1987), pp. 10-1. 
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refoulement oblige a Member State to make use of the sovereignty clause 
in Article 3 (4) DC? 
This question cannot be answered outside a specific legal context. 
However, some of its preliminaries can be clarified abstractly. First, is it at 
all conceivable that allocation under the Dublin criteria conflicts with 
prohibitions of refoulement? Provided the answer is yes, it could still be 
held that Member States enjoy a margin of discretion when implementing 
the prohibitions. This would make the identification of a precise 
obligation to abstain from allocation difficult, if not impossible. Closely 
linked to this issue is the search for a canon of interpretation to be 
applied. Here, the choice is between domestic canons and Articles 31 and 
32 VTC. In the following sub-sections, we shall look into these 
preliminary questions. Subsequently, we will sift through a test case 
hinging on what is probably the most pertinent interpretative divergence 
within the EU-the issue of non-state agents of persecution. 
12.2.1 Permissive Tolerance, Margin of Discretion or Unitary 
Interpretation? 
Is there a point where prohibitions of refoulement oblige a Member State 
to make use of the sovereignty clause in Article 3 (4) DC? If so, where is it 
located? Let us recapitulate the environment in which all of the named 
norms operate. The domestic law and practice of Member States vary to a 
considerable extent, and there is no international body that may offer 
binding guidance on how prohibitions of refoulement are to be 
interpreted in general terms.1397 The question then becomes when is opt-
out from allocation under Article 3 (4) DC mandatory? As soon as the 
authorities of the fellow Member State deviate from the interpretation 
adopted in the referring country? This is a universalist position, imposing 
the domestic standards of the reallocating Member State on the rest of the 
Union. Or is there a margin of discretion to be enjoyed by fellow 
Member States in their interpretation of non-refoulement obligations? 
1397 Art. 38 GC only relates to disputes between Contracting Parties, which are to be 
referred to the ICJ at the request of one of the parties to the dispute. UNHCR 
supervises the application of the 1951 Refugee Convention according to its Art. 35, but 
lacks the power to offer binding guidance on the interpretation of its norms. The 
judgmentsissued by the ECtHR are only binding in the specific case they concern. 
Individual complaints under the ICCPR do not yield binding outcomes at all. 
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This implies the toleration of deviating interpretations, and goes the 
particularist's errands. At the same time, it would weaken the authority of 
legal interpretation by the reallocating state: one cannot uphold the 
determinacy of one's own interpretation and simultaneously tolerate 
deviating positions by others. Finally, the particularist model begs the 
question of where to demarcate the limits of tolerance. Where exactly 
does the margin of discretion end? Or, most radically, could one argue 
that there are no situations compelling Member States to use 3 (4) DC, 
and that a permissive tolerance for deviating interpretations shall reign 
supreme in this area? 
For tlie time being, we can make out five positions. Probably the most 
extreme particularist position is that allocation under the Dublin 
Convention cannot collide with the 1951 Refugee Convention, as the 
latter is protected in a savings clause in Article 2 DC. Another, slightly 
more moderate particularist claim is that all Member State are formally 
bound to apply the various prohibitions of refoulement, and thus it can be 
validly assumed that protection interests are catered for, in spite of 
varying domestic interpretations. In short, both the first and the second 
positions tolerate any degree of polycentrism in the domestic 
implementation of protective norms. 
But there are also two intermediary positions on offer, amalgamating 
universalist and particularist elements. The third position holds that states 
enjoy a margin of appreciation when interpreting protection instruments. 
As long as the interpretation embraced by the receiving Member State 
stays within this margin, there are no reasons to abstain from allocation 
under the Dublin Convention. However, where its interpretation is 
beyond that margin, the sending Member State must abstain from 
allocation. The fourth position is a refinement of the first. It distinguishes 
between cases of interpretation and of application. While states enjoy a 
margin of appreciation in application cases, there is no such margin in 
interpretation, which must remain faithful to international law. Thus, the 
second position is more universalist in nature than the first. Both 
intermediate positions wish to circumscribe polycentricity, but have no 
ambition of abolishing it altogether. Both revolve around the concept of a 
margin of appreciation. 
Finally, there is a fifth position, holding that there is no margin of 
appreciation whatsoever, and that the legality of allocation under the 
Dublin Convention must be measured against a unitary interpretation of 
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protection instruments, guided by the Vienna Convention. With this 
position, we have reached the universalist pole. In the following, we shall 
go through each of the positions mentioned, following the order of their 
enumeration. 
The first position argues that allocation based on the Dublin 
Convention is per definition in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
After all, Article 2 DC spells out that 
The Member States reaffirm their obligations under the Geneva 
Convention, as amended by the New York Protocol, with no 
geographic restriction of the scope of these instruments, and their 
commitment to co-operating with the services of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in applying these 
instruments. 
A case preceding the actual entry into force of the Dublin Convention 
epitomised its compatibility with the 1951 Refugee Convention. In its 
judgement of 11 June 1993, the U.K. High Court dismissed an application 
for leave to move for judicial review by three citizens of Afghanistan, who 
had claimed political asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom.1398 In 
accordance with his stated policy, the Secretary of State declined to 
consider their applications on the merits and proposed to return them to 
Germany, the safe country whence they had come. Judge Jowitt argued 
that the Dublin Convention and the 1951 Refugee Convention are not in 
conflict: 
What I think is significant about the Dublin Convention, despite 
the fact that it has not been ratified, is that the signatories to the 
Convention, themselves signatories to the Geneva Convention, 
have regarded the Dublin Convention as not being in any way 
inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. Indeed, article 2 of the 
Dublin Convention reaffirms the Geneva Convention. I do not, 
therefore, see any inconsistency between the practice of removals 
to a safe third country and the United Kingdom's treaty 
obligations under the Geneva Convention to which rule 21 of the 
immigration rules says full regard shall be given. 1399 
1398 R v Secretary Of State For The Home Department ex parte Jahangeer and others, Queen's 
Bench Division [1993] Imm AR 564, 11 June 1993. 
1399 Ibid. 
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The core of the Judge's argument is that the will of the Contracting 
Parties to the Dublin Convention shall prevail. If they regard the Dublin 
Convention to be in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention, there cannot 
possibly be a conflict of the two. Let us consider whether there are any 
grounds in the Vienna Convention to adopt such a position. The Judge 
can be understood in two manners. Either, he contends that the Dublin 
Convention enshrined an agreement on the interpretation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, or that it represents an amendment of the latter 
instrument. 
It is relatively easy to see why both contentions would be flawed. The 
group of Contracting Parties to the Dublin Convention is far from being 
congruent with the group of Contracting Parties to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Therefore, the Dublin Convention cannot be regarded as an 
agreement on the interpretation of Article 33 GC in the sense of Article 
31 (3) (a) VTC. True enough, international law does allow the amendment 
of a multilateral treaty between certain of its parties only. However, such 
amendments must live up to the conditions set out in Article 41 VTC. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention neither explicitly allows, nor explicitly 
prohibits such amendments.140° Following Article 41 (1) (b) (ii) VTC, such 
an amendment is only acceptable if it 
does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a whole. 
Article 42 (1) GC spells out that Article 33 GC is a non-derogable 
provision. Therefore, it simply cannot be amended due to the limitations 
spelt out in Article 41 (1) (b) (ii) VTC. Thus, we have excluded the 
possibility of construing the Dublin Convention as an agreement on the 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention or an amendment of that 
instrument. The Judge in Ex parte ]ahangeer and Others erred. Reallocation 
under the Dublin criteria can very well conflict with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
The present Swedish practice is a good reflection of the second 
position, insisting on the legality of removal as long as the receiving 
Member State is legally bound to follow protective instruments under 
international law. In one case before the Swedish Aliens Appeals Board, 
1400 The modalities for a revision of this instrument are laid down in Art. 45 GC. 
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an Iraqi citizen challenged a removal decision under the Dublin 
Convention. He feared that, once removed to Germany, the latter 
country would send him to Jordan, which Germany regarded as a safe 
third country, while Sweden did not, as Jordan has not signed the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Faced with this rather decisive dissimilarity in the 
protection systems of Germany and Sweden, the Aliens Appeals Board 
retreated into formalism: 
However, for the outcome of the case, it will be decisive that both 
Germany and Sweden are bound by the obligations in Article 33 of 
the ·Geneva Convention, as well as by those in CAT and the 
ECHR. With reference to the legislation in Germany, its 
international obligations and its notorious conduct with regard to 
persons seeking asylum there, it must be ruled out that Germany 
would not follow its obligations under the conventions [ ... ].1401 
The decision contains no exploration of the German legislation or 
practice whatsoever. Quite apparently, this reasoning confounds the level 
of international law with the level of domestic practice: as Germany is 
bound by international instruments, the Aliens Appeals Board· argues, it 
must be ruled out that the country violates them in practice. The Board 
must be held to believe that the formal equality between Germany and 
Sweden with regard to their international obligations overrules factual 
inequalities in the application of the instruments. On a matter-of~fact 
level, the result is manifestly absurd. While Jordan is not regarded as a safe 
third country on formal grounds-i.e. the fact that it is not bound by the 
1951 Refugee Convention-and the direct return of a protection seeker 
there would be disallowed on these grounds, it is apparently correct to 
send her there via a Member State, again on the basis of formal grounds. 
In an earlier case, this denial to subordinate reality to law is made 
manifest. This case, alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, turned 
1401 ['Avgorande for arendets utgang bar emellertid vara att saval Tyskland som Sverige ar 
bundna av atgandena i art. 33 Genevekonventionen avensom av best1immelsena i 
tortyrkonventionen och Europakonventionen. Med hanvisning till Tysklands 
lagstiftning, internationella ataganden och kanda agerande nar det giiller personer som 
ansoker om asyl dar, maste det anses som uteslutet att Tyskland inte skulle'fullfolja sina 
ataganden enligt konventionerna [ ... ].' Translation by this author.]. AAB, Decisions of 
7 March 2000 (unpublished). On file with the author. This decision referred the appeal 
to the Swedish government with a recommendation to dismiss it. At the time of writing, 
it has not been decided upon by the government. 
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on the issue of a so-called internal flight alternative for Bosnians. 
Following the German interpretation, there was such an alternative, while 
the Swedish practice denied that. When seized with the question whether 
removal to Germany under the Dublin Convention was permissible, the 
Aliens Appeals Board saw no consequences flowing from these conflicting 
perceptions: 
The fact that, compared to Sweden, Germany may judge the 
question of an internal flight alternative differently than Sweden, 
and thus exclude an asylum seeker from the possibility to receive 
refugee status, relating to the fact that the person can receive 
protection in some part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, does not imply 
that Sweden violates Article 33 of the Geneva Convention by 
sending the asylum seeker to Germany for a determination of his 
claim.1402 
The Board does not motivate further why this difference in removal 
practices would be legally irrelevant. 1403 
An analogous argument has been developed by the U.K. government in 
an admissibility case before the ECtHR, which pondered the relationship 
between the Dublin Convention and extraterritorial protection under the 
ECHR. In T.I. vs the UK., the applicant challenged the decision by U.K. 
authorities to remove him to Germany under the Dublin Convention, 
claiming that it violated Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 ECHR. The U.K. 
Government refuted his claims, arguing inter alia that 
1402 ['Den omstandighet att Tyskland kan gora en annan bedomning an Sverige i fragan om 
det inre flyktalternativet och sa!edes utesluta en asylsokande fr!in mojligheten att fa 
flyktingskap med hanvisning till att personen kan fa skydd i nagon del i Bosnien-
Hercegovina innebar inte att Sverjge bryter mot atagandet i art. 33 Genevekonventionen 
genom att sanda den asylsokande till Tyskland for att fa sin ansokan provad dar.' 
1403 
Translation by this author.] AAB, Decision of 2June 1998. On file with the author. 
The schizophrenia inherent in such misconceived loyalty to other Member States is fully 
exposed when contrasted with requirements for reallocation to safe third countries that 
are not Member States. In its para. 2 (d), the 1992 STC Resolution names protection 
against chain refoulement as a criterion for qualifying a country as safe: 'The asylum 
applicant must be afforded effective protection in the host third country against 
refoulement, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention'. If this stipulation flows 
from Member States' respect for the 1951 Refugee Convention (as the preamble of the 
quoted instrument suggests), the requirement of effective protection against refoulement 
should equally inform the application of the Dublin Convention. 
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this Court should be slow to find that the removal of a person 
from one Contracting State to another would infringe Article 3 of 
the Convention, as in this case, the applicant would be protected 
by the rule of law in Germany and would have recourse, if any 
problems arose, to this Court, including the possibility of applying 
for a Rule 39 indication to suspend his deportation. It would be 
wrong in principle for the United Kingdom to have to take on a 
policing function of assessing whether another Contracting State 
such as Germany was complying with the Convention. It would 
also undermine the effective working of the Dublin Convention, 
which was brought into operation to allocate in a fair and efficient 
manner State responsibility within Europe for considering asylum 
claims.1404 
However, the ECtHR did not accept this formalistic approach: 
The Court finds that the indirect removal in this case to an 
intermediary country, which is also a Contracting State, does not 
affect the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the 
applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can the 
United Kingdom rely automatically in that context on the 
arrangements made in the Dublin Convention concerning the 
attribution of responsibility between European countries for 
deciding asylum claims. Where States establish international 
organisations, or mutatis mutandis international agreements, to 
pursue co-operation in certain fields of activities, there may be 
implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It would be 
incompatible with the purpose and objee! of the Convention if 
Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by 
such attribution [ ... ].1405 
Thus, the ECtHR has reserved the right to scrutinise removal decisions 
under the Dublin Convention with a view to their legality under the 
ECHR. There are, indeed, convincing reasons to do so. The second 
position is hampered by the same counter-arguments as the first: the 
Dublin Convention neither represents an interpretative agreement nor a 
1404 ECtHR (Third Chamber), Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 43844/98 by 
T.L against the U.K., 7 March 2000 (unpublished), [henceforth T.I. vs the U.K.], p. 13. 
1405 T.L vs. the U.K, p. 16. 
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modification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or the ECHR.1406 In 
addition, the second position disregards the simple fact that the both 
instruments oblige a state to ascertain the safety of a third country in a 
concrete manner, involving not only its international obligations in 
isolation, but also their implementation. 
This brings us to the intermediary positions, distinguishing between 
permissible variations in the interpretation of protective instruments at 
the domestic level, and excessive deviations from a proper interpretation, 
disallowing allocation under the Dublin Convention. The third position 
has been aptly expounded by the U.K. Court of Appeal in Kerrouche. This 
1997 case dealt with the lawfulness of returning a protection seeker from 
the U.K. to France under the Dublin Convention. Faced with deviant 
interpretations of a critical concept in the refugee definition, the Court 
took the following position: 
The difference in approach to the interpretation of the [1951 
Refugee, GN] Convention and [the New York, GN] Protocol has 
to be of such significance that it can be said that in making a 
decision affecting the position of a particular asylum seeker for 
asylum, the third country would not be applying the principles of 
the Convention. For this to be the position, the third country's 
approach would have to be outside the range of tolerance which 
one signatory country, as a matter of comity, is expected to extend 
to another. While it is highly desirable that there should be a 
harmonised approach to the interpretation of an international 
document such as the Convention, until that harmonisation is 
achieved, one signatory must allow another signatory a margin of 
appreciation before treating that other country as being one which 
did not fulfil its obligations to adhere to the principles of the 
Convention. [ ... ] Unless the interpretation adopted by the "safe 
country" was sufficiently different from that in English law to be 
outside the range of possiele interpretations the difference need not 
concern the authorities in this country. 1407 
Thus, the Kerrouche Court allows other Member States a certain margin 
of appreciation, encompassing 'possible interpretations' of the 1951 
1406 Parenthetically, one should mention that instruments of human rights and humanitarian 
law are not even protected by a savings clause in the Dublin Convention. 
1407 U.K. Court of Appeal, Kerrouche v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997] 
Imm AR 610, at 615. 
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Refugee Convention. As long as their interpretations are situated within 
this margin, allocation under the Dublin Convention is permitted. But 
where domestic interpretations are situated beyond this margin, the 
Dublin Convention cannot be applied. 
However, later U.K. case law has modified this approach, which brings 
us to the fourth position, proceeding further into a universalist direction. 
In the landmark case of Adan and others, the Court of Appeal had to 
determine whether the U.K. Secretary of State complied with the law 
when authorising the return of three asylum seekers from the U.K. to 
Germany under the Dublin Convention. In this determination, the Court 
distinguished between matters of law and matters of application. While a 
strictly unitarian model should govern the former, a tolerance model 
would determine the legality of the latter. 
In our judgment a distinction of principle falls to be drawn 
between the interpretation of the [1951 Refugee, GNJ Convention 
and its application. The duty of the Secretary of State, [ ... ] is to 
examine the practice in the third country in question in order to 
decide (a) whether it is consistent with the Convention's true 
interpretation, and (b) whether, even if so consistent, it 
nevertheless imposes such practical obstacles in the way of the 
claimant as to give rise to a real risk that he might be sent to 
another country otherwise than in accordance with the 
Convention. (a) is a matter of law; and if the Secretary of State 
mistakes the law, he is reviewable on illegality grounds as surely as 
if he erred in the construction of a municipal statute. (b) is a matter 
of fact; and the Secretary of State's decision upon it therefore falls 
to be reviewed only upon Wednesbury grounds (see Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp, [1947] 2 All 
ER 680 [1948] 233), although the test is modified by the need for 
"anxious scrutiny" in asylum cases [ ... ].1408 
Materially, Adan and others was about protection from persecution by 
non-state agents, which U.K. courts considered to fall within the 
protective scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention, while German courts 
did not. The Court of Appeal regarded this to be a matter of law, while it 
1408 Adan and others, para. 62. The term 'Wednesbury grounds' refer to a standard for 
controlling the legality of discretionary decisions by authorities, first introduced in the 
case referred to in the quote. 
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classifies earlier U.K. cases-Canbolat, Kerrouche and Iyadurai-as 
involving matters of application. 
If a signatory State were to take a position which was as a matter of 
law at variance with the Convention's true interpretation, and act 
upon it, it could not be regarded as a safe third country: not merely 
because the "real risk" test was breached (though it certainly would 
be) but because in the particular case the Co;vention was not being 
applied at all. The essence of the Convention's protective measures 
is to be found in Art.1A(2), which defines "refugee" (and in the 
prohibition of refoulement in Art.33). The scope of the definition, 
which did not fall to be considered in Canbolat, Kerrouche or 
Iyadurai, must be a matter of law, not fact. Otherwise the 
protection offered by the Convention would in effect be reduced 
to a discretionary exercise by the signatory States. But the 
Convention's very purpose is plainly to afford international 
protection to persons falling within objectively defined classes. 
And the Vienna Convention, whose relevant provisions we have 
cited, would be set at nought. Its provisions imply that every treaty 
falling within its scope has to be interpreted in accordance with 
objective canons of construction.1409 
The message is very clear. If another Member State deviates from 'the 
Convention's true interpretation' as a matter of law, no matter how little 
this deviation may be, removal to that state would amount to a breach of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. Fully in line with this reasoning, the Court 
of Appeal considered the removal of the three claimants to Germany to 
contravene the law, as the German interpretation of Articles 1 (A) (2) GC 
was too narrow with regard to persecution by non-state agents. 1410 Thus, 
there is no question of imposing domestic interpretations on fellow 
Member States. The issue at stake is to identify an authoritative 
international interpretation. 
Let us now move from the fourth to the fifth position. In doing so, we 
should examine the last particularist stronghold in the judgement in Adan 
and others. This is the allowance to cases of application, where, in the view 
of the Court of Appeal, a certain margin of appreciation is acceptable. 
However, the distinction between application cases and interpretation 
1409 Adan and others, para. 68. 
1410 Adan and others, paras 71 and 72. 
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cases, introduced by the Court of Appeal, is not as clear-cut as it might 
seem. When going through earlier U.K. case law on the Dublin 
Convention, the Court of Appeal classified three cases as 'application 
cases'. The first was Canbolat1411, focusing on allegedly sloppy 
determination procedures in France, while the second, Iyadurai1412 , dealt 
with the standard of proof in Germany, which was said to be more 
demanding for the protection seeker than in the U.K .. Neither of these 
issues is explicitly regulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, one 
could argue, as long as they secure the observance of Article 33 GC, 
different forms of determination procedures all comply with the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Against this background, the classification of 
Canbolat and Iyadurai as application cases appears to be quite logical. But 
is the third case, Kerrouche1413, indeed to be considered an application case, 
as claimed by the Court of Appeal? This is how the Court motivates its 
position: 
Kerrouche [ ... ] was concerned with the sense given by the French 
authorities to the notion of a political crime for the purpose of 
Art.1 F (b) which, where it applies, deprives the refugee of the 
Convention's protection. "Political crime" is not defined in the 
Convention. It is an expression which is capable of a range of 
meanings, as the jurisprudence in extradition cases demonstrates. In 
our judgment here, too, it is for the signatory States to conclude as 
a matter of fact what they will regard as amounting to such a 
crime. The Secretary of State in deciding whether to grant a 
certificate in a case where there is material to show that the third 
country in question will or may treat the claimant as a political 
criminal, will of course examine the factual material available and 
arrive at a pragmatic judgment as to whether or not the approach 
taken by the third country lies within a reasonable range, bearing 
in mind, no doubt, that local conditions may promote a more, or 
less, restrictive sense of the expression "political crime". [ ... ] 
1411 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Immigration Officer, Waterloo 
International Station ex parte Canbolat [1997} INLR 198, sub nom R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department and Another ex parte Canbolat, [1997] 1WLR1569, CA. 
1412 Court of Appeal, R v Secretary uf State for the Home Department ex parte Iyadurai, 10 
June 1998. 
1413 Kerrouche v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997] Imm AR 610. 
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Kerrouche, then, also falls to be regarded as an "application" 
case.1414 
Here, it seems that the Court of Appeal fails in applying its own 
distinction. Precisely as for the issue of persecution by non-state agents, 
the matter of exclusion due to a political crime impacts directly on the 
scope of protection under Article 33 GC. After all, Article 1 (A) (2) GC, 
invoked by the Court of Appeal to justify its inclusive position on non-
state agents of persecution, forms part of the refugee definition as much as 
Article 1 (F) GC. The term 'political crime' is in want of interpretation as 
much as the decisive phrase in Adan and others ('unable[ ... ] to return' in 
Article 1 (A) (2) GC). If Adan and others hinges on a matter of law, which 
the Court of Appeal contends it does, so should Kerrouche. And if the 
precise scope of the refugee definition is a matter of interpretation, so are 
the procedural implications of Article 33 GC. Thus, the difference 
between matters of law and matters of fact is not binary in character, but 
rather one of degree. It is by no means clear that the precise meaning of 
the term 'unable [ ... ] to return' is per se easier to identify than the 
procedural requirements implicit in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The 
bottom line is the precise content of international obligation, even in 
those cases that the Court of Appeal classifies as turning on 'application'. 
In substance, the Court of Appeal has been radical. It claimed nothing 
less than that Germany is misinterpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and thus breaking international law. It is to be lamented that the Court of 
Appeal has not been equally radical in its method. Instead of deploying 
the double standard of 'law' and 'application', it should have done away 
with the myth of a discretionary margin altogether, declaring any 
question affecting the enjoyment of rights under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention to be a matter of law. 'Otherwise', to quote the Court of 
Appeal itself, 'the protection offered by the Convention would in effect 
be reduced to a discretionary exercise by the signatory States'. 1415 And by 
the courts, one must add, which have to operate a distinction between 
matters of law and matters of application. By conclusion, the fifth 
position, insisting on a unitary interpretation in any matter affecting state 
obligations under protective instruments, offers itself as the only viable 
alternative. 
1414 Adan and others, para. 66. 
1415 Adan and others, para. 68. 
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Nonetheless, for the cause of determinacy, the Court of Appeal's 
particularist step on 'matters of application' is far outweighed by its two 
universalist steps in 'matters of law'. The first universalist step is, as 
already outlined, the demand that matters of law be subjugated to one 
single, unitary standard, with no allowances for domestic deviations. This 
claim is easily recognisable as a universalist one, taking the Dublin 
leitmotiv 'one for all' at its word. The second universalist step was taken 
on the issue of interpretation. The Court of Appeal expressly rejected the 
argument that the third country in question must apply the same 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention as has been vouchsafed by 
the English courts. 1416 Instead, the protective scope of the Convention 
and, in particular, its Article 33, are to be established objectively by means 
of the interpretative rules in the Vienna Convention.1417 
The importance of this conclusion can hardly be underestimated. For a 
claimant challenging the legality of allocation to another Member State, it 
is no use to argue that the domestic interpretation upheld by the sending 
country is more favourable than its counterpart in the receiving country. 
Instead, the claimant has to measure the interpretation upheld by the 
receiving country against the 'international meaning' of the relevant 
norm-a meaning which has to be identified through Articles 31 and 32 
VTC. But is there so great a difference between domestic interpretations 
and international interpretations of protective norms? Yes, there is a 
difference. It is one thing to interpret a norm of domestic law by means of 
a domestic canon of interpretation. It is quite another to interpret the 
norm of an international instrument by means of the Vienna Convention. 
After all, not all states have copied the refugee definition and the 
prohibitions of refoulement into domestic law. Some operate home-made 
norms, which mirror the content of international obligations to a greater 
or lesser extent. 
1416 Adan and others, paras 51-8 
1417 In the Adan and others judgment, the Court of Appeal quotes Arts 31 and 32 VTC in the 
section enumerating legal norms of relevance for the case (paras 34 and 35). It is fully in 
line with these provisions, that the Court of Appeal attaches much greater importance 
to the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention (para. 71), while rejecting historical 
arguments (para. 72). Moreover, in para. 71, the Court of Appeal motivates its position 
on non-state agents of persecution by referring to the UNHCR Handbook as 'good 
evidence of what has come to be international practice within Art. 31 (3) (b) of the 
Vienna Convention' (VTC). 
1417 See Art. 311 TEC. 
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But what would be so wrong about referring to the domestic 
interpretation of the sending Member State? It must be considered 
possible that it could produce an outcome more favourable to the 
protection seeker than the canon of interpretation laid down in the 
Vienna Convention. Therefore, it is by no means self-evident that a 
universalist would share the Court of Appeal's position and opt for the 
Vienna Convention. And the Court of Appeal's position is more 
demanding for the protection seeker as well as for domestic courts and 
authorities looking into Dublin cases, who must all argue with a 
methodology of interpretation new to them. 
The answer is simple, and brings us back to the conundrum of sharing 
and concentrating burdens expounded in an earlier chapter. If the legality 
of allocation to other Member States were to be based on domestic 
interpretations, those states with the most restrictive interpretations 
would benefit. As all other Member States would uphold more inclusive 
interpretations, the Courts in the restrictive states would never have any 
legal reason to declare an allocation unlawful. On the other hand, those 
states embracing more inclusive interpretations would be punished. Their 
Courts would strike down all allocations to other Member States 
upholding less inclusive interpretations. While the restrictive states would 
make full use of the Dublin mechanism to shift their protection 
obligations to other Member States, the inclusive Member States would be 
stuck with a growing number of protection seekers. They would absorb 
not only those allocated to them under the Dublin criteria, but also those 
which they could have allocated to other Member States, had the latter 
adhered to the same interpretation as the inclusive Member State. In the 
long run, this would set off a spiral movement towards less inclusive 
interpretations, fuelled by the domestic legislators in those states bearing 
the largest protection burdens.1418 
Clearly, the Vienna Convention is no miracle cure against this 
development. The canon of interpretation laid down in Articles 31 and 32 
VTC can be understood in a variety of manners. Even if States were to 
1418 This logic is not specifically confined to extraterritorial protection. In his brilliant 
exegesis of the Hauer case, Weiler has pointed to a similarly structured problem when 
protecting human rights in EC law. Going for a maximalist approach and taking the 
most far-reaching protective provisions among domestic constitutions as a model for the 
whole Union will create distortionary effects. What represents a workable protection of 
the right to property in Germany, may very well create unemployment in Sicily. 
Weiler, 1999, p. 116. 
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develop a perfectly congruent interpretation of the precise content of 
Articles 31 and 32 VTC, it nevertheless hosts considerable potential for 
indeterminate outcomes. Its advantage is, however, that it forces domestic 
decision-makers to use a unitary language when arguing for certain 
outcomes. Compared to giving primacy to domestic interpretations, the 
risk of initiating the spiral of restrictionism is far more limited. Put 
simply, the Vienna Convention is a tool for speeding up material 
harmonisation of protective norms among Member States. It is the only 
Archimedian point available to ensure an operation of the Dublin 
Convention mindful to international law. 
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that a position insisting on a 
unitary interpretation finds full support in the drafting process of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, during which delegations opted for giving the 
refugee definition an autonomous content, not allowing discretion on part 
of the Contracting Parties.1419 
The preceding reflections allow for three conclusions. First, the 
allocation criteria in the Dublin Convention can very well conflict with 
norms of international law prohibiting refoulement. Second, there is no 
margin of discretion for Member States when interpreting prohibitions of 
refoulement. Therefore, it amounts to a performative self-contradiction, 
when Member States uphold one interpretation, while sending back 
protection seekers to another Member State upholding another 
interpretation. Third, the Vienna Convention provides the relevant canon 
of interpretation, along which prohibitions of refoulement must be 
construed. 
Next we will embark on an empirical probe. We shall identify whether 
an interpretation along the methodology set out in the Vienna 
Convention produces a determinate outcome to one of the most intricate 
conflicts in European law on extraterritorial protection. The issue of non-
state agents of persecution shall be our test case. 
1419 See T. Einarsen, Retten till vern som Flykting (1998, Universitetet i Bergen, Bergen), pp. 
98-9, with further references to the travaux. In the same context, Einarsen refutes that 
there is any 'margin of appreciation' when interpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention, as 
this would amount to a modification of treaty obligations to the detriment of the third 
party it seeks to protect-namely the refugee. Einarsen, 1998, pp. 93-7. 
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12.2.2 Delimiting Protection Categories: Persecution by Third 
Parties 
Human rights violations by non-state agents are handled differently in 
different domestic jurisdictions, ranging from outright exclusion to 
outright inclusion. For protection seekers, the issue of violations by non-
state agents is of the utmost importance. As the conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Former Yugoslavia and Somalia have shown, a large fraction of violations 
are carried out by non-state agents. Such violations are intrinsically linked 
to non-international armed conflicts, which have augmented in frequency 
during the last decades. Failed states are no singular phenomenon either, 
as the protracted difficulties in erecting effective state structures in 
Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan have illustrated. So the question is not 
merely an academic one, but has considerable impact on the fate of 
persons in search of a haven. We recall that the non-binding 1996 Refugee 
Joint Position did little to part the fray. By and large, it accommodates an 
exclusionary position, while leaving the door open for inclusionary 
interpretations. 1420 
At this stage, it should scarcely be surprising that the dispute on agency 
is fed by the same differences in perception of the international legal order 
as the dispute on non-refoulement under the ECHR and ICCPR. The 
universalist approach focuses on the protective needs of the individual and 
denies a contingency of extraterritorial protection on state agency. 
Instead, it seeks to establish a direct legal relationship between the victim 
of a violation and the state where extraterritorial protection is sought. The 
particularist approach relies mainly on an idea of international law as an 
inter-state phenomenon. Without state agency, there is no possibility of 
attributing violations to a state; without this possibility, the violation is 
beyond the protective scope of international refugee law and international 
human rights law. In the case of failed states, particularists have to accept 
that the obligation to protect human rights vanishes in a black hole in the 
universe of state responsibility. 
It is no coincidence that the agency dispute came into full bloom after 
an increasing fragmentation of state protection in the aftermath of 1989; 
1420 See chapter 7.1.2 above. 
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cynically speaking, restrictive host states must have perceived the 
enormous exclusion possibilities inherent in this issue. 1421 
In the following, we shall single out the normative content of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the CAT and the ECHR. In this process, 
manifestations of conflict between the universalist and the particularist 
approaches shall be tracked, and the possibility of a determinate 
interpretation explored. 
12.2.2.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
What is the dispute on non-state agents all about? Before entering the 
niceties of interpretation, some basic distinctions feeding the dispute have 
to be expounded. The overarching distinction between state agents and 
non-state agents has already been mentioned. Beyond that, multiple 
constellations are conceivable. Is the state deliberately choosing to remain 
passive when violations are taking place? Or is it simply unable to protect 
the victims of non-state persecution? Is there a state capable of protecting 
its citizens? Or are its functions exercised by a de-facto authority in parts 
or all of the territory? To attain clarity, we may distinguish five cases, 
based on the exploration of Vermeulen et al. 1422: 
A) Human rights violations carried out by the state; 
B) human rights violations condoned or acquiesced to by the state; 
C) human rights violations carried out, condoned or acquiesced to by a 
de-facto authority; 
D) human rights violations by a third party not being a de-facto 
authority, with the state unable to protect; and 
E) human rights violations by a third party not being a de-facto 
authority in a failed state. 
1421 Marx follows this line of thought when reconstructing the German case law, which 
introduced a new doctrine on state agency precisely in 1989. This doctrine was based on 
the existence of an 'order of peace' (Friedensordnung) established and maintained by a 
state, as a precondition for granting asylum. This doctrine was introduced at a time 
when 'orders of peace' cracked up by the numbers, no longer mitigated by a cold war 
world order. Marx, 1999, p. 59. 
14zz Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Femhout, 1998, pp. 7-10. 
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Categories A) to C) are generally unproblematic. There is consensus that 
all three categories are within the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Even those states upholding a restrictive interpretation of the Convention 
mete out protection when persecution sterns from a de-facto authority. 1423 
This position is also acknowledged by the Refugee Joint Position. 
Following its paragraph 6, it is suggested that, in a civil war or internal or 
generalised armed conflict, persecution may stern 'from de facto 
authorities in control of part of the territory within which the State 
cannot afford its national protection'. 
Rather, cases falling under D) and E) are the focal points of dispute. Let 
us set out with cases under D). A state exists, but is actually unable to 
protect from violations by non-state agents. The violators, in turn, do not 
constitute a de-facto authority. The Refugee Joint Position takes an 
exclusionaP/ stance on this position. As emerges from paragraph 6 quoted 
earlier, it requires the persecutor to be a de-facto authority-where it is 
not, the case falls outside the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Vermeulen et al. note that this interpretation corresponds to that upheld 
in French and German case law. 1424 In other jurisdictions, however, cases 
falling under category D) are included under the protective umbrella of 
the Convention. The constant case law of the Dutch Council of State1425 
as well as the Section 3 Article 2 of the Swedish Aliens Act1426 provide 
relevant examples. 
Category E) is best illustrated by the situation in Somalia after the fall 
of Siad Barre's regime in 1991. A violent conflict was fought out by armed 
factions in blatant disregard of human rights and humanitarian law. There 
was no state authority whatsoever. Victims of violations had nowhere to 
turn. The quoted formulation in paragraph 6 of the Refugee Joint 
1423 Vermeulen et al. refer to Germany (BVerwG 9 C 38.96, BVerwG 9 C 15.96) and France 
(CRR 5 July 1991 (Kaba), CRR 4 September 1991 (Freemans) and CRR 30 September 
1991 (Togbah)). For further references, see Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and 
Fernhout, 1998, p. 8. 
1424 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Fernhout, 1998, p. 9, with further references. For a 
good comparison and analysis of French and German case law with regard to the agency 
issue, see Wolter, 1999, pp. 241-81. See also R. Marx, 'Doktrin der "Friedensordnung" 
gegen eine unfriedliche Welt: Die Realitatsflucht des Revisionsgerichts in eine Fiktion, 
19 ZAR 2 (1999), on the development of German case law. 
1425 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Fernhout, 1998, p. 9. 
1426 For an analysis, see K. Folkelius and G. Noll, 'Affirmative Exclusion? Sex, Gender, 
Persecution and the Reformed Swedish Aliens Act', 10 IJRL 607 (1998), pp. 619-20. 
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Position also excludes this category. Again, this exclusionary reading 
corresponds with the German and French case law1427, while an 
inclusionary position has been taken by the Dutch Council of State.1428 
It follows from this brief expose that refugee lawyers can be divided 
into two camps, each supporting a theory of its own. Following the 
terminology suggested by Vermeulen et al., the exclusionary camp 
professes the accountability theory, while the inclusionary camp 
promotes the protection theory. 
According to Vermeulen et al., the accountability theory limits the 
types of case in which a claimant might obtain refugee status under the 
Geneva Convention to situations where the alleged persecution can be 
attributed to the State. To do full justice to German case law, Vermeulen 
et al. should have extended the accountability theory to situations where 
the alleged persecution can be attributed to a de facto authority. The law 
of state responsibility, which underpins the accountability theory, 
supports this view. Most prominently, Article 15 of the ILC Draft on 
State Responsibility provides for the attribution of responsibility to an 
insurrectional movement which later forms the new government or a new 
state. Therefore, in our view, the accountability theory should be framed 
as follows: it limits the classes of case in which a claimant might obtain 
refugee status under the Geneva Convention to situations where the 
persecution alleged can be attributed to the State or to a de facto 
authority. 
The protection theory simply holds that 'the absence of adequate 
protection against persecutory measures is a sufficient condition for 
assuming the existence of persecution'.1429 For its proponents, it is 
irrelevant whether these measures can be imputed to a state or not. 1430 
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that this view is supported by the 
UNHCR Handbook.1431 
1427 See Wolter, 1999, pp. 250-2 (Germany) and pp. 259-60 (France). 
1428 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Fernhout, 1998, p. 10 with further references. 
1429 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Fernhout, 1998, p. 11. 
1430 Ibid. 
1431 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refagee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1992, UNHCR, 
Geneva), paras 65 and 98. 
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Which theory is supported by the methodology of interpretation flowing 
from Articles 31 and 32 VTC?1432 Let us start with the first stage, focusing 
on the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
From the outset, it should be underscored that the 1951 Refugee 
Convention does not address the issue of agency in an explicit manner.1433 
The core provisions of the Convention are the relevant starting point-
the prohibition of refoulement in Article 33 GC, and the definition of the 
term 'refugee' in Article 1 GC. 
We recall that Article 33 GC obliges Contracting Parties not to 'expel 
or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion'. This seems to make matters clear. The phrase 'to the 
frontier of territories' allows no other conclusion than that the drafters 
referred to a geographical rather than an institutional entity. The relevant 
threat simply has to materialise within a certain territory. No 
requirements are made with regard to its source. At this stage, any 
pretensions that Article 33 GC presupposes persecution by a state or a de 
facto authority would amount to an interpretation contra legem, which is 
simply excluded by the methodology prescribed by Articles 31 and 32 
VTC. Our interpretation could have already come to an end here, 
yielding an unequivocal support for the protection theory, had it not been 
for the word 'refugee'. This term is defined in Article 1 (A) (2) GC, and 
Article 33 GC cannot be properly understood without that definition. 
Although it is placed in another article, the refugee definition forms part 
of the prohibition of refoulement, and must be taken into account when 
establishing the ordinary meaning of the latter. And indeed, this 
definition opens up the divide between accountability theorists and 
protection theorists. 
Article 1 (A) (2) GC extends the Convention's protection to a person, 
who 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
1432 Vermeulen et al. construe the Convention along the lines set out in the VTC, and so 
does the U.K. Court of Appeal in Adan and others. However, as will emerge below, our 
reading is not identical with theirs, although the outcome is the same. Vermeulen, 
Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Fernhout, 1998, pp. 12-7. Adan and others, paras 71 and 72. 
1433 When used in the text, the term 'state' refers only to Contracting Parties to the 
Convention, i.e. potential hosts. With regard to the source of the threat, the text uses 
the words 'country' or 'territory'. 
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religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country 
[ ... ]'.What can be inferred from this wording? The threat of persecution is 
qualified solely by the five grounds of persecution set out in the text. 
Thus, the term 'persecution' as such cannot support the accountability 
view. Its ordinary meaning is certainly not confined to persecution by the 
state.1434 Neither can the term 'country' serve as an indicator that the 
drafters wished to limit the protective scope to persecution by state 
agents. The ordinary meaning of 'country' embraces not only the political 
state, but also the people of a state or district, and is thus wide enough to 
accommodate persecution by non state agents. 1435 
However, interpreting the latter part of the quote turns out to be more 
challenging. What is meant by the words '[he] is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'? We 
have to assume that this wording does not contain any redundancies, and 
that the reference to inability or unwillingness actually serves a purpose. 
Apparently there are two kinds of refugees. One is 'unable to avail 
himself of the protection of that country', and the other is, 'owing to such 
fear, [ ... ] unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'. 
Here it can be argued that the second category refers to persons 
persecuted by the state, while the first refers to those persecuted by third 
1434 According to Merriam-Websters, the term 'persecution' has the following two 
connotations: 
(1) the act or practice of persecuting especially those who differ in origin, religion, or 
social outlook 
(2) the condition of being persecuted, harassed, or annoyed. 
Merriam-Websters Online English Dictionary. Available at <http://www.eb.com:180/ 
cgi-bin/dictionary?va=persecution+ > (accessed on 14 December 1999). 
1435 Among the relevant connotations of 'country', Merriam-Websters lists: 
(1) an indefinite usually extended expanse of land: Region 
(2a) the land of a person's binh, residence, or citizenship, (b) a political state or nation or 
its territory 
(3a) the people of a state or district : Populace, (b) Jury, (c) Electorate 
Merriam-Websters Online English Dictionary. Available at <http://www.eb.com:180/ 
cgi-bin/dictionary?va=country> (accessed on 14 December 1999). 
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parties. 1436 Consider the situation of a person fleeing state persecution. In 
her home country, state protection is available in general. However, she is 
unwilling to avail herself of this generally available protection, due to the 
risk of persecution in her specific case. The availability of protection is 
not helpful, as protector and persecutor are identical. Now consider the 
case of a person threatened by third parties. In her case, state and agent of 
persecution are two different entities, and the former cannot protect her 
from the latter. As there is no protection available, the person in question 
is simply unable to avail herself of it. This reading gives a meaning to each 
single word in the quoted passage1437 and avoids redundancy.1438 
1436 While abstaining from making a clear cut distinction, the UNHCR Handbook 
enumerates 'a state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance' as examples of cases 
where a person is unable to return, while the 'term unwilling refers to refugees who 
refuse to accept the protection of the Government of the country of their nationality'. 
1437 
1438 
UNHCR, 1992, paras 98 and 100. 
This corresponds well to the principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat, also known as the rule of effectiveness. See Yasseen, 1976, 
p. 71, suggesting that this maxim is implied in Article 31 VTC; and Bernhardt, 1992, 
p. 1420. 
In its essence, the Adan judgment of the House of Lords relies on the same approach: 'It 
was also common ground that article 1A(2) covers four categories of refugee: (1) 
nationals who are outside their country owing to a well founded fear of persecution for 
a Convention reason, and are unable to avail themselves of the protection of their 
country [ ... ] If category (1) were confined to refugees who are subject to state 
persecution, then I can well see that such persons would, ex hypothesi, be unable to avail 
themselves of state protection. On that view the words would indeed serve no purpose. 
But category (1) is not so confined. It also includes the important class of those who are 
sometimes called "third party refugees," i. e. those who are subject to persecution by 
factions within the state. If the state in question can make protection available to such 
persons, there is no reason why they should qualify for refugee status. They would have 
satisfied the fear test, but not the protection test. Why should another country offer 
asylum to such persons when they can avail themselves of the protection of their own 
country? But if, for whatever reason, the state in question is unable to afford protection 
against factions within the state, then the qualifications for refugee status are complete. 
Both tests would be satisfied'. House of Lords, R v Secretary Of State For The Home 
Department Ex Parte Adan, 2 April 1998 [1999] AC 293 (304 C, 305H, 306C). The Adan 
and otlm-s Court of Appeal takes a similar approach, leading to the same inclusionary 
outcome, deploying a less orthodox reading. '[T]he issue we must decide is whether or 
not, as a matter of law, the scope of Art.1A(2) extends to persons who fear persecution 
by non-State agents in circumstances where the State is not complicit in the persecution, 
whether because it is unwilling or unable (including instances where no effective State 
authority exists) to afford protection. We entertain no doubt but that such persons, 
whose case is established on the facts, are entitled to the Convention's protection. This 
seems to us to follow naturally from the words of Art.1A(2): " ... is unable or, owing to 
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Proponents of the accountability theory could turn this argument around. 
They could argue that the reference to inability exclusively covers cases of 
persecution by a de facto authority-that is, cases in category C). 
Categories D) and E) would still be outside the scope of the Convention. 
This-restrictive-reading would also give meaning to each single word 
and avoid redundancy. The possibility of such a reading seems to be 
overlooked by the adherents of the protection theory.1439 Probably, there 
are good reasons for this neglect. To be sure, the divide between inability 
and unwillingness is explicit in the wording of Article 1 (A) (2) GC. The 
same cannot be said of a further subdivision of the category in the 
inability bracket. Nothing in the wording of the Convention suggests that 
such a subdivision is warranted. Therefore, such a restrictive reading has 
no place within the first stage of interpretation, turning on the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the Convention. 
Here our interpretation under the first stage has come to an end. The 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the Convention does not suggest that 
persecution by third parties is beyond the scope of the Convention. 
However, the terms of the Convention do not allow for outright 
exclusion of such a reading either. A limitation of the scope to categories 
A), B) and C) remains arguable after the first stage. This residual doubt is 
sufficient to trigger the second stage in our interpretative operation. We 
recall that the second stage makes available two further sets of data, 
namely the context and the telos. 
The context of Articles 33 (1) and 1 (A) (2) GC gives additional 
insights. It has been pointed out that Article 31 (1) GC contains a 
reference to 'territories' analogous to the one chosen for Article 33 (1) 
GC.1440 This reinforces the protection theory further. 
We would like to introduce a further contextual argument into the 
debate. Throughout the text, limitations to the protective scope of the 
1951 Refugee Convention are made in an explicit manner. Earlier it was 
mentioned that the concept of persecution is linked to five grounds, 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"; and this 
involves no technical or over-legalistic reading of the provision.' Adan and others, para. 
71. The Court of Appeal focuses on the inability or unwillingness of the state, rather 
than on the inability or unwillingness of the refugee, as suggested by the wording of Art. 
1 (A) (2) GC. 
1439 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, et al., 1998 make no mention of it, and neither did the U.K. 
Courts in Adan and others. 
1440 Vermeulen, Spijkerboer, Zwaan, and Femhout, 1998, p. 14. 
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which, in fact, limits the protective scope. Furthermore, the reach of the 
refugee definition in Article 1 GC is explicitly confined by limitative 
clauses in paragraphs (C) to (F). The same is true for Article 33 GC-its 
paragraph (2) excludes certain categories of persons from the group 
protected by the prohibition of refoulement. To set out such limitations 
explicitly has apparently been a principle followed by the drafters in a 
systematic manner. It is indicative that the drafters refrained from 
qualifying persecution as an act attributable to the state or to de facto 
authorities. Reading such a qualification into the Convention, as the 
accountability theorists do, runs counter to its layout. 
The adherents of the accountability theory have hitherto not adduced 
contextual arguments. Nonetheless, they could point to the customary 
law of state responsibility, which forms part of the context of Articles 33 
(1) and 1 (A) (2) GC. To a certain extent, its norms are mirrored in the 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It can be pointed out that 
categories A) to C) are backed up by explicit accountability norms. 
Category A) would correspond to Articles 5 and 6 ILC Draft, category B) 
would correspond to the attribution under Article 8 (a) ILC Draft and 
category C), would correspond to the attribution under Article 15 ILC 
Draft. 
Ultimately, this is a coherence argument, aiming to show that the 
accountability theory 'fits better' with the normative corpus of 
international law. Against the existence of such coherence, valid counter-
arguments can be adduced. Protective treaties such as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention draw on a tripartite setting involving at least two states, and, 
as beneficiaries, human beings. The law of state responsibility is largely 
based on an inter-state conception of international law, and was not 
designed to capture the intricacies of the tripartite setting. 
Accountability theorists draw heavily on a teleological argument. It is 
claimed that the object and purpose of the Convention is to protect 
victims of state persecution.1441 After all, the refugee problem the 
Convention sought to resolve was created by persecution by totalitarian 
states. However, the U.K. Court of Appeal challenges this view: 
1441 BVerwG, Judgement of 18 January 1995, BVerwGE 95, 42. 
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But this argument as to the scope of An. l A (2) is in our judgment 
deprived of all its force by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention, 
[ ... ]. It is clear that the signatory States intended that the 
Convention should afford continuing protection for refugees in the 
changing circumstances of the present and future world.1442 
There is a great deal of merit to this argument. But the teleological 
argument of the accountability theorists is unconvincing for additional 
reasons. An important source for deductions on the telos of the 
Convention is its preamble. However, nothing in the preamble indicates 
that states solely wished to cater for persons persecuted by a state or by de 
facto authorities. Thus, the teleological argument may not amount to 
much more than historical reflections, lacking supportive expression in 
the instrument to be construed and falling outside the scope of the second 
stage. Furthermore, the historical accuracy of the particularist argument 
can be questioned; in the course of the 1930s and 1940s, there were 
numerous examples of persecution by non-state agents. 
Concluding on the second stage, we may state that Article 33 (1) and 1 
(A) (2) GC, as modified by the 1967 New York Protocol, extend 
protection regardless of the source of persecution. Cases falling under 
categories D) and E) are included under the protective umbrella provided 
for by the Convention. The doubts remaining after the first stage did not 
persist in the second and, accordingly, recourse to the third stage is not 
necessary. 1443 Thus, the methodology flowing from Articles 31 and 32 
VTC can assist in resolving a persistent vexation of protection law in 
1442 Adan and others, para. 72. One the face of it,the New York Protocol seems to fall 
outside the context, as there are a number of parties to the Convention which have not 
ratified the Protocol. Taking this position would relegate the teleological argument 
made by the Court of Appeal to the third stage. We recall, however, that any reference 
to the Convention in this work implies the Convention as modified by the Protocol. 
Therefore, the present interpretation actually depends on the Member States' obligations 
under the New York Protocol, which automatically brings in their obligations under 
the Convention. 
1443 However, given the scarcity of references to agents of persecution in the travaux, it is 
highly unlikely that the third stage would have produced an outcome in line with the 
accountability theory. 
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Europe. There is no basis in international law for denying victims of third 
party persecution extraterritorial protection under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.1444 
This outcome also has repercussions on the normative content of the 
Refugee Joint Position. As shown above, this instrument does not 
consider cases under categories D) and E) to come under the protective 
ambit of the 1951 Refugee Convention. At this stage, we understand that 
this defies a proper interpretation of the Convention. However, as the 
Refugee Joint Position is a non-binding instrument, the conflict between 
it and the Convention is a political one, leaving the realm of the law 
unaffected. Nonetheless, when deliberating on an instrument on the 
qualification of third country nationals as refugees under Article 63 (1) (c) 
TEC, the EC institutions must depart from the solution chosen in the 
Refugee Joint Position. If they merely copied the quoted paragraphs of the 
Refugee Joint Position, the result would be a perfect conflict between EC 
law and international law. 
12.2.2.2 The CAT 
The discussion on agents of persecution is also of relevance for the 
protection afforded under Article 3 CAT. But as CAT is much more 
explicit in this respect than its counterpart in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, there are no overt divisions in its interpretation. 
We recall that Article 3 CAT only protects from return to torture. For 
the purposes of CAT, the concept of torture is defined in Article 1, which 
sets out certain requirements as to agency. The relevant pain or suffering 
must be 'inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity'. It is abundantly clear that cases falling under categories A) and 
1444 Vermeulen et al. point to other valid arguments supporting the protection theory, 
which, however, fall outside the second stage. A strong argument against the 
accountability theory is that it would exclude all forms of protection if the persecuting 
state had not ratified relevant human rights treaties. Moreover, they demonstrate that it 
is logically incompatible to exclude persecution by third parties from the scope of the 
1951 Refugee Convention while operating the concept of internal flight alternative to 
the extent that it relies on the protection of third parties. While some jurisdictions deny 
protection to the victims of third party persecution, they refer refugees to the protection 
of third parties in the framework of the internal flight alternative. Vermeulen, 
Spijkerboer, Zwaan and Fernhout, 1998, pp. 14, 17 and 22. 
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B) are covered. Neither can there be any doubt that cases under categories 
D) and E) are not covered. In both cases, the agent is not a public official 
or acting in an official capacity. This understanding is confirmed in the 
case law of the CAT Committee: 
The Committee considers that the issue whether the State party 
has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk 
pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without 
the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the 
scope of article 3 of the Convention.1445 
What remains to be clarified is category C). Is the threat of torture by de 
facto authorities covered by the protective scope of Articles 3 and 1 CAT? 
The CAT Committee was seized with this question in the case of Sadiq 
Shek Elmi vs. Australia1446, and answered it in the affirmative. The author 
of the communication was a Somali national who feared torture at the 
hands of the Hawiye clan, which represents a de facto authority.1447 The 
argumentation of the respondent government, of counsel and of the 
Committee shall be briefly presented in the following. 
The respondent government maintained that the case was outside the 
scope of the concept of torture enshrined in Article 1 CAT. The 
government asserted that the members of armed Somali clans were private 
individuals rather than 'public officials' or persons acting in an 'official 
capacity'. To support its view, the government relied on the wording of 
Article 1 CAT, on earlier case law of the Committee1448 and on the 
travaux. However, the respondent state did not expressly deny that 
torture by de facto authorities could come under the scope of Article 1 
CAT.1449 
1445 Committee against Torture, Communication No 83/1997, G.R.B. vs. Sweden, 15/05/98, 
CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 [henceforth G.R.B. vs. Sweden], para. 6.5. 
1446 Committee against Torture, Communication No. 120/1998, Sadiq Sbek Elmi vs. 
Australia, 25/05/99, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 [henceforth Sadiq Shek Elmi]. 
1447 Sadiq Shek Elmi, paras 3.1 and 5.5. 
1448 The respondent government referred explicitly to G.R.B. vs. Sweden. 
1449 Sadiq Sbek Elmi, paras 4.3--4.8. 
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The author's counsel maintained that 
when the Convention was drafted there was agreement by all States 
to extend the scope of the perpetrator of the act from the "public 
official" referred to in the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to include 
"other person[s] acting in an official capacity". This would include 
persons who, in certain regions or under particular conditions, 
actually hold and exercise authority over others and whose 
authority is comparable to government authority.1450 
At bottom, this is a contextual argument, in that it distinguishes between 
'public official' and a person 'otherwise acting in an official capacity'. 
Ruling out the possibility of redundant formulations in Article 1 CAT, it 
can be presupposed that the two concepts are not congruent. In the view 
of the author's counsel, the inclusion of 'person[s] acting in an official 
capacity' in the definition relates to persons exercising de facto authority. 
Now, the Committee proved to be more liberal than the author's counsel: 
The Committee does not share the State party's view that the 
Convention is not applicable in the present case since, according to 
the State party, the acts of torture the author fears he would be 
subjected to in Somalia would not fall within the definition of 
torture set out in article 1 [ ... ] The Committee notes that for a 
number of years Somalia has been without a central government, 
that the international community negotiates with the warring 
factions and that some of the factions operating in Mogadishu have 
set up quasi-governmental institutions and are negotiating the 
establishment of a common administration. It follows then that, de 
facto, those factions exercise certain prerogatives that are 
comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate 
governments. Accordingly, the members of those factions can fall, 
for the purposes of the application of the Convention, within the 
phrase "public officials or other persons acting in an official 
capacity" contained in article 1. mi 
1450 Sadiq Sbek Elmi, para. 5.3. 
1451 Sadiq Shek Elmi, para. 6.5. 
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Thus, the CAT Committee considers that both public officials and 
persons acting in an official capacity can denote persons exercising de 
facto authority. However, it has to be recalled that the government and 
the Committee did not diverge on the interpretation of the words 'public 
officials or persons acting in an official capacity'. Rather, they diverged on 
the qualification of the Somali clan from which the threat emerged. While 
the government thought of clan members as private individuals, the 
Committee qualified them as persons exercising a de facto authority. 
Thus, it remains uncontested that cases under category C) are covered by 
the protective scope of Articles 3 and 1 CAT. 
To conclude, the prohibition of refoulement in Article 3 CAT covers 
cases falling under categories A), B) and C), while cases falling under 
categories D) and E) are excluded from its protective scope. 
12.2.2.3 The ECHR 
Do the rights enshrined in Section I of the ECHR afford extraterritorial 
protection to persons threatened by third parties?1452 This question has 
been contentiously discussed with regard to the protection from torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment in Article 3 ECHR. In the following, we 
will present two opposed positions as typecasts for a universalist and a 
particularist approach. The first one is maintained by the European Court 
of Human Rights, which accepts violations by non-state agents as a basis 
for protection.1453 The second one has been expounded in two judgements 
by the German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) 
1452 The reasoning expounded in this section is applicable mutatis mutandis to the ICCPR as 
well. However, as the debate has mainly focused on Art. 3 ECHR, and as the European 
system makes more powerful remedies available than its universal counterpart, we 
choose to limit our efforts to the ECHR. 
1453 For a detailed and thoughtful account of the case law of the European organs with 
regard to extraterritorial threats by third parties, see S. Karagiannis, 'Expulsion des 
etrangers et mauvais traitements imputables a J' etat de destination OU a des particuliers', 
10 Re:v.trim.dr.h. 33 (1999), pp. 66-88. 
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and limits the scope of protection to violations by state or de facto 
authorities. 1454 
The ECtHR has summarised its position by stating that the 'principle' 
of extraterritorial protection under Article 3 ECHR 'has so far been 
applied by the Court in contexts in which the risk to the individual of 
being subjected to any of the proscribed forms of treatment emanates 
from intentionally inflicted acts of the public authorities in the receiving 
country or from those of non-state bodies in that country when the 
authorities there are unable to afford appropriate protection'.1455 The 
Court's extension of protection to threats by non-stage agents manifests 
itself in four landmark cases. 
In Chahal vs. U.K., the ECtHR held that the removal of a Sikh claimant 
to India would contravene Article 3 ECHR. In the view of the Court, the 
Indian authorities had not succeeded in suppressing the frequent human 
rights violations by certain members of the police forces in Punjab and 
elsewhere in India. As earlier noted, the Court refrained from exposing 
the theoretical backdrop of its analysis. The case falls under category D), 
as India was unable to prevent ultra vires activities of its police forces. 
H.L.R. vs. France1456 provided another clarification. The claimant was a 
Colombian drug trafficker who had co-operated with the French police 
by giving information on Colombian drug cartels. He feared that, when 
removed by the French authorities, the drug cartels would murder him 
upon his return to Colombia. The Court stated that persecution by 
persons or groups of persons not being public officials in the country of 
reception may fall under the protective scope of Article 3 ECHR, 
1454 For a presentation see W. Kalin, 'Tragweite und Begriindung des Abschie-
bungshindernisses von Art. 3 EMRK bei nichtstaatlicher Gefahrdung', in Hailbronner, 
K and Kokott, J (eds), Einwanderungskontrolle und Menschenrechte-Immigration Control 
and Human Rights. Beitrage eines Symposiums am 29./30. ]uni 1998 in Potsdam (1999, 
C.F. Millier Verlag, Heidelberg), pp. 56-7; H. MaaBen, 'Abschiebungsschutz aus Art. 3 
EMRK auch bei nicht vom Staat ausgehenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen und 
allgemeinen dem Auslander im Herkunftsstaat drohenden Gefahren fur Leib, Leben und 
Gesundheit?', 18 ZAR 3 (1999), pp. 109-11; and A. Zimmer, 'Abschiebungsschutz durch 
Art. 3 EMRK im Fall nichtstaatlicher Verfolgung', 18 ZAR 3 (1999), pp. 119-21. For a 
discussion of these and related cases with further references to German case law and 
doctrine, see R. GObel-Zimmermann, Asyl· und Fluchtlingsrecht (1999, C. H. Beck, 
Miinchen), pp. 326-8. 
1455 ECtHR, D. vs. U.K, ECHR Reports 1997-III, No. 37 [henceforth D. vs. U.K.J, para. 49. 




provided that 'the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State 
are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection' .1457 
As the claimant did not satisfy the standard of proof, the Court ruled that 
there was no violation of Article 3 ECHR. The constellation in this case 
clearly falls under category D). While the power structures of Colombia 
were intact, the state proved unable to protect its citizen against the drug 
cartels. 
In the case of Ahmed vs. Austria1458, state structures were simply non-
existent in the country of origin. The Somali claimant belonged to a clan 
opposing the faction of General Aideed. Upon return to Somalia, he 
feared treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR at the hands of that faction. 
The Court held that removing the claimant would contravene Article 3 
ECHR. It is not possible to infer from the ruling whether the Court 
regarded General Aideed's faction as a de facto authority or simply as a 
private actor in a failed state. Apparently, it attached no importance to 
such a distinction. Thus, Ahmed could be brought in either under 
category C) or under category E). 
A somewhat odd, but most enlightening case is D. vs. U.K. .1459 Here, 
the European Court held that the removal of the claimant suffering from 
AIDS to his home country (St. Kitts and Nevis) would constitute a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR. This case combines threats in the host 
country with those in the country of origin, as the risk facing the claimant 
was a consequence of the termination 'of medical treatment in the U.K. in 
combination with very limited medical resources in St. Kitts and Nevis 
and his lack of resources for subsistence. Thus, as Kalin aptly notes, there 
is no agent of persecution in this case.1460 However, D. vs. U.K. is 
particularly supportive of the explicatory model pursued in this work: 
removal was barred by the positive obligations of the U.K. to avert 
inhuman treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR. This obligation is 
decoupled from considerations of geographical location or agency-it is 
simply immaterial where exactly the risk is situated or who would provide 
for its realisation. This reading of D. vs. U.K. reconfirms that all 
14s7 H.L.R. vs. France, para. 40. 
1458 ECtHR, Ahmed vs. Austria, ECHR Reports 1996-VI, No. 26 [henceforth Ahmed vs. 
Austria). 
1459 D. vs. U.K., note 1455 above. 
1460 Kalin, 1999, p. 55. 
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categories-A) to D)-are necessarily covered by the protective scope of 
the ECHR and its Protocols. 
In two cases related to Somali protection seekers, the German Federal 
Administrative Court saw itself compelled to take a stand on the position 
developed by the ECtHR. Both turned primarily on the prohibitions of 
removal in the German Aliens Act. However, for their proper appli-
cation, it was critical to identify the precise content of Article 3 ECHR. 
The first case was decided on 15 April 1997.1461 A Somali, who feared 
persecution at the hands of the Hawiye clan upon return to Somalia, had 
sought protection from the German authorities inter alia under the pro-
hibition of removal in Section 53 (4) of the German Aliens Act. The latter 
norm incorporated the extraterritorial protection flowing from Article 3 
ECHR into German law. The Federal Administrative Court dismissed 
this part of his appeal, stating that, as a matter of principle, only ill-
treatment by state organs or by de facto authorities (or, in the language of 
the court, state-like entities) falls under the protective scope of Article 3 
ECHR: 
[D]er Begriff der Behandlung setzt ein geplantes, vorslitzliches, auf 
eine bestimmte Person gerichtetes Handeln voraus. Das ergibt sich 
aus dem Wortlaut und aus dem Zweck der EMRK, dem Millbrauch 
staatlicher Gewalt vorzubeugen und den der Herrschaftsgewalt des 
Staates Unterworfenen bestimmte Rechte und Freiheiten 
einzuriiumen. Als unmenschliche Behandlungen gemaB Art. 3 
EMRK sind daher grundsatzlich nur Millhandlungen durch 
staatliche Organe anzusehen. Ausnahmsweise konnen auch 
Millhandlungen durch Dritte eine solche Behandlung darstellen, 
sofern sie dem Staat zugerechnet werden konnen, weil er sie 
veranl~t, bewuBt geduldet oder ihnen gegeni.iber keinen Schutz 
gewahrt, obwohl er dazu in der Lage ware. 1462 
1461 BVerwG, Judgment of 15 April 1997, 9 C38/96, EZAR 043, Nr. 21 [henceforth the 
April judgement]. 
H6l ['[T]he concept of treatment presupposes a planned, intentional action, targeting a 
certain person. This flows from the wording and from the purpose of the ECHR, which 
is to prevent the abuse of state power and to mete out certain rights and freedoms to 
those subject to the exercise of state power. Therefore, as a matter of principle, only 
maltreatment by state organs is to be regarded as inhuman treatment according to 
Article 3 ECHR. Exceptionally, maltreatment by third parties may also represent such 
treatment, in so far as it is attributable to the state, because the state has caused, 
consciously tolerated, or denied protection from it, although the state would have been 
in a position to protect.' Translation by this author.] April judgement, p. 4. 
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According to the German Court, no state or state-like power had been 
exerted in Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, and thus 
the domestic provision replicating Article 3 ECHR could not be 
successfully invoked by the claimant. 
In the following, the Court maintained that its position was supported 
by the rule on interpretation in Article 31 VTC. In the opinion of the 
Court, there was no subsequent practice in the sense of Article 31 (b) (3) 
VTC which could underpin an extensive interpretation. In its own 
interpretation, the Court deployed three main arguments. First, it 
construed the term 'inhuman treatment' in the context of the terms 
'torture' and 'inhuman or degrading punishment', whose ordinary 
meaning was said to presuppose state agency. Here, the Court referred 
explicitly to Article 1 CAT and Article 7 ICCPR.1463 Secondly, the Court 
adduced a teleological argument, according to which the ECHR was 
created to protect against violations by state actors.1464 As for the third 
argument, the Court maintained that an interpretation including 
treatment by non-state agents under Article 3 ECHR would provide 
better protections to aliens from third countries than to other persons 
within the jurisdiction of the ECHR, leading to an excessive degree of 
protective rights for refugees, unsupported by the Contracting Parties. 1465 
Generally, the Federal Administrative Court tried to downplay the 
impression that its decision conflict~d with the ECtHR judgment of 
Ahmed vs. Austria. It disqualified the statements of the ECtHR on 
protection under Article 3 ECHR from non-state agents of persecution as 
an 'obiter dictum', not relevant for the outcome of the case. However, in 
rather unmistakable terms, it warned the Strasbourg Court not to exceed 
its competencies. Specifically, the Federal Administrative Court 
underscored that it was not up to the judiciary 
die Grenzen der Aufnahmefahigkeit und Aufnahmewilligkeit der 
V ertragsstaaten durch eine rechtsschopferische Konven-
tionsentscheidung weiter auszudehnen und dadurch die auch als 
V erfassungsentscheidung geschiitzte Souveranitiit des nationalen 
Gesetzgebers [ ... ] und des Verfassungsgesetzgebers aufier acht zu 
1463 April judgement, p. 4. 
1464 April judgement, p. 4. 
1465 April judgement, pp. 4-5. 
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lassen und damit auch iiber die Aufnahme von Fliichtlingen und 
die Grenzen der Belastbarkeit frei zu entscheiden.1466 
The second case before the Federal Administrative Court, decided on 2 
September 19971467, was also about a rejected Somali protection seeker, 
who invoked the prohibition of refoulement in Section 53 of the German 
Aliens Act. In addition to the risk of persecution, he invoked medical 
problems, for which adequate care could not be found in Somalia. At that 
point in time, the Federal Administrative Court had a clearer picture of 
the position taken by the EctHR-while the April judgement could look 
back to the Chahal and Ahmed cases only, the September judgement could, 
also draw on H.L.R. vs. France, and D. vs. U.K .. Due to the invocation· of 
medical factors, the case dealt with in the September judgement bore 
apparent parallels to that of D. vs. the U.K .. 
In the September Judgment, the Federal Administrative Court bluntly 
refuted the position held by the ECtHR in D. vs. U.K., which it 
considered to dilute the limits of the protective scope of Article 3 
ECHR.1468 The Federal Administrative Court was particularly disquieted 
by the following passage in the D. vs. U.K. judgment: 
[T]he Court must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to address 
the application of that Article [Article 3 ECHR, GN) in other 
contexts which might arise. It is not therefore prevented from 
scrutinising an applicant's claim under Article 3 [ ... ) where the 
source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country 
stems from factors which cannot engage either directly or 
indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities of that 
country, or which, taken alone, do not in themselves infringe the 
standards of that Article [ ... ). 1469 
1466 ['[ ... ] to expand the receptive capacity and willingness of the Contracting Parties by 
means of a law-making, convention-based decision, thereby neglecting the sovereignty of 
the national legislator, protected also in the form of a constitutional decision[ ... ] and of 
the constitutional legislator, and therewith to decide freely on the reception of refugees 
and the capacity limits.' Translation by this author]. April judgement, p. 6. 
1467 BVerwG, Judgment of 2.9.1997, 9 C 40/96, EZAR 043, Nr. 26 [henceforth September 
judgement]. 
1468 September judgement, p. 4. 
1469 D. vs. the U.K., para. 49. 
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The Federal Administrative Court suggested that this statement was not 
only completely vague, but could be understood to the effect that the 
ECtHR would reserve itself the right to state a violation of Article 3 
ECHR in cases where its factual presuppositions would not be fulfilled. In 
sum, the Federal Adminstrative Court had now made fully clear that it 
was on a collision course with the ECtHR in this matter. It qualified the 
inclusive reading by the ECtHR as an extensive interpretation surpassing 
the content of the treaty .1470 
Eased on this argumentation, some doctrinal writers have contended 
that certain judgmentsof the ECtHR 'may not be applied in Germany for 
reasons of constitutional law' .1471 The writers esteem that the Strasbourg 
Court has exceeded the competencies conferred upon it by the 
Contracting Parties, and that ultra vires acts do not bind the latter. 1472 It 
must be underscored, though, that the ultra vires-argument is not made by 
the Federal Administrative Court, but only by the commentators. 
Nonetheless, the high-pitched contribution of the latter may serve as an 
indicator that the conflict between Strasbourg and Berlin is not trivial. 
The Vienna Convention has been invoked both by the Federal 
Administrative Court and a number of commentators.1473 Let us now 
unfold an interpretation along the lines of interpretative norms enshrined 
in the Vienna Convention to see whether any of the two positions finds 
its justification in them. Looking at the ordinary meaning of its terms 
within the first stage brings only limited gains. We recall the wording of 
Article 3 ECHR. 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
1470 September judgement, p. 5. 
1471 Lehnguth, Maa:Ben, et al., 1998, p. 45. 
1472 Lehnguth, Maa:Ben, and Schieffer, 1998, pp. 45-6. 
1473 Among doctrinal commentators, the virtues and vices of earlier writings resurface. In 
line with his earlier explorations of prohibitions of refoulement, Kalin develops an 
argumentation with detailed references to Arts 31 and 32 VTC (Kalin, 1999, pp. 57-9), 
while Maa:Ben again misconceives the place of historical arguments in the interpretative 
process under the Vienna Convention and is satisfied with sweeping references to the 
intentions held by the drafters of the ECHR (Maa:Ben, pp. 112-3). Compare chapter 
10.1.1.3 above. 
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The circle of beneficiaries is unqualified ('no one'). The use of passive 
voice suggests that the same is true for the circle of perpetrators ('shall be 
subjected').1474 The ordinary meaning of 'to subject' and 'a soumettre' re-
spectively1475 does not give any indications either. We recall that the 
former connotes 'to cause to undergo or experience some action or treat-
ment'1476, while the latter signifies 'exposer a un effet qu'on fait subir'. 1477 
It must be concluded that wording neither entails nor excludes any limi-
tations with regard to agency. At any rate, the Federal Constitutional 
Court is wrong to deduce a limitation of the protective scope of Article 3 
ECHR to state action already from its wording. As the dispute does not 
find a solution in the first stage, it is mandatory to proceed to the second, 
and to look into the context and the telos of Article 3 ECHR. 
Resorting to contextual arguments brings in the positive obligation in-
herent in Article 1 ECHR, which prescribes that the Contracting Parties 
'shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section 1 of this Convention'. Precisely as was the case in our 
earlier interpretation of Article 3 ECHR, this contextual element delivers 
the decisive nuance. 
To our mind, the issue of agency in the country of origin is simply 
irrelevant for the delimitation of protection under Article 3 ECHR. 
Article 1 ECHR puts the focus on the removing state, and not the 
country of origin. It has been argued above that a Contracting Party 
would violate Article 3 ECHR by removing a protection seeker to a 
country where she would be exposed to ill-treatment prohibited by this 
article. By the act of removal, the removing state acquiesces to the 
realisation of the threat. Thus, it acquiesces to ill-treatment by a third 
actor-be it another state, or be it private individuals.1478 The decisive issue 
1474 It is perhaps indicative that the drafters refrained from using the phrase 'No State shall...'. 
1475 The English and French texts of the ECHR. are equally authentic. 
1476 Websters New World Dictionary of the American Language, (1970, The World Publish-
ing Company, New York and Cleveland), p. 1418. 
1477 Le Micro·Rohert, 2eme edition (1988, Dictionnaires le Robert, Paris). 
1478 The linkage made here between Drittwirkung and the issue of agency has been earlier 
captured by Karagiannis, 1999, p. 68: 'On mesure ainsi plus facilement l'audace de la solu-
tion qui imputerait a l'Etat extradant ou expulsant une violation de l'article 3 produite non 
pas par l'Etat de destination, qui lui est deja 'tiers', mais par des individus agissant sur le 
territoire de ce demier.' Karagiannis succintly describes the relationship between the 
removing state and the non-state perpertrators of violations as 'doublement "tiers~'. Ibid. 
However, whether the third-party relationship between the removing state and the 
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is the extent of positive obligations on behalf of the removing state, and, 
of course, the magnitude of the risk in the country to which the claimant 
is removed. Consider the following two examples. A prison guard, acting 
in her official capacity, beats up inmate X. There is no doubt that this act 
is in violation of Article 3 ECHR. Knowing that inmate Y is intensely 
disliked by a specific group of other inmates, the prison guard locks her 
into a cell where Y's adversaries are present, and stands idly by, as she is 
beaten up by them. In the light of Article 1 ECHR, it is safe to assume 
that Y's rights under Article 3 ECHR have been violated. This under-
standing is supported by the case law of the ECtHR.1479 
It also explains the position taken by the ECtHR in D. vs. D.K., which 
so infuriated the Federal Administrative Court. We recall that the ECtHR 
was prepared to consider a claim under Article 3 ECHR, 'where the 
source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country stems 
from factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly the 
responsibility of the public authorities of that country, or which, taken 
alone, do not in themselves infringe the standards of that Article' .1480 It 
would be wrong to perceive this as an act by which the ECtHR gave itself 
vast discretionary powers. Firstly, the statement reflects an old truth, 
established at least since Soering: the responsibility of the receiving 
country for acts or omissions impacting on the enjoyment of Article 3 
ECHR is immaterial for deducing the responsibility of the removing state. 
What is at stake is the direct relationship between the removing state and 
the claimant. In that relationship, it is not required that the receiving state 
has an intermediary role. Secondly, while admitting the opaqueness of the 
language chosen by the ECtHR ('factors[ ... ] which, taken alone, do not in 
themselves infringe the standards ofohat Article[ ... ]'), we would contend 
that the quote merely restates that whether or not a violation has taken 
individual is a simple or double one, remains immaterial for the legal analysis. 
1479 'The Court considers that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 
1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to 
take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such 
ill-treatment administered by private individuals [ ... J.' ECtHR, A. vs. the U.K., Judgment 
of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-IV, para. 22. 
1480 See text accompanying note 1469 above. 
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place, must be established in the light of all circumstances, and cannot be 
solely a matter of stating the existence of certain factors. 1481 
Drawing on the context of Article 1 ECHR affirms the universalist 
position. Now, we recall that the German Federal Administrative Court 
also adduced a contextual argument, claiming that inhuman or degrading 
treatment must be understood as sharing the characteristics of state agency 
in the concepts of torture and inhuman or degrading punishment. To 
support this argument, the April judgement invokes the definition of 
torture in Article 1 CAT and Article 7 ICCPR. Could this argument 
affect the outcome of interpretation in the second stage? The answer is no. 
The CAT does not form part of the context of the ECHR-not all 
Contracting Parties to the latter have ratified the former. 1482 The same is 
true for the ICCPR. 1483 Therefore, neither the CAT nor the ICCPR fulfil 
the requirements of Article 31 (3) (c) VTC. Suffice it to note here that the 
argument of the Federal Administrative Court is ill-founded, not only due 
to its disregard of the VTC, but also on purely material grounds. 1484 
The Federal Administrative Court further relied on a teleological 
argument, maintaining that the telos of the ECHR was to protect against 
abuses of state power. The sole support for this argument is a reference to 
1481 See text accompanying note 1325 above. 
1482 For example, Andorra, Moldova and San Marino are bound by the ECHR, while not 
being bound by the CAT. 
1483 As an example, Andorra and Turkey are bound by the ECHR, while not being bound 
by the ICCPR. 
1484 To start with, Art. 7 ICCPR is inconclusive in this regard, as its wording gives no more 
indication as to the question of agency than does the wording of Art. 3 ECHR. 
Furthermore, one should note that Art. 1 CAT expressly limits the concept of torture to 
acts by public officials or persons otherwise acting in an official capacity. The drafters of 
the ECHR and the ICCPR avoided any limitation in that respect. What the German 
court does is to disregard the difference in the very wording of Art. 3 ECHR and Art. 7 
ICCPR on one hand, and Art. 1 CAT on the other. Second, CAT cannot be construed 
as an agreement on the interpretation of the torture concept in the ECHR and the 
ICCPR (Art. 31 (3) (a) VTC) or an amendment of both instruments. As earlier 
mentioned, the circle of Contracting Parties of the named three instruments is not 
congruent. Third, the definition of torture in Art. 1 CAT does not prejudice the concept 
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Drawing analogies between Art. 1 
CAT and the latter concept begs the question as to why the former contains an express 
limitation, while the drafters settled for an implicit limitation in the latter. Moreover, 
there is no indication whatsoever that the three concepts relevant here ('torture', 
'inhuman treatment or punishment' and 'degrading treatment or punishment') are 
structured as concentric circles, differing only in the severity of treatment. 
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the defeat of a draft protocol on asylum in 1961.1485 We repeat that this is a 
historical rather than a teleological argument, which would relegate it to 
the third step.1486 Furthermore, the Federal Administrative Court also 
claimed that an extensive interpretation including treatment by non-state 
agents under the protective scope of Article 3 ECHR would provide 
better protections to aliens from third countries than to other persons 
within the jurisdiction of the ECHR. This consequential argument cannot 
be linked to the context or the telos of Article 3 ECHR, and is thus 
misplaced in the second stage.1487 Beyond that, it is simply wrong. This 
argument disregards that the positive obligation enshrined in Article 3 
ECHR makes an identical risk assessment necessary regarding both 
groups. Thus, there is no preferential treatment for aliens fearing 
extraterritorial risks. Risk assessments and the extent of positive 
obligations are the inherent limitations of territorial as well as 
extraterritorial protection under Article 3 ECHR. There is simply no 
logical basis for denouncing the inclusion of non-state agency as a new 
'carte blanche' for protection seekers. 1488 
Finally, we note that there are no specific teleological arguments at 
hand which militate for either of the two readings. Inquiring into the telos 
merely brings us back to the initial divide between particularism and 
universalism. 
Summing up, we may state that the second stage provides a clear and 
unambiguous outcome. If one concedes that Article 3 ECHR can be a base 
for extraterritorial protection, one has to accept that it stretches over 
threats from non-state agents as well. We have shown earlier why the first 
concession is mandatory under the Vienna Convention.1489 The contextual 
argument expounded above is but a consequence of that line of reasoning. 
Article 3 ECHR stretches over cases falling under all of the named 
categories. Mindful of our argumentation in the preceding chapter1490, we 
1485 See text accompanying note 1168 above. We have analysed the impact of that protocol 
on the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR in chapter 10.1.1.4 above. 
1486 Furthermore, it is wrong and would falter even in a third step. As Kalin has shown in a 
detailed analysis of the ECHR's travaux, its drafters wished to include torture exercised 
by private agents into the protective scope of the Convention. Kalin, 1999, pp. 59-61. 
1487 See also Kalin, 1999, p. 54 
1488 See also Kalin, 1999, p. 55. 
1489 See chapter 10.1.1.4 above. 
1490 See chapter 11 above. 
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have to conclude that the same is true for all rights in Section I ECHR and 
its Protocols, to the extent that they provide a base for extraterritorial 
protection. Thus, the rights catalogue in Section I of the ECHR and its 
Protocols is, in principle, applicable to cases under categories A) to E)-
that is, all of the categorised cases. 
Reverting to the conflict between Strasbourg and Berlin, the German 
Federal Administrative Court erred in its interpretation. Thus, the ultra 
vires-argument advanced in doctrine falters as well. 1491 
12.2.3 Appraisal 
Our exploration gave the following results. Both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR cover all categories of cases, and extend 
protection irrespective of the official capacity of the agents of persecution. 
In both cases, an interpretation along the lines of the Vienna Convention 
resulted in an unambiguous result in the second stage, supportive of the 
universalist approach. By contrast, protection under the CAT only covers 
cases falling under categories A) to C), i.e. where violations are 
attributable to a state or to de facto authorities. This interpretation of 
CAT was a comparatively simple exercise, which must be ascribed to the 
relatively precise wording of its Article 1. It should be noted that Article 1 
CAT is in line with the particularist accountability theory, which may 
explain its uncontested status. 
Our interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ECHR 
does not necessarily imply any criticism of the domestic courts arriving at 
outcomes supporting the particularist position. After all, as long as these 
courts construe domestic protection categories on the basis of domestic 
canons of interpretation, they may validly take the accountability view.1492 
Thus, it is no surprise that Ari:icles 31 and 32 VTC produce one outcome, 
and domestic canons of interpretation another. What is important, 
1491 The ultra-vires arguments have been convincingly challenged in Kalin, 1999, pp. 57-9 
(invoking Dworkin and Alexy's principle theory), and Zimmer, 1999. Zimmer has 
turned the ultra-vires argument around and maintains that the Federal Administrative 
Court was under a legal obligation to follow the case-law of the ECtHR. Zimmer, 1999, 
p. 124. 
1492 When construing German law, the historical method of interpretation has a given place. 
See e.g. K. Larenz and C-W. Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995, 
Springer, Berlin), pp. 149-53. 
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though, is that material as well as methodological pluralism becomes 
problematic, when states wish to apply the allocation criteria of the 
Dublin Convention. A deference to pluralism forces Member States to 
take the sovereignty clause into consideration in each single Dublin case. 
Doing so complicates procedures considerably. What was intended as a 
formal allocation procedure, ends as a material comparison of protection 
options in different Member States. The gains of the Dublin 
Convention-avoiding multiple processing and thus econom1smg 
procedures-are lost. Cases like Adan and others can easily be processed 
twice within the Union. By way of example, U.K. authorities have to 
assess the concrete protection prospects of the claimant in Germany, 
which can be a tedious exercise in comparative law. If the U.K. authorities 
decide that Germany is safe for the claimant, she is returned there, and her 
case is processed materially. Now, the claimant is present in Union 
territory for the length of both procedures, triggering a corresponding 
duplication of costs. 
The premise underlying the Dublin Convention was the assumption 
that systems of extraterritorial protection in the EU afford roughly the 
same standards. Like a boomerang, the fallacy of this assumption 
reappears in the courts of Member States. As the U.K. Court of Appeal 
has shown in Adan and others, the problems entailed by allocation under 
the Dublin Convention can be managed if judges in Member States resort 
to the prohibitions of refoulement in international law and the unitary 
standard of interpretation flowing from the Vienna Convention. 
1.2.3 Access to Full-Fledged Procedures: The Spanish 
Protocol and Discrimination 
12.3.1 Interpreting the Spanish Protocol in the Light of 
International Law 
For the time being, the Spanish Protocol remains the only binding 
instrument of the EU acquis relating to procedures. In an earlier section, 
we have noted the idiosyncrasies contained in the wording of the 
instrument.1493 Before concluding on conceivable conflicts between the 
Protocol and international law, we must clarify its content further. 
1493 See chapter 6.2 above. 
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Looking solely at the wording of the Spanish Protocol, one might be 
induced to read it as an abolition of asylum procedures for nationals from 
other Member States. However, this would be an improper 
interpretation. A declaration adopted together with the protocol states 
that the Protocol 'does not prejudice the right of each Member State to 
take the organisational measures it deems necessary to fulfil its obligations 
under the [1951 Refugee] Convention'. 1494 The following argument will 
demonstrate why those obligations include a duty to conduct individual 
determination procedures or to refrain from removal. 
All Member States are under an obligation to observe Article 33 GC. 
This leaves them two choices. Either they conduct determination 
procedures to find out which claimants fall under the refugee definition 
and which do not-in principle, only the latter can be sent back-or they 
omit procedures and let all claimants stay. If states rule out the last option, 
as states interested in migration control do, they are actually under an 
obligation to conduct determination procedures.1495 Denying a certain 
group of asylum seekers any form of procedures would only be acceptable 
under the Convention if the whole group were allowed to stay. The only 
way of slashing procedures and keeping the option of removal is to 
denounce the obligation under the 1951 Refugee Convention.1496 Given 
that the group of Contracting Parties is larger than the group of State 
Parties to the Spanish Protocol, the latter cannot amend the former. 
Therefore, the sole article of the Spanish Protocol cannot modify or 
abolish the obligation to conduct individual determination procedures 
inherent in Article 33 GC. If a state were indeed to deny a national of a 
Member State any form of procedure and remove her to the Member 
1494 Declaration relating to the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the 
European Union, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
1495 Zimmermann, 1994, pp. 80-1. 
14% Denunciation is regulated in Art. 44 GC. Further, it is self-evident that a sub-group of 
Contracting Parties cannot modify the 1951 Refugee Convention without the consensus 
of all other states bound by this instrument. 
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State that was allegedly persecuting her, this would amount to a breach of 
Article 33 GC.1497 I 
Recourse to human rights instruments provides for a similar argument. 
Where removal would violate rights set out in the ECHR, the right to an 
effective remedy in Article 13 ECHR becomes relevant. Deciding to 
return a claimant to the Member State from which she originated without 
a material determination would violate Article 13 ECHR. 
Conflicts between the acquis and international law can be avoided, if 
the Sole Article of the Spanish Protocol is interpreted in line with the 
obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ECHR. Drawing 
on Article 31 (3) (c) VTC, the latter instruments form part of the context 
of the Spanish Protocol. Such a contextual interpretation would yield the 
following results: 
1. Member States do not possess the choice implied by the wording of 
the second sentence of the Sole Article1498 and of the first sentence of 
its paragraph (d). 1499 Indeed, Member States are obliged to consider the 
substance of any asylum claim filed with its authorities by a citizen of 
another Member State. Thus, Member States are obliged to make use of 
their competence to conduct a material determination set out in 
paragraph (d). 
2. The Spanish Protocol adds two procedural obligations through 
paragraph (d) of its Sole Article. 
1497 The obligation to conduct individual determination procedures was reaffirmed in para. 
20 of the Asylum Procedures Resolution: 'The Member States observe that, with due 
regard for the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, there should be no de facto or de jure 
grounds for granting refugee status to an asylum applicant who is a national of another 
Member State. On this basis a particularly rapid or simplified procedure will be applied 
to the application for asylum lodged by a national of another Member State, in 
accordance with each Member State's rules and practice, it being specified that the Member 
States continue to be obliged to examine individually every application for asylum, as 
provided by the Geneva Convention to which the Treaty on European Union refers'. 
[Emphasis added]. 
1498 'Accordingly, any application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may be 
taken into consideration or declared admissible for processing by another Member State 
only in the following cases: [ ... ].' [Emphasis added]. 
1499 '[IJf a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of the application of a 
national of another Member State', the case shall be processed according to paragraph (d) 
of the Sole Article of the Spanish Protocol. 
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a) First, it prescribes that the Council must be immediately 
informed whenever a Member State makes use of its competence 
under paragraph (d). As international law obliges Member States 
to make use of that competence, the Council will be informed 
about each single asylum application filed by Union citizens.1500 
b) Second, it states that 'the application shall be dealt with on the 
basis of the presumption that it is manifestly unfounded without 
affecting in any way, whatever the cases may be, the decision-
making power of the Member State'. The logic behind this 
formulation is contradictory. The use of the word 'shall' suggests 
the existence of a legal obligation. By its very nature, an 
obligation affects the decision-making power of a state. 
Unaffected decision-making power would imply the absence of 
an obligation. At first sight, the quoted phrase is self-cancelling. 
To some extent, the contradictions can be dissolved by the 
following interpretation. Member States are obliged to process 
applications within the scope of the Spanish Protocol on the basis 
of the presumption that they are manifestly unfounded. But they 
retain the power a) to deal with such cases in ordinary, full-
fledged asylum procedures and b) to issue a positive decision to 
such an application. This power flows from state obligations 
under international law, namely the prohibition of refoulement. 
Now, the remaining question would be whether the processing of a 
certain class of claims under the presumption that they are manifestly 
unfounded is in line with international law. This question raises the issue 
of discrimination based on nationality, as the class of claimants subjugated 
to such procedures is limited to Union citizens. In the following sub-
section, we shall clarify whether or not this aspect of the Spanish Protocol 
amounts to discriminatory treatment. If it does, we would be confronted 
with a compliance conflict, in which states are to obey two mandatory 
1500 This is extremely detrimental with regard to the protection of the claimant's personal 
data. Through the Council, the Member State alleged to persecute the claimant is 
informed about the case as well. In the course of a Council survey on the 
implementation of the acquis, Belgium underlined 'that an application for asylum being 
a confidential act, no information is forwarded to a third country in the absence of 
guarantees with regard to data protection'. A fortiori, forwarding information to a 
potential persecutor should be out of the question. 1998 Council Survey, p. 30. 
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norms with opposed content: while one orders Member States to use a 
specific form of procedure, the other prohibits Member States to do so. 
Before moving on, however, we should clarify the role of normative 
hierarchies in the potential conflict on the Spanish Protocol. We note that 
the latter is primary EC law, created not by the EC institutions, but by 
the Member States themselves. Thus, the Spanish Protocol cannot be 
simply overruled by the General Principles of EC law, which are on the 
same hierarchical level in the normative edifice of EC law. Principally, the 
Spanish Protocol is on a par with the foundational treaties. If a conflict 
can be shown to exist, it may only be solved beyond simple normative 
hierarchies-e.g. by means of a successful and justiciable discrimination 
argument. 
12.3.2 Discrimination under the 1951 Refugee Convention? 
A starting point for a discrimination argument is provided by Article 3 
GC, offering a prohibition of discrimination ancillary to the other 
provisions in the 1951 Refugee Convention. This article reads as follows: 
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this 
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion 
or country of origin. 
No doubt, Article 3 GC possesses a central significance for the 
Convention as a whole. This is underscored by the fact that reservations 
to this provision are expressly forbidden. 1501 Article 3 GC alludes to the 
application of the Convention's 'provisions' -a provision at stake is the 
prohibition of refoulement in Article 33 GC and the procedural rights 
inherent in it. The Spanish Protocol prescribes a distinction of treatment 
based on nationality. Protection seekers from Member States are put in a 
less favourable position than asylum seekers from third countries. Cases 
filed by protection seekers possessing the citizenship of another Member 
State shall be treated on the basis of the presumption that they are 
manifestly unfounded. By contrast, claimmts from outside the Union do 
not have to rebut a presumption of safety. It remains to be asked whether 
this distinction constitutes discrimination. This issue will be assessed by 
1501 See Art. 42 GC. 
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following the methodology outlined in the preceding section. Its 
benchmarks are the legitimacy of the aim, the appropriateness and 
necessity of means, and the proportionality between means and goal. 
From the eighth recital of the preamble to the Spanish Protocol, it is 
clear that the Member States wished 'to prevent the institution of asylum 
being resorted to for purposes alien to those for which it is intended'. To 
protect asylum procedures from abuse is, as such, a legitimate aim. The 
means used-relegating applications from nationals of other Member 
States into the category of manifestly unfounded claims-must be said to 
be appropriate in relation to the goal. The same goes for the necessity of 
the means used: no alternative means offers itself which is as effective in 
securing the realisation of the said goal, while intruding less into the 
procedural safeguards enjoyed by the asylum seeker. 
Having ascertained the legitimacy of the aim and the appropriateness 
and necessity of the means, we may proceed to the proportionality test in 
the narrow sense. Under the test, we shall balance the intrusion suffered 
by an asylum seeker from a Member State, exposed to the procedures 
prescribed in the Spanish Protocol, against the intrusion suffered by 
relevant Member States, if asylum claims from nationals of other Member 
States were to be processed precisely as other claims, i.e. in a fully 
individual procedure. 
Let us set out with assessing the intrusion Member States suffer from 
abusive applications by nationals from other Member States. Between 
1989 and 1998, 651 citizens of EU Member States filed asylum 
applications in thirteen Member States other than their own.1502 This 
number must be contrasted to the total number of applications by all 
nationalities in the group of thirteen EU Member States, which amounted 
to 3 644 350 in the same period. This goes to show that the group targeted 
by the Spanish Protocol is of very limited importance for the operation of 
protection systems within the EU. In the period under consideration, 36 
persons were granted Convention status and 109 received humanitarian 
status. Taken together, these 145 recognitions correspond to a total 
recognition rate of 22.2 percent. This is to be compared to recognitions of 
all protection seekers in general, which amount to 18.5 percent in the 
1502 The statistics used here exclude numbers for Ireland and Luxembourg. Moreover, it 
must be recalled that not all of the remaining 13 states have been Union Members since 
1989. Source: Governments, compiled by UNHCR (unpublished tabulations). On file 
with the author. 
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same period. 1503 Thus, the probability that applications by EU citizens are 
well-founded is greater than the corresponding probability for all nation-
alities taken together. A prudent evaluation would allow us to conclude 
that the risk of 'abusive claims' does not differ to a greater extent between 
the group of protection seekers at large and the sub-group of EU citizens. 
At any rate, recognition rates for the former group suggest that there are 
no statistical reasons for presuming that protection claims by EU citizens 
are manifestly unfounded. The intrusion Member States suffer due to 
abusive claims from EU citizens is roughly equal to the intrusion suffered 
by such claims filed by other nationalities. 
The second question was how large an intrusion the protection seeker 
would suffer by bearing the additional procedural onus flowing from the 
presumption. Here, our assessment is hampered by the fact that there is 
no harmonised framework for procedures dealing with manifestly 
unfounded claims.1504 Although two non-binding instruments of the acquis 
deal with the subject1505, practices by Member States diverge. Therefore, 
relegation to such procedures may constitute a substantial loss of 
protection in one Member State, while the same is not true in other 
Member States. 
To effectuate a concrete balancing, one is compelled to recur to a single 
Member State. Germany seems to be a rational choice, as it introduced the 
concept of safe countries of origin in 19931506, and qualifies all other 
Member States of the European Union as safe. Moreover, Germany 
relegates claims from the nationals of such countries to accelerated 
procedures, presuming that they are manifestly unfounded. 1507 
The difference between the accelerated procedure for manifestly 
unfounded claims and the ordinary procedure is striking.1508 Under the 
1503 This rate is on the same premises as the recognition rate for EU nationals in the 13 
Member States identified in note 1502 above. In the period 1989-98, 691 704 Con-
vention status recognitions and humanitarian status recognitions are to be contrasted 
with 3 741670 asylum applications. Source: UNHCR, 1999, pp. 82, 84. 
1504 See IGCARMP, 1997, p. 440. By way of example, France and Italy do not operate 
accelerated procedures. 
1505 They are the MUA Conclusions and the Asylum Procedures Resolution. See chapter 6.1 
above. 
1506 See Art. 16a (3) of the Federal Constitution. 
1507 See Sections 29a and 30 of the Asylum Procedure Act. 
1508 For a brief overview, see IGCARMP, 1997, p. 205. For a comprehensive presentation in 
German, see Gobel-Zimmermann, 1999, pp. 99-114. 
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procedure for manifestly unfounded claims, it is presumed that the 
claimant is not persecuted. Where the claimant succeeds in rebutting this 
presumption, her case is dealt with under the ordinary procedure 
(Column 4 in Table 8). Otherwise, rejection of a manifestly unfounded 
claim (Column 5 in Table 8) entails an expulsion warning with a term of 
seven days for voluntary departure. The claimant is given a delay of one 
week for appealing to an administrative court for a reversal of the 
rejection decision and provisional legal protection from expulsion. 
Normally, the Court should take a decision within one week. Only where 
serious doubts as to the legality of the ruling exist, may the court suspend 
expulsion. The decision by the administrative court is final, save for 
exceptional cases where an urgent motion can be filed with the Federal 
Constitutional Court, based on a complaint of unconstitutionality of the 
appeal decision. 
In the ordinary procedure, an appeal possesses suspensive effect as to 
expulsion. There is no requirement of 'serious doubts' for such a 
suspension. Moreover, after a negative decision by the Administrative 
Court, a further appeal to the Higher Administrative Court is possible. 
Under certain circumstances, a third appeal to the Federal Administrative 
Court will be allowed. Having exhausted these possibilities, the claimant 
may also turn to the Federal Constitutional Court under specific 
preconditions. The difference between the procedures mainly consists of 
access to two further tiers of appeal, the absence of narrow time limits and 
the unqualified suspension of expulsion. It is quite obvious that this 
difference in treatment is highly relevant for the procedural standing of 
the individual asylum seeker. 
A look at official statistics on decisions taken at first instance is 
indicative for our further assessment (see Table 8). In 1998, all decisions 
taken on asylum applications by EU citizens were negative. Further, the 
1998 total of six new applications and eight decisions relating to asylum 
claims from nationals of EU Member States must be opposed to the total 
of 98 644 asylum claims filed in Germany in the same year. Precisely as 
stated for the whole of the EU earlier, the cases filed by Union citizens in 
Germany are simply insignificant for the acceleration of procedures. 
However, two of the six rejected cases decided were sufficiently complex 
to necessitate a switchover to the ordinary procedure. This corresponds to 
25 percent of all cases. This suggests that it is far from self-evident that 
applications by nationals of other Member States can be dealt with in a 
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summary fashion, involving the use of presumptions. The gains for 
Germany were marginal compared to the intrusion into the legal standing 
of the applicant. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country Number Number Rejected Rejected Remarks 
of origin of new of as 
applications decisions manifestly 
in 1998 unfounded 
Austria 1 2 1 One case 
closed on 
formal grounds 
France 3 1 1 1 Two cases 
pending 
Greece 1 1 1 
Italy 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1 1 
Spain 1 One case 
rejected due to 
protection 
option in a safe 
third country 






Total 6 8 2 4 
Table 8: Asylum claims filed in Germany by nationals of other Member States 
(1998).1509 
1509 Source: Bundesamt for die Anerkennung auslandischer Fliichtlinge, 31.12.1998. All 
numbers relate to persons, not to cases. 
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The statistical evidence for Germany offers ample proof that the Spanish 
Protocol may produce discriminatory treatment on the domestic level. 
We do not know whether its effects would be less intrusive, or, indeed, 
more intrusive in the domestic systems of other Member States. 151° For 
our needs, it is sufficient to establish that the Spanish Protocol entails 
discriminatory effects in one Member State. Against the backdrop of 
statistical evidence from Germany, the conclusion would be that 
compliance with the Spanish Protocol violates Article 3 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. However, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not 
offer any remedies for an individual whose right under its Article 3 has 
been violated by the application of the Spanish Protocol. But, as we shall 
see below, other instruments do. 
12.3.3 Discrimination under the ICCPR and ECHR? 
The 1951 Refugee Convention is not the only instrument prohibiting 
discrimination based on nationality. At first sight, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination1511 
might suggest itself, as it contains a prohibition of discrimination based on ·•!' 
'national origin'.1512 However, CERD does not apply to 'distinctions,';" 
exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this . 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens' 1513, which is precisely the · ,_ 
~an~ , 
Having excluded CERD, we shall proceed to the ICCPR. Article 26 
ICCPR contains an autonomous right to equality, which would cover 
discrimination that implementation of the Spanish Protocol might 
effectuate. Compared to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the ICCPR offers 
important advantages with regard to justiciability. Monitoring is 
primarily based on the consideration of state reports by the Human 
Rights Committee. In addition, by ratifying the First Optional Protocol 
1510 Establishing the effects of the Spanish Protocol along the same lines as used for 
Germany would be a demanding exercise, as detailed statistics of domestic decisions are 
not readily available in the public domain. 
1511 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 
December 1965, 660 UNTS 195. Entry into force: 4 January 1969 [hereinafter CERD]. 
All 15 Member States are bound by CERD. 
1512 Art. 1 (1) CERD. 
1513 Art. 1 (2) CERD. 
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to the ICCPR1514, State Parties can authorise the Human Rights 
Committee to receive and consider individual communications. 1515 Save 
for the United Kingdom, all Member States have done so. However, 
Germany has exempted Article 26 ICCPR from the Committee's scrutiny 
in individual claims.1516 To be sure, the decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee are not binding upon states. 1517 Should the Committee 
conclude on the existence of a violation, the responsible State Party is not 
compelled to act upon such a finding. From the perspective of the 
discriminated individual, this shortcoming is not trivial. 
The monitoring system of the ECHR has the advantage of producing 
judgments binding upon State Parties. However, as earlier noted, the 
prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR is ancillary to other 
provisions. Therefore, the discrimination argument developed above 
cannot stand alone. It must be related to one of the rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR. Thus, two approaches offer themselves. 
First, one may claim that the Spanish Protocol affects the claimant's 
procedural standing not only with a view to Article 33 GC, but also with 
a view to extraterritorial protection under the ECHR. The most pertinent 
example is Article 3 ECHR, protecting from removal to a third country 
from which the threat of ill-treatment emanates. Being relegated to 
accelerated procedures under the Spanish Protocol augments the risk of 
removal contrary to Article 3 ECHR, simultaneously raising the question 
of discriminatory treatment under Article 14 ECHR. 
1514 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 302. Entry into force 23 March 1976. 
1515 Art. 1 of the First Optional Protocol. 
1516 This flows from the reservation made upon ratification of the First Optional Protocol 
by the Federal Republic of Germany: 
'The Federal Republic of Germany formulates a reservation concerning article 5 
paragraph 2(a) to the effect that the competence of the Committee shall not apply to 
communications 
[ ... ] 
c) by means of which a violation of article 26 of the [said Covenant] is reprimanded, if 
and insofar as the reprimanded violation refers to rights other than those guaranteed 
under the aforementioned Covenant.' 
1517 Art. 5 (4) of the First Optional Protocol: 'The Committee shall forward its views to the 
State Party concerned and to the individual'. 
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A more differentiated approach would integrate the right to a remedy into 
the present argumentation.1518 This right is enshrined in Article 13 ECHR: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
To be sure, the right to a remedy is ancillary to other rights in the ECHR. 
Therefore, the following would be a relevant line of argument. The 
Spanish Protocol affects the procedural standing of a protection seeker 
with regard to any of the rights enshrined in the ECHR and its Protocols, 
including Article 3 ECHR. It also affects the right to an effective remedy 
against a removal violating any of the rights enshrined in the ECHR and 
its Protocols, which brings in Article 13 ECHR. Drawing on the example 
of Germany, the remedies available for a Union national seeking asylum 
in another Member State are substantially diminished in comparison to 
those available to third country nationals. The proportionality assessment 
expounded in the preceding sub-section indicates that this difference in 
treatment is discriminatory. Provided that the German case-study is 
representative for the whole of the Union, the Spanish Protocol is in 
contravention of the ECHR. 
Undoubtedly, basing a discrimination claim on the ECHR might be 
more demanding than arguing on the basis of autonomous equality rights. 
On the other hand, of the four instrnments dealt with hitherto, the 
ECHR was the only one offering the prospect of a binding decision in the 
end. Apart from the ECHR, there is another track to compulsory 
judgements, leading to the ECJ. However, as we will see in the next sub-
section, it is hardly rewarding to pursue it at present. 
1518 It is not advisable to base an argumentation on procedural rights guaranteed under Art. 6 
ECHR, as the ECtHR does not classify asylum procedures to determine the 'civil rights 
or obligations' of the claimant. For a critical analysis, see P. Billings, 'The Influence of 
Human Rights Law on the Procedural Formalities of the Asylum Determination 
Process', 2 The International Journal of Human Rights 1 ( 1998). 
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12.3.4 Discrimination under the TEC? 
Keeping the goal of justiciability in mind, the question imposes itself 
whether the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
Article 12 TEC would be a suitable basis for redress. If this were the case, 
another door might open for achieving a binding judgement.1519 
Article 12 TEC reads as follows: 
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 
The Spanish Protocol forms an integral part of the Treaty1520, which 
brings it under the scope of Article 12 TEC. Moreover, by virtue of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, asylum and immigration issues, including the issue 
of asylum procedures, have been moved over to the first pillar. They are 
now dealt with under Title IV. Drawing on the proportionality 
argumentation expounded in the preceding sub-section, the imple-
mentation of the Spanish Protocol could very well entail discrimination 
on grounds of nationality. Is Article 12 TEC applicable, and does it 
provide a better remedy than those available under international law? 
In this author's view, the first answer should be a 'no', which might 
turn into a 'yes' over time. Whether it actually will do so depends greatly 
on the secondary legislation to be adopted by the Council. For the 
moment, the answer to the second question is a straight 'no'. Even here, 
depending on coming legislation by the Council, this might change in a 
not too distant future. 
We would first need to ponder whether Article 12 TEC actually covers 
the discrimination at stake here. The letter of the provision would suggest 
so. The provision is on discrimination on grounds of nationality. It is 
only restricted thematically, as the discriminatory act must come within 
the scope of application of the TEC to be covered.1521 Furthermore, the 
general prohibition of discrimination does not prejudice 'special pro-
visions' of the Treaty. This might be relevant, because the Spanish 
1519 See Art. 228 TEC. 
1520 This flows from Art. 311 TEC. 
1521 von Bogdandy, 'Artikel 6 EGV', in E. Grabitz and M. Hilf (eds), Kommentar zur 
Europiiischen Union (1994, C.H. Beck, Miinchen), p. 10, mn 35. 
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Protocol must be seen as an integral part of the Treaty, as already noted. 
However, as it does not specify the prohibition of discrimination, it falls 
outside the group of 'special provisions' in the sense of Article 12 TEC.1522 
Nonetheless, discrimination under Article 12 TEC could be assessed 
only if nationals of Member States could be validly compared to third 
country nationals, since the latter, in contrast to the former, are not 
subject to accelerated procedures. Such a comparison is very unusual: 
discrimination issues normally involve comparisons between nationals of 
a Member State and nationals of other Member States. Even the few cases 
dealing the discrimination of third country nationals vis-a-vis nationals of 
Member States are of limited relevance. The Spanish Protocol actualises 
the precise reversal of such discrimination, as it entails that third country 
nationals are better off than citizens of other Member States. 1523 
Some commentators hold that Article 12 TEC is only applicable to 
nationals of Member States, and thus third country nationals are excluded 
from its benefits.1524 On this basis, one might go a step further and exclude 
third country nationals from serving as means of comparison as well. This 
would bring down the whole discrimination argument-if there is no 
comparator external to the Union, there is no distinction in treatment. To 
wit, nationals of different Member States are all to be treated alike under 
the Spanish Protocol. 
However, given the wording of Article 12 TEC, the position taken by 
the restrictive commentators is questionable. Resorting to case law cannot 
decide the matter, as the ECJ has not pronounced itself explicitly on the 
applicability of the general non-discrimination clause to third country 
nationals. 1525 Other commentators reject a limitation of its personal scope 
1522 van Bogdandy, 1994, pp. 15-6, mn 55-8. 
1523 The sole difference is that the nationals of the Member State in which asylum is sought 
must be evidently excluded from the analysis, as asylum, by definition, is a benefit for 
non-nationals of the host state. 
1524 C. de Keersmaeker and T. Pauwels, 'Article 6', in H. Smit and P. E. Herzog (eds), Tbe 
Law of the European Community. A Commentary on the EEC Treaty (1998, Matthew 
Bender, New York), pp. 1-116, § 6.04: 'Though Article 6 does not say so explicitly, it is 
generally recognized that it protects only nationals of the Member States against 
discrimination'. Accord: EU-Kamow, EU:s rattsakter med kommentarer, 1st ed. (1999, 
Fakta Info Direkt, Stockholm), p. 49. 
1525 This issue has to be distinguished from issues where the claimant possesses the 
nationality of a Member State and the nationality of a third country. In these cases, the 
latter nationality is irrelevant for the outcome. 
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by the criterion of nationality. In von Bogdandy's view, this stance is 
supported by a systematic interpretation. He refers to Articles 39 (2), 43 
(1) and 49 TEC, all featuring an explicit linkage between the core content 
of personal freedoms and nationality in a Member State. 1526 Given the 
different construction of Article 12 TEC, a corresponding restriction to 
Union nationals was simply not intended by the drafters. This 
interpretation, drawing on the wording and the context of Article 12 TEC 
is, in our view, plausible. It does not imply, however, that this provision 
is limitless-the nexus to the scope of the TEC has to be recalled. 1527 Let us 
name one example. If the Council is to adopt a measure on asylum 
procedures, the rights of the third-country national under such a measure 
could be scrutinised as to their consistence with Article 12 TEC.1528 Vice-
versa, after the adoption of such a measure, the position of third-country 
nationals in asylum procedures can serve as a comparator in the 
assessment of discrimination of Union nationals. Therefore, in the 
absence of a measure adopted under Article 63 (1) (d) TEC, it is prudent 
to argue that there is no basis for making a comparison between Union 
nationals and third country nationals.1529 
This conclusion opens up the issue of justiciability. In theory, the 
tension between Article 12 TEC and the Spanish Protocol could very well 
be brought before the Court. Article 12 TEC is directly applicable in the 
domestic domain.1530 On the basis of Article 234 TEC, domestic courts 
may choose to request a ruling on the domestic implementation of the 
Spanish Protocol in the light of Article 12 TEC. Where this question is 
raised before a domestic court or tribunal against whose decisions there 
1526 von Bogdandy, 1994, pp. 9-10, mns 32-5, at mn 34. Accord: M. Zuleeg, 'Artikel 7', in 
von der Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann (eds), Handbuch des Europaischen Rechts, October 
1997 ed. (1997, Nomos, Baden-Baden), p. 147, mn. 16; R. Geiger, EG-Vertrag. 
Kommentar zu dem Vertrag zur Griindung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed. (1995, 
C.H.Beck, Miinchen), p. 55, mn 5. 
1527 For an exemplification of how Art. 12 TEC could protect third country nationals, see 
von Bogdandy, 1994, p. 10, mn 35. 
1528 Compare von Bogdandy, 1994, ibid. 
1529 This conclusion finds support with a doctrinal analysis of the Art. 6 of the EEC Treaty, 
which was the identically worded predecessor of Art. 12 TEC. Reitmaier states that a 
comparison of groups whose status is regulated by the EEC Treaty and groups whose 
status is not regulated by that treaty must be excluded. M. Reitmaier, 
lnliinderdiskriminierung nach dem EWG-Vertrag. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Auslegung von 
Art. 7 EWGV (1984, N.P. Engel, Kehl am Rhein), p. 69. 
1530 von Bogdandy, 1994, p. 2, mn. 2. 
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are no legal remedies under national law, that court or tribunal is even 
obliged to request a ruling from the ECJ. However, as it is probable that 
the ECJ would deny the existence of discrimination in the absence of a 
pertinent comparator, nothing would be won by pursuing that track. 
The situation may change, however, when the Council has complied 
with its assignments flowing from the Treaty of Amsterdam and adopted 
a measure under Article 63 (1) (d) TEC, determining minimum standards 
on the granting of refugee status. If such a measure incorporated the 
concept of safe countries of origin, a valid comparator would have come 
within the reach of the ECJ by virtue of Article 234 TEC. 
12.3.5 Appraisal 
The case of the Spanish Protocol confirmed that arguments on equality 
among non-nationals have a place in the discourse on extraterritorial 
protection. Prohibitions of discrimination limit the freedom of states to 
treat groups of protection seekers differently in their quest for targeted 
migration control. Theoretically, the construction of a successful 
discrimination argument moved into the realm of the possible. Provided 
that the German case study is indeed representative for the whole of the 
Union, the Spanish Protocol conflicts with the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
the ICCPR and the ECHR. The conflict is a genuine compliance conflict. 
The Spanish Protocol as well as the quoted norms of international law are 
mandatory and dictate a certain conduct. This conduct cannot be realised 
jointly. 
In a relevant case, the ECtHR or the Human Rights Committee might 
state that a Member State presuming a claim as manifestly unfounded 
along the lines of the Spanish Protocol is simply in violation of the 
prohibition of discrimination. Neither of these bodies is charged with 
maintaining coherence between the human rights instrument they are set 
to monitor and other legal systems. By contrast, had the ECJ possessed 
jurisdiction in a case involving the Spanish Protocol and found the 
discrimination argument developed above to be persuasive, it would 
certainly exert great effort to find an interpretation of the Spanish 
Protocol which upholds the image of coherence between EC law and 
international human rights law-informed, inter alia, by the strong 
impetus of Article 6 TEU. 
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This would not be an overtly difficult task. An interpretation of the 
Spanish Protocol in line with the three named instruments would imply 
that Member States are duty-bound to process asylum claims by nationals 
of other Member States without presuming that they are manifestly 
unfounded. The imperative 'shall' in paragraph (d) of the Sole Article is 
wholly eradicated by the discretion accorded to Member States in the 
same provision. Actually, Member States are obliged by international law 
to use this discretion to process claims by Union citizens precisely as they 
process claims by persons holding the nationality of a non-Member State. 
This conclusion strips the Spanish Protocol further of its normative 
content, and the only obligation still intact is the duty to inform the 
Council on asylum applications made by nationals of other Member 
States. 
Let us compare the itinerary to this conclusion with our earlier 
reasoning on visa requirements. In both cases, the setting was straight-
forward. Distinction in treatment was expressly based on nationality, 
which actualised the issue of direct discrimination. This unambiguous 
setting implies an initial advantage for the individual claimant arguing that 
she is discriminated. 
The closed environment in which the Spanish Protocol operates turned 
out to be the decisive element for the successful formulation of a 
discrimination argument. For the affected individual, the consequences of 
the Spanish Protocol can be specified by comparing accelerated and 
normal asylum procedures. For the affected state, the degree to which its 
aim is realised can be substantiated by statistics. This is a far cry from the 
situation we met when assessing visa requirements. Using the German 
asylum system as a paradigmatic example for quantification of intrusion, 
we could come to a reasonably determinate conclusion: the means devised 
by the Spanish Protocol are not proportional to its aims, and an 
implementation of the Protocol implies discrimination. 
In the case of visa requirements, a discrimination argument would 
ultimately fail on the extremely open empirical environment. Legally, this 
makes the reliance on equality reasoning a highly uncertain option. Are 
there any indicators as to when such indeterminacy will occur? 
We recall that it was simply very difficult to predict what states would 
lose by the abolishment of visa requirements. The determinacy of 
outcomes is contingent upon the predictability of claims and the 
predictability of claims is contingent upon the size of the claimant group 
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and the resource-demands made by their claims. This size of the claimant 
group can be governed by e.g. exclusion on grounds of nationality and 
territoriality. Equality arguments drawing the outcomes of such 
exclusionary mechanisms into question generate, by necessity, in-
determinate outcomes in themselves. The degree to which such 
indeterminacy is manageable depends on several factors. Indeterminacy 
will grow with the size of the claimant group and of the resource-demands 
made by them. At a given point of complexity, any equality argument 
will collapse. Recurring to our case studies, the complexity generated by 
equality reasoning with regard to the Spanish Protocol was manageable. 
The inclusionary claims could be shown to be so limited in number that a 
determinate outcome was still in reach. By contrast, assessment of the 
consequences of modifying visa requirements, as well as the consequences 
of retaining them, proved to be extremely demanding. While the 
imposition of visa requirements is probably the most important regulator 
in the whole protection regime, equality reasoning only opens up the 
complexity of the political discourse again. This overstretches the capacity 
of application discourses in law and, as a result, the outcome will be 
subjectively decisionist rather than technically determinate. Thus may we 
conclude on the theoretical aspects. 
But material determinacy is not all. In the case of the Spanish Protocol, 
the effectiveness of equality norms was hampered by procedural norms 
diminishing their justiciability. We looked into options for redress under 
four relevant instruments. A synoptic view boils down to the rather 
prosaic conclusion that the degree of justiciability is contingent on 
limitations in scope. This general observation can be specified in two 
particular relationships. First, the degree of justiciability hinges on the 
geographical scope of the instrument. Typically, a regional instrument 
yields greater l~verage than an international one. This holds true when 
comparing the ECHR and the TEC on one hand with the ICCPR and the 
1951 Refugee Convention on the other. Second, the degree of justiciability 
is related to the material scope of the norm prohibiting discrimination. 
Ancillary or thematically restricted prohibitions of discrimination are 
equipped with better options for implementation than autonomous 
prohibitions of discrimination. A comparison of the ECHR with the 
ICCPR provides a telling example in that respect. 
To prove this point, let us order the relevant instruments as to the 
degree of justiciability available under them (see Table 9 below). A first 
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group comprises instruments with a potentially universal geographical 
scope. The 1951 Refugee Convention would assume the lowest position, 
as it lacks any form of monitoring mechanism. At the next level, we find 
the ICCPR, featuring a monitoring machinery built on state reports, and 
an optional mechanism for individual grievances. 
The second group is made up of regionally confined instruments, and it 
leaves the first group far behind with regard to justiciability. The next 
position is held by the ECHR, automatically allowing for individual 
grievances and offering the advantage of binding judgements. Finally, the 
top position is assumed by the TEC. In comparison to the ECHR, its 
applicability is geographically limited to the circle of Member States. 
Further, it covers only discrimination based on nationality within the 
material scope of the Treaty. However, with regard to justiciability, the 
advantages offered by it exceed those under the ECHR. The prohibition 
of nationality-based discrimination in the TEC enjoys direct effect in the 
domestic fora of the Member States. The seamless integration of EC law 
with domestic law is an advantage which is hitherto unparalleled by the 
monitoring mechanisms available under international treaties. However, 
for the moment, the usefulness of the TEC is conditioned on future action 
to be taken by the Council. In practice, this confines a claimant to the 
ECHR as the single remaining option. 
A comparison between the first group (universal instruments not 
yielding binding decisions) and the second group (regional instruments 
yielding binding decisions) illustrates the relations of geographical and 
material scope expounded above (see Table 9). 1531 As rational actors, states 
strive for predictability in their commitments. One way to achieve pre-
dictability is to fine-tune the relationship between material obligation and 
formal enforceability. It is prudent not to endow a generously framed 
concept of equality with justiciability. Conversely, a minimalist concep-
tion of non-discrimination, confined to specific grounds and ancillary to a 
limited number of rights, limits the risks entailed by state obligations 
1531 Both relations can even be applied within the second group. It should be noted that they 
do not apply within the first group. The 1951 Refugee Convention offers only an 
ancillary right to non-discrimination, which must be contrasted with Art. 26 ICCPR, 
which grants an autonomous right to equality. Thus, compared to the latter, the 1951 
Refugee Convention is more limited in material scope and offers no possibilities for 




under it. Therefore, it is more likely that such restricted concepts are 
complemented by a mechanism for individual redress. 
Instrument Geographical Material Reporting Individual Binding 




GC Universal Ancillary to No No N/A 
GC rights 
ICCPR Universal Autonomous Yes Facultative No 
ECHR Europe Ancillary to No Yes Yes 
ECHR rights 
TEC EU Autonomous No Yes Yes, 
Member within scope direct 
States of application effect 
ofTEC 
Table 9: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and justiciability. 
Comparison of four international treaties. 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to answer the question whether central parts of the 
binding EU acquis are in conformity with international law. Our analysis 
can be condensed into the following conclusion. All of the scrutinised 
instruments can be interpreted and applied in a manner conforming to 
international law, but a conforming interpretation and application strips 
the acquis instruments of their central control functions. Conformity is 
bought at the price of efficiency. 
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In the light of the ECHR, visa requirements under the Schengen acquis 
and the EU Visa Regulation must be waived if they inhibit single 
individuals from reaching territories where they can find protection. 
However, whether visa requirements as such represent discriminatory 
treatment of the nationalities subjected to them could not be conclusively 
determined. 
Member States must abstain from allocation under the Dublin 
Convention, if the receiving Member State upholds an interpretation of 
international legal norms prohibiting refoulement that deviates from an 
interpretation of such norms under the Vienna Convention. The example 
of persecution of third parties proved that large sub-groups of protection 
seekers a.rid important host countries-Germany and France-are affected 
by such divergences in interpretation. Conformity to international law 
suggests that the allocation mechanism of the Dublin Convention risks 
becoming inoperable due to the widespread disharmony among domestic 
protection systems in the EU. 
Finally, conformity to international law requires Member States to 
disregard the central element of the Spanish Protocol, namely the 
presumption that applications by Union citizens are manifestly 
unfounded. This conclusion largely empties the Protocol of its normative 
content. What remains is a mere reporting obligation to the Council, 
whenever a Member State receives applications by Union citizens. 
In all, the resistance offered by the protective norms of international 
law is considerable. Conforming interpretations of the central instruments 
perforate the filters of pre-entry and post-entry measures to control access 
to territory-the Visa Regulation and the Dublin Convention-as well as 
the sole binding procedural filter-the Spanish Protocol. 
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13 Demos, Determinacy and 
Justification 
As OUR INQUIR y APPROACHES ITS END, we may conclude that 
many contentious issues could be resolved by a rigorous and consequent 
application of the canon of interpretation prescribed by international law. 
However, we were left with a number of indeterminate outcomes: 
1. Is there an obligation to share protective burdens under the law of the 
European Union? This question could not be resolved in chapter 8. 
2. Is there a right to immigration under Article 12 ICCPR? This 
question could not be resolved in chapter 10. 
3. What is the precise extent of positive obligations to accord 
extraterritorial protection under the ECHR and its Protocols? This 
question could not be resolved in chapter 11. 
4. Do visa requirements represent a form of collective discrimination 
prohibited under international law? This question could not be 
resolved in chapter 12. 
These four issues actualise the last of the three basic questions with which 
this work was tasked: can questions on the content of relevant legal norms 
be answered in a determinate manner? 
Before embarking on further explorations, we note that the four 
indeterminate issues enumerated above are no mere details in the 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _014
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normative edifice of European integration. On the contrary. Each of them 
is of considerable significance for the extent of obligations incumbent on 
the single Member State in the areas of migration and asylum law. The 
first question, on burden-sharing, is the prime determinant of how 
domestic and supranational protection systems will develop in the years 
to come, and how much each Member State will contribute to this 
development. Access to territory-the issue uniting both Article 12 
ICCPR and the legality of visa requirements under discrimination 
prohibitions-is presently the critical question in the design of protection 
systems. It has a much greater impact on protection costs in Member 
States than does the level of individual rights accorded to protection 
seekers. already present on state territory. Finally, the ECHR turned out 
to be 1 a wildcard with considerable protection potential, hampered only 
by the unclear extent of positive obligations to mete out extraterritorial 
protection. The implications of the last observation are anything but 
trivial. 
Nt'lither the canon of interpretation prescribed by the Vienna 
Convention nor elaborate proportionality arguments could dissolve the 
indeterminacy engulfing these four issues. Yet it is no coincidence that 
formalism fails in matters of great significance. Legal rules governing these 
matters are frozen political conflicts. As earlier noted, interpretation as 
well as discrimination arguments are nothing less than a gradual un-
packing of the political tension feeding the legislative process. The greater 
the original political tension crammed into a norm, the more likely it is 
that interpretation and discrimination arguments arrive at a full re-
storation of that conflict. The larger the claim, the greater the risk of 
indeterminacy. And the underlying tension is indeed a large one: after all, 
it is not incidental that legal indeterminacy runs precisely along the same 
fault 1lines that sever universalists from particularists in the realm of 
political theory. Hence, the hope expressed by the end of Chapter 2 has 
come to naught: there is no presumption for either universalism or 
particularism implied in the edifice of international law, as far as it is 
relevtnt for the issue of extraterritorial protection. We are faced with two 
questions, springing from the same source: one is about the delimitation 
of communities, the other about the determinacy of legal norms 
governing such delimitation. 
What does the law do with indeterminate issues? One response is to 
institi'.itionalise them. A court or some other decision-making body is 
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entrusted with the task of finding an answer. Even where the crutches of 
formalism fail, such bodies are obliged to deliver a decision. This response 
aims at creating determinacy through justiciability. With one significant 
exception, we find that the indeterminate issues emerging in the course of 
this inquiry are largely beyond justiciability. It is inconceivable that the 
question of burden-sharing can be formulated in such a manner that it 
would fall under the competence of a court. With regard to the access 
question, practical difficulties inhibit affected individuals to turn to courts. 
It is practically impossible to file a claim on access to territory from 
outside that territory, and to pursue it in an efficient manner. Finally, our 
discrimination arguments revealed that entitlement and justiciability are 
linked: justiciability decreases, where the scope of discrimination 
prohibitions increases. Thus, we may complement the preceding para-
graph with the following conclusion: the larger the claim, the less 
justiciable it is. 
But there is one significant exception to both correlates. It is the ECHR 
and its monitoring by the Strasbourg organs. By its case law relating to 
extraterritorial protection under Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR has shown 
that it is willing to consider claims of a considerable magnitude. More-
over, the Contracting Parties to the ECHR have entrusted the Court with 
the competence to pronounce judgments binding in the individual case. 
Although this mechanism of justiciability is hampered by a number of 
needle's eyes-among them the considerable length of procedures-it 
represents a singular, and indeed revolutionary, forum for creating 
determinacy in matters of inclusion and exclusion. 
Now, although formalism failed, the cause of determinacy is not 
necessarily lost for good. Theoretically, it is conceivable that determinacy 
is produced by a material rather than a formal rule. Put simply, it could 
be that the legal system contains an intrinsic rule, tilting the balance of 
indeterminacy into one direction or another. We could imagine a rule 
letting state interests prevail in cases of doubt. Actually, we saw earlier 
that the existence of such a rule has been argued by doctrinal writers. 1532 
Or we could imagine a rule prescribing the contrary, and presuming that a 
universalist understanding of human rights should supersede particularist 
state interests. If such a presumption exists, what is its content? In dubio 
pro communitate or in dubio pro humanitate? We recall that this question 
1532 See text accompanying note 1192 above. 
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was brought up in chapter 2, when expounding the conflict of uni-
versalism and particularism feeding the legal issues in this work. However, 
the question was never answered. Such an answer is our last resort, before 
we have to concede that indeterminacy reigns supreme. The existence-or, 
indeed, the impossibility-of a material presumption shall be the subject 
of the following section. 
We shall proceed in three steps. First, we shall illustrate how conflicts 
of delimitation and determinacy are aggravated at a supranational level; 
the European Union shall serve as a self-evident example. Second, we shall 
look into three possible answers: essence, contract or indeterminacy. 
Third, and finally, we shall reinterpret the function of the Strasbourg 
Court as an imperfect institutional response to the challenges entailed by 
essence, contract and indeterminacy. 
13.1 Tilting the Balance: Constructions of the Demos 
Who is the demos? From chapter 2 onwards, we have encountered the 
difficulties of political theorists, philosophers and international Lawyers to 
consent upon a valid method for singling out valid delimitations of the 
scope of protection. Basically, the search for a threshold is about identi-
fying the group to which institutional protection is extended-a demos. 
The variety of decisions on inclusion and exclusion are all predicated on 
the foundational question of 'who is the demos'. The totality of these 
decisions in a given society forms its answer to that question. In brief, the 
demos is a formula by means of which a given society specifies the right 
balance between inclusion and exclusion.1533 To exemplify, one may refer 
to nationality law with its principal choice between formulas based on jus 
sanguinis or jus soli. Taking another example, one may tolerate the 
continued stay of rejected protection seekers, or one may handcuff them 
and force them onto an aeroplane destined to their country of origin. 
To validate such answers, a variety of assumptions on the ultimate 
linkage between individual and society are on offer. As we have seen 
earlier, some thinkers recur to 'embeddedness'-e.g. kinship, descent, 
language, or common heritage-while others focus on contractual 
1533 On the exclusionary aspect of the demos concept, see F. Muller, Wer ist das Volk? Die 
Grundfrage der Demokratie-Elemente einer Verfassungstheorie VI (R. Christensen ed.), 
(1997, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), pp. 47-56. 
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bounds-e.g. hypothetical social contracts or actual human rights 
instruments.1534 Evidently, non-consensual models build on an organismic-
particularist perception of what constitutes a demos, while consensual 
models reflect an artefactual-universalist approach to that question. Below, 
we shall introduce Carl Schmitt's conception of the demos as an example 
of a non-consensual model. Such models are problematic for a number of 
reasons, one being their essentialist foundation, whose core is inaccessible 
to rational reconstruction.1535 
The non-consensual understanding of demos is countered by con-
sensual models, drawing on some form of contract, either as a mere 
hypothesis, or in the form of a constitutional agreement. Contractual 
models are products of modernism, having their basis in the experience of 
the bourgeois revolutions. Their centrepiece is the idea of the human 
being as a rational actor. Below, we shall introduce Jurgen Habermas' 
reconstruction of basic rights and democratic rule by means of a 
contractual approach. But contractual models beg questions as well. Who 
is to determine the circle of participants constituting themselves as a 
demos in the original discourse situation? And how does the contractual 
model handle claims for inclusion which are made after the constitution of 
society and demos has taken place? Apparently, within such models, a 
new divide of universalist and particularist positions opens up. 
Before embarking on explorations of essence, contract and an 
indeterminate in-between, let us recapitulate how the dispute on demos is 
aggravated by the process of European integration. 
I 
1534 The dichotomy of consensual and non-consensual models has been used by Jern 
Hampton when criticising nonconsensual models (as practiced in Germany and Japan)las 
incompatible with liberal democratic principles. See J. Hampton, 'Immigration, welfare 
and justice', in W. F. Schwarz (ed.), justice in Immigration (1995, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge), pp. 76-93. 
1535 Another pertinent question for essentialists is how to handle situations where not all 
parts of a state population belong to the essentialistically defined demos. As already 
pointed out in 1814 by Heinrich Luden, the choices on offer are eviction or integration 
(H. Luden, Das Vaterland oder Volk und Staat (1814)). Luden himself esteemed eviction 
to be ethically unacceptable. However, historical expertise has shown that its practice 
represents a marked feature of our century. Eviction, or, as a popular euphemism has it, 
'ethnic cleansing' has been exercised repeatedly in various forms, ranging from 
voluntary population transfers to physical extermination. Since World War II, historical 
research has counted between 40 and 80 million victims of such policies. For a brief 
overwiew, see Karl Schlogel, Kosovo war itberall, and Europas verschobene VOiker, both in 
Die Zeit Nr. 18 (29 April 1999), pp. 14-7 and p. 16 respectively. 
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13.1.1 The European Union and the Demos Dilemma 
If identifying the demos is painstaking even at the level of the nation state, 
these difficulties are amplified in a supranational setting. For all that is 
certain, the project of a European Union can be described as simul-
taneously extending and limiting protection. Seen from the perspective of 
the Member States, the Union is about sharing protection with the 
populations of other Member States. Seen from the outside, the Union 
appears as a merger of mighty sovereigns promoting protection for its 
populations at the expense of others. This actualises two dimensions-one 
on the extension, the other on the limitation of protection. 
Extending protection to others than one's own people1536 means giving 
up parts of the established linkage between a preconceived, essentialist 
demos and inclusion. Limiting protection to the citizens of the Member 
States begs the question of justification: why stop here, why not extend 
protection further eastwards or southwards? Hence, to justify this shifting 
of boundaries, the Union would need a demos of its own-or a social 
contract of its own. 
To be sure, the establishment of a new, pan-European demos was 
expressly not envisaged by the drafters of the foundational treaties. It is 
indicative that the preamble of the TEC speaks of 'an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe'. Weiler asserts rightly that the allusion to 
peoples rejects 'any notion of melting pot and nation-building' .1537 
Regarding the conjuration of an 'ever closer union', he points out that 
'something which goes on for "ever" incorporates, of course, the 
"never"'_ 1538 
Keeping this rejection in mind, it is simply misconceived to answer the 
demos question by lanuching an essentialist conception of 'European 
culture' as an organising principle, as attempted by the European 
Commission. 1539 Firstly, it represents a retrogression to nation-building 
techniques of the past, as Hansen aptly noted: '[i]n some meaning then, 
the European Union resembles the Western European nation-states prior 
1536 The flagship of this extension is the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, enshrined in Art. 12 TEC as well a number of context-specific norms. 
1537 Weiler, 1999, p. 93, note 212. See also pp. 336-47. 
1538 Weiler, 1999, p. 93, note 212. 
1539 For an elaborate analysis, see P. Hansen, Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and 
the European Union (2000, Department of Political Science, U mea), pp. 51-71. 
564 
DEMOS, DETERMINACY, JUSTIFICATION 
to the expansion of voting rights and large scale population mobilization 
from below, in that it seeks to disseminate a mythical cultural identity 
rather than the practical tools with which a process of democratization 
could be initiated'. 1540 Secondly, and most importantly, it is a deeply 
ironic contradiction that archaic nation-building techniques are used in a 
situation where the foundational treaties reject the existence of a single 
European demos. 1541 The conclusion is inevitable: a 'Union identity' 
capable of competing with the foundational qualities of its national 
counterparts, does not exist. Ultimately, the core of the legal regimes 
spawned within the Union framework is citizenship in a Member 
State. 1542 
In the absence of any common 'national identity' predicated on a 
traditional demos concept possessing mythical force, integration and the 
ensuing sharing of resources can only be justified by the universality of 
certain values. Here, the necessary responsiveness to universality and 
equality poses specific problems for the supranational particularist 
professing d'abord !'Europe. If free trade is a common good, it is definitely 
so for all, not only for Member State populations. And the same goes for 
the other freedoms, including the freedom of movement under scrutiny in 
this work. In the same vein as the particularist argument of 'national 
interests' loses power within the Union, arguing the exclusion of non-
U nion interests becomes more difficult to justify. 
In the absence of a mythically delimited demos, the particularist 
justification of exclusion hinges solely on functional arguments. That is: 
building the European Union is only justifiable as a first step in the global 
realisation of freedom, security and justice. To be successful, this step 
needs to be taken in a secure and controlled environment, limiting the 
amount of outside interference. Thus, the move to an ever-closer Union 
produces its own Orwellian paradoxes: integration is attained by means of 
154-0 Hansen, 2000, p. 66. 
1541 See also the concise analysis in D. Curtin, Postnational Democracy. The European Union 
in Search of a Political Philosoplry (1997, Kluwer Law International, The Hague), 
pp. 48-51. This rejection has been seconded, most famously, by the Maastricht-judgment 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court. 
1542 This becomes particularly clear in the formulation of European Citizenship in Part II of 
the EC Treaty. From a national perspective, the EU is a regulatory mechanism for the 
differentiated treatment of aliens. Citizens from other Member States are generally 
accorded a more favourable treatment than other citizens. Ultimately, the nation state's 
divide between citizen and non-citizen remains intact. 
565 
CHAPTER 13 
exclusion, freedom achieved by means of control. The liberal-universalist 
paradigm behind the dismantling of borders is violently forged together 
with a particularist control paradigm erecting new ones. 
These paradoxes become particularly visible in the regulation of free 
movement in the European Union. As we have seen, the abolishment of in-
ternal borders is bought at the expense of erecting ever-higher external 
borders. Such a trade-off tends to undermine the very ideal of freedom of 
movement, as its justification hinges precisely on universality. The only de-
fence would be, once more, to display the elitist solution as a first step to 
the universal implementation of rights. Compared to an essentialist delimi-
tation inherent in the demos concept, the functional perspective is much 
weaker when it comes to deflecting inclusionary claims. Otherwise put, it is 
still a particularist perspective, but includes a fair dose of universalism. 
If the non-consensual concept of demos cannot be applied to the 
Union, what about the consensual counterpart? At first sight, this quest-
ion seems to lead us to the comprehensive debates on the democratic 
deficit, the need for a European constitution and uncertainties engulfing 
the draft EU charter of fundamental rights. 1543 While relevant, a more spe-
cific indicator seems to be the position of third country nationals in the 
normative edifice of the European Union. First, we have the situation of 
third country nationals being legally present in the Union. Had the EU 
drawn on a consensual demos concept, we could reasonably expect that 
group to be allowed to participate in the extension of supranational rights 
within the EU. However, this is not the case. Although the European 
Commission as well as single governments have repeatedly pushed for a 
reinforcement of integrative measures to the benefit of third country 
nationals, the actual achievements have been extremely limited.1544 With 
1543 For a discussion on the constitutional dimension of European integration, see e.g. J. 
Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (1996, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), 
pp. 185-91. 
1544 Staples submits that '[t]he net result of Union dealings with third country nationals is 
that there is not one, comprehensive regime applicable to all third country nationals 
irrespective of their country of residence or nationality. Key features of the Union's 
approach are in-equality and a complex legal structure, hardly understandable to 
specialists in the field, let alone to those whom it really concerns'. H. Staples, The Legal 
Status of Third Country Natio·nals Resident in the European Union (1999, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague), p. 184. See also B. Vila Costa, 'The Quest for a Consistent 
Set of Rules Governing the Status of non-Community Nationals', in P. Alston (ed.), The 
European Union and Human Rights (1999, OUP, Oxford), p. 437, speaking of a 'plurality 
of confused legal solutions and an asymmetrical and purblind policy'. 
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regard to freedom of movement, it is all too indicative that the adoption 
of measures regulating residence rights within the Union for legally 
present third country nationals is merely listed among the facultative 
measures under Art. 63 (4) TEC. This relegates third country nationals to 
an uncomfortable position between nation and Union. However far-
reaching domestic integration policies may be, the absence of a supra-
national counterpart leaves them with a mark of inferiority. Second, we 
have third country nationals, who, for whatever reason, wish to enter the 
Union. This group is met with a deafening silence: while there is certainly 
a common policy on immigration control, a policy on immigration is 
simply absent. The Union prefers to remain tacit on the future 
composition of its demos. 
Taken together with the absence of a constitutional instrument and a 
charter of rights on a par with domestic counterparts, the Union's absent 
demos concept makes a contractual reconstruction of European 
integration extremely difficult. Reverting to Carens' demand that we 
should allow immigrants to sign our social contract1545 , it has to be ad-
mitted that the EU simply possesses no social contract to sign. 
So much for empiry. As long as the Union fails to develop a credible 
notion of its demos, the setting of exclusionary thresholds remains a 
technical exercise, predicated on the tools designed for the framework of 
the nation-state and governed solely by a rationale of controlling 
migration. 1546 In all, the Union's demos is controlled, yet undefined. Our 
question on determinacy and delimitation reached further, though. Could 
an essentialist or a contractarian approach lend itself to justifying the 
delimitation of the demos and the determination of the law in the future? 
If the answer is a twofold 'no', what are the consequences? We shall 
pursue these questions in the following sections. 
1545 See text accompanying note 241 above. 
1546 It is highly ironic that Member States enforce a control paradigm even if it strikes back 
against their own citizens. The Spanish Protocol stipulates that all Member States shall 
regard each other as safe countries of origin when determining asylum claims from 
Union citizens. This is unique insofar as the EU consciously places citizens from other 




13.1.2 Essence: Distinguishing Friend and Foe 
To exemplify non-consensual approaches, we choose to reflect on the 
conceptualisation of the demos elaborated by Carl Schmitt. To be sure, 
Schmitt is a problematic figure in a twofold sense. First, his affiliations to 
the power structures of the Third Reich have haunted and continue to 
haunt his oeuvre. Until today, the debate on Schmitt's biography as well 
as his writings remains polarised. 1547 Second, his radical antiuniversalism 
and critique of liberalism have experienced a renaissance in the aftermath 
of postmodernist scepticism. 1548 In the fields of political as well as legal 
theory, Schmitt presently evokes a fascination reminiscent of the earlier 
postmodernists' enormous interest in Friedrich Nietzsche: both combine 
radicality, originality and intellectual agility with a sinister aura and a 
certain haut gout. Given the political distance between Schmitt-a 
Catholic conservative fiercely critical of the Weimar democracy-and 
postmodern scepticism of radical-democratic progeniture, one may speak 
of a paradox. 
Why Schmitt? In the realm of essentialist conceptions of the demos, his 
writings offer a considerable degree of transparency, stringency and 
eloquence which is largely unparalleled in particularist approaches 
discussed earlier. 1549 By exemplifying particularism with Schmitt, we do 
not wish to discredit particularism by a creeping association to the Third 
1547 For a concise biographical discussion on the relationship between Schmitt and the 
power structures of the Third Reich, see M. Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel? Die 
philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats- und Rechtslehre (1988, Verlag Karl 
Alber, Freiburg im Breisgau/Miinchen), pp. 31-43. A balanced and reflective 
introduction, intertwining biography and oeuvre, can be found with R. Mehring, Carl 
Schmitt zur Einfiihrung (1992, Junius, Hamburg). 
1548 For a well-argued reflection of the reasons behind this rising interest, see D. Dyzenhaus, 
'Introduction: Why Carl Schmitt?', in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), Law as politics: Carl Schmitt's 
critique of liberalism (1998, Duke University Press, Durham and London). One recent 
exploration can be found with J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship (1997, Verso, London), 
ch. 6, looking into the friend/foe distinction discussed in the present section. For a sharp 
criticism of the Schmittian renaissance, see J. Habermas, Die Normalitat einer Berliner 
Republik (1995, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), pp. 112-22. 
1549 Compare the particularist approaches discussed in chapter 2.3 and 2.6 above. Even from 
the perspective of the 'true universalist', there are reasons to study Schmitt to detect 'the 
deadlocks of post-political liberal tolerance', it is argued in S. Zi:Zek, 'Carl Schmitt in the 
Age of Post-Politics', in C. Mouffe (ed.), The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (1999, Verso, 
London), pp. 35-6. 
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Reich. Rather, we would like to flag for the potential for political 
manipulation and exploitation inherent in essentialist approaches. 1550 
The particularist core distinction in Schmitt's thinking is the distinc-
tion between friend and foe. Before looking into the latter, we need to 
clear our thoughts on how Schmitt conceived of democracy, equality and 
the pluralist structure of the international community. 
In line with his definition of democracy as the identity of rulers and 
ruled1551, Schmitt points to the homogeneity of a people as a prerequisite 
for its capacity to exert sovereignty.1552 To Schmitt's mind, a people is 
more than an aggregation of individuals, it is an essence in itself. 
However, as Chantal Mouffe has pointed out in her distinct essay on 
Schmitt and political liberalism, Schmitt was not necessarily having ethnic 
homogeniety in mind: 'Schmitt never postulated that this belonging to a 
people could only be envisaged in racial terms. [ ... ] He says for instance 
that the substance of equality "can be found in certain physical and moral 
qualities, for example, in civic virtue, in arete, the classical democracy of 
vertus (vertu)"'. 1553 Hence, Schmitt's demos is not necessarily an ethnos. 
This axiomatic linkage between homogeneity, equality and the exercise 
of sovereignty suggests that the state is an ultimate entity of the political, 
1550 The manipulate dangers of-particularist or universalist-essentialism can be illustrated 
by Schmitt's claim that 'he, who says mankind, intends to deceive'. (C. Schmitt, 
'Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat', in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-
Genf-Versailles 1929-1939 (1988, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), p. 143). Turning around 
this warning for the imperialist potential in universalism, one could say that he, who 
says demos, intends to deceive as well. Judging who is to be included and who is to be 
excluded under an essentialist concept of demos is, pro tanto, subject to the same 
manipulative dangers as are inherent in an uncritical, mythical concept of humanity. 
1551 C. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1991, Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin), p. 20 and C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie (1985, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin), p. 64. 
1552 
1553 
'Zur Demokratie gehi:irt als notwendig erstens Homogenitat und zweitens-
ni:itigenfalls-die Ausscheidung oder Vernichtung des Heterogenen.' ['Necessary 
attributes of democracy are, first, homogeneity, and, second, where necessary, the 
exclusion and annihilation of the heterogenous.' Translation by this author.] The piece 
containing this stat~ment was written in 1926-nine years before Germany passed the 
laws prohibiting marriage and sexual intercourse between Jews and Non-Jews. C. 
Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1929-1939 (1980, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), p. 59. 
C. Mouffe, 'Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy', in D. Dyzenhaus 
(ed.), Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism (1998, Duke University Press, 
Durham and London), p. 162. Emphasis in the original. 
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which inevitably entails a situation of pluralism in the international 
arena. 1554 Schmitt traces the advent of the nation state back to a liberation 
process from the universal demands of a global emperorship and the 
political demands of papal power. Following Schmitt, the plurality of 
states is the genuine expression of a correctly grasped pluralism.1555 This 
explains why Schmitt is deeply sceptical of the universalist concept of 
humanity, which he associates with imperialist aspirations for domi-
nance.1556 Very much in line with later communitarian thought, the state 
is regarded as the ultimate vehicle for self-determination of the demos. 
This alone does not exceed where our earlier explorations of 
particularism had brought us. The added value lying in Schmitt's 
approach surfaces in his inquiry into the political. To start with, he 
suggests that 'the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political' .1557 The state is but a status of the people; however, Schmitt 
underscores, in comparison to any other conceivable individual or 
collective status, it is the 'decisive' one. 1558 Hence, the concept of the 
political is at the core of the demos: 
Alle Merkmale dieser Vorstellung-Status und Volk-erhalten 
ihren Sinn erst durch das weitere Merkmal des Politischen, und 
werden unverstandlich, wenn das W esen des Politischen 
millverstanden wird.1559 
What, then is the essence of the political? Schmitt localises it in a specific 
political category: it is the distinction between friend and foe. 1560 He 
attempts to develop this distinction not by inquiring into the concept of 
friendship, but by probing the concept of the foe: 
1554 Schmitt, 1988, pp. 141-4. 
1555 Schmitt, 1988, p. 142. 
1556 See note 1550 above. 
1557 Schmitt, 1963, p. 20. 
1558 Schmitt, 1963, p. 20. 
1559 ['All attributes of this representation-status and people-receive their meaning only 
through the additional attribute of the political, and become incomprehensible, if the 
essence of the political is misconceived.' Translation by this author.] Schmitt, 1963, 
p. 20. 
1560 Schmitt, 1963, p. 26. The parallels between Schmitt's bipolar categorisations and 
Luhmann's systemic codes are striking. 
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Feind ist nur eine wenistens eventuell, d.h. der realen Moglichkeit 
nach kampfende Gesamtheit von Menschen, die einer ebensolchen 
Gesamtheit gegeniibersteht. Feind ist nur der offentliche Feind, 
weil alles, was auf eine solche Gesamtheit von Menschen, 
insbesondere auf ein ganzes Volk Bezug hat, dadurch offentlich 
wird. Feind ist hostis, nicht inimicus ini weiteren Sinne [ ... ).1561 
Schmitt uses the attribute of the political to support his thesis of a 
pluralist world of states: 
Aus dem Begriffsmerkmal des Politischen folgt der 
Pluralismus der Staatenwelt. Die politische Einheit setzt die 
reale Moglichkeit des Feindes voraus. Es gibt deshalb auf der 
Erde, solange es iiberhaupt einen Staat gibt, immer mehrere 
Staaten, und kann keinen die ganze Erde und ganze 
Menscheit umfassendenden W elt"staat" geben.1562 
At the same time, Schmitt is careful to maintain a high degree of 
flexibility in the classification of friend and foe, and to detach it from the 
concept of the state. He underscores that associations and dissociations 
along the friend/foe divide may change over years, and that the political 
can draw power from any area of human life, be it from religious, 
economic, moral or other oppositions. Moreover, the foe can be both 
external and internal to the state.1563 Thus, the political demarcates a degree 
of intensity attached to associations or dissociations between human 
beings.1564 Compared to traditional modes of delimitation, drawing on 
territoriality or ethnicity, this is a decisive difference. 
1561 ['The foe is solely a totality of persons, at least possibly fighting, that is, according to the 
real possibility, which is opposed to an identical totality. The foe is solely the public foe, 
because everything which has a bearing on such a totality of humans, especially a people, 
turns public. The foe is hostis, not inimicus in a wider sense [ ... ].' Translation by this 
author.] Schmitt, 1963, p. 29. Emphasis in the original. 
1562 ['From the concep'tual attribute of the political flows the pluralism of the state sphere. 
Political unity presupposes the real possibility of the foe. Therefore, as long as a state 
exists in the world, there will always be several states, and there cannot be a world 
"state", embracing the whole world and humanity as a whole.' Translation by this 
author.]Schmitt, 1963, p. 54. 
1563 Schmitt, 1963, p. 46. 
1564 Schmitt, 1963, pp. 38-9. 
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Following Schmitt's conceptualisation of the foe, the element of struggle 
is at the base of the political. And this element is circumscribed strictly by 
Schmitt. The concepts of friend, foe and struggle receive their meaning 
only through their relationship to the actual possibility of physically 
killing the foe. 1565 Preparedness to kill, and preparedness to die1566-this 
couplet is the water-shed severing the political foe from other concepts of 
the foe, and demarcating the concept of the political as such. 1567 But the 
violence inherent in armed struggle merely evidences that a distinction 
between friend and foe has been made. The core of that distinction 
remains occult, and Schmitt no more than hints at it in his later works: 
'Der Feind ist unsere eigene Frage als Gestalt'-the foe is our own question 
qua gestalt. 1568 As Meier has pointed out, this recognition of the foe is 
concurrently the recognition of one's own identity, which therewith 
attains a perceptible gestalt. 1569 This fits nicely with constructivist con-
temporary models, seeking to explain restrictive immigration practices in 
the North as an important factor in the fabrication of national identi-
ties.1570 Where communitarians devise identity from the embeddedness of 
the individual within community, Schmitt-and his postmodern epi-
gones-construct identity as a function of collective opposition. 
Mirroring Schmitt's approach on the reality of migration and asylum 
law in the EU certainly creates uncomfortable feelings. All talk of 
'fighting illegal migration', lamentably present in EU instruments 
1565 Schmitt, 1963, p. 33. 
1566 Schmitt, 1963, p. 46. 
1567 Schmitt's approach has been repeatedly criticised for its bellicose character, a critique 
which he has tried to refute ex ante in Schmitt, 1963, pp. 33-4. See W. Palaver, Die 
mythischen Quellen des Politischen. Carl Schmitts Freund-Feind-Theorie (1998, Verlag W. 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart), pp. 14-5, who identifies important differences between Schmitt 
and ideologically proximate intellectuals of the German 'conservatory revolution' of the 
1920s. See also Kaufmann, 1988, p. 51 note 15; and the foreword of the 1963 edition of 
'Der Begriff des Politischen' .Schmitt, 1963, pp. 9-19. 
1568 C. Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen (1975, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin), p. 87. Schmitt has taken this phrase from Theodor 
Daubler's 'Sang an Palermo' ('Der Feind ist unsre eigene Frage als Gestalt./Und er wird 
uns, wir ihn zum selben Ende hetzen.'). 
1569 H. Meier, Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss und 'Der Begriff des Politischen~ Zu einem Dialog unter 
Abwesenden (1998, Verlag J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart), p. 35. 
157° For a recent example, see C. Dauvergne, 'Confronting Chaos: Migration Law Responds 
to Images of Disorder', 5 Res Publica (1999), claiming that migration law addresses 
disorder within the nation by reflecting a coherent picture of national identity. 
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presented earlier, takes on a sharper, indeed bellicose, tinge. The fact that 
EU Member States deploy their armed forces to control borders attains an 
increased significance, and so do the lethal incidents during forcible 
expulsions.1571 Beyond all metaphors, one may de facto speak of an armed 
struggle between human smugglers and the Italian border authorities in 
the Adriatic Sea. Futhermore, the strong linkages between protection 
seekers, human smugglers and organised crime, crafted in the deflective 
rhetoric of Western European governments, seem to confirm Schmitt's 
description. Indeed, in such company, the protection seeker risks 
becoming part of the 'hostis', that is, the public foe, opposed to the 
citizenry of the Union. On a descriptive level, Schmitt's approach appears 
to adduce a vocabulary, jarring as it may be, capable of capturing the 
sinister parts of European deflection policies. 
Beyond description, is there a justificatory potential in the Schmittian 
conception of the political? This is the issue at stake in the present 
chapter. Within the offer of particularist approaches, Schmitt's model 
appears to draw on voluntariness rather than organismic essentialism. The 
distinction between friend and foe is not a product of nature, it is the 
product of a decision by a collective of human beings. Concurrently, this 
is the problem with Schmitt's conception of the political: who decides? 
To be helpful in our context, we would need an answer to that question. 
Kaufmann has shown that Schmitt is unable to provide an answer, and 
that his reasoning turns circular at this point. Schmitt gives the concept of 
the political a double task. On the one hand, it shall delimit one political 
entity from other political entitities; on the other, it shall sever political 
entitities from other entitites. 1572 It cannot fulfill this double requirement, 
as the concept of the foe remains linked to the concept of the political. On 
one hand, the political entity-i.e. a totality of human beings-is defined 
by the fact that it will not resort to armed struggle internally. On the 
other hand, this entity shall concurrently decide who shall be regarded as 
its foe. Kaufmann underscores rightly that Schmitt denies this decision to 
be an objective one, and he bars neutral third parties from judging on 
it.1573 But, as Schmitt postutlates that the foe can be external or internal to 
the state, any person may be any other's foe. The sole indicator of who is 
1571 See note 7 46 above. 
1572 Kaufmann, 1988, p. 50. 
1573 Kaufmann, 1988, p. 51. The decision on who is to be a foe can only be made on the basis 
of existential participation in the potential conflict. Schmitt, 1963, p. 27. 
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to be regarded a foe would be the f acticity of armed struggle. 1574 
Ultimately, Schmitt remains silent on who shall determine the foe, and 
his theory cannot be extrapolated to provide an answer beyond its 
circularity. 
Zizek has formulated the Schmittian failure in identifying the core of 
the political decision in a wider context: 
The basic paradox of Carl Schmitt's political decisionism-the rule 
of law ultimately hinges on an abyssal act of violence (violent 
imposition) which is grounded in itself; that is, every positive order 
to which this act refers, to legitimize itself, is self-referentially 
posited by this act itself [footnote omitted, GN]-is that his very 
polemics against liberal-democratic formalism inexorably gets 
caught in the formalist trap.1575 
Zizek identifies this trap as the inability of abstract formalism to bridge 
the gap to actual life. It resurfaces in Schmitt's combination of material 
pluralism with a universal conception of order. 
This is the main feature of modern conservatism which sharply 
distinguishes it from every kind of traditionalism: modern 
conservatism, even more than liberalism, assumes the lesson of the 
dissolution of the traditional set of values and/ or authorities-there 
is no longer any positive content which could be presuspposed as 
the universally accepted frame of reference.[ ... ] The paradox thus 
lies in the fact the only way to oppose legal normative formalism is 
to revert to decisionist formalism-there is no way of escaping 
formalism within the horizon of modernity.1576 
This brings us back to the universalist foundations of particularist models, 
discussed earlier in chapter 2. In Schmitt's thinking, the universalist 
element lies in the decision for order, whatever its content. 1577 But most 
importantly, as the Schmittian decision remains grounded in itself, there is 
no rational justificatory potential to be hoped for. We may inquire into its 
1574 Kaufmann, 1988, p. 53. Kaufmann traces Schmitt's fallacious reasoning back to his 
conception of the state. See Kaufmann, 1988, pp. 55-76. 
1575 Zizek, 1999, p. 18. 
1516 ziuk, 1999, p. 19. 
1577 ziuk, 1999, p. 18. 
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faith, rather than its reason.1578 Nonetheless, although scrutiny of 
Schmitt's thinking has contributed to a clearer picture of the tensions 
surrounding migration and extraterritorial protection, it is ultimately 
unhelpful for determining and justifying the delimitation of the demos. 
13.1.3 Contract: Universality by Consent 
To introduce social contract reasoning, we would like to reformulate 
somewhat the original conflict between organism and artefact. In the 
following, we shall recap that narrative, based on the idea that the social 
contract means bartering freedom for equality, and equality for exclusion. 
There are few legal arenas where equality arguments seem to be so 
disjointed as in migration and asylum law. The reason is apparently 
straightforward. After all, is not the exclusion of non-citizens the price to 
be paid for equality among citizens? How could the freemen of Athens 
have pursued their own public good if women, slaves, or Spartans had 
been admitted to the debates at the Athenian agora? The institu-
tionalisation of equality-whether in politics or in law-is contingent on 
its delimitation. Thus, the public good is always a private affair of the 
delimited collective. In the international system, this logic translates into 
the constitution of sovereign nation states. 
On the face of it, the universalist potential of human rights is a spoil-
sport in the system of segregated egalitarian communities. Once consented 
upon by governments, human rights stretch over national boundaries and 
are-at least in part-no longer at the disposal of single political 
constituencies. If the exercise of sovereignty is subject to human rights 
obligations, delimitation no longer reigns supreme, and distinctions on 
the basis of nationality become questionable again. The folkloric discourse 
on human rights tends to overlook this catch in its own universality 
claims. Questioning the exclusion of non-citizens entails two problems-
one is about resources, the other about legal theory. 
Practically, a large-scale unleashing of this universalist potential would 
eradicate the resource-base of human rights: as long as the single state is 
the bearer of human rights obligations, it will necessarily be overburdened 
with the satisfaction of human rights-based claims from other than its 
1578 For a theological and mythical analysis of Schmitt's conception of the political see 
Palaver, 1998. For a psychological interpretation, see Zi:Zek, 1999. 
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own population. Thus, legal universalism would be conditioned upon a 
revolutionary reordering of global resource distribution. One of the first 
victims of such a reordering would be the nation state, together with its 
potential to protect citizens, denizens-and protection seekers. 
Pursuing the track of theory, the universal applicability of human 
rights brings us back to the dichotomy of equality and freedom. This 
dichotomy seems to be tamed in the metaphor of the social contract, 
which has become the modernist's standard mode of reasoning when 
justifying the distribution of rights and goods. The social contract 
metaphor has been criticised for its failure to specify criteria for 
membership in a group of contractarians. 1579 In the following, we would 
like to pursue a related, but distinct, track and question the capacity of the 
social contract metaphor to justify international human rights norms. Let 
us set out with some simple reflections. 
This is the essence of the social contract metaphor: the actual disparities 
in power between various actors are diminished by rules constraining 
their usage. The body-builder is disallowed to use his or her physical 
capacities to mug people in the street, and the state may not make use of 
its might by torturing citizens. Reciprocity is the magic formula: what 
you do not unto me, I shall not do unto you. Thus, we are confronted 
with a trade-off: equality is bought at the price of freedom. As we saw 
above, equality is also bought at the price of exclusion, which translates 
into curtailing the freedom of non-members. Thus, the social contract 
entails a double limitation of freedom. Internally, the freedom of citizens 
is constrained; externally, the freedom of non-members is limited. The 
loss of internal and external freedom is converted into a gain of equality. 
So far, we are fine. 
The going gets rough when the model of a social contract is used to 
justify human rights as universally binding legal norms. Deducing human 
rights from a truly universal level would presuppose either a social 
contract by all human beings or a paternalist social contract, affording 
protection to non-parties. 
1579 'It seems rather that the two institutions of the contractual paradigm, consent and 
property, have contradictory implications, because of the failure of the contract 
metaphor to specify criteria for membership in the contracting group. While such a 
neglect is of no importance in the case of bilateral 'spot contracts' in which we assume 
no further social bonds or lasting effects outside the exchange, such an assumption is 
incoherent in the case of contracts setting up political· authority and negotiating, 
distributive schemes.' F. Kratochwil, 'The Limits of Contract', 5 EJIL 465 (1994), p. 466. 
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An all-embracing social contract is a contradiction in terms. First, a truly 
universalist community, consisting of mankind as a whole, lacks non-
members whose freedom can be restricted. By consequence, there is no 
external freedom, which can be converted into internal equality. Or, in 
Schmitt's somewhat bellicose terms: 'The concept of humanity excludes 
the concept of the foe'. 1580 Approaching the same issue from a different 
tack, one may state that a universalist community cannot create 
predictability by limiting the number of contracting partners. The result 
would be an extremely open contract, and it is questionable whether this 
can be termed a contract at all. Second, the postulation of such a universal 
contract is a mere hypostasis, approximating the essentialism of natural 
law. While the social contract metaphor makes empirical sense on the 
constitutional level-after all, each citizen has a voice in a democratic 
process capable of changing the constitution-it represents an idealisation 
on the level of international decision-making. 
A paternalist social contract entails its own problems. It could very 
well be imagined that a group of persons agree to extend certain benefits 
to non-members of the group. However, there are no contractual 
impediments that a consenting group of paternalists withdraws these 
benefits one day. By reconstructing human rights in this manner, two 
classes of human beings are introduced-group members and non-
members. This violates the axiom of equality so essential for social 
contractarians. 
Therefore, it is quite indicative that the reconstruction and justifi-
cation of human rights by contractarians is regularly based on the nation 
state. 1581 This is fully sufficient for vindicating basic rights under 
constitutional law. But it entails considerable problems when it comes to 
vindicating human rights on a supranational or international level. Let us 
demonstrate these problems by putting Habermas' 'system of laws' to the 
test. It is a model that has been widely acknowledged for its success in 
1580 'Der Begriff der Menschheit schlieBt den Begriff des Feindes aus.' C. Schmitt, Der Begrijf 
des Politischen (1963, Berlin), p. 54. 
1581 Interestingly, Rawls does not reconstruct universal human rights from a universalist 
original position, but merely explains them as expressing a minimum standard of well-
ordered political institutions of all those people who are ordinary members of a just 
community of peoples. J. Rawls, 'International Law', in S. Shute and others (eds), On 
human rights. Oxford Amnesty Lectures (1993, BasicBooks, New York). It should be 
noted that Rawls derives human rights from the national level, following a two-pronged 
model. As shown below for Habermas' approach, this is bound to fail. 
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moulding universalism into a proceduralist form, well fit to represent the 
cutting edge of social contractarianism. 
In 1992, Habermas elaborated a discourse-theoretical model of a 
'system of laws', premised on equality. His starting point is the 
autonomous individual entering into a specific form of discourse1582 with 
other individuals and thereby accepting them as legal consociates with 
equal rights. The institutionalised acceptance of the other participants' 
equality and of discourse rules enables these consociates to create legal 
norms. Equality in discourse will produce a number of basic norms 
ensuring the potential for continued participation. In the real world, those 
norms are reflected in basic constitutional rights. Thus, these basic rights 
are concurrently preconditions for the exercise of individual autonomy 
and a borderline for the exercise of collective autonomy. 1583 
This model distinguishes between norms of action in general and legal 
norms of action. The validity of the former is governed by the discourse 
principle: 
Just those norms of action are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.1584 
This principle contains the normative nucleus in Habermas' model. A 
precondition for its viability is that all 'persons possibly affected' have 
equal access to participation in discourse. Equality of the autonomous 
individuals is the axiomatic value, which has to be legitimated outside the 
discourse itself. 
From this principle, Habermas derives the principle of democracy for 
the specific case of legal norms of action. This principle states that 
only those statutes may claim legitimate validity that can meet 
with the assent of all legal consociates in a discursive process of 
legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.1585 
1582 According to Habermas, discourse is the place for the intersubjective creation of truth. J. 
Habermas, 'Wahrheitstheorien', in H. Fahrenbach (ed.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. 
Festschriftfiir W. Schulz (1973, Neske, Pfullingen), p. 226. 
1583 Habermas, 1992, pp. 151 et seq.; J. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (l996c, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), pp. 160 et seq. 
1584 'Giiltig sind genau die Handlungsnormen, denen alle moglicherweise Betroffenen als 
Teilnehmer an rationalen Diskursen zustimmen konnten.' Habermas, 1992, p. 138. 
Translation in Habermas, 1996a, p. 107. 
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The difference is obvious: while the discourse principle operates with a 
general criterion of affectedness, the democracy principle limits 
participation to 'legal consociates'. An empirical criterion is replaced by a 
formal one, tailor-made for the needs of the nation-state. As we shall see, 
this limitation is of major importance. 
True enough, Habermas manages to merge sovereignty and basic 
constitutional rights in a contractarian co-originality. But it is no 
coincidence that he is careful to limit the applicability of his theory to 
constitutional law.1586 Although basic rights enshrined in national 
constitutions and human rights enshrined in international instruments are 
sometimes congruent, their legitimation is not. While it is fully possible to 
track the former to a contractarian original discourse of individuals, the 
latter are negotiated by governments and approved by national con-
stituencies. And governments as well as parliaments are, after all, the 
representative of particularist communities of legal consociates. It is quite 
understandable that such a representative cannot stipulate universalist 
norms on the same footing as constitutional rights, which are stipulated 
by legal consociates. This would undermine the very exclusion of non-
consociates so vital for the constitution of the state.1587 
The problem is a serious one indeed: deriving universalist human rights 
via particularist communities generates control by the latter over the 
former. The particularist community would be automatically endowed 
with a veto, which could be activated when universalist human rights ran 
counter to the interests of the said community. Put briefly, in universal 
human rights, the norm creators and the norm addressees are not 
1585 '[ ••• ] da£ nur die juridischen Gesetze legitime Geltung beanspruchen diirfen, die in einem 
ihrerseits rechtlich verfa£ten diskursiven Rechtssetzungsproze£ die Zustimmung aller 
Rechtsgenossen finden konnen.' Habermas, 1992, p. 141. Translation by this author. For 
criticism of Habermas' approach see: R. Alexy, 'Basic Rights and Democracy in Jurgen 
Habermas's Procedural Paradigm of the Law', 7 Ratio Juris 227 (1994); 0. Weinberger, 
'Habermas on Democracy and Justice. Limits of a Sound Conception', 7 Ratio Juris 239 
(1999); I. Maus, 'Freiheitsrechte und Volkssouveranitat', 26 Rechtstheorie 507 (1995). 
1586 In this context, it should be recalled that Habermas' discourse principle is much more 
radical than his democracy principle. While the former gives all those possibly affected 
by the stipulation of a (moral) norm a place in discourse, the latter only admits legal 
consociates to the stipulation of Oegal) norms. Habermas, 1992, p. 138 and p. 141. 
1587 Determining the group of consociates and thus the members in discourse also 
determines the visibility of interests in the process of norm stipulation. Non-consociates 
have not participated in the process of reciprocal recognition. As they lack the leverage 
of reciprocity, there is no reason to take their interests into account in discourse. 
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necessarily identical.1588 This divergence between rulers and ruled is the 
reason why democracy theory is capable of explaining legitimacy deficits 
inherent in asylum law1589, but, simultaneously, remains incapable of 
justifying the equal enjoyment of human rights on the universal: level. 1590 
The former strikes against the legitimacy of particularist sovereignty, and 
the latter against the legitimacy of universally valid human rights law. 
For the universalist supporter of human rights, the consequences are 
devastating. The explanation of legitimacy deficits only results in an 
argument de lege ferenda. The justification deficit, however, is not a 
moral, but a legal one. If this deficit cannot be filled, according human 
rights to non-nationals remains an unjustified legal anomaly. 
Now, Habermas is not the only thinker who has contemplated the 
issue of rights. What marks him out is an ambition to ponder not only the 
moral1591 , but also the legal justification of basic rights. Probably more 
1588 The identity of rulers and ruled is a classic definition of democracy, embraced inter alia 
by Carl Schmitt. See note 1551 above. 
1589 See Noll, 1997b, pp. 429-51. 
1590 It is significant that those parts of Habermas' essay 'Kampf um Anerkennung im 
demokratischen Rechtsstaat' dealing with the asylum issue remain exceptionally feeble 
Q. Habermas, 'Kampf um Anerkennung im demokratischen Rechtsstaat', in Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen (1996b, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main), pp. 264-76). 
Habermas rightly points out that an analysis of migration and asylum issues must 
embrace not only the perspective of the inhabitants of prosperous and peaceful societies, 
but also that of the would-be migrants (Habermas, 1996b, p. 269). While he asserts moral 
claims to immigration in a number of cases, the question of legal claims remains 
unanswered. Fully in line with his discourse principle, Habermas suggests that 
immigration must be subject not only to the economic needs of the host country, but to 
criteria, which are 'acceptable from the perspective of all persons involved' (Habermas, 
1996b, p. 271). This begs the question where the process of discursive will-formation 
spawning such criteria takes place. Both the question on a legal right to immigration and 
on the forum for the production of legal norms on immigration must remain empty, as 
long as the justification of human rights is limited to the setting of the nation-state. For 
all its merit, Habermas' theory does not equip him with the tools to justify transnational 
rights or transnational claims of inclusion. 
1591 The literature on moral justification of human rights is vast. For an overview of 
different approaches, see J. S. Shestack, 'The Philosophic Foundations of Human 
Rights', 20 Human Rights Quarterly 201 (1998). For an attempt to justify the principle 
that all human beings equally have certain rights, see A. Gewirth, Human Rights. Essays 
on Justification and Applications (1982, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London). 
However, moral and legal justification are two different things, as the incongruence 
between the discourse principle and the principle of democracy poignantly illustrate. 
Fully acknowledging the importance of moral justification, its role is limited to support 
arguments de lege ferenda only. 
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than others, he has succeeded in pushing back metaphysics in justification, 
and replacing it with a far-reaching proceduralisation. It is a serious 
drawback for the universalist cause that such a model, seemingly fit for a 
world of diverse value communities, cannot be transferred to a supra-
national or universal level. 1592 As far as we can see here, this limitation of 
the Habermasian approach is inherent in any approach justifying human 
rights through the intermediary of the state.1593 Given this theoretical 
vacuum in the universalist reconstruction of human rights, there is a 
temptation to conclude that states always retain a veto on human rights of 
non-citizens. 
13.1.4 Indeterminacy: The Particularist's Last Trump? 
The exploration of meta-legal arguments has led us full circle. We recall 
that both essentialist-particularist and contractarian-universalist ap-
proaches were at pains to explain and justify the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion in the integrationist environment of the European Union. Our 
further inquiry forced us to witness the implosion of a Schmittian 
approach into a tautology. Finally, the contractarian-universalist model 
1592 Habermas himself is fully conscious of the demos lacuna in the rational reconstruction 
of constitutional communities. 'In der rechtlichen Konstruktion des Verfassungsstaates 
besteht eine Lucke, die dazu einladt, mit einem naturalistischen Begriff des Volkes 
ausgefiillt zu werden. In normativen Begriffen allein laBt sich namlich nicht erklaren, 
wie sich die Grundgesa:mtheit jener Personen, die sich vereinigen, um ihr Zusammen-
leben mit Mitteln des positiven Rechts legitim zu regeln, zusammensetzen soil. Normativ 
betrachtet sind die Grenzen einer Assoziation freier und gleicher Rechtsgenossen 
kontingent. Da die Freiwilligkeit des Entschlusses zur verfassungsgebenden Praxis eine 
vemunftrechtliche Fiktion ist, bleibt es in der Welt, die wir kennen, dem historischen 
Zufall und der Faktizitat der Ereignisse [ ... ] iiberlassen, wer die Macht gewinnt, die 
Grenzen einer politischen Gemeinschaft zu definieren.' Habermas, 1996c, pp. 139-40. 
['The legal construction of the constitutional state hosts a lacuna, inviting to be filled 
with a naturalist concept of "people". To be sure, it is not possible to explain solely in 
normative terms, how the basic community of persons, who unite to regulate their 
communal life legitimately by means of positive law, should be composed. Regarded in a 
normative fashion, the boundaries of an association of free and equal legal consociates is 
contingent. As the voluntariness of a decision on the practice stipulating a constitution 
remains a fiction of rational legal theory, it is-in the world that we know of-for 
historical accident and the facticity of events [ ... ] to decide, who is going to gain the 
power to define the borders of a political community.' Translation by this author.] 
1593 See an earlier remark on John Rawls, note 1581 above. 
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was ultimately incapable of justifying human rights on the global level, 
transforming any inclusion of non-nationals to a mere question of 
benevolence. So far, we can state that there is neither a presumption for 
particularism, nor a presumption for universalism. There is but a theo-
retical vacuum and empirical material supporting and undermining both 
the particularist and the universalist positions. Mouffe describes this 
stalemate as a paradox: 
The democratic logic of constituting the people and inscribing 
rights and equality into practices is necessary to subvert the 
tendency toward abstract universalism inherent in liberal discourse. 
But the articulation with the liberal logic allows one to constantly 
challenge, through the reference to humanity and the polemical use 
of human rights, the forms of exclusion that are necessarily 
inscribed in the political practice of instituting rights and of 
defining "the people" who are going to rule. [Footnote omitted.]'594 
While refuting Schmitt's pessimism with regard to the liberal variety of 
democracy, she warns: 
However, we should not be too sanguine about its prospects either. 
No final resolution or equilibrium is ever possible between its 
conflicting logics and there can only be temporary, pragmatic, 
unstable, and precarious negotiations of their tension. 1595 
The prospect of a constant renegotiation of the equilibrium between 
universalists and particularists may be appealing for some. It strikes 
heavily against a central myth of international law-the production of 
predictability. As Koskenniemi stated at the end of the eighties: 
The idea of one coherent explanation of the character of global 
social life and a coherent programme for world order needs to be 
rejected. People act under varying contextual constraints and their 
ideal social arrangements are dissimilar-indeed conflicting. There 
is no "deep-structural" logic or meta-narrative (of history, 
economics, etc.) to which we could refer to wipe existing conflict 
1594 Mouffe, 1998, p. 165. 
1595 Mouffe, 1998, p. 165. 
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away. Recourse to such narrative can only appear as power 
disguised as knowledge. 1596 
A few years later, Gaete added that 'judicial disagreements-which express 
the diversity of views on the complex social issues that we call today 
"human rights" -are unresolvable' .1597 This allows him to conclude that 
'human rights decisions are grounded in a [ ... ] rhetoric of reason which 
conceals its decisionistic (its will-based rather than reason-based) 
aspects'. 1598 
However, the sceptics to modernism are not out on a mere demasking 
mission. The false myth of determinate human rights produces adverse 
effects. Koskenniemi warns that 'the liberal principle of the "priority of 
the right over the good" [footnote omitted, GN] results in a colonization 
of political culture by a technocratic language that leaves no room for the 
articulation or realization of conceptions of the good'. 1599 And Gaete 
suggests that 
political struggles do not require the complex theoretical apparatus 
based on a juridical theology of man and a belief in the sovereignty 
of abstract master principles that we have inherited from the 18'h 
Century. We may need forms of organisation and discipline that 
have proved to be useful and are systemically indispensable, but we 
no longer need to believe in the stories we have told ourselves for 
centuries. And is it [sic] not this ironical distance precisely the 
message, the inheritance of modernity?1600 
Against Gaete, one could hold Zifoks rhetorical question: what if that 
distance, far from threatening the system, precisely signifies the most 
1596 Koskenniemi, 1989, p. 500. 
1597 R. Gaete, Human Rights and the Limits of Critical Reason (1993, Dartmouth, Aldershot), 
p. 98. 
1598 Gaete, 1993, p. 106. 
1599 M. Koskenniemi, 'The Effect of Rights on Political Culture', in P. Alston (ed.), The 
European Union and Human Rights (1999, OUP, Oxford), p. 1. 
1600 Gaete, 1993, p. 172. 
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extreme form of conformism, as the normal functioning of the system 
necessitates the cynical distance to it?1601 
Transposed into this context, indeterminacy is no longer a technical 
problem arising due to the insufficiency of formalism. It strikes against 
the function of law as a system capable of mitigating social conflicts by 
rational means. If law has no answer, power has. Beyond technique, there 
is but might-either unconcealed, or cloaked in the disguise of the rational 
meta-narrator, as described by Koskenniemi. 
For the universalist's cause, this dead heat appears to be more 
devastating than for the particularist's. In reality, it could be identical with 
defeat. If the world cannot be rationally explained, a free interplay of 
forces will prevail. Far from being an exclusive quarrel between different 
strands of international lawyers, this issue forms part of the grand polemic 
between modernists and their sceptics, severed rather than united by the 
label of 'post-modernists'. Referring to Derrida's conception of law as 
'that which we do not have to touch' 1602, Salter suggests that '[m]ysticism 
of this kind [ ... ] is rarely entirely innocent of questionable political 
implications. It can, for instance, imply that there is a duty upon citizens 
to abandon any critical attitude to questions of law's legitimacy, and 
instead to respect the authority of law simply because it has an 
inaccessible and unknowable source' .1603 
While Salter is certainly right to warn against quasi-essentialist 
regression inherent in certain figures of postmodernist thought, he cannot 
wind himself out of the conundrum of axiomatic thinking. Given the 
difficulties of justifying human rights on a universal level, modernists and 
human rights lawyers ask us for something not so different: to respect the 
authority of international human rights, although it has an inaccessible and 
1601 'Was, wenn die Distanz, weit davon entfernt, das System zu bedrohen, gerade die 
auBerste Form des Konformismus bezeichnet, da das normale Funktionieren des 
Systems die zynische Distanz zu ihm notwendig macht?' S. Ziuk, 'Immanuel Kant als 
Theoretiker des Bosen', in F. Ri:itzer (ed.), Das Bose. fenseits von Absichten und Tatem 
oder: [st das Bose ins System ausgewandert? (1995, Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland GmbH, Bonn), p. 147. 
1602 J. Derrida, 'Ends of Man', in Margins of Philosophy (1982, Harvester, Brighton), p. 128. 
Salter acknowledges that Derrida's later writings underscore the imponance of 
addressing legal issues at large, and specifically civil rights. M. Salter, 'The Impossibility 
of Human Rights Within a Postmodern Account of Law and Justice', 1 Journal of Civil 
Liberties 29 (1996), pp. 43 and 52. 
1603 Salter, 1996, p. 47. 
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unknowable source. And sceptics such as Gaete ask us to struggle with 
weapons we have precisely unmasked as manipulative. 
The oscillation of oppositions continues: indeterminacy is in itself a 
narrative. Even though it may reaffirm power pro tanto, as feared by 
modernists, it endorses simultaneously the very possibility of a meta-
narrative. In doing so, its posture of agnosticism falters, and it ultimately 
affirms universality. Thus, the indeterminacy critique cannot perform the 
functions of a trump, as it only purports to explain, but not to justify 
power. Salter simply overstates its dangers. 
Taking a step backwards, would it be permissible to describe the debate 
between modernists and sceptics as performing just another circle, 
connecting the twilight of the late twenties and a 'twilight' fin-de-
siecle?1604 Consider Carl Schmitt's apodictic parallel between juris-
prudence and theology, drawing on Leibniz: 'Alie pragnanten Begriffe der 
modernen Staatslehre sind sakularisierte theologische Begriffe' .1605 He 
professes that 
die Idee des modernen Rechtsstaates setzt sich mit dem Deismus 
durch, mit einer Theologie und Metaphysik, die das Wunder aus 
der Welt verweist und die im Begriff des Wunders enthaltene, 
durch einen unmittelbaren Eingriff eine Ausnahme statutierende 
Durchbrechung der Naturgesetze ebenso ablehnt wie den 
unmittelbaren Eingriff des Souverans in die geltende 
Rechtsordnung.1606 
But, different from Gaete, Schmitt does not reject the metaphysical 
dimension of law. The miracle is not banned. In the legal arena, it takes 
on the form of the exceptional1607, and Schmitt makes it the centrepiece of 
1604 The last section of Gaete's opus is entitled 'In the twilight'. Gaete, 1993, p. 171. 
1605 ['All concise concepts of the modem theory of state are secularised theological concepts.' 
Translation by this author.] C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 4 ed. (1985, Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin), p. 49. 
1606 ['the idea of the modem Rechtsstaat imposes itself together with deism, with a theology 
and a theory of metaphysics, which expels the miracle from the world, and which 
declines the exceptional breaking of natural laws by means of an immediate 
intervention-contained in the concept of the miracle-precisely as it declines the 
immediate intervention of the sovereign into the valid legal order.' Translation by this 




his doctrine of the state. Where the fin-de-siecle sceptic Gaete merely 
reverts to a diffuse 'irony', Schmitt is prepared to go a step further. 
Let us walk the road together with him a while. Let us accept the meta-
legal stalemate between universalism and particularism, and acknowledge 
that in much of the law we have looked into, might masquerades as right. 
If this is normal, let us now look into the exceptional. But we shall not 
pursue a Schmittian agenda in doing so. Quite the opposite-we shall 
attempt to track the manifestations of universalism in the exceptional. 
1.3.2 The Anomaly of Transnational Human Rights 
This brings us back to the empirical level once more. Given our earlier 
explorations of the insufficient legitimation of international law as well as 
the indeterminacy critique, one might expect non-nationals to be excluded 
outright from any protection under human rights law. But the actors of 
international law have not opted for such a radical solution. Thus, in 
some specific constellations, the equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms is 
assured to nationals and non-nationals alike, overriding the state right of 
exclusion. 
1. If human rights law were subordinate to the sovereign right to 
exclude, rights catalogues in constitutions and in international 
instruments would have been exclusively reserved for nationals of the 
single State Party concerned. While catalogues do make distinctions 
on the basis of nationality, these are normally reserved to 
participatory and electoral rights-e.g. the right to vote. In 
international human rights treaties, the scope of application is usually 
limited by the territory and by the jurisdiction of the contracting 
party. The ECHR goes even further, in that its scope is coextensive 
with the jurisdiction of the contracting party.1608 This allows for a 
considerable inclusion of claims by non-nationals. 
2. The case law of the ECtHR on the prohibitions of refoulement 
inherent in the ECHR and its Protocols cannot be explained without 
resorting to transnationally applicable rights. As the ECtHR has 
made clear, the exclusionary argument of immigration control is not a 
1608 Art. 1 ECHR. 
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trump capable of overriding human rights claims by non-nationals. 
The practical consequences of this argumentation have been accepted 
by the Contracting Parties to the ECHR, who regularly comply with 
the ECtHR's requests of interim measures and inhibit removal while 
cases are pending before the ECtHR. 
3. Refugee law at large provides another counter-argument. Given 
certain preconditions, aliens may not be removed; they enjoy certain 
minimum rights, although they may never have been legally admitted 
by the host state. 
In the areas above, we may speak of a transnational equality of nationals 
and non-nationals. 1609 Put succinctly, we are confronted with an empirical 
fact that represents a theoretical anomaly. Given the incapacity of ad-
vanced constructivist theories to justify transnational equality, it is all the 
more surprising that norms demanding such equality actually exist. It 
appears that universalism is in urgent demand of a beefed-up theory of 
transnational equality, in line with the realities of international human 
rights law. 
Now, one could denounce much of this fragmented equality as 
window-dressing. However, when it comes to the ECtHR, right has been 
joined by a certain measure of might. In the following section, we would 
like to re-deploy discourse theory to explain what the Strasbourg Court is 
doing when it deals with cases on extraterritorial protection. 
1.3.3 Strasbourg and the Exceptional: Legitimation in the 
Courtroom? 
'Souveran ist, wer uber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet'1610-sovereign is 
he who decides the exceptional. With the following, we certainly do not 
wish to declare the inclusion of non-communitarians as an exceptional 
phenomenon in the EU. Our point is another one-it relates to the locus 
of decisions on inclusion. The ultimate decision is made not by the 
1609 The list of transnationally protected rights could be further prolonged. For an overview, 
see M. Gibney, K. Tomasevski, and J. Vedsted-Hansen, 'Transnational State 
Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights', 12 Harvard Human Rights journal 267 
(1999). 
1610 Schmitt, 1985, p. 11. 
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national constituencies, the governments or the Council, but by the 
European Court of Human Rights. In practice, the question 'who is the 
demos' may find its answer in the transit zones of Schiphol airport, at the 
Oder river and in the coastlands of Gallipoli in Southern Italy. The 
answer on the legality of this practice is situated in Strasbourg. 
In issues of extraterritorial protection, sovereignty rests with the 
Court. Indeed, the extent of positive obligations to accord extraterritorial 
protection is a question of the exceptional in its Schmittian sense. The 
exceptional 'cannot be subsumed, it shuns a general formulation'. 1611 This 
fits well with the environment in which the Court's decision are placed. 
Let us briefly recapitulate. The Court's competencies are limited to 
producing a norm for the single case only, lacking any general portee. As 
the Court readily reiterates in its judgments, there is no right to 
immigration under the ECHR, and states maintain the right to control 
the composition of their population. Any deviations from this orthodoxy 
are labelled as 'exceptional' by the judges. And that term is fully adequate. 
After all, with Soering, the Court had empowered itself to judge on 
territorial access. To be sure, our theoretical explorations in chapter 11 
did track the existence of a wide margin of subjectivity in the single case. 
The extent of protection under each right would not only hinge on its 
precise formulation, but also on an assessment of risk and predictability. 
Formalism had come to an impasse, and considerable discretionary 
powers would be vested with the Strasbourg judges. 'The exceptional is 
what cannot be subsumed; it shuns a general formulation, but, 
simultaneously, it divulges a specific-juristic element of form, the decision, 
in absolute purity.'1612 
Yet one might argue that any case is exceptional if it disallows a purely 
formal subsumtion, and requires the judge to make a subjective input to 
find the right jU:dgment. Are not many legal cases structured like that, at 
least the so-called 'hard cases'? Granting that hard cases on extraterritorial 
protection share the necessity of subjective input with ordinary hard 
cases, it must be underscored that the former turn not only on the right 
interpretation of the right norm, but concurrently on the inclusion in the 
community of 'legal consociates'. The latter claim can be validly described 
1611 'Die Ausnahme ist das nicht Subsumierbare; sie entzieht sich der generellen Fassung, 
aber gleichzeitig offenbart sie ein spezifisch-juristisches Formelement, die Dezision, in 
absoluter Reinheit.' Schmitt, 1985, p. 19. [Translation by this author]. 
1612 See note 1611 above. 
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as 'exceptional', and the choice of: this term by the Court must be 
endorsed. 
To fully appreciate the difference, we are compelled to leave the 
Schmittian perspective here, and return to the explicatory tool-box of 
discourse-theory. Let us start out with a provocation. In matters of extra-
territorial protection, Strasbourg is the sole forum producing outcomes 
that are formally binding and substantially legitimate. 1613 
This may seem absurd. To some, the self-empowerment of the 
Strasbourg judges qualifies as highly undemocratic. 1614 For all that is 
certain, they are not elected by the citizens of the Member States of the 
Council of Europe. Neither is there a mechanism for ensuring that their 
judgments reflect the political preferences of these citizens. But this 
criticism reduces democracy to a pinball game in a haphazardly chosen 
machine. 
As we saw above, Habermas has proposed two principles under which 
moral and legal norms respectively are to be regarded as possessing 
legitimate validity. Now, it is fairly uncontroversial that legal norms 
impacting on extraterritorial protection do not satisfy the principle of 
democracy. While affected by such norms, protection seekers are not 
'legal consociates' and do not participate in processes establishing 
acceptability.1615 One may conclude that the corpus of norms impacting 
on extraterritorial protection is not democratically legitimised. From a 
proceduralist perspective, this is due to the initial exclusion of non-
consociates from the process of norm-creation. From a substantial 
perspective, this is due to the inequality between human beings that such 
1613 Provided one accepts the following argumentation, the CAT Committee would also 
qualify as producing legitimate outcomes. However, the views of the Committee are not 
legally binding upon respondent states. 
1614 Maassen criticises the ECtHR for undermining removal policies which have been 
decided by democratically elected legislators in the Member States of the Council of 
Europe. MaaBen, 1997, p. 130, where he accuses the European organs to 'estime 
democratic legitimation to be something which can be foregone'. For a counter-
argument, see Noll, 1998, p. 378. 
1615 First, they have been excluded from their communities and, as a consequence, from 
participation in norm-creating discourse in their country of origin. This exclusion is 
precisely what endows them with the quality of 'refugees' or 'persons in need of 
protection'. Second, as they lack its citizenship, they are not participating in norm-
creating discourse of their host state. For a comprehensive argumentation, see Noll, 
1997b, pp. 450-1. 
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exclusion implies. As we shall see, the legitimacy deficit of the drafting 
process shall resurface in the Strasbourg courtroom. 
However, the drafting of norms is one matter, and their application 
quite another. The test-case of a 'system of laws' is the courtroom. Here, 
law shall prove its capacity to stabilise 'counterfactual expectations' in a 
coherent manner. Legal norms legitimised by a democratic procedure are 
at the disposal of judges, and reduce the complexity of the case. But 
reduction is not complete. As we have seen, norms can be ambiguous, and 
interpretations may end up in a state of indeterminacy. Here Habermas 
once more deploys the discourse metaphor. He frames courtroom 
proceedings as a structured communication between the two disputing 
parties and the judge as a representative of those legal consociates that are 
not taking part in the dispute. 1616 Thus, law stretches over two forms of 
discourse-a discourse of justification endowing a specific legal norm with 
legitimacy, and a discourse of application endowing a specific legal 
outcome with legitimacy. In both discourses, legitimacy is ultimately 
produced by the transformation of participant perspectives. The 
communication taking place in discourse shall enable any participant to 
take the perspective of any other participant. This simplifying reminder 
will suffice for our needs. 
When we compare a case on extraterritorial protection before the 
ECtHR with an ordinary case on, S!lY• a litigious claim, involving two 
citizens and a domestic court, stark differences appear. First, we have 
already stated that the Strasbourg case is on inclusion. This means, more 
specifically, that discourse not only involves the citizenry of Contracting 
Parties as 'legal consociates', but also a non-consociate, namely the alien 
claimant. Thus, cases on extraterritorial protection assemble consociates 
and non-consociates alike. Second, the invoked norms lack democratic 
legitimacy, as expounded earlier. The reduction of complexity that the 
judge in ordinary civil litigation may rely on is greatly reduced. To be 
sure, the norms are formally valid-even the claimant invokes them-but 
the presumption of their material correctness is reopened to doubt. In the 
end, the Strasbourg judge is doubly tasked. She must not only guide the 
creation of determinacy in an application discourse on the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR, but also compensate for the lack of legitimacy of 
the corpus of norms impacting on extraterritorial protection. Thus, 
1616 Habennas, 1992, p. 280. 
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Strasbourg offers a forum for staging a justification discourse with a much 
higher degree of inclusion than its national counterparts. 
This compels us to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion. Proceedings in 
Strasbourg cases offer the only option for an inclusive discourse between 
the protection seeker and the legal consociates holding citizenship in a 
European host state. It follows that the judgments of the ECtHR are 
democratically better legitimised than the laws of the domestic legislator, 
or, for that matter, of the EC law and Union law legislator. The assertion 
that 'judicial review is a deliberately countermajoritarian institution'1617 
attains a new dimension in the Strasbourg context. The majority of 
particularists has only one voice of two in the Strasbourg courtroom. 
What makes ECtHR cases different from cases on extraterritorial 
protection in domestic courts? It is the representation of discourse 
participants by the judges. While a domestic court, neutral as it should be, 
ultimately is an organ of the nation state into which inclusion is sought, 
Strasbourg is located on a superior layer, representing a regional 
agglomeration of nation states. Strasbourg judges do not defend basic 
rights flowing from a particularist social contract underlying the nation 
state, but rather human rights flowing from an international instrument. 
Let us grant that the ECtHR still depends on the endorsement of 
Contracting Parties to the ECHR-legally, fiscally and, to a degree, even 
politically. The decisive difference is that the degree to which it is 
representative cannot be reduced to the single nation state into which 
entry is sought. Strasbourg is much more remote from the domestic 
immigration authority denying entry than a domestic court is. With a 
view to the EU acquis, it merits recalling that the Strasbourg judges come 
from a group of states much wider than the EU. In theory, this secures 
the representation not only of host countries, but also of transit countries, 
and a minority of sending countries. 1618 
1617 M. J. Perry, Morality, Politics and Law (1988, Oxford University Press, New York), 
p.149. 
1618 The representativity argument applies to a higher degree to the CAT Committee. In 
contradistinction to the regionally confined ECHR, CAT is a universal instrument, and 
all parts of the world are represented in the CAT Committee. However, we recall that 
the scope of CAT is much more narrowly circumscribed in matters of extraterritorial 
protection than the scope of the ECHR. This restricts not only the number of cases, but 
also the reach of application discourses before the CAT Committee. Furthermore, in 
contradistinction to the ECtHR, the CAT Committee cannot issue decisions binding 
upon respondent states. 
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This is not to praise the Strasbourg court, or, for that matter, its case law. 
Nor do we suggest that Strasbourg is performing a full-fledged 
compensation for the legitimacy deficits inherent in norms impacting on 
extraterritorial protection, and that there is no reason to worry. The task 
of this section was merely to recollect the multiple legal conundrums of 
protective norms in one location. Strasbourg will remain the focal point 
for transforming these conundrums into binding outcomes endowed with 
a provisional legitimacy. Let us revert once more to Mouffe: 
The logic of democracy does indeed imply a moment of closure 
which is required by the very process of constituting the "people". 
This cannot be avoided, even in a liberal democratic model; it can 
only be negotiated differently. But this can only be done if this 
closure and the paradox that it implies are acknowledged.1619 
This is probably truly exceptional about Strasbourg-it offers a 
mechanism for bringing a bantam bit of transparency into the 
construction of closure. And, indeed, it seems to be the only mechanism 
offering a public arena for staging the paradoxical demands of liberal 
democracy. 
1619 Mouffe, 1998, p. 164. 
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14 Negotiating Asylum: A 
summary of Observations 
UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM are two poles between which 
migration and asylum law is situated. While the universalist orders the 
world along the lines of transnational equality and strives for the global 
realisation of human rights, the particularist insists on the freedom of 
delimited communities and the right of state populations to exclude 
outsiders. Both paradigms are axiomatic, resisting rational reconstruction. 
MIGRATION CONTROL AND EXTRA TERRITORIAL PROTECTION 
can be described from two perspectives. From the state perspective, the 
availability of extraterritorial protection largely depends on the way its 
costs are distributed. Cost distribution, and therefore the design of pro-
tection systems, is affected by three determinants: the number of 
beneficiaries of extraterritorial protection present on the territory of the 
host state, the level of individual rights accorded to these beneficiaries, and 
the degree of burden-sharing among states. By means of various strategies, 
host states seek to control these three determinants. 
From the perspective of the protection seeker, many of the legal 
devices used by states to regulate protection systems appear as hurdles on 
the track to safety. They can be structured in three categories ranging 
©  gregor noll, 2000  |  doi: 10.1163/9789004461543 _01
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from norms impacting on access to territory, to full-fledged procedures, to 
protection. Protection seekers have developed various counter-strategies 
to circumvent normative hurdles erected by states. 
As state strategies and protection seeker strategies evoke and affect each 
other, we are faced with a loop, whereby governmental efforts at control 
and the individual quest for extraterritorial protection feed back into one 
another. To this loop linking protection seeker and potential host state, 
the degree of burden-sharing among potential host states must be added. 
This brings in a second feedback loop, where non-co-operation among 
states yields a spiral of restriction, and co-operation produces openness. 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION in the area of immigration and asylum 
issues suffers from a dual fragmentation. One is of an institutional, the 
other of a normative nature. Within the institutional world, a slow move 
towards limited supranationalism is taking place. The Amsterdam Treaty 
has made binding EC instruments available in the field of asylum and 
migration and has opened a window for judicial review by the ECJ. 
However, the perseverance of the veto and a variety of formal opt-outs 
hamper coherence and harmonisation. In essence, the area of migration 
and asylum remains entangled in a strait-jacket of intergovernmental 
decision-making, at least for the duration of the transitional period. While 
Amsterdam merged the Schengen Group and its achievements into the 
Union framework, fragmentation was exacerbated by the variable geo-
metry among Member States and the association of Non-Member States to 
parts of the acquis. Finally, the enlargement process has significant 
potential for intensifying the existing tendency toward fragmentation. 
The existing acquis on asylum and migration is heavily burdened by 
normative fragmentation. Fourteen years of co-operation yielded only 
four major instruments of binding nature, all of which seek to control the 
protection seeker's access to territory: the 1990 Schengen and Dublin 
Conventions, the 1995 Visa Regulation and the 1997 Spanish Protocol. 
The discussion of protection-related issues by EU institutions did not 
yield a single binding instrument. The divide between protection and 
control is further widened by the schedule set for future measures in the 
field of asylum and immigration. Both the Amsterdam Treaty itself and 
the Action Plan drawn up by the Council prioritise mostly control-
oriented measures, according control a 'first mover's' advantage over 
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protection. This gives leeway to a market dynamics, encouraging Member 
States to compete for increasingly restrictive solutions. 
The EU lacks a sufficiently comprehensive and predictable BURDEN-
SHARING MECHANISM to inhibit the deflection of protection seekers 
or the downgrading of their rights. Article 63 TEC exempts the issue of 
burden-sharing from the obligation to adopt measures under the tran-
sitional period. As the outcome of future burden-sharing deliberations 
remains uncertain, a rational Member State will try to control future risks 
by minimising the number of beneficiaries of extraterritorial protection as 
well as the level of rights accorded to them. 
Statistics indicate that the Dublin Convention stabilises an inequitable 
distribution of protection seekers among contracting States. In three 
associated countries, the number of asylum seekers is on the rise, while 
recognition rates are extremely low. It is reasonable to conclude that such 
restrictiveness is causally linked to burden concentration under safe third 
country arrangements. 
As equitable burden-sharing is systemically blocked by the Dublin 
Convention and other safe third country-arrangements, there are only 
limited choices left for Member States and candidate countries that fear 
overburdening. The choices are either to block the access of protection 
seekers to their territory or to minimise protection obligations by cur-
tailing the level of rights enjoyed during and after procedure, inter alia by 
adopting restrictive interpretations of existing protection categories and 
by avoiding the introduction of additional protection categories. 
AN INTERPRETATION OF RELEVANT NORMS of international law 
along the prescriptions of the Vienna Convention was necessary to 
prepare for a legality analysis of central instruments of the acquis. First, it 
emerged that Article 14 UDHR, Common Article 3 and Article 32 FC 
did not entail any legally binding rights to extraterritorial protection. 
Second, in situations where the claimant is situated within the territory of 
a potential host state or at its border, Article 33 GC, Article 3 CAT, 
Article 45 FC, Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR oblige states to 
refrain from refoulement. Third, in situations where the claimant is 
situated elsewhere, the ECHR and its Protocols remain the sole 
595 
CHAPTER 14 
instruments on which a claim for extraterritorial protection can be based. 
Provided the preconditions for the applicability of one or more of the 
rights enshrined in the ECHR or its Protocols are fulfilled, a Contracting 
Party is not only legally required to mete out protection, it is also first 
and foremost obliged not to obstruct access to its territory, e.g. by 
demanding an entry visa. Given that visa requirements are the prime tool 
of regulating access to extraterritorial protection in contemporary Europe, 
this outcome should have considerable practical repercussions on regional 
asylum and migration policies. Fourth, no determinate conclusion could 
be reached on an implied right to immigration under Article 12 ICCPR. 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS are the source of extraterritorial protection 
under the ECHR and its Protocols. In contradistinction to other expla-
nations, the model of positive obligations developed in this work avoids 
imposing artificial hierarchies on the rights catalogue of the ECHR. Thus, 
it is better able to explain the case law of the European organs, especially 
with regard to cases dealing with potential human rights violations by 
non-state agents. 
In principle, any human right enshrined in the ECHR or its Protocols 
could entail eligibility for extraterritorial protection. Whether it actually 
will depends on an in casu assessment. First, the extent of positive obli-
gations under the invoked right has to be identified, making recourse to 
its inherent risk requirements and, second, it has to be determined 
whether the facts of the case fall within the extent of positive obligations. 
The facts of the case are a composite of two elements. The first relates to 
the degree to which the invoked right is intruded into upon return, while 
the second consists of the degree of predictability that this intrusion will 
materialise. 
THE VISA REGULATION, the Dublin Convention and the Spanish 
Protocol can be interpreted and applied in conformity with international 
law, but such interpretation and application strips these instruments of 
their central control fonctions. 
In light of the ECHR, visa requirements under the Schengen acquis and 
the EU Visa Regulation must be waived if they inhibit single individuals 
from reaching territories where they can find protection. However, the 
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question whether visa requirements as such represent discriminatory 
treatment of the nationalities subjected to them could not be answered in 
a determinate manner. 
Member States must abstain from removals under the Dublin 
Convention, if the receiving Member State upholds an interpretation of 
international legal norms prohibiting refoulement, which deviates from 
an interpretation of such norms under the Vienna Convention. By way of 
example, it could be shown that Member States must refrain from 
removing protection seekers to other Member States who deny protection 
from persecution of third parties in violation of the GC, CAT or ECHR. 
Finally, conformity with prohibitions of discrimination in 
international law requires Member States to disregard the central element 
of the Spanish Protocol, namely the presumption that applications by 
Union citizens are manifestly unfounded. This conclusion largely empties 
the Spanish Protocol of its normative content. What remains is a mere 
reporting obligation to the Council, whenever applications by Union 
citizens are received by a Member State. 
THE INDETERMINACY engulfing four issues-the existence of an 
obligation to share burdens and of a right to immigration under Article 12 
ICCPR, the precise extent of positive obligations under the ECHR and its 
Protocols, and whether visa requirements represent a form of collective 
discrimination-cannot be dissolved by formal means such as inter-
pretation or discrimination arguments. It is not incidental that legal 
indeterminacy runs precisely along the same fault lines that sever 
universalists from particularists in the realm of political theory. 
International law proved not to hold an inherent presumption for 
either particularism or universalism. An exploration of two theoretical 
models-Schmitt's distinction between friend and foe, and Habermas' 
reconstruction of a syst~m of laws-suggested that both added explicatory 
value, but were unable to justify either exclusionary freedom or 
inclusionary equality. The indeterminacy critique, on the other hand, 
could not liberate itself from the foundationalism it set out to censure, 
and risks affirming particularist structures. 
A discourse-theoretical analysis of the functions exercised by the 
ECtHR in cases on extraterritorial protection suggested that the Court 
offers the only forum in which the inclusionary conflict between 
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universalism and particularism-indeed, the 'paradox of democracy' -can 
be negotiated with a legally binding outcome. 
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